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J. Lewis Diman

A Memorial Volume

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J. LEWIS DIMAN.

A Memorial Volume.

J. L. Dinman





J. L. D.

I.

I REST my eyes upon these features traced
With skilful hand, and aid of subtle art,
And all the charms his living presence graced
Come thronging to my over-burdened heart.
The kindling eye where wit his bow did bend, —
The face all radiant with the soul within, —
How fraught with joy the fleeting hours have been,
When to the flowing thought, his voice did lend
Its winning charm! 'T is memory sweet with pain,
As I live o'er those happy hours again!
From youth to manhood's prime, he was my friend, —
My soul is grateful for that blessing given,
And parting now, before the gate of heaven,
O God! I bow to what Thy will doth send.

II.

He was my friend. Before the closèd door
I stand, slow to believe that I no more
  Shall press his hand. The days drag on to years,
With added sense of loss, and pain in store,
  And grief doth overflow in bitter tears,
While steadfast Faith her loving comfort gives:
  The converse sweet with him who is not here,
  Is not a memory dead upon his bier,
But in the life beyond most surely lives.
  I do not only say, "he was my friend,"
  But looking calmly forward to the end,
When I shall also pass the opening door,
And grasp his hand with joy unknown before,
  I wait in faith, and say, "he IS my friend."

Anal.

ORATIONS AND ESSAYS:

WITH

SELECTED PARISH SERMONS.

BY

REV. J. LEWIS DIMAN, D. D.

LATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN BROWN UNIVERSITY.

A MEMORIAL VOLUME.

BOSTON:

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PREFACE.

THIS volume has been prepared as a memorial of a scholar fast rising into a distinguished position, especially in the department of history. Unfortunately for the world and for his own fame Professor Diman left behind him no finished historical work, embodying the results of his studies, and revealing his merits as a student and teacher. The volume entitled "The Theistic Argument," which has been received with high and discriminating praise, is the only volume he had prepared. This, a posthumous publication, able as it is, does not belong to his chosen department, and it does not show the breadth nor the distinctive characteristics of his scholarship.

In the judgment of his friends, therefore, there was a call for the publication of some of his occasional addresses and essays which disclosed his peculiar gifts, and which to some extent had already secured the hearty commendation of cultivated audiences and of the reading public. Fortunately the

task of selection has been made lighter by the fact, that nearly all the literary and historical addresses and essays gathered in this volume, Professor Diman had himself designated as those which he might publish at a future day. The monograph on Sir Henry Vane appears now in print for the first time. The article on "University Corporations" is introduced as bearing on a subject likely to meet with an early discussion at the hands of all those who are interested in the question of university administration and training.

To these selections a few of his sermons have been added. To the last he fulfilled the sacred offices of the Christian ministry, for which he had the deepest reverence and the noblest enthusiasm. In this relation of Christian teacher he was known to many persons who cherish a rare affection and respect for his memory as an instructive and inspiring preacher. It was deemed best to select sermons most characteristic of his style of thought on the great themes of Christianity. The choice has been made by his wife, who was most familiar with his pulpit teachings, to whose loving criticism all his writings were habitually submitted, and who had especial interest in his sermons. Of the seven thus chosen, four pertain to the nature and work of Christ; two to the office of the Holy Spirit, while the remaining

one, entitled "The Kingdom of Heaven and the Kingdom of Nature," is published as the complement to his volume on Theism. It was the last sermon he wrote, its aim being to show that "the conceptions which give to modern science its characteristic tone are conceptions in striking analogy with the deeper teachings of the gospel."

Some may miss from the volume articles which had equal literary claim to a place there, which, for want of room only, have been omitted. The aim has been to preserve in a connected form, and by a discriminating selection, what will best recall to memory the comprehensive and accurate scholarship, the choice thought, the earnest and lofty spirit of Professor Diman. The only changes made, have been in the nature of verbal correction, slight as well as few and far between. The portrait is from a plate etched by the skilful hand of Mrs. Anna Lea Merritt, whose name will be recognized as that of an accomplished American artist now residing in London, and whose personal acquaintance with Professor Diman lent enthusiasm to the cunning of her pencil in the attempt to reproduce that speaking face. The sonnets which accompany the portrait have been contributed by one of his life-long friends, Rowland Hazard, of Peace Dale, Rhode Island.

It is hoped that the wide circle of admirers and

friends, who knew him so well and loved him so deeply, will find in the book a picture of the man as scholar, teacher, and citizen which they will delight to recall. To that innermost circle, so centred in him, so blessed in its heritage of past communings, dating from college-days, when

"We were nursed upon the self-same hill,"

a circle now broken, the volume will be a cherished reminder of golden hours gone by, alas! forever.

JAMES O. MURRAY.

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY,
October 19, 1881.

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A

COMMEMORATIVE DISCOURSE,

DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE FACULTY OF BROWN UNIVERSITY, IN THE FIRST BAPTIST MEETING-HOUSE, MAY 17, 1881,

BY

THE REV. JAMES O. MURRAY, D. D.

J. LEWIS DIMAN.

A COMMEMORATIVE DISCOURSE, BY THE REV. JAMES O. MURRAY, D. D.

As I rise to fulfill this sacred and responsible duty, I recall with mournful distinctness the similar service rendered by Professor Diman when the university was so deeply bereft in the loss of Professor Dunn. Both were stricken down by the same mortal disease, and vanished from our sight with startling suddenness. Both were "dead ere their prime," and the opening words of that beautiful address have now a double impressiveness. "We bring to these services," Professor Diman then said, "a bitter sorrow. There have been others taken from us whose names were indissolubly connected with our history; but they had long relinquished the active labors of instruction, or crowned with years had come to the grave in the calm decay of their autumnal season. For the first time [alas! it is no longer the first] one of our immediate number has been removed; one who had hardly reached the bright summer of his career; whose auspicious prime held out the flattering promise that his past inestimable years were only the pledge of a still ampler usefulness."

How aptly did these words, as an unconscious

prophecy, anticipate his own career. Of whom could it more truly or with sadder pathos be said that "his past inestimable years were only the pledge of a still ampler usefulness." We cannot bury such a man in utter silence. We are moved to such commemoration as this service contemplates by all the better instincts of our nature. Aside from the fact that it fastens thought on what is admirable in character and achievement, is it not well, while we can gain the ear of men, to lift high and clear before the community the ineffable superiority of the calling which, while relinquishing the glittering prizes of life, seeks and finds in the pursuit of truth, in the vocation of the Christian scholar, in the noble offices of the teacher, the end and the reward of living? For some men, indeed, the obligation to institute such a commemoration has peculiar force. If the work of life has been so fully wrought out as to have expressed itself in something by its own nature monumental, a great discovery, an illustrious public service, an immortal book which gathers up into itself the personality, suggesting and consecrating the fame, perhaps there were less need of the commemorating word. But when the life of a rare and well furnished scholar has been mainly preparation, when the fruits of scholarship lie scattered here and there like sheaves on a harvest field, and need to be gathered up; when, unless this is attempted, that career will seem fragmentary, incomplete, which else would show symmetry and fullness, then the duty is unquestionable.

Nor is this occasion simply academic. How widespreading are the interests, any worthy commemoration of Professor Diman should be fashioned to

meet! If our university is chief mourner, let us not forget that in the grief which passing months have made only sorer, the city, nay the State itself, nay the brotherhood of American sholarship, are, if silent, yet bowed participants. The life and work of Professor Diman touched the life of the community where he lived at so many points, nay had flung their attractive influences into so many other academic centres, that the occasion to-day can be rightly viewed only as the expression of a grief uncommon for the breadth of its sphere as well as the depth of its sources.

Jeremiah Lewis Diman was born in Bristol, R. I., May 1, 1831. There his boyhood was passed. He grew up an ingenuous, pure, attractive lad, fond of out-door sports, yet not excelling in them nor in studies. He was happily destitute of everything like precocity — precocious sainthood or precocious intelligence. His father, Governor Byron Diman, was a man of decided literary taste — a diligent reader of good books, especially of history, "well versed in New England history, and the history of the mother country," possessing also, it is said, a "very exact knowledge of English politics." Those who have shared his genial hospitality will readily recall that open fire with its blazing logs, and the discussions which went on there concerning history, or literature, or politics, in which his son Lewis was always a ready and eager listener or disputant. In the dedicatory address at the opening of the Rogers Free Library, Professor Diman, alluding to the townsman whose name the library bears, said: "Among the most cherished impressions of my own boyhood was that left by my intercourse with one

whose acquaintance with the important movements of his time was so extensive and minute, and whose conversation was always so instructive and so incisive. I acknowledge with gratitude the vigorous intellectual impulse which, as a youth, I derived from his society." It was, in fact, a marked characteristic of his boyhood — this susceptibility to intellectual impulse from older persons. And, as indicating the bent in him for the later studies in which he distinguished himself, it should be stated that during his boyhood he contributed a series of papers to the village journal on matters of local history, gathering his material by conversation with the old inhabitants, or by industrious search of the town records.

He was prepared for college by the Rev. James N. Sykes, and entered Brown University at Commencement, 1847. His career in college was marked by steady growth of intellectual power rather than by extraordinary brilliancy of scholarship. He enjoyed classical studies — developed some aptitude in them, but when the later years of the curriculum were reached, it was evident that in literary or historical and philosophical pursuits his tastes and abilities would, in after life, assert themselves. The literary societies then existing, unhappily now extinct, afforded opportunity for cultivating power in debate. He was a very active member of the United Brothers, and there much of his fine gift in extemporaneous speech was brought out. In short, it may be said, the course of study, the instructors who filled the several chairs, the whole spirit of the college, were such as to bring out in him the best elements of his intellectual nature. His train-

ing here was a genuine educing of native powers, singularly rich. He always gratefully acknowledged this indebtedness to his teachers, deeming no man himself fit to teach who does not duly appreciate his debt to early instructors. He was graduated in the year 1851, pronouncing at Commencement the classical oration. It might have been difficult, at the close of his college course, to predict that for which he had the greatest gift, literature or history. But he did not graduate without leaving behind him the distinct impression that to whichever sphere he betook himself he would bring honor.

During his college course he became a member of the Congregational Church in Bristol, and chose the Christian ministry as his vocation in life. There is one passage in his fine notice of Dr. Wayland, published in the "Atlantic Monthly" for January, 1868, which must be a chapter from his own experience: —

"In the most difficult task of dealing with young men at the crisis of their spiritual history, Dr. Wayland was unsurpassed. How wise and tender his counsels at such a time! How many who have timidly stolen to his study door, their souls burdened with strange thoughts and bewildered with unaccustomed questionings, remember with what instant appreciation of their errand the green shade was lifted from the eye, the volume thrown aside, and with what genuine hearty interest that whole countenance would beam. At such an interview he would often read the parable of the returning prodigal, and who that heard can ever forget the pathos with which he would dwell upon the words."

The religious life thus begun was through all subsequent years a moulding force in his character and

work. He was reserved by nature, and about his Christian life this natural reserve asserted itself perhaps too strongly. But those who were on any footing of intimacy with him knew what spiritual forces his faith in Christ was constantly exerting on his nature, and how genuine and simple-hearted that religious life was.

Wisely, he determined to spend a year in general study before entering on professional studies in Andover. The year 1851–52 was accordingly spent with the Rev. Dr. Thayer, in Newport, R. I. Under his superintendence, studies in the History of Philosophy, Theology, and the Classics, were pursued. It was a year of fertility in his intellectual development. When at its close he became a member of the Junior Class in Andover Theological Seminary, it was evident that the quiet earnestness which had marked his college course had been deepened, and that in mental work he had been gaining breadth, as well as high stimulus. After spending two years in the Theological Seminary at Andover, he decided to pursue a course of study in German Universities, and went abroad for this purpose in August, 1854. At Halle, he studied Philosophy, chiefly Kant, attending lectures on the History of Philosophy, Dogmatik, Encyclopedie, and Old Testament — coming under the influence of such teachers as Erdmann, Julius Muller, Tholuck, and Rödiger. He went much among the Professors socially, was ever a welcome visitor at their houses. The spring vacation was passed in Munich, studying art, and the summer semester at Heidelberg. Here his studies were divided between Rothe, on Dogmatik and Ethics, and the philosophy of Fichte and Schel-

ling. But what perhaps, marked most decisively this portion of his residence abroad, was his acquaintance and intercourse with Baron Bunsen at Charlottenberg, whither the great scholar and diplomatist had returned from the Court of St. James. Professor Diman was a frequent and delighted visitor at Baron Bunsen's villa, and in "its terraced and well-shaded garden" on many a pleasant summer afternoon he spent his time in conversation with Bunsen. Memorable hours they must have been, which left impressions like these upon this favorite and favored young student. Of these conversations he says himself: "The fire and eloquence with which he would enter at once on some chance topic suggested by a visitor, some question, perhaps, of Biblical interpretation or ecclesiastical antiquities, the boundless erudition with which he would illustrate his arguments, the facility with which he would quote the various readings of some disputed text, the earnestness with which he would controvert any opposing views, rendered intercourse with him as delightful as it was instructive." What seems to have kindled Professor Diman's warmest admiration for Bunsen was the latter's cherished view that "all history is instinct with a divine presence, and faith in the possibility of demonstrating a speculative basis for the soul's intuitive perceptions, the inspiring motive of his profoundest study." In that eloquent tribute to him in the discourse on the "Historical Basis of Belief," specially in reference to Bunsen's work, "God in History," Professor Diman remarks that he showed "all the striking excellences and all the striking defects of German thought; but the most marked thing, after all, about

him was the manner in which his daring speculation was tempered by his historic spirit." And when we read such words it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that those delightful summer afternoons in the garden at Charlottenberg, the Neckar flowing at his feet, the fine old castle crowning the heights across the river and in full view, had no indecisive influence in shaping the future career of Professor Diman as a historical student and teacher. His studies in German Universities were completed at Berlin. There he pursued a course in the Hegelian Philosophy. Besides hearing lectures from Nitsch on Old Testament Theology, from Twesten on Dogmatic, from Trendelenburg on Psychology and Logic, he continued his art-studies. From this survey it will be seen how broad and how rich was the culture he sought in foreign universities. Returning home in the spring of 1856, he again resumed his studies at Andover, was graduated from that Theological Seminary in the ensuing summer, and licensed to preach by the Essex South Association at Salem, Mass. He at once drew attention as a preacher. His fine presence, his attractive speech, his simple, clear, choice style, his fresh treatment of pulpit themes, his fondness for the more spiritual elements of pulpit teaching, made him a preacher sought after from the outset. At this juncture of his life a great sorrow overwhelmed him. It was a bereavement which suddenly dashed the hopes and loves of years. The sacred grief was borne by him silently, submissively, manfully. While its shadows were upon him, he received a call to the First Congregational Church in Fall River, Mass. This call was accepted, and there he was ordained and in-

stalled in the autumn of 1856. This ministry to a united and devoted people continued until February, 1860, when he received and accepted a call to the Harvard Congregational Church, Brookline, Mass. In the spring of that year he was united in marriage with Miss Emma Stimson, of Providence, and that home was begun, which, during all these years, has been to him such a joy and rest, and, to those who have known its hospitality, so attractive. At Brookline, Mass., he labored for four years, until the spring of 1864, when he resigned his pastoral charge to accept the chair of History and Political Economy in Brown University. His call here took him by surprise. He had devoted himself to the work of the Christian ministry, and while he was a pastor, was a pastor with his whole heart. He loved, as he reverenced, his calling. The old-fashioned New England clergy were men for whom he had a special veneration. "Who," he said in his Phi Beta Kappa address at Harvard College, "but looks back with veneration to the New England ministers of the olden time, like Ward, of Ipswich, whose vigorous and well furnished intellect could turn from the composition of sermons to the drawing up of a 'Body of Liberties;' like many of a later day, who, in the genuine tradition of the fathers, refused to call any human duties common or unclean." What mainly drew him to these ministers in so appreciative admiration, was the way in which they always "magnified their office." He gave himself wholly to his work. All his study — all his writing were in its direct line. It was no service divided between literature and the altar at which he served. "The thing he had nothing to do with he did noth-

ing with," as Carlyle finely says of his father. Still, in his ministry, as in everything else, he had his own views as to parish work and pulpit teaching, which were in some respects at war with the accepted views about him. What he believed in, and what he used, as the "means of grace," were the word of God and the sacraments. He distrusted "revivals" as an agency or method of church life, through reliance on and use of which the church is to grow. He was convinced that some modern expedients for making religion attractive to the masses ended in vulgarizing religion. He turned with aversion from a travesty of sacred hymnology, which has usurped the place of the fine, strong, genuine old Christian lyrics, sung by saints of all ages and communions. It is quite possible that he failed in doing justice to some aspects of modern Christian effort. But within the circle of parish duty, as he defined it to himself, he certainly fulfilled a noble ministry. Sympathetic and tender in sorrow, patient and wise with the troubled and the doubting, firm and searching with the wandering, attractive to children, his memory as a Christian pastor is still warmly cherished in both parishes he served. Toward what is called "pulpit oratory" he never aspired. Preaching with him meant *teaching*. He paid his hearers the tribute of believing that they came to be *instructed* "in things pertaining to the kingdom of God." As a preacher to thoughtful, cultivated persons he was exceptionally gifted. His discourse was always positive in the direction his thoughts took. His unaffected, dignified manner, his simple, lucid, always fresh, presentation of the truth, the large infusion of what may be called the element of a personal and living Christ,

into his sermons, his deeply reverential, yet rich, devotions made him welcome in the pulpits of this city and other cities. The one truth of Christianity which he emphasized more than any other was that view of Christ as the life of men — which is found eminently in St. John and also in St. Paul, and which appealed to Professor Diman on its mystical as well as its positive side. He regarded as the truly practical sermon — not simply that which inculcates some moral obligation or religious duty, but, far more, the principles of Christianity so unfolded as to bring into the common daily life of men and women the sanctifying influences of the truth as it is in Jesus. Most of the sermons he wrote are cast in this mould. They are in many respects like the parish sermons of Augustus Hare, or those of Newman, alike not less in the singular purity and finish of the style than in their manner of discussing religious themes. Anything like a formal outline of Professor Diman's theological views will not on this occasion be expected from me. He had an intense dislike for the glib use of phrases used too often as the catch-words of orthodoxy. But that his sympathies were with the historical faith of the church is undoubtedly true. He loved to quote Bishop Ken's last words, "I die in the faith of the Catholic Church before its division into east and west." I may be pardoned for quoting at some length a passage from his discourse on the "Historical Basis of Belief," because it shows where his theological sympathies were placed, and also how he approached theology on its historical side.

"Christianity, taken as a whole, may be justly termed the most historical of all religions — not in the sense

simply that it rests on the best authenticated basis of historic fact, but for the profounder reason that only in its continuous and vital connection with history can it be completely manifested. In its true aspect it is not a fact, but a power; not one event, but an increasing purpose that runs through the ages. This purpose is fulfilled, not in effecting individual redemption, but in building up a spiritual kingdom. The gospel swells with this imperial theme. Its closing chapters hail as the final consummation the heavenly Jerusalem, with its streets of jasper and sapphire. While the incarnation must remain the central truth of Christianity, the eternal fount whence all streams of living waters flow, yet the full purpose for which the Word was made flesh cannot be understood, except in connection with that of which it is represented as the essential ground — the gift of the Holy Ghost. The continued indwelling of the Divine Spirit in regenerate humanity is the living fact on which the church is built. As a consequence of this indwelling, the children of the true Israel are not simply converted individuals; they are members of one Body, branches of one Vine. It is their ineffable calling to be built up a spiritual temple, all the parts of which, fashioned by Wisdom herself, shall be fitly framed together. This organic oneness of spiritual life, this corporate identity of the new creation, is implied in all apostolic teaching. It is the inexorable condition of sound spiritual growth. The last prayer of our Lord for his disciples, foreboding, from the darkness of his most bitter anguish, the dark future of the church which he purchased with his own blood, was that they might be one in that transcendent sense in which He was one with the Father. The emphasis with which these words were charged makes it impossible for language to overstate the organic nature of spiritual life; for what more substantial unity can be conceived than that of the Father and Son?"

In the spring of 1864, as I have said, Professor Diman was invited to succeed Professor Gammell in the chair of History and Political Economy. He was its first occupant, and had filled it with so signal a success that his resignation caused the deepest regret to all friends of the University. He nominated as his successor Professor Diman, whose rare abilities and aptness for such a post he had discovered while a student under him. And though the call here was promptly accepted, yet it was a genuine and hearty grief to Professor Diman to give up the position of religious teacher and pastor. He entered on his work in the college in the autumn of 1864. While it was at once evident that he would make a successful teacher in the department of History, yet the brilliant success of his later years was the product of severe and unremitting study. His laborious years in German universities laid its foundation. His ideal was high, his acquaintance with modern historical scholarship full, and he brought to his work mental capabilities and endowments for historical study. He entered with all his heart into that deeper and truer conception of history which has found voice in the preface to Greene's "Short History of the English People." He never sunk his idea of historical development into a "drum and trumpet history." He recognized the truth, and it shaped all his historical teaching, that "war after all has played a small part in the real story of European nations, and in that of England a smaller part than in any other." He delighted to find in art and architecture and literature, if not the highest, yet real exponents of national greatness. Here his art-studies in Munich and Berlin were of excellent service to him. He made the history of

the past vital with undying interest. He lighted it up with every humane and choice culture. Above all, he recognized in it a Divine order; he held that Jonathan Edwards, in his "History of Redemption," had struck out the true path in all deepest historical investigation. "Revelation," he said in his address at Amherst, "has given history a meaning which not even Thucydides conceived. We tread the shores of a new world when we turn from the gloomy pages of Tacitus to the triumphant visions of Augustine." He admired Bunsen because "Bunsen zealously charged himself with the solution of the problem — that Leibnitz first proposed — of establishing the presence of a Divine order in the seeming conflict of the ages." I am indebted to Professor Gammell for a statement of the general plan of Professor Diman's historical course.

"It began with the overthrow of the Roman Empire, and traced the origin and progress of the modern civilization, setting forth the elements and agencies of this civilization, as they were derived from the civilizations of antiquity, from the customs and institutions of the barbarian races that overthrew the empire, from the spirit and institutions of the Christian church, and showing the manner in which they were brought together in the different parts of Europe, and in which they were developed into the institutions of modern society. . . . As the great institutions of the Middle Ages assumed their definite proportions, he would treat them specifically and trace the influence which each exerted on the progress of civilization, and on the fortunes of the countries which it may have specially controlled."

The institutions of the English races held, however, the foremost place in his discussions, and were

throughout contrasted with those of Europe. His thoroughness of treatment was shown in the pains he took to trace our modern institutions to their origin, and it was his delight to point out how little of novelty there is in the modes through which society is administered. During the later years of his professorship he had made special studies in the constitutional history of the United States, including the nature and peculiar characteristics of our government. The whole course in History was closed by a brief series of lectures on International Law. For this department of his work he had less fondness than for History proper. But in Political Economy his interest was deep, his studies thorough, and the students all looked forward eagerly to the Junior year, when they passed under his instruction in Political Economy, and though this study was an elective, it has from the first been customary for the class to enter that department as a body. When Professor Diman first entered on his professorship his instructions were largely connected with text-books, but he at length threw them aside, teaching almost wholly by lectures. He was careful, however, not to repeat himself. His lectures were always reënforced and enriched by his latest studies. They varied from year to year, and the fault of monotony or dullness was never from the outset laid to his charge. A successful professorship of History must, beside aptness in teaching, at least embody the following elements: careful and exhaustive investigation of sources, the power of sound generalization, and facility in grouping and classifying events. In each of these Professor Diman attained high success. From close and full investigations he made his generalizations. He

was in the opposition, by the bent of his mind. Preconceived opinions went for little, perhaps for too little, with him. But his generalizations were never hasty nor yet crude, and they were always honest as they were always fearless. And in what may be called the perspective in historical teaching he showed excellent judgment, fastening the attention of his students on what was really prominent, determining, and lasting in all historic movements. The longer he taught the more he grew inclined to the detailed study of great men, as well as great events. The men were the *real* events. What Dean Stanley has said of this characteristic as applied to the history of church doctrine, applies with full force to the sphere of secular history: "Look at Augustinianism as it arose in the mind of Augustine; at Lutheranism as it was conceived by Luther; at Wesleyanism as it was set forth by Wesley. It will cease to be a phantom, it will speak to us as a man; if it is an enemy we shall slay it more easily; if a friend we shall embrace it more warmly."

In the class-room Professor Diman had some unique qualities as a lecturer. He had rare gifts in inspiring enthusiasm for historical study among his pupils, partly by the influence of his own thorough and attractive culture, still more by his method of dealing with subjects. "I share to the full," he said in his Phi Beta Kappa address at Amherst College, "Lessing's contempt for what he calls professoring. Unless mind touches mind there will be no heat. We make much of our improved methods and text-books; but after all they matter less than we suppose. A genial, opulent, overflowing soul is the secret of success in teach-

ing. To have read Euripides with Milton were better than having the latest critical edition. Not the methods but the men gave Rugby and Soréze their fame." "The mere matter of Professor Diman's lectures," writes one of his pupils to me, "excellent as they were in comprehension of the subjects, accuracy of analysis and clearness of statement, I would not place beside his first three bounties to the student of history, interest in the subject, introduction to the material, and acquaintance with the method."

Joined with this was a happy gift of illustration. In History, by pithy anecdote; in Political Economy, by imaginary incident; in both, by sharp contrast, by keen-edged criticism, he made his abstract discussions luminous. The ease with which he did it all made much of its charm. His wit, so penetrating and so bright, was here employed, sometimes to dangerous extremes. But his classes were always on the alert. Their minds were electrified by the sharp, strong sentences which sometimes flashed through the lecture room. His suggestiveness as a teacher was yet another faculty he possessed in a striking degree. Whatever he treated was so handled as to open invitingly various lines for thought. It was his habit to unfold at length the literature of the subject he was discussing, and he left on his classes an abiding impression that the class-room was the beginning, not the end of the matter; that the real work was to discriminate between the varying values of serviceable authorities, "and to get their knowledge at first hand rather than through the filter of another's mind."

It was undoubtedly the case sometimes that he

shocked the preconceived notions of a portion of the students under him, as when he gave "so striking prominence to the inconsistencies of Protestant belief," and in contrast exalted "Catholic doctrines and characters;" yet in the end by competent testimony he left his classes always on safe ground. This characteristic, however colored by other elements, had its root in that quality which Frederick Ozanam of the Sorbonne, from the opposite standpoint of Romanism, emphasized as the "*being just* to error." But a teacher can never safely forget that inconsiderate pupils and sometimes considerate pupils always outdo the teacher they admire. It would have been well, too, if the wall of reserve between him and his pupils could have been broken down. How his pupils admired him! Nay, how profoundly they are grateful to him for his inestimable gifts as a teacher, for their hearty admiration passed onward into a feeling of hearty obligation, and no sincerer mourners in the wide circle are found to-day than the men whom he taught. So for seventeen years he filled the chair of History. It was in his hands a strong and attractive educating power. It gave honor, nay, more, it gave the most substantial worth to the curriculum of the university. It has left behind, living influences in developed minds, and a bright and stimulating memory. And the loss is simply and sadly irreparable. Professor Diman's work as a teacher of history would, however, be but partially viewed, if only his labors in the professor's chair were considered. He filled a wider sphere. For ten years consecutively he gave a course of lectures to different circles of ladies in the city, each course embracing twenty lectures, and in the end covering

a very wide and rich variety of subjects. Before this company of ladies he had for this season planned and partly finished a series of lectures on modern statesmen. The last, upon Canning, was given on January 28. In less than a week from that time he was in that heavenly city into which kings and princes of the earth "do bring their honor." It is fitting that this public utterance should be made of the profoundly grateful sense of value for this teaching felt by those to whom it was so long given. For thirteen years also he was a lecturer on history in the Friends' School, and when the Normal School was opened in 1871 he was connected with it as "lecturer and special instructor." Every year since, with two exceptions, he has given a course of lectures on his favorite subjects belonging to the Middle Ages, and choosing for the last two, subjects connected with our own national history. His audience did not consist wholly of students, but also of cultivated persons outside the school interested in historical discussions. In the opinion of some he was seen here at his best as a lecturer. "As I recall these lectures," writes the principal, "I hardly know which was most admirable, the ready command of specific facts, his wide and original generalizations, his power to subordinate facts to general principles, or the grace and charm of his utterance." The last lectures of this course, those on the "Revolutionary Period in American History" and "The Constitutional History of the United States," have attracted the widest attention. They were prepared expressly for the Normal School. In them he "correlated in a masterly manner the history of our own country with that of the several countries of western

Europe, while he traced with the clearness of a line of light the development and the modification of the fundamental principles of government." So marked was the success attending these courses of lectures that there were whisperings of a possible public career for Professor Diman. They drew attention to him as fitted for public life. There is, however, little reason to think that he, if opportunity had offered, would ever have left his favorite studies for political life, much as he deplored the alienation of educated men from politics. His own words, in an able and comprehensive review of President Woolsey's work on International Law,[1] would seem to settle the question: —

"Dr. Woolsey has solved, as it seems to us, more successfully than any one else, the much-debated problem of the function of the scholar in politics. He has solved it not by securing for himself a seat in Congress, where the abilities and attainments fitted to much higher work might have been wasted in the mere details of practical legislation, . . . but in undertaking the more useful task of influencing public opinion, and guiding his fellow-countrymen to a higher and more worthy conception of their duties as citizens."

In the spring of 1879, he delivered a course of historical lectures before the Johns Hopkins University. He chose for his subject the "Thirty Years' War." When this theme was announced, President Gilman writes, —

"There was some regret that he had selected one of so intricate and difficult a character for an audience made up of very diverse elements, composed as it was both of students and educated gentlemen and ladies from the

[1] *New Englander*, May, 1878.

city of Baltimore. From the beginning to the end, however, he held the attention of his hearers in the closest manner. . . . If he used any notes they were of the briefest sort. He seemed to be talking to a company of friends on a subject of great importance, which he perfectly understood, with an unhesitating command, not only of names and dates, but of the exact epithets, and discriminating sentences which he wished to employ. The ease with which he lectured under circumstances of very considerable difficulty was only equaled by the instruction and pleasure which he gave the auditors, not being less, but more than all

> "'The gentleness he seemed to be,
> Best seemed the thing he was, and joined
> Each office of its social hour
> To noble manners as the flower
> And native growth of noble mind.'"

It is a matter of deep regret that no report even of these lectures exists. They seem never to have been written out. They were the fruit of studies carried on during all the previous winter, and with consultation of all the latest European contributions to this grave period of European history. A bare enunciation of his method of treatment and of the topics discussed will show at a glance the comprehensiveness with which he treated all subjects, his power to join together and to illustrate historical movements by the side-lights of such movements, in great contemporary characters and events: "The subject will be treated throughout in its general relation to European history, and as marking the transition from ecclesiastical to secular politics." It was made inclusive of the following topics: "The general causes of the struggle as connected with the state of Europe; the House of Austria after

the Reformation; the religious parties in Germany; the Evangelical Union; the revolt in Bohemia; the foreign policy of James I.; the conversion of a Bohemian into a German question; the military system of Mansfield; the Danish war; the rise of Wallenstein; the connection of Sweden with German politics; the designs of Ferdinand II.; the career of Gustavus Adolphus; the relations of Spain with the Empire; the fall of Wallenstein; the policy of Richelieu; the social condition of Germany during the late years of the war; the peace of Westphalia in its relation to the Empire and the State system of Europe; the general results of the struggle in their bearing upon German unity and nationality." Had his life been spared, it was his purpose to gather up and perfect his studies in a work on the great subject. It fascinated him not less by reason of the great characters it involved, than by the bearings he conceived it to hold upon Protestantism and Romanism.

Some of Professor Diman's most characteristic and successful efforts were his occasional addresses. That combination of gifts is rare by which a man is at once the accurate and thorough student and the golden-mouthed speaker. But in him these gifts were choicely blended. These occasions were sometimes academic, oftener civic, in their character. Of the former, the two most admirable are an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Amherst College, given in 1869, and one before the same Society at Harvard College, in 1876. He chose for his theme at Amherst, "The Method of Academic Culture." It is a comparison and a discussion of the two disciplines, that gained by the

pursuit of strictly scientific studies in methods prescribed by their own nature, and that imparted by a distinctive academic discipline in which classical study furnishes both norm and impulse, including History, Philosophy, Poetry, and Art. He shows the fullest appreciation of what scientific studies can do. He grants that "the pure disciplinary uses of scientific study can hardly be over-estimated." But quoting from Emerson that pregnant sentence, "The foundation of culture is the moral sentiment," he advocates the claims of a distinctive academic culture, not in place of the other, not in opposition to the other, but in alliance with scientific studies to preside over and direct them." "Admirable culture of whatever kind," as he said upon another occasion, "must have its roots in the moral sentiment," and he sums up a view defended with acuteness and force, adorned with singular wealth of illustration, in the words: "Scientific training, unless regulated and qualified by broader culture, can only end in debilitating instead of enlarging the spiritual nature. . . . For education must receive its shape from above, not from beneath."

In June, 1876, he gave the Phi Beta Kappa oration at Harvard College, choosing for his theme one gravely pertinent to a crisis in our national history, "The Alienation of the Educated Class from Politics." The line of thought in the address was at the farthest possible remove from the political pessimism which had in some quarters begun to assert itself. In this threatened alienation he recognized a sign of most evil portent upon our horizon. He defined the educated class as "the large number who form the mediating terms between the intellectual leaders of the

community and the great majority, as the interpreters and expounders of principles which others have explored." . . . "In the wider sense, while the phrase implies educated intellect, it implies even more, educated judgment and educated conscience, those sovereign qualities which are usurped by no single calling but belong to man as man." He passed in dignified, but incisive and able, review, the boding utterances of noted European and English thinkers concerning our institutions. While conceding, for the argument, the utmost "that the most dismal of political Cassandras have asserted as to the working of American politics," he triumphantly showed that their complaints and grievances have not the significance which has been attributed to them. And then, taking positive ground, he brought out the truth, that the man educated in the ample sense previously outlined was "a spiritual power in the State that no factions can outwit; that no majorities can overwhelm;" that he "makes himself felt in a sphere where the vulgar conditions of political action no longer operate, —

> "No private but a person raised
> With strength sufficient, and command from Heaven."

He was addressing, perhaps, the most brilliant assemblage of educated men that our commencement occasions annually gather. And his enthusiastic reception by that tribunal of scholars was itself a high tribute to the timely because hopeful, to the eloquent because sincere, utterances of the orator.

His various addresses on civic occasions constitute a remarkable group of such efforts. They began with his oration before the city authorities on July 4, 1866. That is marked by the same comprehensive

treatment which distinguished all his work, but lacks its thoroughness. But his address on the unveiling of the monument to Roger Williams; at the centennial celebration of the capture of Prescott; on the opening of the free library at Bristol; and memorably his last, on the centenary of the settlement of the town of Bristol, are among the best specimens of this species of oratorical effort. At first, in the delivery of these addresses, he used his manuscript. But he grew more and more independent of it, and in his last address spoke for more than an hour without hesitation, without a confused sentence, and without a note before him. The great master of Roman oratory has said, "No power of speaking can belong to any but to him who knows the subject on which he has to speak."[1] It is faint praise to say of Professor Diman that he knew the subject on which he had to speak. The merits of these addresses are the fitness of the word to the occasion, the body of vivid, stirring historical detail, or the line of high thinking pursued, the honesty, the independence of his positions, all suffused with pure literary tone. What Matthew Arnold has said of the poetry of Keats, may, with equal pertinence, be applied to the entire group of his addresses: "There is [in them] that stamp of high work which is akin to the character, which is character passing into intellectual productions." And then his style, how admirable for its purity and simplicity, how finished in its grace, the apt word chosen, sparing of ornament, yet rich in its general coloring and never bare. Joined to this, as a fit interpreter, was

[1] Dicendi enim virtus, nisi ei, qui dicit, ea, de quibus dicit, percepta sint, exstare non potest. — (Cicero *De Oratore*, Lib. I, Cap. xi.)

his delivery; calm, conciliatory, self-possessed, moving through its power of self-command, its tones musical and well modulated, his eye ever kindling with his thought, and his face expressive of every changing emotion his theme awakened.

In the autumn of 1879 he was invited to give a course of Lowell Lectures. Deferring to the strongly expressed wish of Mr. Lowell, that they should discuss some subjects connected with Natural Theology, he turned aside from his favorite historic studies, chose for his theme the relation of the latest scientific theories to Theism, and gave a long and laborious winter to the preparation of the desired course. He read widely and thoroughly all that scientific unbelief had to urge on which he could lay his hands. It chanced that I spent an evening with him just as he had fairly encountered the stress of the opposition. He was evidently pained to find that any satisfactory treatment of the issues involved would cost so much struggle. His tone was almost sad. But he grappled with the subject, shunned no difficulties, and the result of it all is, in the words of Professor Fisher, a most competent judge, "a noble vindication of Theism, treating fully and satisfactorily the problems and objections raised by the science of the day, and having the literary charm that belonged to everything he wrote." The last sermon he ever wrote was the result of all these studies. It was founded on the parable of the mustard seed, and its aim was to show that "enlarged study of nature and of nature's laws, instead of indisposing us to accept the distinctive teachings of Revelation, will arm those teachings with new arguments and lend them more convincing force."

Not by his voice alone did Professor Diman attempt to instruct men. His pen was seldom idle. The regret is now widely felt that he had not concentrated his studies more. What he has done discursively and fragmentarily only shows what he might have done in some extended work. What now remains from his pen, beside addresses already adverted to, are a few published sermons, a few articles in Reviews, book notices in leading journals, and a large amount of editorial writing for the "Providence Journal." The best specimens of his Review articles are, that on "University Corporations," [1] that on "The Roman Element in Modern Civilization," [2] and that on "Religion in America." [3] The last drew to itself a wide attention for its able generalization, its elaborate summary of facts, and its luminous, fair treatment of a difficult subject. For the "North American Review," and the "Nation," he was in the habit of preparing book notices, mainly of works connected with historical study, such as Motley's "History of the Netherlands," or Bancroft's "Races of the Pacific," or Masson's "Life of Milton." And all this work was done with painstaking. He well knew how worthless, how unjust, both to author and reader, such work is if done in a slovenly and superficial manner; how valuable if it is done faithfully and skillfully, and he wrought accordingly. Perhaps no one outside the editorial rooms of the "Providence Journal" could have known the number and the variety of Professor Diman's contributions to the paper. His most intimate friends have since

[1] *Baptist Quarterly*, October, 1869.
[2] *New Englander*, January, 1872.
[3] *North American Review*, January, 1876.

his death been astonished by it. These contributions began more than twenty years ago. They cover a very wide field of discussion. The notices of Continental politics, of English questions as they rose, of ecclesiastical policy in all branches of the church, of distinguished men in all spheres of life, foreign or native, of books, of art, with articles in lighter vein, make up a body of editorial writing which would impress any one as remarkable, considered as an addition to other and main labors. It is, in one view of it, ephemeral. But if viewed in relation to the promotion of a sound public opinion (and here he conceived the function of the scholar in politics mainly to lie) it is not ephemeral. And this is the justification which such a scholar as Professor Diman would ask for expending so much of his strength in the columns of the newspaper.

This survey of Professor Diman's career gives us only the outward view. But the man, though in his works, is always more than his works. That fountain of *intellectual vitality* whence they flowed was, in Professor Diman, deep-set and exhaustless. It gave him easy mastery of subjects. He grasped an intricate point quickly. He absorbed a book quickly. He constructed his plans of work quickly. So easily was everything done that one might not give him credit for the pains with which everything was done. No matter what he had in hand, the law for him was the same, work proportioned to the end in view. Without strain, without noise, he wrought rapidly but thoroughly, and reached his goal, a well-breathed runner ready for some new intellectual race. Following, too, the impulses of this mental vitality, he secured a many-sided culture. Few topics in con-

versation could be started in which his word was not the saying of a man who had digested some knowledge of that subject. It was the genuine love of truth in many directions which developed this quality in him. His mind not only stood four-square to all the varieties of knowledge, but was vitally impelled to seek a various and rich knowledge. Scientific truth attracted him least, but he never disparaged it. It was the spiritual side of things to which he was most drawn. From that he drew impulse, from the "whole varied and subtle experience of humanity, including in it whatever of genuine and noble utterance, whatever in poetry, philosophy, or in history." In alliance with this was an intellectual outspokenness. He had no intellectual timidity, which is sometimes mistaken for wise caution. He was too fond of being in the opposition, too fond, perhaps, of paradox. But his love of truth was something vital and dominant in his intellectual constitution. He might say with John Hales, of Eton: "If, with all this cost and pains, my purchase is but error, I may safely say, to err hath cost me more than it has many to gain the truth." A virtue in excess becomes a fault, and so there may have been occasions when he was too much of the iconoclast. But better a thousand times intellectual iconoclasm, which too rudely dashes against received opinions, than that intellectual dishonesty which plays fast and loose with subscriptions, and smothers convictions through fear of man or love of the world.

A brilliant lecturer on history has lately, in speaking of Carlyle's distaste for the vocation of the teacher, said that "genius does not take to pedagogy." But did not genius take to pedagogy when

Plato taught in Athens, and John Milton had his scholars in London? If genius cannot see in a true pedagogy what its contents really are, so much the worse for genius. At any rate, Professor Diman, by the breadth and fullness of his scholarship, found no difficulty in making his sphere of usefulness here a wide one. For years he has been a connecting link between the university and the city in which it stands; nay, also, and the State of whose traditions he was proud. The college, in his view, could not largely thrive if it existed as an island washed on all sides by tides of business activity, and yet in scholastic seclusion, isolated from living interests. Always have there been men in it to act as a mediating element between it and the stirring world outside, and Professor Diman but continued the goodly succession. Hence his activity in various departments of municipal work, in questions of public education, reformations for the young, in the hospital, and in grave political crises, his readiness to lift his voice as a citizen for what he thought noblest and best in politics. I would not willingly utter a word that should seem to depreciate a very different class of college men, whose lives seem quite separate from all these interests of the community, who do their work as teachers modestly, quietly, efficiently, in class-rooms; for whom the outside world has no meed of applause, but who fulfill noble aims in a noble fashion, as they train men. But when a man like Professor Diman is found, who can bring to the professor's chair the gifts of public influence, and who, by identifying himself with various public interests, can be the spokesman for his city and his State as well as for his college, let us be thankful for such services

as keep the college in the affections of men, in their hearts as well as in their heads. The rich vitality, the genuine honesty, the true breadth of the intellectual character were the controlling elements of his mental structure. Strength and beauty were in him blended in native endowment, blended in his culture, and blended also in his work.

The social nature in him was opulent and fine of texture. As it revealed itself to his family in the sacred privacy of that doubly bereft and darkened home, its sweet and constant overflow, its tender grace, developing with passing years, hallowed and transfigured now by death, those who knew his home, knew full well. Of what he was in the sacred intercourse of friendship I hardly dare trust myself to speak. What depth and trueness, what gentleness and responsiveness of affection dwelt in that soul, affianced also with that gifted and fascinating mental nature! They gave it warmth. He did wear, to many, an air of reserve. But reserved natures, when and where they open themselves in the gracious intercourse of friendship, are apt to be the most genial of men. His love of choice companionship, in his walks or by his fireside, his delight in the converse where soul touches soul in kindred experiences of life, or kindred tastes, or kindred struggles and aspirations, elicited from him that rare power in conversation which marked him everywhere. His wit sometimes glittering with its sarcastic thrusts, far often genial with its drollery, what charm it gave to all his talk! Then, too, came out his fine enthusiasm (*he* had no "bankrupt enthusiasm") as together with his friends he discoursed on the subjects that

lay near his heart. Ah, me! those beautiful hours — how transfigured to memory they all are now.

His Christian character was marked from the very outset, when he made his confession of Christ inside college walls and in student days, by manly tone, by intelligence, by genuineness. He was afraid of effusiveness. He loved quiet earnestness in Christian life. He was too much repelled from really worthy types of Christian life which were of an opposite tenor, by reason of his tastes or distastes. He believed profoundly in the church of the living God, and like Bunsen, from whom, indeed, he may have caught the taste, he loved with "passionate fondness its old familiar hymns, its solemn forms of prayer." As he allied himself with no school in theology, so, of late years, he identified himself actively with no one denomination of Christians. But, however this may be explained, it may *never* be explained with any truth as the giving up of early convictions. He was "knit by all the chords of his being to the church of the past," and he knew no hope for man but in Christianity, preserved and proclaimed by the church of the future.

Such, imperfectly outlined, was his character; such his work. This is finished. That is garnered in the heavenly immortality, has passed also from the force of a personal power here into the influence of a sacred and beautiful memory. Our eulogy dies away into threnody. "All human work," Carlyle says, "is transitory, small in itself, contemptible. Only the worker thereof and the spirit that dwelleth in him is significant." Judged by this test Professor Diman's career *is* significant. Significant of the influence true culture may exert — of the

noble results true culture may produce, and significant also of our loss. These to his memory. But oh, "the heavy change that he is gone." He had been sought for pulpits in our principal cities by reason of his abilities as a preacher; for professorships in other institutions; repeatedly by Harvard College, where he was honored and beloved, as he was honored and beloved here; sought also for positions as the head of seats of learning. But our rejoicing is this, that his work was finished here in the university, of which he had been ever a filial son, in the city which was proud of him, in the State which he loved and with whose history he has forever linked himself. He was stricken down in the very flush and bloom of his power and plans. The summer vacation had been delightfully passed with his family, and with dear, life-long friends among the mountains and lakes and by the sounding sea. Recruited, apparently, by it, he had gone partly through the winter's work. For the first time in his life did that work seem to drag him along with it instead of being triumphantly lifted and borne by him. Disease came at length, so treacherously that none feared till it was too late. And then, on that winter evening, the shock — the pitiless, dreadful shock, the hush that settled in a hundred homes of the city, in the very streets. Nothing could have been more touching, and nothing could have been more significant. Months have passed, and yet we ask ourselves, *Is he gone?* The vitality that was in him, so exuberant, so large, making itself felt in so many circles, is still giving a sense of his presence, so strong and deep that we cannot help recalling and repeating those lines of the "In Memoriam," so closely applicable to our beloved dead: —

'If one should bring me this report
That thou hadst touched the land to-day,
And I went down unto the quay
And found thee lying in the port;

"And standing muffled round with woe,
Should see thy passengers in rank
Come stepping lightly down the plank
And beckoning unto those they know;

"And if along with these should come
The man I held as half divine,
Should strike a sudden hand in mine
And ask a thousand things of home;

"And I should tell him all my pain,
And how my life had drooped of late,
And he should sorrow o'er my state
And marvel what possessed my brain,

"And I perceive no touch of change,
No hint of death in all his frame;
But found him all in all the same,
I should not think it to be strange."

We buried him amid the snows of winter. The sky over our head, as we bore him to the cemetery, was full of blessed sunlight. There was "calm and deep peace in the wide air." There was calm and deep peace, too, in our hearts as we remembered the noble life and recalled the words, "Blessed are the dead that die in the Lord." We thought of the coming spring, in which he always so delighted, and the spring has come to us. He is, in the language of a favorite hymn, where

— "Everlasting spring abides
And never withering flowers."

Yet he himself has uttered words in one of his sermons which are so deeply true and so touchingly

pertinent, that they prove the fittest conclusion to this commemorative service: —

"Even when in middle life the strong man is suddenly stricken down, dying in the midst of the battle with harness on, there are many aspects in which the sorrow is full of comfort. It is the death which the good soldier never shuns. The memory left is not of decay, of feebleness, but of the fullness of manly strength. The image which affection cherishes is a grateful one. And especially is this the case when into the zealous and faithful labor of a few years have been compressed the work of a long life. We need not length of days to do well our lifework. The most consecrated souls are often called soonest away."

One sad word more must needs be spoken. To end this memorial, without allusion to the deeper shadows which have settled on that bereaved home, were to repress sympathies that struggle for expression. The mysteries grow thicker and darker which have closed in on us. That fair young life so suddenly quenched! Yet that life in which he so delighted, so soon with him, and both with Christ in his glory. We in our grief lift our eyes to the hills whence cometh our help, and our hearts to the region, —

"Where beyond these voices there is peace."

LITERARY AND HISTORICAL ADDRESSES.

Phil. — Morals & Scholars, etc.
Orat. — Elmer.
Φ. B. K. — Harvard. (1876.)

THE

ALIENATION OF THE EDUCATED CLASS FROM POLITICS.

AN ORATION BEFORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY AT CAMBRIDGE, JUNE 29, 1876.

You ask me to address you at a time which hardly allows the usual license in the selection of a theme. Gathering, as we do, to this annual festival on the eve of the great secular commemoration which rivets all regards to the issues of an unexampled experiment, I should justly forfeit your sympathy were I rash enough to divert your thoughts from those imperious public concerns which mingle so much of pride and fear with their far-reaching problems. Even when meeting as associates of an academical fraternity, we cannot forget that we are constituents of a larger society, — partners in a fellowship more comprehensive than any specific calling or profession, — members incorporate into that spacious and supreme commonwealth, without whose wholesome restraints and benign supervision all bonds would be relaxed, all intellectual progress would falter, and all highest aims which we here cherish fail of accomplishment. Least of all can we be unmindful of such weightier concerns when assembled, for the first time, under the shadow of

these walls, — these walls that have been reared in recognition of the sacrifice made by scholars on the common altar, which, long as they stand, will attest the alliance of generous culture and unselfish public spirit, and whose very stones would cry out should the sons of this illustrious mother ever grow heedless of the lessons here inculcated.

Is the culture which proved itself so equal to the strenuous calls of war less able to cope with the strain of civil life? Is that educated class which you represent coming to be a less efficient force in our national experiment? Are our intellectual and our political activities doomed to pursue two constantly diverging paths, our ideal aims ceasing to qualify and shape our practical endeavors? These are among the questions which force themselves upon us at a time like this. The solicitude which they awaken is shown in the humiliating contrasts so freely drawn between the public men of the present day and those of an earlier period; in the frequent discussion of the sphere of the scholar in politics, and in the approbation so heartily expressed when men of exceptional training have been selected to fill important public stations. If this conviction that the breach between Politics and Culture is widening be well grounded, it is a capital arraignment of American society, — the one result that would stamp our republican experiment with failure. Does our political system exclude from public recognition those superior interests which enlist the most enthusiastic coöperation of generous minds, or does it tend to strip of legitimate influence those best fitted to wrestle with worthy issues? Whichever the cause, the result would be equally disas-

trous. Should such a deplorable divorce become established, our culture would be cut off from healthful contact with living interests, and our politics be robbed of pure and ennobling inspiration; our scholars would sink to pedants and our statesmen to politicians. The merit of such a policy as ours cannot be measured by the success with which it meets the common ends of government. However effective it may have proved in promoting material prosperity, or a wholesome dispersion of political power, if it does not at the same time hold in happy adjustment the highest instincts and the positive governing forces of the nation, it cannot claim to be truly representative, nor long elicit that prompt allegiance of reason and conscience on which all genuine representative institutions must ultimately rest. Not extent of territory, nor multiplication of material resources, but a noble and sympathetic public life is the guage of national greatness. "The excellencie and perfection of a commonweale," to borrow the words of Bodin, "are not to be measured by the largeness of the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of virtue itself." All famous states have been informed with ideal forces. No dazzling spread of material products at Philadelphia may console us, if throughout that varied show we are haunted with the conviction that what gives meaning and grace and admirableness to national success is losing its sway over us. Though this great Leviathan, whose completed century we celebrate, be indeed hugest of all commonwealths that have breasted the flood of time, its vast bulk will only stand revealed as more ugly, more clumsy, more preposterous, if it simply drift on the sleepy drench of private, selfish interests and sordid cares.

In discussing this question let us not forget the wider meaning with which the phrase "educated class" has become invested. With men of exceptional eminence in the selecter walks of literature and science we are not concerned. That absorbing devotion to a pursuit, by which alone its supreme prizes are purchased, carries with it, in most cases, a corresponding sacrifice of aptitude for other callings; and the familiar instances in which some of our foremost men of letters have entered with success the political arena must be reckoned as brilliant exceptions to the rule. The habits of the study are not the best discipline for affairs, however true the maxim of Bacon, that no kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned. Experience has shown that the intellectual qualities which insure success in the discovery of truth are rarely combined with the qualities which lend these truths their greatest practical efficiency. The service which original genius renders society in other ways far more than compensates for any injury which its renunciation of ordinary duties may involve. The world lost nothing by leaving Adam Smith in a professor's chair, and gained nothing by giving La Place a minister's portfolio. By the term "educated class," I have in mind that much larger number who form the mediating term between the intellectual leaders of the community and the great majority; the interpreters and expounders of principles which others have explored; the liberal connection, so adquately represented here to-day, not of the learned professions only, but of men generously inured, by the discipline of such an ancient university as this, to just opinions, and sincere speech, and independ-

ent action; whose scholarship is the gracious apparel of well-compacted character. In this wider sense, while the phrase implies educated intellect and educated taste, it implies even more, educated judgment and educated conscience, those sovereign qualities which are usurped by no single calling, but belong to man as man, — to man in the most beneficent play of his faculties, in the ripest growth of his reason, and in the widest scope of his influence. This is the class through whom the impulses of sound culture are disseminated, and whose alienation from public interests is a sign of such evil portent on our political horizon.

In our own case, this lessening interest of the educated class in politics is more significant when we recall the fact, that politics once disputed with theology the sway over the most vigorous thought among us. Without doubt this modification may be traced, in part, to the operation of general social causes; but I can by no means consent to their opinion who would find its main explanation here. That the interests of society are far more diversified to-day than a century ago, that the speculative problems pressing for solution are vastly more numerous and complex, that the most adventuresome and prolific intellectual energy of our time no longer expends itself on those questions which in former ages exercised such potent fascination, no man will deny; yet this spurring of mental activity in new directions need not have caused its zeal to flag in the old. Is it not the prerogative of all genuine impulse to quicken a common movement? Does not success in one field rouse to new effort in every other? I would not include in this the wild pur-

suit of wealth, the vulgar materialism, of which in recent years we have had such shocking examples, and within whose poisoned circle all generous aspiration withers; the rivalry which I am here discussing is the rivalry of intellectual forces. Can social progress, in this sense, involve any such result as is here alleged? Can there be any real antagonism between the study of nature and the study of man; between investigations of the laws printed on the heavens and the laws by which society advances and great and durable states are built up? When science, ceasing to speak as a child, published through Newton decrees that claimed obedience beyond the flaming walls of space, did it chill the interest of Locke in those inquiries which scattered such prolific seeds in the soil of this new world? The last century was in France an epoch of prodigious scientific movement; but in what period were social and political problems ever more keenly debated? The country that made its boast of a Buffon and a Lavoisier could point not less to a Montesquieu and a Turgot. Nay, in the same person the two tendencies were sometimes combined, and the precocious genius of Condorcet was busied equally with the differential calculus, and with the foundations of human society. After reaching almost the highest distinction as a mathematician, he declared "that for thirty years he had hardly passed a day without meditating on the political sciences." If, therefore, our educated class has lost the interest it once felt in political problems, this result must be ascribed to something else than our stimulated zeal for physical studies. And if we can no longer say with Algernon Sydney, that political questions "so far

concern all mankind, that besides the influence on our future life they may be said to comprehend all that in this world deserves to be cared for," they certainly have not lost their importance as the great issues of modern society are more distinctly revealed.

The proposition has not lacked vigorous support with a brilliant class of English writers, who shrink appalled from a political tendency which they can see no way of successfully resisting, that the popular movement of modern times, resting as it does on the postulate that all men should be equal so far as the laws can make them so, reduces the individual to impotence by making him a hopelessly feeble unit in the presence of an overwhelming majority. In such a plight it is mere mockery, we are told, to exhort men of superior parts to exercise an independent influence. The wise and the good stand on a level with the foolish and the bad, and to hope that reason will rule in the ordering of affairs when each one is provided with a vote and may cast it as he likes, is an idle dream. This argument does not apply, of course, to our own experiment alone, but is directed against a tendency which in all societies that claim to be civilized is setting forward with accelerated force. It seems enough to say, in answer, that we are not now in a position to analyze with accuracy a movement of such tremendous import. Modern democracy is too recent a phenomenon to admit of any estimate as yet of the complex range of its social and political and intellectual consequences. It is on the dead, not on the living, that the coroner holds his inquest. Ancient society was comparatively simple; its phenomena for the most

part admit of obvious explanation; its completed history allows us to pass a confident judgment upon it as a whole. Mediæval society, if less simple, still turned, in its chief phases, on few points; even feudalism, once so perplexed a study, has yielded to recent analysis, and when it arose, how it affected the classes included in its range, why it came to an end, are questions about which scholars are ceasing to dispute. But that great popular movement, which is now so clearly seen to have thrust its strong roots down into the Middle Age, is still in process; we ourselves are but parts of it; the terms of the mighty equation are not yet written out. It is pleasant to fancy that we stand secure on the rocks and gaze at the mighty rush of the waters, —

"E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem,"

but it is fancy and nothing more. In the flood of phenomena all perspective is blurred, and relations of cause and effect are hopelessly mixed. We are in danger of joining what has only a seeming connection, and of attributing to one class of causes consequences that are due wholly to another. No country ever had a more genial and appreciative critic of its institutions than we had in the accomplished Frenchman who attempted the first philosophical estimate of American Democracy, but how crude and ludicrous even, in the light of our later experience, seem some of De Tocqueville's most elaborate judgments. Has American Democracy, we may well ask, proved unequal to the task of levying taxes, or of raising armies? De Tocqueville was impressed, as others who have come among us have been impressed, with the lack of conspicuous

ability among our public men; but to argue that democratic institutions are unfavorable to the development of the highest individual excellence, because men of moderate parts are most commonly selected for public offices, implies a misunderstanding of the meaning and function of government in a democratic state. When it is so confidently argued that the theory of political equality must result in mediocrity, because it holds out fewer prizes to exceptional superiority in the public service, it should be remembered that in other ways it multiplies the incitements to effort. And even conceding that the removal of political restrictions can add nothing to the intrinsic force of individual character, it by no means follows that such removal presents any bar to the full and varied development of existing forces.

Is it not time to have done with what the latest historian of England terms "this silly talk about democracy." Democratic institutions are on trial; so is modern society itself; it is quite too soon to bring in the verdict. Of all the reproaches hurled against the popular tendency of modern times the most ill-grounded, surely, is the dismal cry about the tyranny of the majority. This is one of the especial dangers on which De Tocqueville dwells; and later writers, borrowing the hint from him, are never weary of repeating that, overawed and intimidated by the opinion of the unthinking mass, all expression of individual sentiment is stifled, and the intelligent and thoughtful few are deterred from attempting to wield the influence which they ought to exercise. But if in a community where law authorizes and protects the expression of opinion, any individ-

ual is restrained by prudential considerations from promulgating what his reason recognizes as true, or his conscience affirms as right, the true explanation must be sought not in any tyranny of the majority but rather in the lack of that "intrinsic force" on which Leslie Stephen so vigorously insists. Every fuller soul, elected in the great crises of history to lead the forlorn hope of the race, has been in a minority; nay, the captain in the most marvelous revolution the world has seen was in a minority of one. Earnest, aggressive, self-forgetful minorities have been, in every age, the conditions of social progress; against them the tyranny of the majority has always been ruthlessly exercised; exercised by arbitrary power, — under the forms of law, — with the sanction of religion; exercised with the sword, the faggot, and the rack; and instead of wielding with us an aggravated rule, never has the power of the majority been subject, in so many ways, to checks and bounds as under the institutions which an English lord chancellor has described as the very greatest refinement of polity to which any age has ever given birth. And never too, it may be truly said, has the will of the minority been more outspoken than with us. The crowning event in our hundred years of history, the turning point in our great struggle for national integrity, was the result of a public sentiment, created, shaped, carried to its triumphant issue by a persistent and resolute minority!

> "For Gods delight in Gods,
> And thrust the weak aside."

An explanation of the abstinence of our educated class from politics, more nearly connected with our

distinctive polity, has been discovered by Mr. Bagehot in the difference between a cabinet and a presidential system. To this difference, he claims, must also be attributed the lack of any public opinion in America finished and chastened like that of England. With the English, attention to politics means a real direction of affairs, the nation making itself felt with effective force at the determining crises of party conflicts. Whether the ministry shall go out or remain in is decided by a parliamentary division, and on this decision public opinion outside of Parliament, the secret, pervading disposition of society, exercises a potent influence. The nation is stirred to the expression of an opinion because it realizes that its opinion is decisive. The sympathy remains at all times close and vital between public sentiment and the actual governing power. But with ourselves precisely the reverse of this obtains. Save in the instant of exercising the elective franchise the nation has no decisive influence; in that supreme effort its vital forces are exhausted, and it must wait an appointed time until its periodic function is restored. Hence it is not incited to keep its judgment fresh, nor is its opinion disciplined by continuous exercise. Our congressional disputes are "prologues without a play;" they involve no catastrophe; the prize of power is not a legislative gift. As a natural result, men of mark are not strongly tempted to secure seats in a deliberative body when they have only power to make a speech, when they are neither stimulated by prospect of influence nor chastened by dread of responsibility. And when public opinion itself is not subject to constant modification, those who shape public opinion

are deprived of the most positive incitement to effort. The results are too distant and uncertain.

To much of this reasoning it is enough to say that while the term of office of the administration is fixed by law, and so far our system is open to the reproach of being inelastic, yet the term is so brief that the nation hardly recovers from the excitement of one presidential election before it is plunged into another; that the choice of the chief magistrate is only one of numberless ways in which the elective franchise is exercised; that congressional debates, if they have not the effect on the instant to change the administration, do have a direct and often a controlling influence upon its policy; and that the national legislature, so far from being unaffected by public opinion out of doors, is often controlled by it to a deplorable extent. That in the agony of a great ministerial crisis a parliamentary debate fixes public attention, as it cannot be fixed by a speech in Congress, must be conceded; but that such an eager strife for power and place disciplines and instructs public opinion any more effectually than our more rigid method is an assertion that seems destitute of all sound support. And still less am I disposed to admit that the participation of our educated class in politics would be sensibly promoted by the removal of the strongly accented distinction between the executive and the legislative branch, which constitutes so cardinal a feature of our constitution, and by making the tenure of the highest administrative office directly dependent on the will of a congressional majority. English experience does not warrant the expectation that public life would be rendered more attractive to men of nice moral instincts;

and while the immediate prospect of great place, without doubt, supplies a most powerful stimulus to effort, it can yet, under ordinary conditions, address itself to only a limited class. The great body of educated men must be inspired by a worthier motive.

While, however, I cannot concede to Mr. Bagehot that the chief explanation of the alienation of our educated men from politics is to be found in the mere mode of administration, I think it must be admitted that there are certain features of our system which have tended, in no small degree, to weaken the hold of public interests upon some of the more earnest and disinterested of this class. Our system is one of carefully limited powers, from which is excluded the larger share of those questions which appeal to the deepest convictions of mankind. It sprang from political needs, and was carefully fashioned to compass certain definite and practical aims. But since that day when the conquering Franks conferred temporal dominion on the successor of the fisherman, the questions which have allured the most generous and enthusiastic spirits to the field of politics have grown out of the disputed relations of the temporal and spiritual powers. These commanding problems for a time turned Dante from poetry and Occam from theology; and if, in the press of modern interests, they have ceased to reign supreme, they have still given to modern European politics most of its noblest impulses. They have provoked the most profound inquiries, the most disinterested effort, the most unselfish surrender to magnanimous if not seldom mistaken and impracticable ends. They have drawn into the heated arena

of politics not a few whom only the most sacred allegiance to ideal principle could have tempted to a public career. On the other hand our politics, for the past hundred years, have been bereft of these ennobling impulses, and political life, of necessity, has lost no small part of the attraction which it has furnished, in other lands, to the purest, most earnest, most cultivated minds. It has not, for example, been within the scope of our American institutions to produce such a man as the late Count Montalembert, coupling the courage and address of a great orator with the religious enthusiasm of a monk, delighting to look at politics as primarily the means of realizing spiritual results, a genuine *fils des croisés* amid the fierce debates of the French Assembly; nor such a man as Gladstone, faulty perhaps as a mere party leader, but treading with no unequal step after Pitt and Peel as a parliamentary debater, and surpassing both, in the comprehensiveness of his range and the earnestness of his moral conviction, habitually looking at politics in the light of man's largest relations as an immortal being, disowned by Oxford when most truly faithful to Oxford's earliest traditions. That memorable measure which taxed his distinctive capabilities as an original legislator, and elicited the most transcendent exhibition of his oratory, was a problem with which no American statesman could be called to deal. And who supposes, for a moment, that the ordinary discipline which a public career with us supplies would qualify one of our party leaders, after laying down the cares of office, to discuss, as Mr. Gladstone has recently discussed, the questions to which the novel assumptions of the Vatican have given such added signifi-

cance. If the separation of church and state that obtains with us has helped religion, it has certainly narrowed the range and weakened the motive of political action.

But not only was our government established as one of expressly limited powers; very soon after it went into operation a political thesis came to be generally accepted which gave this principle a wider and more pernicious application. At the beginning of the present century the maxim was eagerly accepted and enforced, that the functions of government, in general, ought to be confined within the narrowest limits, and directed only to the most utilitarian ends. Since the adoption of our federal constitution two distinct political tendencies have shown themselves among us, — two tendencies radically distinct in origin and spirit, yet singularly tending to the same result. One was a strong infusion of the politics of sentiment, borrowed from Rousseau by Mr. Jefferson, coloring our famous Declaration, and proving itself through all our history by a passion for abstract maxims of equality and liberty, by a somewhat ill-regulated zeal in promoting whatever schemes of social and political reform, and by an undiscriminating sympathy with revolutionary movements throughout the world. The marked characteristic of this tendency has been contempt for the teachings of tradition and experience, and a confident disposition to solve each new problem simply upon its own merits. Political action, controlled and guided by such maxims, can have but slender attraction for the educated class, whose very training implies respect for precedent, who shrink with instinctive suspicion from a sentimental apprehension of political or moral truths,

and who are accustomed to value liberty simply as a means to an end. If by liberty be meant merely the removal of restraint, — the sense in which some of its most famous advocates in our time seem to understand it, — it will be long before men of sound culture can be brought to give it a very enthusiastic countenance. .But by the side of this sentimental conception of political rights there has existed another tendency which in actual practice has usurped the control of public policy. The twin gods of our political Pantheon have been Rousseau and Bentham. To these two masters all our political theories since we became an independent nation may be traced. For whatever may be thought of the utilitarian philosophy as an abstract code of morals, it has unquestionably stamped itself upon our time as a practical rule of legislation. Had this rule always been applied in the enlarged definition given it by Mill its results might have been less deplorable; but the maxim so emphatically reiterated by the founder of the school, that government is a necessary evil, the legislator being simply a physician summoned to wrestle with a disease, worked a fatal paralysis of political opinion. The state was unclothed of all that gave it authority and majesty; politics, surrendered to mere expediency, were hopelessly divorced from the restraints of right and duty, and high sounding declarations of zeal for the general good came, too often, to cover the vulgar conflict of private and selfish interests. Here, too, so far as concerned the participation of the educated class, the same result inevitably followed. Men whose deepest solicitude was for ideal and spiritual ends shrunk from what seemed so much a struggle for mere personal advantages.

But, without doubt, the consideration that has weighed most in chilling the interest of our educated class in politics is connected far less with the theory of our government than with its practical working. It is the wide-spread conviction that in the actual administration of such affairs as fall within its limited range, culture, training, intellectual equipment of any kind, instead of being valued as essential conditions of efficient public service, are rather hindrances to a political career. It was the evident expectation of the framers of our system, that the working of the elective principle would result in the elimination of the best elements of the body politic; and that eminent fitness would be the recognized test for responsible position. As we are forced sadly to confess, this hope has been disappointed, and our government has come to embody, not the highest, but the average intelligence, and to hold out its highest prizes to adroit management rather than to admitted desert. That the majority of those who formed the educated class in this country when our constitution went into operation looked with distrust upon the experiment is a fact familiar to all students of our history; but could they have foreseen the inevitable modification which that experiment was destined to undergo, could they have foreseen how much more powerful that popular control which they so much dreaded was destined to become, their distrust would have changed to despair; over the portal of the structure which they reared with so much pains they would have carved the ominous warning —

"All hope abandon, ye who enter in!"

And yet, if we fairly considered it, this modification was but the logical working out of the primary postulate in which our whole political system rested, and, if we take a just view of that system, will furnish no ground whatever for the suspicion that we have wandered from the normal path of our political development. It is a modification that, after all, has lessened rather in appearance than in reality the real influence of the educated class. It furnishes no ground either for indifference or discouragement; for if the visible prizes of political success lie less within their grasp, the opportunities for the exercise of a permanent and controlling influence have been in no way diminished.

Let us concede, for the argument, the utmost that the most dismal of our political Cassandras have asserted, that a representative government, under democratic rule, must inevitably conform to the level of the majority which it represents; and conceding, too, what in this whole discussion has been strangely assumed as a thing of course, that the majority in any community will always prove themselves less capable and less intelligent in the direction of affairs than the minority, it still would by no means follow that under institutions like ours an educated minority would be finally cut off from a wholesome participation in political duties. Those who reason in this way reason from precedents that do not apply to our condition, and mistake the function of government, and the significance of public offices under a system where the representative principle is allowed full play. For the gist of the complaint that educated men with us are debarred from exercising their legitimate influence in politics, for the most

part means simply that they are not selected to fill public offices, and so cannot make themselves felt in the ordinary manipulations of the political machine. The complaint is well grounded, and the grievance complained of is a real grievance; yet does it have the significance which has been attributed to it? May not what has been so persistently urged in proof of our political decline be a passing but inevitable phase of our development? But excluding other considerations that here suggest themselves, the position on which I wish to fasten your attention is simply this: that under a strictly representative government, like our own, public functions, even when regarded from a strictly political point of view, are less significant than under systems where power is possessed, not as a trust, but as an estate, and hence that exclusion from a technical public career carries with it far less sacrifice of real influence.

The framers of our constitution were not seeking to carry out any abstract formulas; their simple aim was to set up a compact and well-articulated constitutional republic. Yet while they had in mind a system rather than a theory, and restrained public opinion by checks and guarantees, they built on rational foundations and recognized a principle the full scope of which they did not themselves, perhaps, suspect. In this recognition lay the essential originality of their contrivance, and the sole claim of their labors to mark an epoch in the history of political experiments. In the governments of the Old World the administration was the state. The famous maxim of Louis XIV. was no empty boast, but the terse formulating of a maxim which Bossuet

had elaborately vindicated as the teaching of Holy Writ. In the purely modern monarchy which the unscrupulous genius of Frederic erected upon force the maxim was as fully recognized; and even in the mixed system which Walpole and Grenville administered, hereditary monarchy and hereditary peerage remained, in theory at least, remote from any popular control. But our system, whatever the artificial checks it sought to interpose, rested, at last, in the explicit recognition of one single, homogeneous, sovereign power. This power lay behind the legislature, behind the executive, behind the constitution itself; for no principle can be plainer than that so strongly insisted on by Hobbes, — and which Austin has repeated after Hobbes, — that sovereign power is, in its nature, incapable of legal limitation. Resting thus, as our institutions do, both in theory and fact, on popular will, it is true of us in a sense more complete than it has been possible to affirm it of any former political society, that it is Public Opinion which rules: that all-powerful judge, which, in the language of the accomplished prince who is writing so impartially the story of our great civil strife, "possesses, perhaps, the caprices but not the fatal infatuation of despots." With us government is the mere function through which the public will is made efficient, not directing that will, but created and determined by it. Washington himself most clearly recognized this principle, when, in 1793, he wrote: "I only wish, whilst I am a servant of the public, to know the will of my masters, that I may govern myself accordingly;" words of peculiar emphasis as coming from such a man. It is a commonplace remark that a leading tendency of modern

civilization is to make the influence of society greater and the influence of government relatively less; but it would be a more accurate statement that government has become more the agency through which the power of society is wielded, the relation of the two being not antagonistic, but harmonious. According to this view, government should receive, not give, the impulse. That government alone is strong which marches at the head of popular convictions. Never was the real strength of our own government so proudly demonstrated as in the dark crisis when the conspiracy against it first revealed the mighty force of the national sentiment. One reason, doubtless, why the political discussions of the past generation have lost so much of their interest, is, that they were so much concerned with the mere form under which the masking spirit hides itself, and reached so seldom the deeper sources of national life. And one of the most precious results of our late struggle has been to cure us of the habit of looking so exclusively at the mere formal constitution, and turning our gaze to those deeper conditions of national unity and strength that lie in the great providential dispositions of our history. Let us not call it a victory of the North over the South, but rather the vindication of our formal law by the great facts of our historical development. In this truer, profounder conception of the state, as anterior to the most sacred and authoritative expressions of its will, we have at once the right explanation of our political system, and at the same time the most encouraging exhibition of the true sphere of the educated class. For it follows that the real governing class are not, and are not meant to be, the mere agents of admin-

istration, but those on whom rests the responsibility of creating and informing that sovereign public opinion, — of which, in a free community, the administration is the mere mouth-piece and attorney.

What does it matter that this public opinion can only make itself efficient through the action of the majority? In a government by discussion, to borrow a favorite phrase of Mr. Bagehot, the type toward which all civilized states are tending, and of which our own presents the most perfect example, what other method could be introduced? Lord Bacon, who denounces an appeal to the majority as the worst of all tests in the decision of purely intellectual questions, admits that in politics and religion it is the safest rule. It was the voice of the majority which fixed the articles of Catholic faith at Nice, and which admitted the Bill of Rights as part of the British constitution. It is no modern device, as some would seem to think, but was recognized by the Greeks as a fundamental principle of corporate political action, which so careful a writer as the late Cornewall Lewis terms the most important improvement introduced into practical politics since the dawn of civilization. All admit that the contrivance is defective; but when the ultimate decision is made to rest, not with any single individual but with a collective body, it is difficult to see what other arrangement could be substituted for it; and the phrase "rule of the masses" will lose much of its repugnant meaning if we allow it to be divested of associations which it has inherited from other ages, and from conditions of society widely differing from our own. In the old Latin proverb it is not inaptly termed *argumentum pessimi;* for a Roman populace,

at least in Seneca's time, was compacted of every pernicious element. Even as the phrase is now used in most European countries, it has no meaning here; for, happily, we have no class sentenced by inexorable social distinctions to hopeless poverty and ignorance, The exceptions which a few of our larger cities furnish are not products of our civilization. The majority with us is a majority not indeed of high culture, not always of wise discernment, not exempt from the influence of prejudice, but singularly open to new impressions, of flexible opinions, of ever-fluctuating social consequence, and never reluctant to recognize the application of a principle. It surely does not raise the great historian of Athenian democracy in our estimation when we learn that in his last days his faith in free institutions was shaken because the majority of the American people showed such tenacious fidelity to the great principles on which all free governments must rest.

In asserting so strongly that the distinctive political function of the educated class, in a community governed by discussion, is discharged less at the ballot-box, or in the technical duties of administration, than in shaping public opinion, let me not seem to argue for the release of any portion of the body politic from their personal obligations as citizens. I am not unmindful of the benefit that results from the direct participation of every educated man in politics, — the more generous direction of political action, the elevation of political discussion, the wholesome correction of political methods which his presence ought to imply. I do not mean that the educated class should dwell apart; on the contrary

I hail it as a cheering sign when the representatives of this class replace in our political machinery the mere party politician. But I am not the less persuaded that the supreme service of the educated man is rather indirect than direct, — rendered less in his limited capacity as a constituent part of the body politic than in his broad and comprehensive relations as a member of society. I would not utter a word to detain him from the primary meeting or the political convention; but in neither of these can his distinguishing parts be called into most efficient play. In the primary meeting he is too often surprised by a packed majority; on the floor of the convention he finds himself thwarted by the tricks of the wily parliamentary tactician. It is only in the indirect and slower process of appealing to public opinion that the ultimate vindication of truth and justice is assured; and it is precisely in his fitness to make this appeal that the educated man — the man educated in the ample sense in which I have defined the term — stands head and shoulders above his fellows. He is a spiritual power in the state that no factions can outwit, that no majorities can overwhelm. He makes himself felt in a sphere where the vulgar conditions of political action no longer operate, —

> "No private, but a person raised
> With strength sufficient and command from heaven."

And how false to history their view who hold that in a democratic community, or, in other words, in a community governed by reason and discussion, such a man can be stripped of any legitimate influence! I will not appeal to the familiar and splendid argument of antiquity, — for it may be objected that

political equality then invariably had slavery as its corner-stone. — but will limit myself to modern examples. Where, let me ask, did the earliest impulses of distinctive modern civilization show themselves but in the democratic communes of the Middle Age? The movement towards equality of classes here initiated marked the beginning of the great mediæval Renaissance. What, indeed, were the famous mediæval universities, in their formal organization, but applications of that fruitful principle of corporate action which the free towns protected against the encroachments of feudalism? The venerable terms "university" and "college" are simply survivals of the far more ancient municipal fraternities. Bologna and Paris and Oxford were, in fact, free commonwealths, creations throughout of a popular impulse, memorable protests against the isolation of man from man. Macaulay has noted as an inconsistency in Milton, that while his opinions were democratic his imagination delighted to revel amid the illusions of aristocratic society: alleging in proof the contrast between the Treatises on Prelacy and the exquisite lines on ecclesiastical architecture in *Il Penseroso*. But the instincts of the poet were right; there was no discord whatever between his reason and his taste. The most distinctive products of mediæval architecture, — those soaring spires, those tranquil fronts of fretted stone that hush the murmuring surge of the thronged marketplace, those

> "Storied windows, richly dight,
> Casting a dim, religious light," —

all had a democratic origin. The long-drawn aisles of Chartres, of Rouen, of Amiens, of Beauvais, the

vast structures in which the common people could assemble around the episcopal throne, were popular protests against monastic and baronial exclusiveness. The cloister had no longer the monopoly of art. Investigation and experiment were substituted for tradition. The pointed style of the thirteenth century, in which the architectural taste and structural skill of the mediæval builders were united in their consummate perfectness, was not an ecclesiastical and aristocratic but a lay and democratic style. Its novel and surpassing forms were direct embodiments of the new aspirations throbbing in lay society. The laity alone, from their readiness to adopt rational methods, were competent to execute these surprising works. Viollet-le-Duc does not hesitate to say that the period included in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is the most instructive in the history of art, for the simple reason that it was the expression of a movement provoked by the lay spirit acting against tradition; and the lay spirit of that age was simply another name for the spirit of the free towns.

I would not depreciate the debt we owe to the ecclesiastical and the aristocratic institutions of the Middle Age. Who can forget the monastic scholar, feeding the lamp of learning through the dark night of ignorance and barbarism? Who can refuse to recognize the seeds of generous and polite sentiment hid under the rough crust of feudal society? Who of us has not felt the romantic charm of a life so removed from anything with which we come in contact in this new world? I recall the rapture of old vacation rambles by famous streams where

> "A splendor falls on castle walls,
> And snowy summits old in story,"

when every thrilled sense and spell of song and legend was quickened by the companionship of one who ranked with the noblest of those whom yonder walls commemorate, but still I cannot forget that the intellectual revival of Europe received its most powerful impulse, not from the priest, nor from the noble, but from the citizen. It was from social conditions essentially like our own, that modern civilization sprang, and when we are sneered at as a gigantic middle-class experiment, when we are told that the theory of equality on which our institutions rest can result only in the dismal mediocrity of Chinese civilization, in the unbroken level of a Western prairie, let us call to mind the cheering words of Schiller, that the creator of modern culture was the middle class. If the past has any lesson to teach us on this point it is the lesson of encouragement and hope. If we have anything to learn from experience, it is, before all else, the lesson that when political institutions rest on public opinion, when the final appeal lies to the reason and intelligence of men, when, above all, the great majority are prepared by a widely diffused common education to entertain this appeal, to pass a judgment on the great issues continually brought before them, the educated class, the shapers and instructors of public opinion, sit on a throne of state beside which the common seat of kings seems idle pomp!

With this interpretation of the distinctive sphere of the educated class, how enlarged the scope of their influence. In its practical operation so much more moral than legal, that influence is no longer fettered by the limitations which the mere form of government imposes. For the primary relation of

the educated man is not to the technical duties of the citizen, but to the whole life of the nation. His hand may seldom touch the visible cranks and levers, but he calls into action the vital forces by which the vast engine of state is kept in motion. He sweeps over a wide range of questions with which the mere politician never comes in contact. The laws may assign bounds to political action, but they can interpose no check to the operation of public opinion; they are but mile-stones that mark social and political progress. In a representative system the formal constitution must conform to the growth of public opinion, for this is the wisdom by which the house is builded, by which its seven pillars must be hewn out. To the bar of public opinion, the august tribunal of public reason, all questions that affect man in his relations with his fellow man may be brought. The contrast between the dreary stagnation of a despotism and the animating stir of a free state is simply the result of the principle that a free, and above all, a representative government must be a progressive realization of ideas. Its existence is an existence of conflict and endeavor; it implies strenuous service, and imposes inexorable responsibilities. But while the form of government in a free state of necessity is plastic, yet as the life of the nation is continuous, its present action must have constant reference to its previous history. The conditions of healthy growth are violated if at any time it be rudely uprooted from its own past. In what line of amendment it may wisely move must be decided from its own traditions, and it is especially in the wise interpretation and useful application of these traditions

that the influence of an educated class makes itself felt.

As thus dealing with ideas rather than with institutions, with the essential life of the nation rather than with its mere machinery of administration, the educated class in a free state renders its most inestimable service as the exponent and upholder of those spiritual forces on which society ultimately rests. And here we touch truths of vital moment. Though the maxim of Winthrop be no longer true, in any literal application, that the civil state is reared out of the churches, yet the principle is eternally and unchangeably true, that in the deeper life of the nation the spiritual and the temporal can never be divided. The mere government may be secular, but the state is built on everlasting moral foundations. We may do away with an established church, but we can never emancipate ourselves from the restraints and obligations of Christian civilization; they are part of our history, they are inwrought into our being, we cannot deny them without destroying our identity as a people! For in its deepest analysis the state is a moral person; in no other way could it serve as the agent and minister of that beneficent Providence by which history is invested with a moral order, and rendered luminous with an increasing purpose. However in common and limited transactions we may discriminate between the spiritual and the temporal, we cannot do so when dealing with those supreme interests and relations, from which the ultimate ends of human action and the sanctions of civil society derive their meaning. The life of a nation, like the life of an individual, forms an indivisible whole. The soul is one, and

all voluntary acts of a moral being must be spiritual acts. We cannot at one moment be spiritual beings, and at the next be released from spiritual restraints; now subject to law and now a law unto ourselves! The principle of the separation of church and state receives an unwarranted and most pernicious interpretation, when it is understood to mean, as it so often is, that religion and politics occupy two wholly distinct provinces. Much, I know, has been said of the non-political character of early Christianity, but the relation of the primitive Christians to external society was exceptional; they were subjects of a state based on antagonistic beliefs, and were hemmed in on every hand with corrupt pagan institutions. But as the Gospel gradually refashioned society, this relation was changed; the church found its most efficient ally in that secular arm which had so cruelly crushed it; and religious conviction, instead of alienating men from political duties, became the most powerful spur to political action. Rothe, indeed, has argued that Christianity is essentially a political principle, and that it is the destiny of all distinctive ecclesiastical organizations to be finally absorbed into a Christian state.

Throughout the early period of our own history the only educated class were the ministers of religion. To furnish the churches with trained teachers was the main purpose for which our most venerable institutions of learning were founded. While the clergy no longer hold this exceptional rank they still form a numerous and conspicuous part of our educated class, and, so far as concerns the shaping of popular opinion, doubtless its most influential

part. They touch the deepest chords of popular sentiment as no other agency does. And if it be true that the state is but the embodiment of this popular sentiment, that its action is inevitably shaped by the convictions which the great body of the people come from time to time to cherish as right and true, what duty can rest upon the pulpit more sacred and more imperative than the duty of subjecting this popular sentiment to the discipline of religious belief? Even what is termed speculative opinion cannot be set aside as unimportant, for no earnest, efficient action, no action aiming at large and beneficent results, can be severed from speculative opinion. From speculative opinion all the vital movements of society take their shape. Mr. Burke, in a brilliant passage, has declared that Politics and the Pulpit have very little in common, but it was the Puritan pulpit which created the noblest type of the republican citizen.

And in this trying crisis through which we now are passing, when a cup of humiliation and shame is pressed to our lips such as we were not forced to drink in the darkest hour when treason stalked abroad, to whom shall we look to quicken our sluggish moral sense, to diffuse a more sober temper, to inspire a more genuine reverence for things that are true, honest, lovely, and of good report, rather than to the ministers of religion? Who but they can educate that public will which, Sismondi tells us, "is the sum of all the wills, of all the intelligence, of all the virtue of the nation"? What voice but theirs shall bid that storm to rise which shall sweep forever away the whole abhorred crew that have swarmed like unclean birds to the seats of power, —

"Conspiring to uphold their state
By worse than hostile deeds, violating the ends
For which our country is a name so dear"?

I cannot but think that our American Christianity has come, of late years, to concern itself too exclusively with private and social needs, and has lost the masculine hold it once had on public duties. In enforcing the fear of God in "civil things," no minister of the gospel need for a moment think that he is falling below the highest level of his official duty. Who but looks back with veneration to the New England minister of the olden time, — like Ward, of Ipswich, whose vigorous and well-furnished intellect could turn from the composition of sermons to the drawing up of a "Body of Liberties," — like many of a later day, who, in the genuine tradition of the fathers, refused to call any human duties common or unclean. Nay, are not some of the most brilliant memories of this anniversary associated with one whose course has but just ended, — one in whom the sinewy fibre of the past generation was singularly blended with the grace, the sweetness, the insight of the new, — who, while exploring the innermost mysteries of spiritual experience, could discuss with unrivaled force the true wealth and weal of nations? Known to the world as a preacher and theologian, he was not less known to his neighbors as a wise and zealous and public-spirited citizen; and when they sought to console his dying moments by ordaining that the fair park which owed its existence to his foresight should bear his name, they surely did not deem that Bushnell had in aught degraded religion while enforcing such earnest conviction of the sacredness of political duties.

But in proof of my position that, in a community governed by discussion, the most wholesome and potent influence of the educated man is independent of political office, I need not turn from your own roll. Since your last anniversary the oldest graduate of this university has passed away. From the long procession which yesterday for the first time entered these doors the most venerable figure was missing. Deriving his early nurture from these springs, his long and useful and honorable career was passed in a distant city. In youth a scholar of fairest promise, yet never coveting mere intellectual gains as the highest acquisition, — achieving at the bar the foremost rank at a time when the leaders of the Philadelphia bar, to whom he stood opposed, would have graced Westminster Hall in its palmiest days, — instructing the bench with the research, the discrimination, the perspicuity of his arguments; and, while devoted to his profession, never relaxing his love of letters, — a proficient in the literatures of France and Spain, delighting in history and poetry, a close student of theology, — he was much more than lawyer, much more than scholar. Always, with one brief exception, declining political office, indifferent to the honors which only waited his acceptance, he furnished a crowning proof of his eager interest in political issues and his unflagging zeal for the public welfare when, at the age of fourscore, he issued from his well-earned retirement to uphold the pillars of the state; and in the unflinching courage with which he more than once faced and conquered a perverted public sentiment, he merited the tribute paid by the greatest Athenian historian to the greatest Athenian statesman, that

"powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, he held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them." Such is the sway of wisdom, of courage, of unsullied integrity. We live in evil days; ominous clouds lower on our political horizon; but when I behold the unsought homage paid to a private citizen like Horace Binney I gather new hope for the republic.

Is not the fashioning of such a man the crowning achievement of a great university like this? Let me not seem to disparage the wider scope which our time has given to university training. I heartily applaud the extended significance of liberal studies; I rejoice in the enriched apparatus of discovery, in the multiplied and exhilarating solicitations to research. I would throw these portals wide open to all investigation, yet still remembering that in the history of Higher Education the liberal arts were the precursors of special and professional studies, and that admirable culture of whatever kind must have its roots in the moral sentiment, I am unshaken in the conviction that a seat of liberal discipline fulfills its noblest functions in the rearing of wise, magnanimous, public-spirited men, — of men not merely equipped for specific pursuits, but accustomed to the most generous recognition of the responsibilities resting upon man as man. Where, indeed, can we look for such but to our seats of learning? and where so much as to such a seat of learning as this? — a seat whose years remind us that the sources of our national life lie far back of the centennial period which we are this year commemorating; the

first ever founded by a free people through their elected representatives; linked, in its earliest days with the statesman

> "Than whom a better ne'er held
> The helm of Rome;"

which hastened our independence by half a century; which bears on its long catalogue the names of so many public men, of so many patriots, of so many heroes. Let Harvard cherish letters; let her foster the sciences; let her lead in extending on every hand the frontiers of knowledge; but let it be her chiefest glory, in the future, as in the past, to be called the Mother of Men. Let her sons as they survey these stately piles, as from year to year they delight to walk about her, to tell her towers, and consider her palaces, still repeat, as their proudest boast, —

> "Hic locus insignes magnosque creavit alumnos."

THE METHOD OF ACADEMIC CULTURE.

AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY OF AMHERST COLLEGE, JULY 6, 1869.

I COUNT myself happy in coming before you furnished with a subject to which your sympathies are already pledged. The occasion suggests a theme. Surely we may accept it as an auspicious sign that the tie between the graduate and his *alma mater* has ceased to be merely nominal. These annual gatherings are invigorated with new life, as we come more and more to view them as arenas for the discussion of whatever concerns the supreme academic interests. As conservators of these interests we can tolerate no narrower interpretation of our function. We are here to take care that the republic of letters receives no harm. And at a time when the foremost minds among us are earnestly grappling with one problem it would imperil the highest uses of this hour to divert your thoughts to any other. Confident that your appreciation of the subject will supplement my shortcomings, I shall ask you to consider the Method of Academic Culture.

Before such a company as this I may assume the existence of a distinctive academic discipline. Well nigh seventy years have, indeed, elapsed since Schel-

ling, in the famous lectures which he gave to Jena, said that a youth in pursuit of liberal culture was adrift on a boundless sea without star or compass, and still, after this long interval, we find the historian of Elizabeth, in his inaugural oration at St. Andrews, declaring, in almost the same strain, that the great schools and colleges of England were in the midst of a revolution which, like most revolutions, meant discontent with what they had, with no clear idea of what they wanted. Yet this unpromising result need not make us waver in the faith that there is an aim and scope of education more complete than mere acquisition of knowledge or technical skill; and in the rush and pressure of this modern age, hemmed in with material wants and triumphs, begirt with paltry expedients of politics and trade, we gather to-night about the old altars, to confess ourselves the worshippers of this perennial Truth and Beauty.

It is proof of wholesome progress that, of late, the controversy respecting education has changed its front. The old babbling about useful knowledge is now well nigh banished to the baser sort. Both parties have seen at length that the ineffectual debate between the advocates of classical and of scientific training was wide of the real mark. A mere classical pedant like Dr. Moberly may avow without a blush that he does not know in what the disciplinary value of the sciences consists, or a mere intellectual gladiator, like Mr. Robert Lowe, may find a pleasure in measuring his strength with the mother from whose breasts he drew it, but more liberal minds are coming to loathe this false antagonism. The great high priest of the utilitarian

philosophy has shamed Oxford's ungrateful son with his appreciative estimate of classical study, while at the same time the most intelligent advocates of scientific training rest the distinctive claims of the sciences to form a part of education, on their disciplinary power. They hold to intellectual culture as the chief end, thus conceding the position on which the defenders of the classical discipline have stood from the beginning. Mr. Atkinson, in his spirited assault on the great schools of England, frankly confesses this. But while both sides have taken the only sound and tenable position, that the comparative value of all studies must be measured by this common standard, the important fact is not overlooked that the strain and tendency of the two methods remain essentially distinct. Says the recently elected President of Harvard University, who has earned the praise of stating more fairly than any other what the new education may be expected to accomplish : —

"Between this course and the ordinary semi-classical course, there is no question of information by the one and formation by the other; of cramming utilitarian facts by one system, and developing mental powers by the other. Both courses form, train, and educate the mind, and one no more than the other, only the disciplines are different. The fact is that the whole tone and spirit of a good college ought to be different in kind from that of a good polytechnic or scientific school."

Such an admission from such a source has a significance that cannot be overlooked. Had this essential distinction between the college and the scientific school been always borne in mind we might have been saved much wild experimenting. I make

it the starting point of this discussion. This distinction will not, however, avail us much if we fail to reach an adequate conception of what culture means. For if by culture we understand no more than the word is often taken to imply, the formal training of the intellectual powers, the question between the classics and the sciences is not worth the ink that has been wasted on it. If we value the study of ancient languages, or the study of modern sciences, simply as mental whetstones on which to sharpen youthful wits, there is no need to set one against the other. The utility of both has been amply vindicated. Surely no one would deem the time was wasted that the younger Pitt spent in translating the rhapsody of Lycophron, or that Peel was idle when as a boy he used to sit on the stone steps of Harrow school-house, and while the bell was ringing write Greek verses for his playmates. And in his memorable speech in introducing the Irish Church Bill, certainly the most marvelous intellectual display that the British parliament has seen during the present generation, Mr. Gladstone has abundantly demonstrated the value of that early discipline which Eton and Oxford gave him. On the other hand, the pure disciplinary uses of scientific study can hardly be overestimated. The mere intellectual powers are nowhere more highly taxed. Whatever opinion we may form of such methods of dealing with the natural sciences as Mr. Wilson tells us he has been practicing for the past eight years at Rugby, the truth of Mill's maxim is indisputable that in the higher physical investigations "reasoning and observation have been carried to their greatest known perfection." It is absurd to

say that such studies do not furnish an intellectual discipline of the highest order. If, therefore, the mere formal training of the mental parts be made the chief aim, there is no question between the classics and the sciences that need cause a long dispute.

But can the meaning of culture be thus restricted? In other words does the value of a study reside chiefly in the intellectual strain required to master it, or is there beyond all this some vital and fruitful relation between its subject matter and the acquiring mind? Is there not a power to inspire as well as a power to train? If effort only be the aim, there might seem some show of reason in the rule of an English teacher that a study is good just in the proportion that it is dry and disagreeable. To stop with this is a hopeless confusion of means and ends. Mere mental training, however nice or rigorous, must remain but the threshold of genuine culture. No matter whether it be the discipline of the observing or of the reflecting powers, no matter whether acquired by dealing with words or things, with the critical comparisons of language, or the analytical processes of science, if we do not go beyond this we content ourselves with a theory of education which Montaigne might correct. "The advantages of our study," he says, "are to become better and wiser."

Not that we would in the least underrate fine intellectual discipline, but it is always the means, not the end. Even when this intellectual discipline is put to its final use in the mastery of new truth, it is yet far short of culture in the highest sense. For mere intellectual activity may be vain and profitless,

and earn at last the bitter verdict, "all is vanity and vexation of spirit." The most varied training of the reasoning powers, the most far-reaching and all-embracing application of them, may still fail to touch the great circumference of spiritual completeness. Culture is the aspiration for all things that may be desired. Its aim is the perfect man. It is realized not in any one-sided development of human nature, nor in the exclusive recognition of one kind of truth, but in the happy, harmonious play of all spiritual energies, in the pursuit of whatever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, and of good report. Thus it has its origin not in scientific curiosity, still less in petty social pride; its true source is man's insatiable longing to be made complete in the image of the infinite perfection. "The foundation of culture," says Emerson, "is the moral sentiment."

This complete inclusion of man's nature within the scope of culture at once renders culture vital and dynamic. It is not the mere perception by the mind of the true order, but the conforming of the whole nature to it. The cultivated man is not the man who has mastered truth, but the man who has been mastered by it; the man in whose soul the love of truth is the sovereign principle; whose inner citadel of reason and desire is garrisoned with all noble and just and rational convictions; whose feet are swift to run in the pathway of gracious and magnanimous acts. Mr. Bright has sneered at culture as a smattering of a little Latin and less Greek. It is not this; nor is it all the knowledge of Latin and Greek possessed by Porson or Bentley, or all the knowledge of the physical sciences possessed by Oersted or Faraday. It is measured not by any variety or extent

of acquisition; it is in the man. All intellectual acquisition is tributary to it, all the faculties do its behests, yet these all are but

> "The shapes the masking spirit wears."

Culture sucks the sweetness from all laws, from all civilization. Apprehended in its true meaning, all things that men have sought after are its ministering servants. Not mind alone, but will, emotion, sensibility are the material with which it works. It combines them all in prolific alliance. It bears its fruit in the indestructible harvest of sweet and beautiful souls. In this sense culture is its own end. It is self-sufficing and final. To possess it is to realize the chief good of life. Nor is it merely the aspiration for individual perfection. Resting on the benign principle that we are members one of another, and that the perfection of human nature, as it is the aspiration for one eternal truth and beauty, can only be realized in the unity of one body, culture is not selfish but social, not exclusive but comprehensive, not individual but catholic. A divine judgment on every forced and mechanical method of reform, it is the main-spring of all effectual philanthropy. "The men of culture," says Matthew Arnold, "are the true apostles of equality."

With this definition of culture, there is no need of showing that in any method not the form alone but the subject matter must be of prime importance. The question as to the comparative value of certain courses becomes not merely a question as to their disciplinary power; we must also ask by which study is the mind brought into most fruitful contact with noble, inspiring, stimulating truth. If it be the final

object of a complete and generous education to achieve so far as we may this ideal of compact and proportioned character, plainly those studies must have the preference which touch the mind in its most vital parts, and waken it to most harmonious action. And these must be truths which appeal to the spiritual sense; truths not of form and relation, but of essence; not of inanimate, unconscious nature, but of life and feeling; truths not of expedient application to mere present needs, reaching no interests beyond the range of things seen and temporal; but truths of the supersensuous, eternal world, "truths which wake to perish never."

"Greatness of style in painting," says Ruskin, "is always in exact proportion to nobleness of subject." The rule holds just as well in education, for culture in its highest stage is simply genial assimilation. It is only when commercing with the highest truth that the soul is touched to its finest issues. Never can culture wrest itself from this alliance with the supreme interests of humanity. It ceases to be the expression of completeness and harmony soon as it shuts its eyes to this horizon. The ultramontane De Maistre did not exaggerate this principle when he claimed that educational not less than social institutions must rest on the principles of all existence; and Niebuhr laid down a principle more profound and far-reaching than himself, perhaps, perceived, when, writing to Madame Hensler about the education of his boy, he said, with a sad sincerity, "I shall nurture in him from infancy a firm faith in all that I have lost." As the law of culture is centrality, so it can never be gained when the true centre is lost sight of.

Does it seem the mere summing up of our discussion to say, with J. Stuart Mill, that education has for its object, "besides calling forth the greatest possible quantity of intellectual power, to inspire the intensest love of truth." But the question still remains, in relation to what truth is this most intense love exerted? In the perception of what relations and affinities are these inmost springs of being touched, and the soul thrilled, absorbed, enraptured, with its vision? In contact with what superior forces are these tides of feeling at their flood? There may be joy in the perception of mere mathematical relations, as Newton, when he drew near the demonstration of his great law, was overpowered by his emotion; the mind may be exalted by tracing the broad operation of physical principles, as Kepler cried with rapture, "I read thy thoughts after thee, O God:' yet who will question that the intensest feeling can be aroused only with reference to those questions of the soul that are linked to the eternal poles of the spiritual firmament.

It is this that draws the ineradicable line between literature and science as sources of a complete and noble culture. Remember it is no question here as to their disciplinary power, but as to their capacity to furnish this living bread which must form the diet of all generous souls. It is not the form but the substance that now concerns us. Judged by this rule the sciences must be assigned a lower relative position, as failing to lead the mind to the most invigorating springs of spiritual culture; and a method of discipline in which the sciences are made predominant can never be relied on to achieve the highest end. I am far from wishing to deny the sciences all

moral and esthetic influence, but where this influence can be most clearly traced it will be always found that the spirit of rigid scientific method has been qualified by convictions drawn from an independent source. That sense in nature of "something far more deeply interfused," which is one of the prime characteristics of modern in distinction from ancient literature, is, in fact, a protest of the spiritual nature against the materialistic tendency of modern science.

So far as science comes into contact with the great problems of humanity, it holds a two-fold attitude. In the first place it ignores religion altogether, restricting the study of man's spiritual relations to those ties and obligations simply that connect him with his fellow-man; the position of Mr. Herbert Spencer, to whose cheerless attempts to coördinate the sciences might be applied the words of an old writer, "that like Ulysses wandering through the shades, he met all the ghosts, but could not see the queen." For he not only rejects as failures all attempts to cross the confines of phenomena, he goes to the limit of denying that the human mind has any capacity for apprehending a supreme cause. He does not even rise to the level of worshipping an Unknown God. And in professing this dismal creed it is past doubt that Mr. Spencer does not speak for himself alone. A second position, but one hardly in advance of this, is when Mr. Mill generously concedes that Theism, "under certain conditions," is still an open question. "The positive mode of thought," says he, "is not necessarily a denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the origin of things. The positive philosopher is free to

give his opinion on this subject, according to the weight he attaches to the analogies, which are called marks of design, and to the general traditions of the human race: the value of these evidences is indeed a question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one in which Positive philosophers must necessarily be agreed." Mr. Mill admits, therefore, no nearer approach to Deity than through the inference from design, or external evidence. "In his general philosophy," says Masson, "he provides no room or function whatever for belief as distinct from knowledge." And who that recalls the tone of unconsoled, comfortless sorrow that sighs through the dedication of his essay upon Liberty to the memory of his deceased wife can doubt that, to this capacious and highly trained understanding, the truths which minister the most serene and beneficent discipline to the soul are indeed open questions.

That these carefully expressed opinions of the two foremost English writers who have discussed the logical connections of the sciences must be accepted as a fair exposition of the most advanced speculative opinion among scientific men of the present day will be doubted by no reader of Huxley or Darwin. The unmistakable tone of both is indifference toward those truths which science cannot readily coördinate. This position at times is temperately implied, at times arrogantly asserted, but the result in either case remains the same. It is no exaggeration to affirm that the study of the physical sciences, as the scope and limits of that study are expounded by some of its most eminent professors, excludes the mind from the highest and most pressing questions that concern man as an immortal being. And

a student whose mental diet is drawn exclusively or mainly from these sources must inevitably miss the most vitalizing sources of intellectual culture. The spirit is hopelessly dwarfed on which these shackles have once been fastened.

"There are," as the Duke of Argyll most truly says, "many kinds of priestcraft." In behalf of science some men seem on the point of putting forth an "Index Expurgatorius" of scientific study. It furnishes an instructive lesson to find one of the loudest advocates of intellectual freedom laying down the rule that "whatever is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted to research." But who shall sit on this high tribunal; who shall draw the line where reason ends? Alas! there are "slaves of thought" as well as "slaves of sense," chambers of darkness, in which the soul may wander, more dismal than any dungeon in which the body can be immured. Of all servitude there is none so grinding as servitude to a system of ideas, when the reason, proud, self-satisfied, boasting its emancipation from all vulgar prejudice, repelling with scorn dependence upon any higher guidance, is all the time hopelessly chained by its own processes, weighed down with fetters

"Forged by the imperious, lonely, thinking power."

Even when physical science does not assume this despotic right of legislation respecting the limits of intellectual activity, it may equally sap the highest culture by tempting the soul to lower ranges of inquiry. This point need not be argued; we may appeal to history. If the end and use of literary history be, as Bacon has declared, "not so much

for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning; but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning," we may gain a lesson from the Italian universities. In the fourteenth century Italy had the intellectual preëminence which in the twelfth had belonged to France. But the institutions which had been centres of living thought became, after the Reformation, mere scientific schools. They boast a continuous series of illustrious names, but, with the single exception of Vico, illustrious only in one direction. Says Matthew Arnold: "It shows how insufficient are the natural sciences alone to keep up in a people culture and life, that the Italians, at the end of a period with the natural sciences alone thriving in it, and letters and philosophy moribund, found themselves, by their own confession, with a poverty of general culture, and in an atmosphere unpropitious to knowledge, which they sorrowfully contrast with the condition of other and happier nations."

Is it said, on the other hand, that the method of scientific culture is very different now from what it was in the days of Galileo and Torricelli; I answer, the method has been improved, but the subject matter, with which alone the present discussion is concerned, remains the same. The instruments of investigation are more perfect, but the field itself has not been enlarged. In its widest scope science aims simply at finding a theory of nature; its last word is impersonal, inexorable law. The more complete the absorption of the intellect in purely scientific methods, the more complete the severance from all spiritual intuitions. To the soul imprisoned

within these processes the "*flamentia mœnia mundi*" are walls of brass. Huxley, like Hume, can find no refuge from materialism but in skepticism. Science yields him no more solid ground than this.

The most ringing protest against this absorbing tyranny, in modern times, of the scientific spirit is seen in the wonderful development of modern music. Here the esthetic sensibilities escape the sway of the understanding. The part of man's nature that science does not touch and cannot arouse struggles for expression. "Music," says Taine, "is the organ of the over-refined sensibility, and vague, boundless aspiration of modern life." That refuge from the limitations of corroding every-day existence which coarse natures seek in coarse excitements, is furnished the more cultivated mind in the enchanting melodies of "Orpheus," in the profound sadness that underlies the impetuous movement of "Don Giovanni," and in the linked sweetness of "Fidelio." The serene domain of fancy and imagination which the lively Greek possessed in the fair humanities of old religion now lingers in the modern world of tones; where the dim feeling of the soul for things not dreamed of in earth-born philosophies finds such fit embodiment. Indeed, as I stood the other day with the great multitude which the Jubilee had gathered, and caught the dense waves of sound which beat on the air with almost the solidity of Atlantic billows, it seemed far less a festival of Peace than the fleeing of men and women from that sway of the Common, which, says Goethe, binds us all. Against such wants science can furnish no antidote. On the contrary, science has most in common with these tendencies of a mate-

rialistic civilization. Science addresses the understanding. Along her straight and even path the mind runs with swiftness and precision, but never soars. Her graded course shuns heights and depths alike. Shut up in her luxurious cars the traveler speeds to his journey's end, unconscious that during the night he has had the glitter of the Northern Lights above him or the boiling surges of Niagara beneath. Science discusses Force and Method, but says nothing of God, Freedom, and Immortality. She leads us to the tree of Knowledge; not to the tree of Life.

The distinction and supreme excellence, considered as a part of academic method, of what were aptly termed, in former times, the "Litteræ Humaniores," consist in this contact which they furnish with the central and indestructible interests of the soul. There is, after all, no such music in the spheres as the "still, sad music of humanity." How undying are these wants! The oldest book that time has spared is fresh and new when looked at in this aspect. The problems that troubled the patriarchs are the problems that trouble us. The circle that began with Job comes round again with Faust. The moral and esthetic influence of science is limited and indirect, but in converse with literature we feel a power that is close and living; we tread the overshadowing verge of the great mysteries that have baffled sages and saints; our hearts throb in unison with all that man has hoped or feared; we wrestle with him in his midnight conflicts with unknown foes; we pillow our heads beside him, and dream his heavenly dreams.

Were the study of the classics no more than a

school-room drill it might be difficult to show that some modern tongues could not be used with the same advantage. But surely the tale of Troy divine has a higher use than to furnish to the Greek grammars painful lists of exceptions. The highest value of all literature is in its substance, not its form. Bacon calls it the first distemper of learning when men study words. A man may waste years in the fruitless labor of wearing out his dictionary, and yet die without catching a sound of the infinite melody of the many-voiced sea; while Keats, who knew no Greek, by the subtlety of a kindred poetic sense, filched some of its fairest flowers from old Parnassus. Unless our classical discipline goes beyond mere grammatical analysis, we may as well dismiss the classics from our curriculum. The doubtful advantage otherwise derived from them will hardly compensate for the toil and trouble. Ascham tells us that Queen Elizabeth never took Greek or Latin grammar in hand after the first declining of a noun and a verb.

Accepting literature in its widest sense as the vehicle for expressing the whole varied and subtle experience of humanity, including in it whatever of genuine and noble utterance, whether in poetry, in philosophy, in history, and how ample and manifold its material as a means of highest culture! How high its reach, how broad and comprehensive its scope! What shapes it evokes! What pictures it holds up before us! What joy, what sorrow, what triumph, what despair; what biting accents of doubt and mockery; what angel voices of faith and love! The anguish of Lear; the troubled conscience of Macbeth; the mental torture of Othello; the introspection of

Hamlet; do these speak to us in a foreign tongue? The spiritual struggles of Augustine; the haunted rhymes of Dante; the doubts of Pascal; the sentimentalism of Rousseau; what have we in all this but ourselves, sketched in larger outlines, and dyed in deeper tints?

Mr. Herbert Spencer speaks with a sneer of "such as care not to understand the architecture of the heavens, but are deeply interested in some contemptible controversy about the intrigues of Mary Queen of Scots." Had his philosophy gone a little deeper he would have guessed the reason. The moral laws that appeal to the conscience are more vital than the physical laws that are comprehended by the intellect. A story of human sorrow and grief touches the heart more nearly than any star shining in the milky way. In the practical problems before us we feel an interest that we cannot feel in any question of astronomy. Life and death are more mysterious, more awful, than gravitation or chemical affinity; what we are, and what we shall be, we are forced to ask ourselves with a solicitude that no inquiry about the origin of species or the law of metamorphosis can ever cause; heirs of immortal hopes, even Mr. Huxley's question whether all protoplasm be not proteinaceous, does not sum up all we want to know!

In thus defining the class of studies which must form the basis of all high and generous culture, I am not unmindful of the fact that some of the studies which I have grouped under the broad designation of literary, in distinction from scientific, as moral philosophy and history, admit scientific method, and are commonly classed among the sciences. Moral phi-

losophy has always held this rank, nor is there any reason why it should be refused to history. For if not the foundation, history is undeniably the verification of the social sciences. Mr. Goldwin Smith, with a singular confusion of ideas, complains that the founders of the new physical science of history have to lay the foundation in what seems the quicksand of free will. "Let those," says he, "who have studied the science of man and history, predict a single event by means of these sciences." This objection springs from an altogether exaggerated and erroneous notion of what science undertakes to do. Prediction is, under no circumstances, part of its proper function. Science simply discerns a certain order, and is only competent to say that in case that order be maintained, results that are involved in it may be expected. It does not detract from the claim of medicine to be called a science that the most skillful physician cannot predict the day and the hour when some individual patient will be struck with sudden death: it does not detract from the claim of geology to be called a science that no observation of Murchison or Dana could forewarn men of the frightful convulsion that devastated South America. This line between the physical and moral sciences, with reference to prediction, has been altogether too loosely drawn. Says a much more discriminating thinker than Mr. Goldwin Smith, I mean the late Sir Cornewall Lewis: "Positive politics, like anatomy or physiology, does not, properly speaking, predict anything, though it furnishes general truths, by which the determination of future facts may be facilitated." History, in this respect, differs from the physical sciences chiefly in the fact that its phenomena do not repeat themselves.

But while I thus claim for history, equally with moral philosophy or psychology, the application of scientific method, and trace all the advance made in this study, in recent times, to the recognition of this fact, I am just as much persuaded that the supreme and unequaled value of those studies as means of culture arises from precisely those features of them which are not scientific. It is not because moral philosophy and history may be ranked as sciences, as Mr. Herbert Spencer and men of his school would argue, but because they are much more than sciences, and because they introduce the mind to the presence of mysteries too august and unfathomable to be brought within the confines of any sciences, that their educational influence is so ennobling. So soon as they are reduced to the rank of mere sciences we have but the skeleton remaining. We are like the poet when he had fetched his sea-born treasures home, and found

> "The poor, unsightly, noisome things
> Had left their beauty on the shore,
> With the sun and the sand and the wild uproar."

Take such a system as that of Bain, where moral philosophy is merged in psychology, and where psychology in turn is rooted in physiology, the inner sanctuary of the reason being reduced to a mere phantasy of consciousness. Whatever may be the merits of such a system as a dry outline map of the human faculties, what satisfaction can it afford to a mind putting itself those questions which, in its deeper moods, it can never fail to put. How does it help us to conceive of our thinking, feeling selves as only complex bundles of nerve-currents, all diversities of knowledge and belief, of character and genius,

resulting from their endless action and reaction? What interest would this study of ourselves retain were it thus cut off from the deeper ontological questions in which, like all the physical sciences, it lies imbedded?

> "Sure, He, that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and godlike reason
> To fust in us unused."

Or, take such a view of history as that of the late Mr. Buckle, when the imposing range of illustration served for a time to veil the shallowness of thought. According to this writer, history is simply scientific: "For in the moral," he says, "as in the physical world, nothing is anomalous, nothing is unnatural, nothing is strange; all is order, symmetry, and law." In other words, there is no interest for us in the checkered story of human progress, more touching, more profound, than that with which we watch the growth of a cactus, or note the pathway of a comet. Hence the conditions of human progress are intellectual, not moral; the chief concern of the student is with tables of statistics; he can rise no higher than the recognition of regular phenomena; all idea of an over-arching destiny, or a directing Providence, is scouted as absurd. History is made by this method merely a register of such facts as may be grouped and classified in some petty system, its pages as dry and lifeless and uninspiring as those of last year's almanac.

No one, of course, who admits a progress in the history of humanity can deny the presence of some controlling principle by which that progress has been shaped. But when we say that the course of

nature is determined by invariable laws we should remember that while those laws are invariable in their nature, they are subject to incessant variation in their application. History, like nature, is governed by variable combinations of invariable forces. In this sense law is not, as commonly conceived, an adamantine barrier; it is not rigid, not immutable, not invariable; it is plastic, subtle, changeful, these endless transformations being determined by a regnant principle that lies behind the veil of phenomenal existence. What we dignify with the name of laws are but methods of a supreme will. "The supernatural order," says Ozanam, "rules, enlightens, and fertilizes the order of nature," and the principle is just as true when applied to history. As the events of history are in part results of will, a physical theory fails to account even for the physical facts.

We are all familiar with Aristotle's maxim that poetry is more weighty and philosophical than history; for those of us who have never read it in the original must have come across it in the fine paraphrase of Sir Philip Sidney. And using the term history in the sense in which it is defined in the preface of Polybius, the maxim is correct; for as Sidney puts it, "the historian is tied, not to what should be, but to what is; to the particular truth of things; not to the general reason." Yet Revelation has given history a meaning which not even Thucidides conceived. We tread the shores of a new world when we turn from the gloomy pages of Tacitus to the triumphant visions of Augustine. Bossuet, Vico, Bunsen, mark successive phases of a change by which history from being a mere discipline for the practical administration of affairs, has become a

study of human destiny, addressed less to the lower than to the higher reason; equally with poetry an intuition of the spiritual, the universal, the eternal. "The highest idea of history," says Schelling, "can never be realized through the understanding."

With this view of history as a progressive, ever unfolding verification and illustration of spiritual truths, I feel that its influence in giving tone and shape to all higher culture can hardly be exaggerated. The true historic spirit will always be a liberal, a catholic, but at the same time a humble, a reverential spirit. Says Carlyle: "Science has done much for us; but it is a poor science that would hide from us the great, deep, sacred infinitude of nescience, whither we can never penetrate, upon which all science swims as a mere superficial film." We learn tolerance as we see how strangely mixed in all men's beliefs have been truth and error; we look with distrust on our most cherished plans of reform as we remember how the hopes of the best and wisest have been often baffled; and bearing in mind how this great mystery of Time, that rolls on without haste, without rest, is but a moment embosomed in eternity, we murmur "Who is worthy to open the Book and to loose the seals thereof?"

History, Philosophy, Poetry, Art, these are then the sources of that supreme culture in which the ideal of academic method is reached. How urgent the need of such culture in this age and this land I need not add. We hear much about an education suited to the times. But an education truly suited to the times is not such an education as the times ask for, an education that flatters our overweening conceit of material progress, that drives us with

new force along the path on which we are already rushing with railroad speed; we want a corrective for this distemper; a power that shall struggle with these debilitating influences, and strengthen our civilization at precisely those points where it is most weak. Culture should lead, not follow. That indefinite tribunal which goes under the convenient designation of "public sentiment" has no right to meddle with these high matters. "The end of education," says Richter, "is to elevate *above* the spirit of the age."

In our politics, which are allowed to usurp such a disproportioned share of our time and thought, how much we need this corrective of high culture to instruct us in the worthlessness of most of the results at which politicians aim, to lessen our exaggerated estimate of the power of legislation; to cure us of the folly of confounding the right to vote with the grand end of life; in our religion how much we need it to enlarge our scope of doctrine; to save us from our distressing faith in mechanical appliances; to lift us above our little sects and systems; to make us realize that the Son of Man came that we might have life, and that we might have it more abundantly; in all our doing and seeking, in our business and pleasure, how much we need this wise, sweet, balanced temper which takes things at their true value, which refuses to confound means with ends; which recognizes all good; which strives after all perfection! In our strenuous, uncompromising moods how gladly should we welcome this gracious but invincible ally!

I know it has been questioned whether in such a social state as ours this highest culture will be

cared for. The unmistakable leaning of an industrial democracy is towards the sciences. Not only do the sciences admit of more immediate application to those arts which a material civilization rates so high; but their method and scope suit the exaggerated estimate of mere mental power by which such a civilization is characterized. No doubt Knowledge is power; but it should be something more. It is much to our credit as a people that we have built so many miles of railroad and of telegraph; that we have spanned so many rivers and crossed so many mountain chains; but if this is all we have to show, we shall make, after all, but a poor figure among the nations. It was a great thing to lift Chicago out of the mud; and so it was a great thing to pile up the pyramids, but these are not the things for which men, as they beheld them, have blessed God.

The disposition to lay such undue stress on things which belong to the mere shell of life and do not touch its vital essence, is the perilous side of the great social and political experiment which we are making. And the most discouraging part of it is that the influences which should correct, in many cases only intensify the evil. It grieves a right-minded man to see reported in the papers the saying of a preacher of the Gospel that the Pacific railroad would give us more enlarged conceptions of the divine attributes. But men have walked humbly with God who went on foot; the poor in spirit, the meek, the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, were on the earth before the days of Watt and Stephenson. How much are we benefited by crossing the continent in six days, if our object is

greedy and selfish; why lay new wires beneath the Atlantic waves if, after all,

> —"the light-outspeeding telegraph
> Bears nothing on its beams?"

Does it seem that Religion is the corrective for all this? But the working of the religious sentiment is always shaped by the circumstances under which it manifests itself. In its specific forms it too often loses sight of its final aim. This aim is the constant clothing of man in the stature of an ampler spiritual completeness; but, alas, man's own apprehension of this aim is blurred and indistinct, so that religion, instead of being the spur to all perfection, becomes the excuse for narrowness, for resting satisfied with a stunted and enfeebled growth. And just in proportion as the religious sentiment is sincere and powerful does it often become a barrier to progress. A man of limited intellectual range, who is at the same time a man of sincere religious conviction, is apt to be the most impracticable and unreasonable of men. Nowhere is the illumination of sound culture so much needed as in that sphere where the confounding of light and darkness entails such disastrous consequences.

In no country in the world is the religious sentiment so genuine, so energetic, as with us, and nowhere does there exist such multiplicity of sects, such endless disposition to lay exclusive stress on single truths, such unhealthy fostering of selfish instincts of spiritual life. It is pitiful to think of the ideal of Christianity enforced in much of our religious literature, and by so many of our religious teachers. I would not, in the least, underrate the real good that religion achieves even in its most

imperfect forms. It is the infirmity of our nature, that we see in part, but surely it should be our constant aim to seek after better things. We have a superabundant religious energy. We rush about doing good with only less of zeal than we rush about in pursuit of money; we carry the Gospel into all the earth. But, after all, the kingdom cometh without observation. There are things more to be desired than making proselytes or multiplying churches.

If we are ever to have this high culture in the United States, is it not clear that our colleges must be its nurseries? Is not this the proper aim of that distinctive academic method, which I have been all along asserting? Is it not the supreme function of our colleges to supply this gracious and ennobling ministry? "The American College," as President Eliot has truly said, "is an institution without a parallel." Its aim must not be confounded with the aim of the common school, which seeks to effect the greatest good for the greatest number, nor with the aim of the scientific or professional school, which aims at special results in a particular direction. The training of a college, to be effective, must be, to a considerable degree, exclusive; it eliminates the best material, and aims at the highest mark; achieving its end, not in any special preparation for special avocations, but in the enlargement of the whole nature, in the expansion of the spiritual senses to just and adequate apprehension of all the ends of living.

We gain nothing by baptizing our colleges with high-sounding names, and hopelessly confounding the object of academic with the object of university instruction. We need great universities, in-

stitutions where the highest instruction shall be communicated in all departments, where libraries, cabinets, and all scientific apparatus, shall be provided; but we shall get them soonest, not by wiping out our old college course, but by making it more distinctive and exacting. It cannot be recognized too clearly, that the functions of the college and university are distinct. The university cannot be too varied in its courses; cannot be too well furnished with collections of every kind; is better for standing in a great centre, and being thronged with crowds of eager students; but the best results of college discipline are secured by severe training in few studies; great libraries and museums are not essential, and an increase of students beyond a certain limit is an evil. The aim should be, not so much to have many, as to have them carefully matched.

The question has been asked, whether in the fundamental idea of the college, we are not at fault. Before we decide this question, let us remember that in this country the fundamental idea of the college has never yet been realized. Our oldest institutions were founded just at the crisis when, at Oxford and Cambridge, the colleges were supplanting the old mediæval universities, and hence they received the name of colleges. And no doubt when the President and Fellows of Harvard College were incorporated the purpose was to introduce the English college system. But whatever the original purpose may have been, it was never carried out. Long rows of brick buildings, with less of architectural beauty than any well-built cotton mill may boast, do not make a college. Neither do dry, formal recitations to a tutor. All this may be found in any pub-

lic school. The fundamental idea of a college is that of an academic family. This is the substance of which our American college system retains the shell alone. This it is that constitutes the distinctive excellence of the English colleges; this, that with all their faults, makes Oxford and Cambridge the seats of such serene culture, the haunts of so many beautiful and gracious memories. Who that has read the delightful memoir of Keble, by his life-long friend and biographer, Sir John Coleridge, will need to be reminded of that apt illustration of what I mean, in the charming picture which he gives of college life at Corpus sixty years ago, when Thomas Arnold had just been elected scholar, a "college," says Coleridge, "very small in its numbers, and humble in its buildings, but to which we and our fellow students formed an attachment never weakened in the after course of our lives." It is the fashion of the hour to speak with contempt of the English collegiate system, to decry the methods as antiquated, and the studies as useless. But a system which kindled the enthusiasm and retained the affection of two such opposite natures as Arnold and Keble, which armed one with heroic panoply for the thickest of life's battle, and sent the other to a remote country parish, to lead a life whose singular purity and grace has breathed itself in heavenly music across oceans and over continents, must have had in it some feature which we can ill afford to spare.

This subtle charm of Oxford, the source of this deathless fascination, was what Keble, borrowing a word from his favorite Aristotle, used to call its ἦθος, that is the toning or general color that it diffused over the whole character, imparting a peculiar

gentleness and grace to the habitual exercise of the vigorous moral virtues. And who can fail to see that this peculiar tone, this ineffable and characteristic grace that steeps Oxford in sentiment, and bathes her with enchantment, is the result in very great measure of that development of the idea of academic fellowship, which marks the English universities from their great continental rivals. In other words, it is the distinctive college spirit; the intimate fellowship of scholars gathered under one roof, and sitting around one board; the close contact of cultivated minds; the familiar exchange, not only between men of the same rank, but between pupil and instructor, meeting in private chambers and in classes of half-a-dozen, so painfully contrasting in all its aspects with the unloveliness of our college life, and the frigid, formal intercourse of student and professor.

We need, then, to import into our academic life a different spirit. For, of course, such culture as I have been upholding cannot be imparted by mechanical and formal methods. The impulse must be living, personal; it must come not from books, but men. The mere schoolmaster is never more out of place than in the professor's chair. I share to the full Lessing's contempt for what he called professoring. Unless mind touches mind there will be no heat. We make much of our improved methods and text books, but after all they matter less than we suppose. A genial, opulent, overflowing soul is the secret of success in teaching. To have read Euripides with Milton, were better than having the latest critical edition. Not the methods but the men gave Rugby and Sorèze their fame. And

hence the advantage, in a college, of smaller numbers, where the students, brought into daily familiar contact with superior minds, may catch unconsciously the earnestness, the urbanity, the kindred glow which only such personal contact can communicate.

All inspirations are vital. The spirit of a living creature is in the wheels. It was in strict conformity with this supreme spiritual law that when the highest, holiest truth was manifested, it was manifested in a Living Person. And here, that nothing in this discussion be misunderstood, let me distinctly say, what I have all along implied, that the highest, most perfect culture is only possible through Him in whom alone we are made complete. For I have aimed to show that culture is not simply intellectual, but covers the whole nature. It is such quickening of the vital springs of being as can come only from a person. It is love of the Supreme Perfection, such love as can only be created by an inward loving apprehension of Him in whom it was revealed. The goal of human perfection can be reached in no other way. Without this personal fellowship with the Incarnate Life and Truth, we are cut off from the Sovereign Quickener. We hew out for ourselves broken cisterns instead of drinking of that river of God which is full of water. We garnish a sepulchre which within is full of rottenness and death.

And as the supreme, all constraining power of the Great Teacher was rooted in his transcendent personality, in itself a judgment of all evil, an allurement to all good, so in a lower sense is it not less true of all teachers. We have been discussing

methods; but let us not forget that method, after all, is secondary. "To write well," says Milton, "a man must be himself a poem;" so to teach well his inmost soul must be imbued with the sweetness, the generosity, the simplicity of that divine philosophy which it is his highest duty to inculcate. The springs which he causes to gush forth can never rise higher than their fount. We cannot be too earnestly persuaded that all fruitful academic reform must find its beginning here. And if our colleges are destined ever to become the seats of this serene culture, the chosen haunts of those gracious, ennobling influences, it will be chiefly for the reason that those to whom the sacred office of instruction is intrusted, warming to their work, and gathering their pupils about them in an emulation and rivalry of love, shall wield that spontaneous, rhythmic influence which flows "from soul to soul, and lives forever and forever."

I have been asserting a distinctive academic culture. It has been my aim to show that the progress of knowledge, the immense increase in the extent and variety of the sciences, instead of rendering the need of this distinctive culture less, has only made it greater. Let us banish the false notion of any antagonism between this culture, and education that has a different scope and aim. It is not necessary to depreciate the value of specific technical training in order to exalt the worth of this more complete development. Such an institution as the Technological School in Boston is doing a good work. It supplies a need which our colleges could supply only through the sacrifice of a greater good. I approve its method, and rejoice in its success. In

our common schools we are doing a better work. We cannot forget that the great mass of the community, from the necessity of the case, can receive no other training than they receive here. I advocate a distinctive academic culture, not in place of these, not in opposition to them, but in alliance with them, to preside over and direct them. I advocate it, because scientific training, unless regulated and qualified by a broader culture, can only end in debilitating, instead of enlarging, the spiritual nature; because popular instruction, unless constantly invigorated and enlightened by higher intellectual forces, can move only in a dull mechanical routine. For education must receive its shape from above, not from beneath. Unless we do something to raise as well as to diffuse, there is danger that the sneer of Renan will prove well founded and the New World atone for its neglect of superior instruction, by a long course of vulgarity of thought and brutality of manners.

I have not then, in the view which I have advanced, been pleading for a puny, dilettanti culture; a culture remote from life and its serious concerns. On the contrary, the culture I have been asserting keeps the soul in constant, inspiring contact with the deepest springs of action. It is not selfish and individual, but permeates the whole social organism. Itself accessible only to its elect, its benediction descends on all. Its influence is wide as the influence of spiritual truth. For man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

ADDRESS

AT THE

UNVEILING OF THE MONUMENT TO ROGER WILLIAMS IN THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, OCTOBER 16, 1877.

WE bring to a close, in these services, a long purposed work. A full year before yonder shores were lighted by the flames of the burning Gaspee, when this State was still a dependency of the British crown, and the rule of George the Third was as undisputed by the Pawtuxet as the Thames, the freemen of Providence, assembled in public meeting, resolved to erect a monument to the "founder of the town and colony." The population at that date scarcely exceeded four thousand souls, and it is unlikely that anything more was contemplated than a simple memorial to mark the western slope where, for well nigh a century, the rays of the setting sun had gently touched his grave. The swift march of events, the quarrel with the mother-country, the pressure of the revolutionary struggle, hindered a project, which still never wholly passed from mind, till after the lapse of another century the munificent bequest of one of his lineal descendants made any longer delay unworthy of a prosperous and public-spirited community. Yet we need not deplore a

postponement which has caused the original plan to be carried out on a scale so far beyond what was first intended. Let us rather congratulate ourselves that the final execution has been reserved for a time when the real merit of Roger Williams is much better appreciated, and for a generation whose ampler means allow a more adequate tribute, and for an artist, who charged with the difficult task of embodying in ideal form one of whom no authentic likeness has been preserved, has divined with such admirable insight those characteristics of the man which establish his chief claim to our veneration. And if to any who now hear me it may seem that some more central or conspicuous site befits so elaborate a work, let it be borne in mind that this statue of Roger Williams stands in the midst of fields which he received as a free gift from the great sachems Canonicus and Miantunnomi in grateful recognition of the many kind services he had continually done them, which for more than two centuries remained in the uninterrupted possession of his posterity, and which have only passed from their hands to be forever preserved for the public use. What more fitting site could have been selected than a spot which thus recalls the estimate in which he was held by the original possessors of the soil?

These ceremonies would be incomplete without a brief summary of the career and services of him to whom we pay this unusual tribute. In thus setting up, with solemn religious rite, a memorial whose enduring bronze and granite shall attest to coming generations our estimate of Roger Williams, we owe to ourselves, we owe to those who shall gaze upon it with respectful interest after we are gone, a de-

liberate statement of the grounds on which that estimate is based. And on the present occasion such a survey is something more than a becoming close to these public exercises. For as we consider the thoughtful features that have just been unveiled, we cannot forget that they are the lineaments of one respecting whom the judgments of men have been much divided, of one whose career has given rise to more difference of opinion than has existed respecting any prominent actor in our early New England history. There is, therefore, the more need to-day that we place on record, even at the risk of reciting a familiar story, the considerations that have moved us to this step. A work which three generations have waited to see finished ought surely to be the fruit of intelligent conviction. Let us then seek to set before us precisely what manner of man Roger Williams was, and precisely what work it was that he accomplished. After he has lain in the grave for well-nigh two hundred years the time has surely come for an unprejudiced estimate of the real service which he rendered as well to this community, as to the world. A proper local pride may make us jealous of the good name of one whose career gives the distinctive significance to our early history, yet if he has really done anything worthy to be remembered, he does not stand in need of mere eulogium from us. The best service we can pay his memory is to place him in his true light; to assign him his rightful rank among the venerated names of the past; to make him if possible stand forth on the page of history in all the essential outlines of his character as clear and distinct as, by the hand of genius, his visible form is made to stand before us now.

And should the natural inquiry here arise, why has the merit of Roger Williams been so much more debated than that of his contemporaries, some of the foremost of whom have left on record such a generous estimate of his character and motives, the simple answer is, that those who have judged him most favorably, and those who have passed the most adverse sentence on him, have equally agreed in assigning the most conspicuous place to what was only a passing episode in his career. It was his fate, as soon almost as he landed on these shores, to be placed in antagonism with a singularly compact and homogeneous community, a community whose early eminence in letters afforded it a marked advantage in impressing upon posterity its own view of any transaction in which it bore a part. It almost of necessity followed, that when the earliest attempts were made to vindicate his memory, the line of attack became the line of defense, and thus a wholly disproportioned space was assigned to his controversy with the Massachusetts colony. Unfortunately those who for a long time felt most interest in this controversy failed to estimate correctly its true aspects. On the one hand it was hastily assumed that the course pursued by the Puritans could be successfully defended only by representing Roger Williams in the most odious light, while on the other hand it was supposed with as little reason that his reputation could be vindicated best by denouncing in most unmeasured terms the inconsistency which fled from persecution in the old world only in turn to persecute for mere opinions' sake in the new. Hence Roger Williams came to be held up either as a headstrong enthusiast, a disturber of the public

peace, or as a martyr for conscience sake, who suffered exile solely for his unflinching advocacy of the great principle of religious liberty. But this episode had no such supreme significance as has been assigned to it. Had his career closed with this we should not be here to-day, for it is not on any attitude which he assumed at this time, that his claim to be remembered rests. It is only in the light thrown back upon it by subsequent events that the controversy demands even a passing notice on this occasion. When in the month of February, 1631, Roger Williams landed at Boston, from the ship Lyon, he was still a young man. While very little is known respecting him, his whole later history leaves no doubt that when young he was ardent, impulsive, fearless, fond of disputation, perfectly frank in the expression of his opinions. From the language with which Winthrop notes his arrival as a "godly minister," he would seem to have received orders in the English church; but he had renounced gains and preferments rather than act with a doubting conscience in conforming to a national establishment. Though he came on the flood-tide of the great Puritan migration, he did not come as a part of it. It does not appear that he was specially concerned in the memorable enterprise which had just been undertaken by Winthrop and his associates; for he never became a freeman of the colony where he made his residence. In the series of shrewd, well-considered steps by which a private trading corporation was silently converted into a body politic, he seems to have felt no interest; nor was the ultimate success of the experiment a matter which he ever had at heart. It may be doubted whether his mind

even took in its full dimensions. A man of speculation rather than action, an enthusiast in the pursuit of ideal truth, he came a pilgrim to these shores in search not of a thrifty and well organized plantation "with a religious idea behind it," but of a promised land where truth and peace might have their "endless date of pure and sweetest joys." In his own touching words, he had "tasted the bitterness of death," that he might "keep his soul undefiled." It was a foregone conclusion that such a man should come in conflict with the community which received him at first with cordial welcome; a community without a parallel in the history of colonial enterprise, welded together by a common faith, inflexibly resolved on the accomplishment of definite ends, earnest to establish a reign of righteousness, but intolerant of difference of opinion, regarding liberty of conscience with equal fear and hate, and above all, a community where civil and religious institutions were so singularly blended that the advancement of pure religion was viewed as one of the primary functions of the civil magistrate. Against this community, so jealous of their rights, so resolved on the exclusive enjoyment of them, "knit together as one man, always having before their eyes their commission as members of the same body," the headstrong enthusiast dashed himself. He had hardly landed when we find him denouncing the Boston congregation for not separating wholly from the Church of England. He next raised a question respecting the power of the civil magistrate which cut at the roots of the theocratic system already so firmly planted; he opposed the freeman's oath; and he did all this not in a period

of profound calm when the freest discussion of fundamental principles might be safely tolerated, but at an anxious crisis when the very existence of the company was at stake; when it was known that in the Privy Council grave charges were insinuated that the colonists had virtually cast off their allegiance, and were planning to be wholly separated from the church and laws of England; when an order in council had actually been obtained for the production of the charter; when the influx of new-comers threatened to weaken essentially, if not destroy, that unity of belief and action which the founders of the colony had regarded as a fundamental condition of their enterprise.

Under these circumstances, the course pursued towards Roger Williams was not exceptional. What was done to him had been done in repeated instances before. Within the first year of its settlement the colony had passed sentence of exclusion from its territory upon no less than fourteen persons. It was the ordinary method by which a corporate body would deal with those whose presence no longer seemed desirable. Conceiving themselves to be by patent the exclusive possessors of the soil, — soil which they had purchased for the accomplishment of their personal and private ends, — the colonists never doubted their competency to fix the terms on which others should be allowed to share in their undertaking. So far from being exceptionally harsh, their treatment of Roger Williams was marked by unusual lenity. His "sorrowful winter flight," when for fourteen weeks he was so severely tossed, "not knowing what bread or bed did mean," was no part of the official sentence pronounced against him, but hardship which he voluntarily assumed.

While there is some discrepancy in the contemporary accounts of this transaction, there is entire agreement on one point, that the assertion by Roger Williams of the doctrine of "soul-liberty" was not the head and front of his offending. Whatever was meant by the vague charge in the final sentence that he had "broached and divulged new and dangerous opinions, against the authority of magistrates," it did not mean that he had made emphatic the broad doctrine of the entire separation of church and state. We have his own testimony on this point. In several allusions to the subject in his later writings, — and it can hardly be supposed that in a matter which he felt so sorely his memory would have betrayed him, — he never assigns to his opinion respecting the power of the civil magistrate more than a secondary place. He repeatedly affirms that the chief causes of his banishment were his extreme views regarding separation, and his denouncing of the patent. Had he been himself conscious of having incurred the hostility of the Massachusetts colony for asserting the great principle with which he was afterwards identified, he would surely have laid stress upon it. It is true that almost from the day he landed, some form of this principle seemed floating before his mind. One of the very earliest charges brought against him was, having broached the novel opinion that the magistrate might not punish the breach of the Sabbath, nor any other offense against the first table; and in the final proceedings this same offense was made the ground of the foremost accusation brought against him. It is clear that the conviction had a strong hold upon his own mind, and it is not un-

likely that "in the spacious circuits of his musing" he already saw the fundamental place it held; but it is equally clear that in the long controversy it had become covered up by other issues, and that his opponents, at least, did not regard it as his most dangerous heresy. So far as it was a mere speculative opinion it was not new. It had been explicitly affirmed in the Confession of the English Baptists at Amsterdam, put forth in the year 1611, and, according to Cotton, there were many known to hold this opinion in Massachusetts, who were tolerated "not only to live in the commonwealth, but also in the fellowship of the churches."

I repeat that the reputation of Roger Williams has suffered because such undue importance has been assigned to the transaction which I have just narrated. When carefully examined it will be seen that no such significance belongs to it. To upbraid the Puritans as unrelenting persecutors, or extol Roger Williams as a martyr to the cause of religious liberty, is equally wide of the real fact. On the one hand, the controversy had its origin in the passionate and precipitate zeal of a young man whose relish for disputation made him never unwilling to encounter opposition, and on the other, in the exigencies of a unique community, where the instincts of a private corporation had not yet expanded into the more liberal policy of a body politic. If we cannot impute to the colony any large statesmanship, so neither can we wholly acquit Roger Williams of the charge of mixing great principles with some whimsical conceits. The years which he passed in Massachusetts were years of discipline and growth, when he doubtless already cherished in

his active brain the germs of the principles which he afterwards developed; but the fruit was destined to be ripened under another sky. Though he himself, at a later period, complained bitterly of the treatment which he had received, yet it cannot be doubted that for him exile from Massachusetts was an incalculable boon. As rightly put by his great antagonist, John Cotton, though in a far deeper and truer sense than was intended, "it was not banishment, but enlargement," — it determined him to another, a wider, a far more beneficent career. Had he remained in Massachusetts, he would only be remembered as a godly but contentious Puritan divine. Removed for a time from the heated atmosphere of controversy, he first saw in its true proportions the great principle which has shed enduring lustre on his name. His personal characteristics also present themselves in a far more engaging light when winning the confidence of the shy Narragansett sachems, than in wrangling with his brethren of the bay. It would almost seem as if Winthrop himself had some presentiment of this larger future that lay before the exile, when, with the kindness that never failed, he urged Williams to steer his course to these shores, "for many high, heavenly and public ends." I pass gladly to consider him as he emerges on this new stage, where his admirable qualities, his benevolence, his intellectual breadth, his rare spiritual insight were revealed in their clearest light. The solemn bar before which the actors in the world's history are made to pass for judgment is not a petty police-court, turning its microscopic eye simply on their shortcomings, but a tribunal which weighs the good against the evil that men

have done, and which fulfills its high and sacred functions not less in applauding the one than in condemning the other. Few, indeed, would remain to claim our reverence if we were only curious about their faults.

It was in the spring of 1636 that Roger Williams, accepting the hint privately conveyed from Winthrop as a "voice from God," began to build and plant on the eastern bank of the Seekonk, a little distance above the present Central Bridge. But upon receiving from the authorities of Plymouth a friendly intimation that he had settled within their bounds, he cheerfully, though with great inconvenience to himself, set out in quest of another habitation. Early in the month of June, when external nature in this region is decked in her loveliest attire, he launched on this brief but memorable voyage. Five companions were with him in his canoe. The pleasing tradition has always been preserved that, as he approached the opposite bank, a group of Indians greeted him with a friendly salutation, and that he stepped to return their welcome on the rock which for years has been one of our cherished historic spots; but which I fear, in the march of modern improvement, is destined to become to our children a mythical locality. Once more embarking, and rounding the two promontories which, with their crowded wharves and network of iron rails, have so little to remind us of the winding shore and fair undulations of peaceful woodland that greeted his gaze, he turned to the north, and paddling till he reached the mouth of a small stream which poured its limpid current into a wide cove, there made his final landing. A spring of delicious water

gushing from the foot of the steep hill probably determined the precise locality. In grateful recognition of the guiding hand which he never doubted had led him in all his way, he named the place Providence.

The name has become familiar on our lips and few, as they now pronounce it, ever pause to consider how much it means. It is a word that carries with it a commentary on the career of him who chose it. The early settlers of Massachusetts brought with them tender memories of the homes they had left behind. In the names which they selected for their new settlements they gave evidence of the touching solicitude with which these memories were cherished. But when the founder of Providence pillowed his weary head for the first time by the mouth of the Mooshausic, his thoughts turned not to an earthly home, but to a home above. Thrice an exile and a pilgrim, he now saw in his dreams only the open skies and the protecting angels of an invisible power. Years after, in writing of this incident, he says: "I turned my course from Salem unto these parts, wherein I may say Peniel, that is, I have seen the face of God." The dreamy, mystical, unworldly temper of Roger Williams is nowhere made more evident than in this unique designation which he selected for his infant settlement.

In thus settling upon the shores of the Narragansett nothing was farther from the thoughts of Williams than to become the founder of a new colony. Still less was it his aim, like Blackstone, who was here before him, merely to escape the tyranny of the "lords brethren," and secure for himself, in

solitude, the largest individual liberty. His end was nobler and more unselfish than that. The great purpose that led him here was simply to preach the gospel to the Indians; to quote his own words, "my sole desire was to do the natives good." The impulse surely was as lofty as that which had led the Puritans, sixteen years before, to seek in Massachusetts, "a place of cohabitation and consortship," where only those who adopted their precise creed should be welcomed to their narrow domain. Already with this end in view he had made, long before his banishment, a diligent study of the native languages. "God was pleased," he writes, "to give me a painful, patient spirit, to lodge with them in their filthy, smoky holes, even while I lived at Plymouth and Salem, to gain their tongue." His exile seemed to open the door to this endeavor. Yet the same benevolence which had led him to make his own misfortunes a means of good to the Indians, constrained him not to refuse an asylum to such as had suffered like himself. Not to promote any private interest, but "out of pity," he permitted others to come with him. A few had joined him while still at Seekonk; more followed him after he had fixed himself at Providence. The territory belonged to him alone. In obtaining it he acted on the principle which he had so earnestly avowed, that the Indians were the rightful proprietors of the lands they occupied, and that no English patent could convey a complete title to it. But though he was obliged to mortgage his house in Salem to secure the means of making presents to the Narragansett sachems, it was not by money that the land was purchased. "It was not," he affirms, "thou-

sands, nor tens of thousands of money that could have bought an English entrance into this bay, but I was the procurer of the purchase by that language, acquaintance and favor with the natives, and other advantages, which it pleased God to give me." The land was conveyed to him by formal deed from Canonicus and Miantunnomi, and "was his as much as any man's coat upon his back." Thus circumstances which he had not at first foreseen, caused a modification of his plan. Desiring to make his purchase a "shelter for persons distressed for conscience," and considering the condition of divers of his countrymen, he "communicated his said purchase unto his loving friends." In accordance with this modified purpose, he executed a deed giving an equal share with himself to twelve of his companions, "and such others as the major part shall admit into the same fellowship of vote." Such was the simple beginning of the little settlement long known as the Providence plantations. Had Roger Williams loved power, he might have secured for himself some kind of preëminence. The philanthropic Penn did not disdain such a course. But the founder of Providence chose to admit his associates on terms of perfect equality. In providing a shelter for the poor and the persecuted, "according to their several persuasions," he established a commonwealth in "the unmixed form of a pure democracy."

Still, remarkable as were the circumstances under which the infant community struggled into life, these do not furnish its distinctive claim to our attention. It was not for the broad foundation on which it rested all civil power, but for the novel limitation which it imposed on the exercise of that

power, that it holds a place in history so disproportioned to its importance in every other respect. Opened as an asylum for the distressed in conscience, it seems from the outset to have been tacitly assumed that conscience should never be restrained. Hence Williams, in seeking the advice of Winthrop as to the mode by which the new settlement could best become "compact in a civil way and power," makes no allusion to the principle which he had asserted so recently in Massachusetts. But it would be absurd to argue from this omission that the principle had lost any of its importance in his mind. When the actual covenant was drawn up, which became the basis of public order, in extracting from the inhabitants a pledge of active and passive obedience to all orders, made by the major consent, for the public good, the provision was expressly added that this should be "only in civil things."

Thus, for the first time in history, a form of government was adopted which drew a clear and unmistakable line between the temporal and the spiritual power, and a community came into being which was an anomaly among the nations. The compact signed by the Pilgrims in the cabin of the Mayflower has been praised as the earliest attempt to institute a government on the basis of the general good; surely the covenant subscribed by the settlers of Providence deserves a place beside it as a first embodiment in an actual experiment of the great principle of unrestricted religious liberty. In either case the settlements were small and the immediate results were unimportant; but the principles were world-wide in their application. The Prov-

idence document was, in fact, the more significant, since the political maxim that lay imbedded in the Mayflower compact was implied rather than consciously affirmed, while the principle to which Roger Williams and his associates set their hands was intentionally and deliberately adopted as the corner-stone of the new structure they were building.

The community which grew into shape at Providence embodied in a "lively experiment" the principle which Roger Williams had so strenuously maintained. Let us now examine his position, and ascertain precisely in what sense this experiment was novel. Had we no other information than the vague charges brought against him in Massachusetts, or the significant clause attached to the Providence covenant, his exact theory would have remained a matter of conjecture. How clearly it was held, how carefully it was limited, there would have been no way of accurately ascertaining. But fortunately he has left his views on record, and we may know precisely what meed of praise is due him. He has himself supplied us with abundant means of making ourselves familiar with the arguments with which he "maintained the rocky strength" of his impregnable position. When in England, engaged in procuring from the Long Parliament the earliest patent for Rhode Island, he found time, amid engrossing duties, to publish his famous volume, "The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience," and it is in this volume, printed in the year 1644, that we find the first full expression of his opinions. They are views which he had long been meditating, which it cannot be doubted he was revolving in some form when he first arrived in

Massachusetts, but which, it can be as little doubted, meditation and experience had matured. The book throughout is of a piece with his whole previous career. It was rapidly written; as he tells us himself, "in change of rooms and corners, yea, sometimes in variety of strange houses, sometimes in fields in the midst of travel." The style is not unfrequently confused, as though the earnest flow of the writer's thoughts left the pen lagging behind; and the course of the argument is not always well held in hand. Still each page is stamped with most intense conviction, and in some passages the language has a passionate warmth of imagery that almost becomes poetic. The personal characteristics of Luther are not more distinctly revealed in his writings than are those of Roger Williams. But what especially marks the "Bloudy Tenent" is the clear conception of one great principle that runs through it, and the boldness with which every logical deduction from this principle is accepted.

The doctrine laid down in the book is that of the radical and complete separation of the spiritual and temporal provinces. Roger Williams was profoundly sensible of the fundamental importance of religion to the welfare of society, and he affirms in the most emphatic manner the obligation of every human being to love God and to obey his laws. We could not do him a greater wrong, and could not more completely misapprehend his meaning than by confounding his theory with the secular theory which has come to prevail in our time, which not only separates church and state, but insists on regarding religion as of secondary consequence. While he removes religion from the care of the civil magistrate

he does not weaken in the slightest its binding obligation. But this obligation binds the soul of man only to his maker; no fellow-man has a right to come between. God has delegated to no one authority over the human soul. Under the old dispensation he prescribed the mode by which he chose to be worshipped, but under the new this was left free, and all human laws prescribing or forbidding rites or doctrines not inconsistent with civil peace, are an invasion of the divine prerogative. Belief cannot be forced; to make the attempt is only to cause hypocrisy. To determine the standard of belief the civil authority must be itself infallible; if permitted to regulate conscience, the magistrate will only make his own views the standard of truth. In these propositions we have the great doctrine of liberty of conscience first asserted in its plenitude.

It is no less important to observe how, in the clear apprehension of Roger Williams, this principle was limited. To those who were firmly persuaded that religion could only flourish when protected by the state, above all to those who regarded church and state simply as two forms of the same thing, it is not surprising that his views seemed subversive alike of ecclesiastical and civil order. But because he so warmly opposed the order then established in Massachusetts it by no means followed that he was opposed to all order. Here again we most grievously mistake him if we suppose that he sought to weaken the restraints of law. His temper was hasty but not anarchical. When he affirmed his doctrine that the magistrate ought not to punish the breach of the first table, he was careful to add, "otherwise than in such cases as did disturb the civil

peace." In his treatise we find this important qualification not overlooked. He affirms that civil society is necessary to the happiness of men, and that to ensure its protection a sufficient amount of power must be confided to its rulers. But the object of such a society is simply the promotion of civil interests. Still the civil and the spiritual interests of man are so inseparable that even the civil magistrate has duties with reference to religion. If the religion be one that his own conscience approves as true, he is bound to honor it by personal submission to its claims, and by protecting those who practice it; on the other hand, if the religion be false, he still owes it permission and protection. But should a man's religious opinions lead him to practices which become offensive to the peace and good order of society, the civil magistrate is bound at once to interfere. So long, however, as this line is not passed, not even pagans, Jews, or Turks should be molested by the civil power; or, to quote his own words, "true civility and Christianity may both flourish in a state or kingdom, notwithstanding the permission of divers and contrary consciences, either of Jews or Gentiles."

To understand how far Roger Williams was the advocate of a new principle we must carefully bear in mind that he was not arguing simply for religious toleration. It is strange how this point has been misconceived even by writers who have devoted careful study to the subject. It is true, that in his letter to the town of Providence, so often quoted as the most felicitous expression of his views, he seems to have in mind merely the right of persons of divers beliefs to be excused from attendance upon the es-

tablished worship; but evidently his illustration of a ship's company "not forced to come to the ship's prayers" is only a partial expression of his theory. There can be no doubt whatever as to his true principle. The doctrine which he constantly maintains is, not that men of various beliefs should be tolerated by the civil power, but the far broader and more fruitful principle that the civil power has nothing whatever to do with religious belief, save when it leads to some actual violation of social order. In a word, what he advocated was not religious toleration, but the entire separation of the temporal and spiritual provinces.

Mere religious toleration had long found advocates. In the wonderful book which breathes the earliest and purest spirit of the English reformation, the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, it is distinctly taught. It was pathetically urged by the great Chancellor de l'Hopital on the brink of the precipice down which religious fanaticism was precipitating France; with what practical effect in either case, was shown by the fires of Smithfield and the massacre of St. Bartholomew. At the very time when Roger Williams was writing, it had, in various forms, found much support in England. With the meeting of the Long Parliament it came to the forefront of discussion. In opposition to the Presbyterian theory of an absolute conformity of the whole nation to one established church, a theory carried out in the adoption by Parliament of the Westminster Confession and Discipline, there were those who advocated a limited toleration around a national establishment, and those who advocated an establishment with an unlimited toleration of every religious opinion.

Roger Williams belonged to neither of these parties. What he claimed was the entire separation of religion from the civil power. His position may be put in a still clearer light by contrasting what was done at Providence with what was done at nearly the same time in Maryland. By the original charter of Maryland, granted in 1632, Christianity as professed by the Church of England was protected, but beyond this, equality of religious rights was left untouched. The mild forbearance of Calvert caused religious freedom to be established; but in awarding praise for this to a Catholic proprietary, it must be remembered that Maryland was not an independent Catholic state, but simply the colony of a Protestant kingdom. And, at best, it was toleration that was established. Religious freedom was a boon which the civil authority had granted, and which the same authority was competent to limit or take away. So when, in 1649, three years after the settlement of Providence, the legislature of Maryland placed on her statute book an act for securing religious freedom, it was expressly extended only to those who professed the Christian religion; while any who blasphemed God, or denied the Trinity, were punished with death. Surely no one can confound this with the doctrine laid down by Roger Williams.

That Roger Williams completely solved the difficult problem of the relation of church and state I do not affirm. That problem is more complex than he supposed, and since his day it has assumed aspects which he did not consider. But he stated it more clearly than it had been stated by any earlier writer, and more than anticipated Jeremy Taylor. He cleared the path which even Massachusetts has been

content to tread. The principle which he laid down is now the accepted and fundamental maxim of American politics. More than this, his distinctive merit lies in the fact that he not only defended it as an abstract principle, but himself carried it into successful operation. In the ranks of sovereign honor Lord Bacon assigns the first to the founders of states and commonwealths. In the strictest sense it cannot, perhaps, be claimed for Roger Williams that he was even the founder of a colony, for it was a procedure for which he possessed no legal authority, and which formed no part of his original plan. But since the settlement at Providence was the creation of his benevolence, and crystallized round his great idea, and at last owed its legal recognition to his disinterested labors, it may look back reverently to him as the author of its existence. The unusual circumstances under which it came into being only intensifies the gratitude with which we hail the apostle of religious liberty as the founder of Rhode Island.

But it is time to consider more closely the man himself. For this study the material is ample. No man who ever lived in New England has had every defect of temper so minutely explored and every inconsistency of conduct so unsparingly exposed. The day, I trust, is long past when one in the position in which I stand to-day, is expected to vindicate a historical character from every charge. Of that sort of commemorative discourse we have had, in New England, more than enough. We have ceased to think that in the days of the fathers only angels were walking the earth. Let us then grant, without hesitation, that Roger Williams was a man like

other men. Let us concede that his "many precious parts" were coupled in the early part of his career with an "unsettled judgment," that his "well approved teaching" was mixed with what seemed to his hearers "strange opinions," that the "judicious sort of Christians" found him "unquiet and unlamblike," and that even his best friends deemed him guilty of "presumption" and condemned his conduct as "passionate and precipitate;" yet evidently all these are faults of a generous, a bold, an enthusiastic spirit. There was no quality about him that made him either hated or despised. On the contrary, there was in all his trials a calm courage, an abiding patience, a noble disinterestedness, an unfailing sweetness of temper, an unquestioned piety that won for him the warmest affection even of those who opposed him. We find Winthrop writing to him in words that do equal honor to both: "Sir, we have often tried your patience, but could never conquer it." And the most accomplished of our living critics, Lowell, rises from the study of this period with the remark: "Let me premise that there are two men above all others, for whom our respect is heightened by their letters — the elder John Winthrop and Roger Williams." The very weaknesses and eccentricities of Roger Williams only make him a more striking character. He stands out from the somewhat monotonous background of Puritan decorum, as the mountains of his native Wales stand out from the uniform sweep of the English coast. The recent biographer of Milton terms him "a picturesque figure forever in early American history," and adds that no man of that age deserves more attention. Must he not have had about

him something more than usually winning, who, while still a youth, so gained the regard of that morose and ill-tempered man Sir Edward Coke, that this greatest master of English law that had yet appeared, took care to further his education, and affectionately addressed him as his son? It is interesting to know that the founder of Rhode Island, who in his writings laid down the principle "that the sovereign power of all civil authority is founded in the consent of the people," thus sat in his youth at the feet of the illustrious judge who was sent to the tower for resisting the encroachments of arbitrary power.

Roger Williams not only merits our admiration for his personal qualities, his intellectual culture was also generous and broad. By the favor of Coke, he was sent to the Charter-house, then recently founded by a liberal-minded London merchant, Thomas Sutton, but since become one of the most famous of the great schools of England. The chapel stands to-day, with the superb monument of the founder, precisely as it stood when Roger Williams knelt beside it, reciting the impressive liturgy of the English church. On the long roll in which his name ranks among the earliest, are written the names of Barrow, of Addison, of Steele, of John Wesley, of Blackstone, and to pass to our own time, of Grote, and of Thackeray; and who that has lingered, with dimmed eye, over the chapters which describe the closing hours of Colonel Newcome, can forget how the memories of this place have been embalmed on the most nobly pathetic pages of English romance! After receiving the thorough classical training of the Charter-house, Roger Williams

proceeded to Cambridge, where he was matriculated a pensioner of Pembroke College, in 1625, and took his degree as Bachelor of Arts in 1627. Cambridge was the great Puritan university. There most of the leading divines of the New England churches received their education. Thence came John Cotton, Chauncy, Buckley, John Eliot, Hooker, Norton, Hugh Peters, Shepard, Ward, and others of the men whose piety and learning did so much to give New England character its distinctive shape; nor is there any reason to suppose that Roger Williams, while at Cambridge, was a less apt or less diligent scholar than any of these.

How diligently these rare opportunities of culture were used, may be gathered from a glance at those with whom, afterwards, he stood on a footing of most familiar companionship. Through life his most trusted counselor was the wise, the discriminating, the magnanimous Winthrop, who, he declares, "tenderly loved him to his last breath." Next we find him winning the warmest regard of young Harry Vane, like himself an enthusiast for ideal truth, misunderstood by the community in which his lot was cast, but a spirit touched to the finest issues, whom even his enemy Clarendon terms "a man of extraordinary parts," and whom Milton praised as a senator unsurpassed in Roman story. When the acquaintance of Williams with Vane began, we are not informed; but it must have been soon after the latter's arrival in this country, since, in speaking of the settlement of Aquidneck, Williams says: "It was not price nor money that could have purchased Rhode Island. It was purchased by the love and favor which that honorable

gentleman, Sir Harry Vane, and myself had with the great sachem Miantunnomi." The name of Roger Williams is peculiarly connected with the most brilliant statesman of the commonwealth; for mainly through the friendly intervention of Vane the charter of the Providence plantations was obtained, so that to Vane, more directly than to Williams, Rhode Island owes her actual political existence. At the country-seat of Vane, Williams, when in England, was always a welcome guest. But in the circle of his chosen friends was one more famous than Vane. During his second visit to England, we find him instructing John Milton in Dutch, who in return read him "many more languages." It is easy to surmise how two such kindred spirits were drawn together. When his "Bloudy Tenent" had appeared, in 1644, it had been ranked with Milton's "Treatise on Divorce," as containing "most damnable doctrines." They had stood side by side in the great battle for freedom of thought, though even Milton, in the magnificent bursts of his "Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," did not advocate a liberty of conscience so complete and absolute as that claimed by Roger Williams. He seems to have had in mind rather toleration than perfect freedom. With the great Protector, too, the founder of Providence was sometimes admitted to "close discourse." I need not pause to comment on the kind of man he must have been who was permitted even the occasional companionship of Vane, of Milton, and of Cromwell.

One of the most grievous charges brought against Roger Williams is based on the apparent vacillation of his opinions. "He had," said Cotton Mather,

"a windmill in his head." But these changes were far less significant than is commonly supposed. With regard to the great principle with which his name is connected, he never wavered in the slightest. On some minor points that entered into his controversy with Massachusetts, it is not unlikely that experience modified his views. But with his religious belief there was very little change. He was a sturdy, uncompromising separatist, when he renounced the communion of the Church of England, and such he remained to the day of his death. Warmly as he denied the theocratic theory of the churches of the Bay, he always cordially approved their "heavenly doctrine." In no heat of controversy was he ever accused of being a heretic. It is true that, having been for a brief period connected with the Baptists, he renounced their communion and lived for the rest of his days isolated from all visible church fellowship. Yet, when we consider what the religious conditions of the period were, we shall not censure him severely if, like Milton, he shrank from the Babel of sects that filled the age with their noise; nor, if we call to mind how swift and how startling were the transitions of that unsettled time, will it surprise us to see that, like Vane, Williams was led to look for the speedy revelation of a new heaven and a new earth. But whatever we may think of his speculative belief, respecting his practical zeal to do good there can be no dispute. We find him repeatedly interposing his benevolent offices to save from destruction by the Indians the colony which refused him a passage even through its territory; we find him interrupting his arduous labors in London to aid in providing

the suffering poor of that city with fuel; above all, we find him at all times, on the land and on the sea, yearning to promote the spiritual welfare of the Indians. Eliot has won the name of the Indian Apostle; but ten years before Eliot preached his first sermon to the Indians, Roger Williams had consecrated himself to this missionary work; not sent out by a powerful and wealthy board, and followed with the prayers of thousands, but driven forth an exile, and selling his house even, "that he might do the natives good."

To the seeker whose adventurous thought carried him further than any of his time in the exploration of a novel principle; to the wise master-builder whose faith in this principle did not falter when charged with the responsibility of an experiment which to so many seemed subversive of social order; to the scholar who, trained in the languages of the old world, wrought the first key for unlocking the dialects of the new; to the philanthropist whose abounding charity recognized no distinction of race or tongue, we erect this statue! Why need I say more? The muse of history has already written her imperishable record; the marvelous touch, that endows marble and bronze with life, has set him before us with a reality that words can only feebly counterfeit!

An epoch is marked in the history of a community when it thus pauses to conquer forgetfulness. We rise to higher levels as we recognize the sacredness of the past; as we commerce with the great and good who have gone before us, and whose examples are our most precious possession. And, still more is this the case, when we invoke the aid of art to in-

vigorate these ennobling influences, and when we consecrate to the departed, memorials whose very presence among us breeds gracious and perpetual benediction. Let us rejoice that in making, to-day, this lavish offering, we have at the same time enriched ourselves. Here have we placed our statue of Roger Williams, and here let it stand; here in a seclusion allowing the thoughtful study which its various excellence exacts; here amid the fields which he once received from Canonicus; here in solemn companionship with kindred dust! Here let it stand! Here let returning seasons greet it; here let men as they rest from labor, here let children as they turn from play, gaze with reverence at him who chose rather to taste the bitterness of death than to act with a doubting conscience.

NOTE.

ROGER WILLIAMS, according to the most trustworthy tradition, was a native of Wales, and was born near the close of the sixteenth century. In a document dated July 21, 1679, he speaks of himself as "being now near to fourscore years of age." During his youth, he lived for a time in London, where he attracted the notice of Coke. He was elected a scholar of the Charter-house, June 25, 1621; and was matriculated a pensioner of Pembroke College, Cambridge, July 7, 1625. He took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, January, 1627. His signature is still preserved in the subscription book of the University. From this date till he left England there is no record respecting him, but from an incidental statement in the "Bloudy Tenent yet more Bloudy" it has been surmised that he lived in Lincolnshire. He sailed from Bristol, with his wife Mary, in the ship Lyon, December 1, 1630, and after a voyage of sixty-six days, arrived off Nantasket, February 5, 1631. According to his own account he was invited, soon after, to be-

come teacher of the Boston church, in place of Wilson who was about returning to England, but declined the offer because he "durst not officiate to an unseparated people." The statement that he was admitted freeman, arose from the fact that another of the same name was in the colony, whose application was made nearly four months before the Lyon arrived. In April, 1631, he was invited to the church at Salem, but the authorities interfered, and during the summer he went to Plymouth, where he became assistant to Rev. Ralph Smith. While here he composed a "treatise" against the Patent, which was submitted to the examination of the magistrates in December, 1633, and the author was cited to the next session of the court "to be censured," but on his expressing submission, the matter was dropped. Before the close of 1633, he returned to Salem, assisting the Rev. Mr. Skelton, but "in not any office." In August, 1634, after the death of Skelton, he was called to be teacher of the church. In November, 1634, he was summoned before the court for having broken his promise "in teaching publicly against the King's patent," but at the March session, proceedings were again suspended, on the ground that his action sprang from "scruple of conscience" rather than "seditious principle." When the court met again, April 30, a new charge was brought against him of withstanding the freeman's oath. Early in the summer of 1635, the Salem church proceeded with his ordination, which led to his being cited before the court, July 8, on the ground that "being under question for divers dangerous opinions," he had been called in "contempt of authority," to the office of teacher. A petition of the Salem men with reference to certain lands on Marblehead Neck was, on the same ground, refused. Availing himself of ecclesiastical right, Williams caused letters of admonition to be written by the Salem church to its sister churches, complaining of the "heinous sin" committed by the magistrates. When a majority of the church showed a disposition to recede from its position, he wrote a letter renouncing communion with them. At the September session of the court, when he had been cited to appear, no action was taken, and the court adjourned till October 8. At this time, Williams, when asked whether he was prepared to give satisfaction, "justified both these letters, and maintained all his opinions." In consequence, sentence was passed requiring him "to depart out of

this jurisdiction within six weeks." According to Winthrop, this was done "the next morning," which would make the date of the sentence October 9, but the original record has no mention of any adjournment. On this point there has been a singular confusion. Soon after, Williams was seized with severe illness, and the authorities allowed him to remain till spring, but as he began again to maintain his opinions "to company in his house," it was decided in January, 1636, to send him to England, when he fled to the woods. After wandering for fourteen weeks, in the spring of 1636, he began "to build and plant" at Seekonk, but in June changed his location and settled on the spot to which he gave the name of Providence. During the summer he interfered to prevent the Pequot league. In March, 1639, he was re-baptized by "one Holliman, a poor man, late of Salem," and united with Holliman and ten others in forming what was afterwards the First Baptist Church; but after three or four months "he broke from the Society." In the summer of 1643 he sailed for England, devoting the leisure of his voyage to the preparation of his "Key into the Language of America." In March, 1644, he obtained the charter of the "Providence Plantations." In the same year he published, at London, his "Key," and in the year following the "Bloudy Tenent." Bound up with the latter was the "Examination" of Cotton's Letter, in which he incidentally presents his own view of the grounds of his banishment. In November, 1651, he sailed for England the second time, and published, in the following year, "The Bloudy Tenent yet more Bloudy," the "Hireling Ministry," and the "Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health." Early in the summer of 1654 he returned to Providence. From September, 1654, till May, 1657, he served as President of the Colony. In August, 1672, occurred his debate at Newport with the Quakers, a full account of which he published in 1676. He died some time between January 18, and May 10, 1683. According to custom, he was buried on his own grounds, not far from his house and the spot where he landed. The grave was distinctly marked at the beginning of the present century.

THE SETTLEMENT OF MOUNT HOPE.

AN ADDRESS AT THE TWO HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TOWN OF BRISTOL, R. I., DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 24, 1880.

We have met to commemorate the founding of this ancient town. Two hundred years have fled since the hearths of our fathers were planted here. Well nigh seven generations have completed their mortal term since these broad streets were opened, since this spacious common, on which we are gathered, was set apart for public use. As we enter upon the third century of our history, we pause, for a brief space, to confess the debt which every community that has done anything worthy of remembrance owes to itself, and which no community swayed by generous sentiments, and mindful of its own best interests, can refuse to pay. There is no more becoming impulse than that which brings us hither. The most elevated instincts of our nature are enlisted in such a service. The deep and widespread interest which this occasion has awakened, this great multitude before me, afford convincing proof that we are not insensible to the obligations which our connection with a community like this imposes. We have gladly heeded the summons to

this festival; we have trodden with willing feet these familiar paths. It is a festival in which we cannot join without emotion. It has for all of us a meaning which no ordinary festival can have. Amid the ringing of bells, and the inspiring strains of music, we can none of us forget that we have come to a spot hallowed by our most affecting memories. Here we were born; here by the fireside we heard the first accents of affection; here in the school-room we learned our earliest lessons; here in the house of God we were taught the consoling truths that alone compensate for the losses which a day like this brings so vividly to mind. A cloud of witnesses, invisible to mortal eye, looks down upon us. Everything around us invests these services with an exalted and religious sentiment. There are no ties more sacred than those of which we are now reminded. We have come to the home of our childhood; to the graves of our fathers. The words of Holy Writ leap unbidden to our lips: "If I forget Thee, may my right hand forget her cunning; if I do not remember Thee, may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!"

The circumstances under which we meet may well call for our heartfelt gratulation. We have come to a spot beautiful for situation, lovely indeed at all times, but never more lovely than at this season, when lingering summer bathes the landscape in the pensive beauty that so well befits the strain of thought in which we cannot help indulging. We have come at a time when we may turn without effort from our common avocations and cares, a time of great prosperity, when our land is teeming with abundant harvests, when, after years of weary de-

pression, commerce and industry show everywhere signs of healthy revival, when our public credit is restored, when peace reigns in all our borders. No dreg of bitterness poisons our overflowing cup. Nor should the fact that we are now engaged in one of the great periodical contests which determine the political character of our government, when throughout its length and breadth the land is stirred with the eager strife of conflicting parties, lessen in the least our interest in these services. To one who rightly apprehends the nature of our political system, and who correctly estimates the real sources of its strength, they will seem invested with additional significance. For even amid the excitement of a national election, and with the inspiring spectacle before us of fifty millions of freemen choosing their chief magistrate under the wise and regulated restraints of constitutional law, we may well turn our gaze, for a few moments, to those ancient sources from which the broad stream of our national life has flowed; we may well remind ourselves that our local institutions form, at once, the foundation and safeguard of our federal system; that from the broad support of numberless scattered municipalities like this, whose founding we commemorate today, springs the splendid arch that gilds with promise the future of American civilization. Let us never forget that American liberty had its cradle in towns; that here the earliest lessons of self-government were learned. And let us rest assured that so long as the traditions of these local rights are zealously cherished American liberty will never be subverted.

Nor can I count it inopportune that our services

so nearly coincide, in point of time, with the great and splendid commemoration, which, during the past week, has concentrated the gaze of the entire nation upon the chief city of New England. At first sight, indeed, it may well seem that our modest festival cannot fail to suffer from too close proximity to another so similar as to provoke comparison, and yet so much more impressive in its historical associations, and so much more elaborate in its attending circumstances. Still even this seeming disadvantage, when we reflect a moment, gives additional meaning to our celebration. There is a peculiar fitness in having one so soon succeed the other. For it serves the more forcibly to call attention to that feature in our early history which gave this town its distinctive character, and drew the broad line of distinction between this settlement and the earlier settlements upon the shores of the Narragansett. It reminds us that Bristol was the offspring of Boston. At the ripe age of fifty years the sturdy Puritan mother gave birth to this beautiful child. It was the sagacity of Boston merchants that first saw the admirable adaptation of this commodious harbor to the purposes of commerce, it was the public spirit of Boston merchants that reserved for a remote posterity the ample provisions of these streets and squares, it was the intelligence and piety of Boston merchants that planted by this shore the institutions of education and religion which their Puritan training had taught them to reverence, and which they brought with them to their new home, as their most precious heritage. Here, so far as their circumstances would permit, they sought to build another Boston; and surely as they gazed on

the fair surroundings of this favored spot, as they surveyed the gentle slope of the ground, as they followed the graceful course of the silver bay, as they pictured, perchance, the possible success that might attend their enterprise, they may well have been pardoned if they sometimes exclaimed, —

"O matre pulchra filia pulchrior!"

Two hundred years do not cover a long period when we reckon the centuries of the world's history, yet two hundred years carry us back to a time when much that now seems majestic and venerable existed only in the womb of futurity. The faded banner that was borne in our procession to-day, precious as the gift of one of the first proprietors, is the symbol of a municipal organization that went into operation more than a century before our Federal Constitution was adopted. When this town was founded the kingdom of Prussia had not been established, the empire of Russia had not become a European power. Charles the Second was still degrading the crown of England, the fierce contest caused by the Exclusion Bill was raging, the great revolution had not taken place which drove the Stuarts from the throne. Our town government is, therefore, older than the English constitution as it now exists, older than the Bill of Rights, older than the Act of Settlement, older than the great division of parties that ran through the reigns of Anne and the Georges, older than the England of Bolingbroke, of Walpole, and of Pitt. Two hundred years of the quiet annals of a neighborhood like this do not, it is true, appeal to the imagination like two hundred years of the history of a famous state. The stage

is small, and the interests seem trivial, the actors are not heroes and statesmen and kings. But it is, after all, a history that touches us more nearly than the plots of rulers, or the devastating march of armies. It is the history of the human life which we all are leading. And when we reflect what two hundred years of the history of a community like this really represent, when we consider the inestimable benefit diffused by a well-ordered social system, the wholesome restraints of law, the sweets of domestic life, the elevating influence of education, the priceless blessings of devout religious instruction, the influence of good example transmitted from generation to generation, we shall feel that two hundred years of history like this are as worthy of our study as much that fills a larger and more pretentious page.

When the first houses were built upon this spot, two of which still remain to attest the solid workmanship of our fathers, there already existed four settlements on Narragansett Bay. Forty-four years earlier Roger Williams had undertaken, upon the banks of the Mooshausic, the unique and memorable experiment of founding a community upon the principle of obedience to the civil magistrates only in civil things. A little later the great Antinomian controversy had driven to the island of Aquidneck another company, who, planting themselves just at the northern end, had afterwards removed to the unrivaled harbor which excited the admiration of the Florentine navigator, Verazzano, more than a century before; and almost directly opposite, upon the western shore of the bay, that singular enthusiast, Samuel Gorton, after coming into collision with

the authorities both at Providence and Newport, had founded Warwick. In the year 1663 the three settlements had been united under the charter of Charles the Second.

The course of events which reserved this territory for a later occupation, and for a different jurisdiction, forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of New England. The neck of land on which this town was built, called by the English Mount Hope, but known to the Indians as Pokanoket, was the last recognized possession of the aborigines in this portion of the country. Here was their final refuge; here began the great struggle which resulted in their overthrow; here was witnessed the last tragic act in the bloody strife. I shall not transgress the proper limits of my subject if I glance briefly at events which were directly connected with the founding of the town, and which explain the distinctive characteristics of its early history. It is only from a review of these events that we can understand how this community presented, at the outset, such marked contrast to the other settlements upon our bay.

Whether, as has been claimed by enthusiastic Scandinavian scholars, the Northmen ever visited these shores, is a question we need not discuss. There seems, indeed, no reason to doubt the substantial truth of the narratives which describe the adventurous voyages of Biörn and Leif and Thorfinn; we may accept without hesitation the claim that they discovered Greenland, that they cruised along the coast of Labrador and Nova Scotia, that they pursued their dangerous navigation as far south as Cape Cod and Narragansett Bay. But when we

seek from any of their own statements to determine the precise localities they visited we are involved in insuperable difficulties. The attempt from a passage of doubtful meaning respecting the length of the day at Vinland, where they wintered, to identify its latitude with Rhode Island, can hardly be accepted as conclusive. The most that we can safely say, is, that they may have been here; that there is nothing improbable in the supposition that they may have found in this bay their winter refuge. But if they did they left no trace behind them. Their daring enterprise had no influence whatever upon subsequent events. To suppose, as some have done, that the name of the neighboring summit is the corruption of the Norse word with which they marked their resting-place, and that it was preserved in the traditions of an alien race for more than six hundred years, is to carry credulity beyond the limit of common sense. We may please ourselves with the fancy that the dark barks which arrested the troubled gaze of Charlemagne, which at a later period carried terror to the coasts of France, and pushed up the Seine to the very gates of Paris, may have anchored in these waters; a halo of romance will surround these shores if we connect them with those adventurous vikings; but the course of events that claims our serious attention belongs to a far later period. Let us leave these obscure legends and pass to the region of unquestioned fact. We shall find enough here to invest this familiar region with a singular and enduring interest.

At the beginning of the authentic history of our town, we are confronted with the most venerable figure among the aborigines of New England. When

the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, they were told that the desolate region around them belonged to the great sachem, Massasoit, whose sway extended from Cape Cod to the shores of the Narragansett. With him their first treaty was concluded. In an unfinished building near Plymouth, the floor spread with a rug and cushion to give dignity to the proceedings, were conducted the simple negotiations which are memorable as the beginning of American diplomacy. The treaty was one of alliance, and not one of subjection, and the sachem was assured that "King James would esteem him as his friend and ally." In the following summer, the first passed by the Pilgrims in New England, envoys were sent by the colonists to visit the sachem at Pokanoket. The narrative of this visit, the earliest ever made by Englishmen of which any account has been preserved, while it presents a vivid picture of the squalid surroundings of the Wampanoag chief, furnishes at the same time abundant evidence of his hospitality and kindness. It is impossible to read it without recognizing in Massasoit a genuine courtesy. His guests came upon him unexpectedly, and "he was both grieved and ashamed that he could no better entertain them." In this visit the compact already concluded was renewed, and the relations between the two races thus established upon a permanent basis. For more than fifty years it was faithfully observed. Long as Massasoit lived no charge was made that its stipulations were either broken or evaded. He lived to see his territories melt away before the steady inroad of the whites, till at length, at the close of his long reign, he found himself shut up to the narrow peninsula of Pokanoket. But he remained

to the last true to the compact he had made. And when we remember on what flimsy pretexts the most Christian kings of Europe, Charles II., and Louis XIV., violated their most sacred engagements, shall we withhold some tribute of respect to this pagan chief?

With the death of the kindly and faithful Massasoit, we pass to the most tragic chapter of our story. The causes of the bloody struggle which, fifteen years later, plunged New England into mourning and wrested this, their last refuge, from the Wampanoags, still remain obscure. From his first accession to power, Philip, for some reason, seems to have excited the suspicion of the Plymouth authorities. He was summoned before them, and though he earnestly protested that he knew of no plot nor conspiracy against them, he was compelled to sign an instrument by which he acknowledged himself a subject of the King of England. When more positive charges were brought against him, five years later, he repeated with great fervor his protestations of innocency and of faithfulness to the English. And when, after four years more had passed, new apprehensions were awakened, he desired to renew his covenant with his ancient friends, and freely engaged to resign to the government of New Plymouth all his English arms. As Philip was still accused of evading this agreement, he was once more summoned before the authorities and compelled to acknowledge himself not only subject to the King of England, but to the government of the Plymouth colony. It is not difficult to conceive how this increasing pressure of a foreign authority must have affected a haughty spirit. The long-established relation be-

tween Massasoit and the English was now completely reversed. Massasoit had been treated as an equal; Philip was reduced to the condition of a subject. Massasoit had been regarded with confidence; Philip, whether justly or unjustly, was viewed with constant distrust. That the sachem, doubtless ignorant of the full force of the submissions he had made, and only conscious that a net was being skillfully woven about him, was wholly free from blame, no one would venture to affirm, but that the authorities of Plymouth were pushing matters with too hard a hand, was the manifest opinion of their Massachusetts brethren. These doubted whether the engagement of Philip imported more than "a friendly and neighborly correspondency."

In the cabinet of the Rhode Island Historical Society there is preserved a curious paper which purports to give the substance of a reply made by Philip to his friend, John Borden, of Portsmouth, who sought to dissuade him from engaging in the war. The statement was not committed to writing till many years after the sachem's death, and cannot claim the authority of a historical document. Yet undoubtedly it preserves the tradition respecting the causes of the war that lingered in Philip's own neighborhood, and among those who knew him best. While the language belongs to a later period, the general representation may be accepted as correct. In this reply the sachem contrasts the reception which his father had extended to the English with the ungenerous treatment to which he had been himself subjected. Unfounded charges had been brought against him, and he had been compelled to part with his territory to make restitution for in-

juries that he could not prevent. Thus tract after tract was gone till only a small part remained. "I am determined," said he, "not to live till I have no country."

That the Indians, in the main, were unfairly treated, there is, indeed, no evidence. Where the Pilgrims landed the territory had been depopulated by a pestilence, and they interfered with no rights by bringing once more under cultivation a desolate and deserted tract. The subsequent acquisitions of the settlers were made by purchase, to which the natives, for the most part, gave their free consent. And in their transactions the authorities took special care to guard the Indians from imposition. Yet the policy was avowed of crowding them upon narrow peninsulas, and they saw their territory continually wasting away. And it may be questioned how far the chiefs had authority to alienate the lands of their tribe, and how far they understood the full meaning of the transfer they made. Still less could they comprehend the nature of the allegiance which they were compelled to swear to a sovereign who lived three thousand miles away. Added to this were the unconcealed suspicion and contempt with which they were regarded, and which led the whites to insist strenuously "on the distance which is to be observed betwixt Christians and barbarians."

It is an interesting fact that we find the most favorable representations of Philip's character in the region where he lived, and among those who had the best opportunity for judging him. Thus the earliest historian of Rhode Island, Callender, tells us that Philip entered reluctantly upon the war, and that he shed tears when he heard that the first blood was

spilled. To the same effect is the tradition of his grateful treatment of the Leonards. Though his ordinary residence was at Mount Hope, in the summer time he frequently found his way to Taunton. Here he became acquainted with this family, and received many acts of kindness at their hands. When the war broke out his gratitude saved Taunton from destruction. "You have made him ready to die," said one of his men to the English commander, "for you have killed or taken all his relations." It has been urged against him as a reproach, that, when his prospect darkened elsewhere, he did not join himself to the Eastern Indians; but is it not a touching trait in his character, that when wife and child had been taken from him, he turned back to die in his own home?

It is claimed by some that Philip of Pokanoket is simply a hero of romance; that fancy has arrayed with fictitious majesty a squalid savage, whose dwelling was a sty. No doubt many of the representations of his character are incorrect. It is folly to speak of him as a great warrior, a penetrating statesman, a mighty prince. Such exaggerated language does him gross injustice, for it applies to him the standards of a wholly different social state. There is no proof that he was at the head of a great conspiracy, or that he possessed the capacity of inflaming his race with a common impulse. But we are equally wide of the mark when we picture him, in the coarse epithets of Church, as "a doleful, great, naked, dirty beast." In spite of all detraction, he remains the most picturesque and striking figure in Indian history. His tragic fate lends a sad interest to yonder mount. We are standing on soil that was

wrested from him; we are enjoying privileges which were purchased by his ruin; but can we pass a harsh judgment on this hero of a lost cause, who fell, in an unequal fight, by a traitor's hand, and whose corpse was insulted by an ungenerous foe?

By the overthrow of Philip, the Mount Hope lands were, for the first time, thrown open to the occupation of the English, but the question was yet to be determined in whom the title to the newly-conquered territory was vested. The manner in which this question was settled forms the most curious episode in our early history. We can hardly fancy a more striking contrast than between the wilds of Pokanoket and the sumptuous palace of Whitehall, between the stern, resolute men who were here laying the foundations of a new English empire, and the gay and dissolute throng who formed the court of Charles the Second. Our story carries us to the Privy Council chamber, where the dull routine of business was at this time so often lighted up by the wit of Shaftesbury. Among those whose occupation it was to amuse the King, was a dramatic poet named John Crowne. He is said to have been first brought to the notice of the Queen through the dislike which Rochester cherished for Dryden, and to have gained the favor of the good-natured monarch by a mask which had been performed before the court. Reckoning on his favor, Crowne came forward with a petition for the Mount Hope lands. His father, who had purchased an estate in Nova Scotia, had been impoverished by the cession of that province to the French, and upon this circumstance the poet based his claim to restitution. The matter was brought before the Privy

Council, who directed that, before any action should be taken inquiry should be made respecting the title to the territory. Plymouth claimed the lands as lying within her patent, and in this view the agents of Massachusetts concurred. The two Rhode Island agents, on the other hand, maintained that the tract, up to the recent war, had belonged to the Sachem Philip, and that no corporation in New England had any title to it. Although the Plymouth authorities had sought to gain the favor of the King by sending to him the greater part of the ornaments and treasures of Philip, the Privy Council adopted the Rhode Island view. But, at the same time, they recommended that the lands be granted to Plymouth, reserving only to the Crown, by way of quit rent, seven beaver skins to be paid yearly at Windsor Castle. No other lands in the colony were held upon this tenure.

The title to the newly-conquered lands having been thus confirmed to Plymouth, measures were at once taken to dispose of them. The most powerful reason which had led the Plymouth authorities to claim the territory was that it "was well-accommodated for the settlement of sea-port towns." The evident advantages which it possessed as a commercial mart could not long remain unnoticed. On the fourteenth of September, 1680, corresponding, if we allow for the difference of style, to the day selected for these services, and in consideration of the sum of three hundred pounds, the Mount Hope lands were conveyed to four citizens of Boston: John Walley, Nathaniel Byfield, Stephen Burton, and Nathaniel Oliver. By the terms of the sale, a "town for trade" was to be at once established. To promote this end extraordinary privileges were granted,

and most liberal provisions were made. The four proprietors reserved to themselves an eighth each, and proceeded to dispose of the remainder. The new settlement was exempted from all colonial taxes for five years, the privilege of sending deputies to the General Court was conceded to it, a local court was established, and it was provided that it should be the shire-town of a new county to be established. The tract was laid out on a plan of which up to this time there had been no example. In contrast with the crowded streets of Boston it presented these broad and regular avenues, but like Boston it had a public common reserved in the centre of the town, while six hundred acres, in addition, were devoted to the general improvement. It is impossible to glance at these provisions without recognizing the fact that the first proprietors of this territory were men of liberal views and large public spirit. While engaged in an enterprise which their own private advantage had no doubt suggested, they scorned to look at it in the light of mere private and selfish interest. The generous conception which they formed of their undertaking received its reward. The best class of settlers was attracted, and in five years, where had been a wilderness, there stood the most flourishing town in the colony.

The great purpose which they had in view was intimated in almost their earliest corporate act. On September 1, 1681, the people assembled together and agreed that "the name of this town shall be Bristol." The only reason that can be assigned for such a proceeding is that at this time Bristol was, next to London, the most important seat of maritime commerce in the mother country, and in

founding their new port of trade, the settlers of this town wished to borrow some of the associations of such a famous mart. We may derive a natural satisfaction from the reflection, that their confidence in the experiment they had undertaken gave us even this trifling connection with a city which, though stripped in part of its commercial eminence, is still one of the most beautiful in England, the city from which Sebastian Cabot sailed on the voyage that resulted in the discovery of the American continent, the city which Edmund Burke represented in Parliament, when he vindicated, in strains of unsurpassed eloquence, the rights of the colonies. In several striking particulars a resemblance between the towns might be traced. The distinctive character of the new enterprise, that which marked it so strongly from the earlier settlements upon the bay, is expressed in this proceeding. The founders of Bristol were not, like the settlers of Providence and Newport, exiles for conscience' sake, smarting with sense of wrong, and cherishing a bitter feeling of resentment against the community from which they had been driven; on the contrary, they were men of wealth and standing, of high consideration in the colony which they voluntarily left, for which they cherished the most affectionate attachment, and whose institutions they zealously labored to perpetuate. In coming here they were not seeking for any larger religious liberty, for that they already enjoyed in as great a measure as they deemed consistent with their own good; they were not aiming to emancipate themselves from any restraints of law. They came here, under due authority, to establish a town for trade, and they sought, from the outset, to

surround themselves with all the sanctions of social order.

Every community is stamped with the impress of its founders. Who, we naturally ask, were the men to whom Bristol owes its origin? The four original proprietors, with one exception, were actual settlers, and became earnestly identified with the interests of the town. Mr. Oliver sold his share to Nathan Hayman, another leading merchant of Boston, who soon after died. The names of the remaining three are written in enduring characters on our early annals. Of Stephen Burton less is known than of the others, but he is said to have been bred at Oxford, and as recording officer of the county he filled a responsible position until his death in 1692. John Walley, whose name stands first on the Grand Deed, was the son of an English clergyman, and held high rank in the Massachusetts Colony. While devoting himself with success to mercantile pursuits, he was called at various times to discharge important public duties. He was a member of the Council, a Judge of the Superior Court, and had command of the land forces in the expedition of Sir William Phipps. These great trusts were executed with an ability and fidelity which gained him universal respect. During his residence in Bristol he stood always among the foremost in promoting every public interest. His substantial dwelling still remains among us. Near the close of his life he returned to Boston, where he died in 1712. But the most prominent and influential of the original proprietors yet remains to be mentioned. Nathaniel Byfield was also the son of an English clergyman, a member of the famous

Westminster Assembly. His mother was sister of the upright and courageous Bishop Juxon, who attended Charles I. upon the scaffold. He landed at Boston only six years before the purchase of the Mount Hope lands. Coming to this town with the first settlers, he remained here for nearly half a century, choosing for his home the beautiful peninsula on the opposite side of the harbor, the greater part of which belonged to his estate. Like Walley he returned to Boston in his old age, and died there in 1733. His remains rest in the old Granary Burial Ground. When Bristol was incorporated it was a part of Plymouth Colony, but after the union of Plymouth with Massachusetts, in 1690, an ampler field was opened to its citizens. Colonel Byfield was several times elected Speaker of the House of Representatives; for many years he was a member of the Provincial Council; for a long period he presided in the County Court; from no less than three English sovereigns he received a commission as Judge in Admiralty. In the notice called forth by his death, he is described as a man of great courage, vigor, and activity; of plain and instructive conversation, and of unquestionable faithfulness and honesty. Nothing is more to his credit than the fact that during the Witchcraft delusion, which remains such a dark spot upon the fame of Massachusetts, he had the courage to oppose and denounce it. He was a man of strong convictions; he was engaged in bitter controversies; and he did not escape the aspersions which were as freely lavished in that day as in ours. But when his long and useful life was ended, his character and public services called forth unqualified eulogium. In this

community his memory has always been gratefully cherished. To no one has Bristol been so much indebted. To him, more than to any other, we owe these broad and beautiful streets; to him we are indebted for this common on which we stand; to his foresight and generosity was due the early provision for schools, which has been such a material aid in the cause of public education. Fitted by his eminent abilities for the highest positions in the colony, he was never unmindful of his obligations to the community in which he lived. And with great appropriateness, when the High School was erected, a few years ago, the town decided that it should bear the name of Byfield. No nobler memorial can be erected to the dead than a memorial like this which is a perpetual blessing to the living, and no more worthy example can be held up to the generations of children who shall receive their training there, than the example of one who in the pursuit of his private interests never neglected the public good. Well may we be proud to enroll such names as Walley and Byfield among our founders!

I have called attention to the fact that the settlement of Bristol was essentially a commercial enterprise. At first sight, no doubt, this feature in its history seems to detract from the significance of the undertaking. Especially in comparison with the neighboring towns, it seems to lack those characteristics which awaken the most enthusiastic interest. We cannot claim that on this soil, so dear to all of us, any novel truth was evolved, or any great principles defended. The fame which justly belongs to Providence and to Aquidneck, does not belong to us. Our early records do not bear

the names of any martyrs for conscience, of any pioneers in the vindication of spiritual truth. We have no Roger Williams upon whose statue we can gaze with reverence, we have no Anne Hutchinson, whose clear perception of first principles may extort our admiration, and whose pathetic fate, after so many years have passed, must excite our warmest sympathy. We are forced to confess the absence in our local annals of those elements which lend to history its highest and most absorbing charm. But there is another side to all this which we must not overlook. In the complex system under which the human race is working out its destiny, it seems to be the rule that an advantage in one direction is always purchased by the sacrifice of some corresponding advantage in another. There are two great principles that control the movements of society, the principle of progress, and the principle of order. If we reckon it a blessing to enjoy an unchecked liberty, if we count it a privilege to dwell in a community where there is no restraint upon the expression of opinion, where every one is free to follow his own course, and to attain the largest measure of individual development and individual action, we must on the other hand admit that there is some advantage in an orderly society, some benefit to be derived from connection with a community where the common interests are not disregarded, where mutual obligations receive full recognition, and where the claims of positive truth are not forgotten in the assertion of the rights of private judgment.

It is impossible not to contemplate with admiration the early history of the State of which, for near

a century and a half, we have been a loyal part; not to gaze with reverence at the little community which, in an adverse age, had it in its heart "to hold forth a lively experiment that a most flourishing civil State may stand and best be maintained with a full liberty of religious concernments;" and which in an age when toleration was hardly known, boldly affirmed that not toleration merely, but complete religious freedom, was the right of every human being; but it is impossible to read the history of Rhode Island and not to recognize the fact that those who drank of this great cup of liberty were compelled to pay a heavy price. When they threw their doors wide open to the distressed in conscience of every name, when they held out so boldly the alluring bait of exemption from all external restraints, they drew together elements so incongruous, so inharmonious, so discordant, that even the invincible patience of Roger Williams at length recoiled from "such an infinite liberty of conscience." The extremely democratic basis upon which the body politic was rested, while it reduced the functions of government to the very narrowest limits, at the same time left the control of affairs in the hands of the least intelligent portion of the population. While it cannot be said that the first settlers were insensible to the importance of education, still education never received any generous public support. The complete separation effected between church and state, by remitting the support of religious institutions to a community divided, beyond all previous example, in religious sentiment, deprived them of the inestimable benefit of an educated clergy. In the town which Williams founded, and to which he

gave a name expressive of his reliance upon divine help, no place of public worship existed until the beginning of the following century. Freedom of every kind prevailed in unexampled measure, but an enlarged public spirit, an intelligent appreciation of the higher interests of the social body, a recognition of what was due from the individual to the community of which he formed a part, were not then traits of Rhode Island character.

The Puritan colonies of Plymouth and Massachusetts, but more especially the latter, stood in striking contrast with all this. Firmly knit in religious faith, making no pretense whatever of toleration, often harsh in their treatment of dissenters, they were eminent for public spirit, and showed the characteristics of homogeneous and highly organized communities. Led by their peculiar theory to invest the State with the largest powers, and ally it with all the supreme concerns of life, they regarded no political duties as more sacred and more imperative than those connected with the promotion of education and the maintenance of pure religion. The public support accorded to religious institutions secured for every town the services of a well educated minister. On the other hand, this close alliance of church and state gave additional import to civil obligations. Public functions were held in high esteem, magistrates were regarded with reverence, and even the ordinary duties of the citizen were discharged in a religious spirit. Equally in civil and religious things the Puritan viewed himself as living unto God.

Coming, as they did, from a Puritan colony, the founders of Bristol did not seek in their new home

to throw off the Puritan traditions in which they had been trained. They walked with undeviating steps in the faith to which they had been accustomed. They came to establish a town for trade, but they did not for a moment forget the higher conditions on which the welfare of every community depends, and without which material prosperity can only prove, in the end, a curse. Though engaged in a commercial enterprise, all their proceedings evinced a noble and conscientious recognition of the fact that society is bound by obligations which transcend all private and selfish interests. I have already alluded to the liberal provision, made at the settlement of the town, for the promotion of education. Almost their first care was to secure the services of "an able schoolmaster." And by a subsequent vote, by which a small additional fee was exacted from children who studied Latin, it appears that the course of study was not confined to common branches, but embraced the classics. But still more characteristic was their concern for the support of religion. When the town was laid out lands were set apart for the support of the ministry, and in the articles of agreement between the original proprietors and the settlers it was expressly stipulated that each should pay his proportion for erecting a meeting-house, and a home for the minister. At the very first town meeting, before their own dwellings had been closed against the winter wind, they voted to carry the latter part of this agreement into effect. For a short time they worshipped in a private house, a house whose sturdy frame, solid and unyielding as the creed of its builders, still defies decay. As soon as arrangements

could be completed, they proceeded to erect a meeting-house. The massive timbers were cut from the common about us. It stood on the site of yonder Court House, and in it, for a hundred years, our fathers assembled to worship God. Around it were the graves of the first settlers, the most hallowed associations gathered about it, and we can but marvel at the stupidity which sacrificed that sacred and commanding site. According to well authenticated tradition, the building was square in shape, having two rows of windows, with a roof rising to the centre, and surmounted by a cupola and bell. The interior was surrounded by a double row of galleries, and the floor was covered, as time went on, with square pews, through the rounds of whose oaken doors the children sought relief from the tedium of the protracted services. I know it is the habit of some to express contempt for the old-fashioned New England meeting-house. But if the principle laid down by the highest authorities on architecture is right, that all genuine and noble building has its origin in actual needs, and finds the measure of its excellence in its adaptation to the use intended; if the Grecian temple, the Gothic minster, the feudal castle, derive their charm from their conformity to this fundamental law, then our Puritan fathers built wisely and well. They built according to their means, and with reference to their wants. Their plain meeting-houses harmonized with their simple worship. To the eye of taste they are far more venerable and far more interesting than the more ambitious structures with which they have so often been supplanted.

The men who made such liberal provision for the

support of public worship were not likely to be indifferent to the ministrations under which they sat. Exalting the pulpit to such supreme rank, they cherished a not less exalted ideal of religious teaching. Accustomed to accord the minister the first place in the community, they exacted, in return, the highest qualification. After one unsuccessful experiment they secured for their first settled pastor a renowned scholar, who brought to the infant settlement the ripest discipline of the Old World. Son of a wealthy London citizen, he received his early training at the famous St. Paul's school, which John Colet, the friend of Erasmus, founded; the school in which Milton acquired the rudiments of his matchless scholarship. Proceeding at the early age of fifteen to Oxford, he won a distinguished rank, and was rewarded with a fellowship at Wadham College. A conscientious Non-conformist, he came to this country in 1686. It was said of him by one well qualified to judge, "that hardly ever a more universally learned person trod the American strand." It is true that he remained here but a short time, but we may safely infer something respecting the character and intelligence of a community which, even for a short time, could command and appreciate the ministrations of such a man as Samuel Lee.

Here let us pause. I have narrated the circumstances that led to the founding of this town, I have sketched an outline of its distinguishing features. I repeat that no such halo surrounds our early history as that which illumines the beginnings of the neighboring settlements. We have no claim to the distinction which Providence and Newport boast. But we may justly claim praise of a different kind. We

may claim that here was planted a town which illustrated the advantages of social order; which was enriched, beyond ordinary measure, with the best conditions of social progress; which entered on its career with high and generous appreciation of social obligations. It had no rude beginnings. It is not too much to say that few rural neighborhoods in the mother country could boast the educational and religious privileges which they enjoyed who followed the wise lead of Walley and Byfield to these untrodden wilds.

Two hundred years have passed since the work which I have described was done. The dream in which our fathers indulged, when they borrowed for their little settlement the name of the famous English mart, has not been realized; in the main object they had in view the course of events has not corresponded with their expectations. The transfer of the town from Massachusetts to Rhode Island, which took place two generations later, lessened its importance; the hard struggle with the mother country bore heavily upon it; and not even the extraordinary enterprise of its merchants, during the half century that followed, could withstand the inevitable tendency of trade which collected foreign commerce into a few great centres. Bristol shared the fate of so many famous New England seaports. The harbor is deserted which was once crowded with vessels from every clime; the wharves are rotting where, within my own memory, were piled the costly products of the tropics, the Mediterranean, and the Baltic. The jargon of strange races is heard no more in our streets; the bustling port is transformed into a summer watering-place. Yet I cannot doubt that

the best work of the founders remains. The mark they made on the character of the town, the impulse they gave to its higher interests, the deep lines they cut upon its moral foundations, — these have not passed away. There is not one of us here, to-day, who is not better for the work they did. We trace their beneficent influence in the conservative character which has always been the just boast of this community, in the regard for social order which has made it always prompt and unswerving in its support of authority and law. We trace it in the generous support of public institutions, of which there are so many striking proofs around us; in the churches, where, under different forms, the God whom they worshipped is adored; in the noble school, which, bearing the name of Byfield, shows that his spirit is not extinct; and in the most recent ornament of our town, the beautiful Library, the gift of one who still survives, as an embodiment of the gentler and more winning virtues of the olden time, virtues which find small place on the page of history, but which form so large a part of all that gives value and happiness and blessing to human life.

Much that the fathers believed we question; much that they deemed essential we have put aside. But let us rest assured that it remains as true in our day as in theirs, that religion and intelligence are the foundations of a well-ordered and prosperous community. The example they have given us is an example which we cannot afford to forget. It is the example of an enlightened public spirit, the lesson that we are members one of another, that our individual concerns are wrapped up in the general welfare, that we best promote our private interests when

we seek the common good. This, as I read New England history, was the great and admirable feature of Puritan character; this it was that made them strong, and prosperous, and honored. Let this be the lesson which we carry from these services, that in a community like this every member must do his part; that no matter how small its size, no matter how local and limited the interests involved, we have no right to hold ourselves aloof from its concerns. The possession of la·ge means, of superior culture, only adds to the obligation. This, I repeat, is the great lesson the fathers teach. May we so ponder it that when another two centuries have passed, when seven generations more have been laid in their silent graves, we ourselves may be as gratefully remembered as we to-day have remembered them!

Vane, Sir Henry, the younger.

SIR HENRY VANE.

AN HISTORICAL ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LONG ISLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY, BROOKLYN, MARCH 26, 1878.

No more appropriate service can be rendered by a society like that which I have the honor to address, than in helping to correct the erroneous estimates for which ignorance or prejudice have gained acceptance. An historical society discharges its highest function not merely in collecting and preserving the memorials of the past, but in contributing to that progressive and impartial judgment which, Schiller tells us, makes the essential movement of the world's history. I shall speak to you of one whose position and character were alike unique; of one whose fame belongs both to the Old and to the New World; the most brilliant and pathetic episodes of whose career are a part of English history, but whose most permanent influence must be traced in the institutions of our own country; of one, who, while strenuously identified with the conflicts of his time, was yet by temper and opinion held aloof from the parties by which those conflicts were carried on; who was most misunderstood by those with whom he most sincerely acted,

and who has been most harshly judged by some professing the warmest sympathy with the cause for which he suffered. In a stormy age, his soul "was like a star, and dwelt apart." It was his signal and extraordinary fate to become involved in the bitter controversies of two hemispheres; to be brought into conflict both with Puritan and with Churchman; to be imprisoned by Cromwell, and to be put to death by Charles the Second; and not released by the grave even from this strange, unquiet destiny, to be ridiculed alike by the believing Baxter and by the skeptical Hume. Such an exceptional fate cannot fail, at least, to provoke curiosity; and we may spend an hour, perhaps, not unprofitably, in seeking for a fair estimate of one who, if not without faults, was a conspicuous representative of what was best in the most ideal and heroic epoch of English history, but whose career can perhaps be most fairly judged in the land where his distinctive principles have borne their noblest fruit.

On the 6th of October, 1635, two great ships, the Defence, and the Abigail, arrived in Boston harbor, bringing several passengers of note, and among them one whose coming was reckoned an event of such importance, that it found full mention in that invaluable record of contemporary events, the "Journal" of Governor Winthrop. He is there described as a young man of excellent parts, son and heir to Sir Henry Vane, comptroller of the King's household, who had been employed in the diplomatic service, but, having been called to the doctrine of the gospel, had forsaken the honors and preferments of the court to enjoy the ordinances of Christ in their purity in New England. His father,

a mere courtier,[1] would hardly have consented to his coming had not the King interfered and gained for the youth permission to reside for three years in the colony. So it was through the good offices of Charles the First that Harry Vane was allowed to come to Massachusetts.

Not one of the worthy company to which he joined himself had come with a purer purpose, or had made sacrifice of more brilliant prospects. Like most of the leaders in the early phase of the great Puritan movement, he belonged to the best English stock. He came of the social class of which Sir John Eliot and Hampden were members, one of his ancestors having won his spurs on the bloody field of Poitiers. To quote his own words, almost the last he spoke on earth, "he was a gentleman born; had the education, temper, and spirit of a gentleman as well as others." But in his fourteenth or fifteenth year, as he himself tells us, a great change came over him; a change, the immediate causes of which are not described, but one so radical and permanent that neither the allurements of ambition, nor the seductions of the court, nor the dissipation of Oxford could subdue it. Escaping from the ungenial atmosphere of Laud's pet university, he passed some time at Geneva, at length returning to England, not only a Puritan in religion, but a pronounced enemy of despotic rule. To those who thought only of the preferment that he sacrificed, his resolution to leave his own country and seek a refuge in the New World doubtless seemed like folly, but he himself thus spoke, years after, of the motives which then influenced him:

[1] Gardiner calls him "a mere courtier." *Sp. Mar.*, 2 : 145.

"Since my early youth, through grace, I have been kept steadfast, desiring to walk in all good conscience towards God and towards man, according to the best light and understanding God gave me. For this I was willing to turn my back upon my estate; expose myself to hazards in foreign parts; yet nothing seemed difficult to me, so I might preserve faith and a good conscience, which I prefer above all things."

After a very short residence at Boston, and before he had completed his twenty-fourth year, he was by common consent chosen Governor of the Massachusetts Colony. And because, says Winthrop in his "Journal," "he was son and heir to the Privy Counsellor in England, the ships congratulated his election with a volley of great shot." It is probable that Vane's high social rank had much to do with his rapid political preferment. The Puritan colony of Massachusetts never shared the democratic temper of the more humble Separatist settlement at Plymouth. It is an indication of the disposition to keep up something of the stately customs of the Old World, that when the governor attended public worship, four sergeants, with halberds, always marched before him. But it would be wrong to trace Vane's advancement mainly to his high social rank. His eminent personal qualities and his earnest piety had most to do with it. His administration was marked by wisdom. The enthusiasm shown by the ships in his behalf, he turned to account by making the masters, whom he invited to dinner, agree that in future all vessels bound to Boston should anchor below the castle till their character had been ascertained; and he displayed his tact by the manner in which he

met the complaint of the masters that the King's flag was not flying from the fort. Yet one American historian, Hildreth, does not hesitate to represent Vane as acting with dissimulation on this occasion.

But the official career that began so auspiciously was destined to be disturbed by the most bitter controversy that ever divided the Massachusetts Colony. To enter into the precise points of this famous Antinomian dispute would be out of place on this occasion, even were it possible that a modern reader could extract intelligent meaning from the theological jargon of that day. Besides, we have only the account of one of the contending parties, and it is by no means certain that the opposite side affirmed precisely the propositions with which they were reproached. In the lofty regions of debate, where language loses any precise significance, misrepresentation was easy, and misunderstanding almost inevitable. "The name of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson," says Mr. Palfrey, "is dismally conspicuous in the early history of New England," and a recent writer, Dr. Dexter, applies to her the coarse epithet of "a first-class disturber of the peace." But a historian of wider survey and more profound insight, Mr. Bancroft, says: "The principles of Mrs. Hutchinson were a natural consequence of the progress of the Reformation."

She has been accused of eccentricity, but we must remember it was an age when the air was fragrant with new opinions. That she was dissatisfied with the formal, precise, and austere type of piety that she found so abundant, is very clear. With her religion was less a creed, than an inner experience; and to her enthusiastic faith the Holy

Ghost seemed actually to unite itself with the soul of the justified person. Like all who are much in earnest with religious truth, she lost no opportunity of divulging her opinions, and in imitation of a custom that obtained with the Boston church, of holding meetings for discussing the sermons of the ministers, she began a series of women's meetings, where, while bestowing unqualified approval upon the teachings of Cotton and Wheelwright, she boldly denounced the other ministers of the colony, so at least it was reported, "as under a covenant of works." Out of this came a controversy which nearly rent the infant commonwealth asunder. It is a significant fact that on the side of Mrs. Hutchinson stands the whole Boston church, with five exceptions, while the country churches took strong ground against her. Doubtless there was not the difference then that now exists between the city and the country, yet the leading men of the colony were in the Boston church, and it should be remembered to the credit of Anne Hutchinson, that those who had the best opportunity of knowing what her teachings really were, gave her the most hearty countenance. Among her warm supporters were John Cotton and the young Governor. The differences increased more and more, until the matter was taken up by the General Court. Wheelwright, for a sermon which he had preached, was adjudged guilty of sedition. A protest made by Vane and a few members of the Court, was not received, and at the next election, in May, 1637, Vane and his friends were left out of office. The next day Vane and Coddington were returned as deputies from Boston.

In this memorable controversy it seems beyond

dispute that what mainly interested Vane was not so much the precise opinions which Anne Hutchinson maintained, as the great doctrine of religious liberty which he conceived to be imperilled. It was no "mocking and unquiet fancy," such as Clarendon describes, but the early and clear apprehension of the great principle which guided and illumined his whole subsequent career. This is plainly shown in his paper termed "A Brief Resume," in which he argues against the order of Court, passed directly upon his removal from office, forbidding that any should inhabit the colony but such as were expressly allowed by the magistrates. With the insight of a far-reaching and penetrating intellect, Vane saw clearly that the peculiar theory on which Massachusetts had been planted was one that could not be maintained, and that a civil state could not be built up upon an entire agreement of religious faith. He denied that either the commonwealth, or the church, had a right to receive or to reject members at their discretion. There was a higher law to which they were subject.

The reputation of Vane has suffered for the reason that in this famous controversy he stood opposed to no less a person than John Winthrop. Winthrop led the minority of the Boston church, and was the recognized head of the country party. The policy represented by Winthrop for the time prevailed. Mrs. Hutchinson and her principal supporters were exiled from the colony; and the storm was succeeded by external calm. By the majority of writers Winthrop has been applauded as a wise magistrate and a consummate statesman, as the one who, more than any other, raised the struggling commonwealth;

while Vane has been condemned as an inexperienced and rash enthusiast, perilling the very foundations of civil order by his inconsiderate zeal for wild and impracticable theories. To judge either of these two men fairly we need to take into account all the considerations which influenced them; and especially the very different relation in which they stood to the memorable enterprise in which the Massachusetts colony was then engaged.

It is with hesitation that I venture to offer any observations that may seem, in the least, to conflict with the traditional and unqualified veneration that is felt for the first Governor of Massachusetts. If in public life, courage, firmness, judgment, unblemished integrity and honor, disinterested zeal for the public good, deserve the approbation of posterity, this veneration, which in Massachusetts has almost amounted to religious faith, has not been unworthily bestowed. Among all the leaders of memorable enterprises that history has celebrated, we may search in vain for a figure more venerable and imposing. Nor has the recent unveiling of his personal character, in the publication of his private letters and religious meditations, done anything to lessen this respect. In his most secret experiences, in his hopes and fears, in his joys and sorrows, he still stands before us grave, majestic, spotless as the marble that represents him in the chapel at Mount Auburn, type of a Puritan without fear and without reproach.

Yet, while in this controversy I have no disposition to withhold from Winthrop the praise due to a wise, a prudent, a temperate magistrate, I cannot withhold from Vane praise for different, and I must think, higher qualities. To comprehend clearly their

relative positions we must remember that there were in Massachusetts, at this time, two wholly different parties, parties aiming at different objects and animated by a different spirit. One of these parties, made up of the original settlers, the members of the colonial corporation, the men who devised and executed the bold transfer of the Charter by which a simple trading company in England became transformed in America into a body politic, were, as was very natural, mainly intent on the preservation of their chartered rights. With them the first aim was to build up and strengthen the infant commonwealth. Their greatest dread was of discord and division. "The cracks and flaws in the new building of the Reformation," said the soul-ravishing Thomas Shepard, "portend a fall." Unlimited religious freedom they viewed with especial dread as fatal to that unique civil order which they had cemented with so much sacrifice, and so many prayers. Into their plan had entered no purpose of establishing a universal toleration; what they coveted as the ideal of social life was a compact and solid commonwealth, founded in the fear of God, and making the protection of pure religion its foremost obligation. In this wise the civil magistrate had no more sacred duty than to protect the church, and what they understood by church was not a confused medley of the devout and the profane, but the earnest supporters of a definite creed. Yet mixed up with this were more worldly interests. Before they became a body politic, they were a trading corporation. The advancement of their private ends was ever a leading aim. In the gradual growth of the great trading and land company into a commonwealth, a jealous regard for their legal rights and

private interests was strangely combined with zeal for higher concerns.

But, beside this party thus embodying the combined religious and mercantile spirit of the original company, there existed another, made up of new comers, and animated by a different spirit, a party not so much concerned for the success of the Massachusetts company, as for the interests of spiritual freedom; thinking less of strengthening and building up the particular enterprise in which the first settlers were engaged, than of following out, in the joy of an unchecked liberty, that pursuit of eternal and ideal truth, which in the Old World had been denied them. These had been allured to the New World by the vision of a land where the principles of the Reformation would be allowed their logical development. Their ideal was not of a sober, well-regulated, thrifty colony, where controversy should cease, and truth should flourish, but of a community opening its hospitable doors to all opinions, where those professing error should not be denied cohabitation, where even Ishmael should dwell in the presence of his brethren.

The first of these parties naturally looked to Winthrop; the acknowledged leader of the second was young Harry Vane. By temperament, by education, by position, Winthrop was pledged to the party of order; by intellectual breadth, by spiritual insight, and also by position Vane was as much pledged to the liberal side. Winthrop was an English country gentleman, of middle life, of moderate opinions, of handsome property, who gave up his fair Suffolk home, transported himself and his family to these shores, made this his abiding place, fixed all his worldly

interests here. It was not only natural, it was perfectly right and proper, that a jealous care for the success of the enterprise, for which he had sacrificed so much, should have supplied a large motive to his action. With the savages on one side, with constant dread of interference from the mother country on the other, but firmly resolved to persevere at any cost in the experiment which they had undertaken, it was not strange that Winthrop, and men situated like Winthrop, should have felt and acted as they did.

Vane, on the other hand, was a young man, with no family, with no worldly concerns at stake, at best but a sojourner in the community which so generously conferred upon him its highest honors. To him Massachusetts was a means, not an end. He was in no way connected with the original company; in the enterprise as a commercial speculation he had no share. What had brought him to the New World was the single desire to preserve faith and a good conscience. This seemed to him the sum of all social and political experiments. For this he had been willing to renounce preferment and wealth. He came in search of an ideal, of such an ideal as then existed only in his own fervid imagination. He had heard the complaints of those who had suffered for conscience' sake; he dreamed of a land where conscience should not be molested under pretense of protecting the civil power; his confident and eager faith picturing in New England a spring of liberty pure and perennial as that fount of immortal youth which the Spanish explorers had sought amid the everglades of Florida.

Has not the time come to render full justice to both

these men? We may applaud Winthrop as an honest, a capable, a judicious magistrate, and still not reproach Vane as a mischief-maker and fanatic. To Winthrop may belong the more grateful mention in the annals of Massachusetts, but on the page of that more inspiring story that concerns itself not with corporate interests, the success of trading companies, and the temporary expedients of colonial enterprise, but with the immutable principles of man's spiritual nature, and the long warfare waged by the sons of light against the evil powers that have stood in the way of ideal truth, that page in whose deathless record live the unsceptered monarchs "who still rule our spirits from their urns," shall not some place be assigned to Harry Vane?

Thoroughly disheartened by the turn that things were taking in Massachusetts, and doubtless with the natural impatience of a young and ardent mind, at finding its dreams so rudely dissipated, Vane returned to England in August, 1637. Baxter afterwards took pains to repeat the slander, that he stole away by night, but Winthrop's trustworthy record tells us that he was honorably dismissed, a great concourse of his friends attending him to the vessel, and the guns of the castle giving a parting salute. The salute was by Winthrop's order, who was too great and magnanimous a man to allow public differences to interfere with private courtesy. As Vane took his last look at the thatched roof and humble meeting-house that long nestled among the three hills of the Puritan town, his spirit doubtless would have been comforted could the veil that hid the future be drawn aside, and could he have seen the village grown to a great city, a city destined to

be renowned beyond all others for tolerance of opinion, and for her eagerness in learning or in telling some new thing.

And one can but muse on what might have been the effect on the later history of Massachusetts had she persisted in this early policy of banishing to Rhode Island all her bright and enterprising wits. She would doubtless have secured a thrifty and well ordered social life; she might have developed her material resources; she might have subdued her sterile soil; might have coined her ice and granite into gold; still I can but fancy she would have lacked some of the things that have given her renown: she might have produced historians like Cotton Mather, and poets like Michael Wigglesworth, but she would hardly have enriched our literature with Bancroft and Motley and Lowell, she would hardly have welcomed the wide humanity of Channing, and hardly have lent an ear to the subtle wisdom of Emerson.

Well for her that she did not cast away the wine of Puritanism simply to swallow the dregs!

But Vane's connection with this country was not destined to be terminated by his return to England. When he first became acquainted with Roger Williams we are not informed, but two days after he landed, the sentence of banishment was pronounced against Williams, and Vane must very early have had his attention drawn to one who, like himself, chose rather to taste the bitterness of death than act with a doubting conscience. They must very soon have been brought together, for years after, Roger Williams, in writing of the settlement of the beautiful island which had attracted the notice of the

bold Florentine navigator nearly a century before the Pilgrims had landed at Plymouth, says: "It was not price nor money that could have purchased the island. Rhode Island was obtained by love, by the love and favor which that honorable gentleman, Sir Henry Vane, and myself had with the great sachem Miantinomo." And when, in consequence of the persistent hostility of Massachusetts, the settlements on the Narragansett were almost on the verge of being blotted from the map, it was mainly through the powerful interference of Vane that they succeeded in obtaining a "free and absolute charter of civil government." This charter was wholly unique in colonial history. All former charters had been granted by favor of the crown, or under charters thus granted, and had aimed at establishing exclusive companies, in most cases with limited provision for civic liberty. But the Long Parliament was now in the ascendant, and the control over colonies formerly vested in the crown was entrusted to a committee of Parliament, at the head of which was placed the Earl of Warwick. Under authority of this body, the "well affected and industrious inhabitants" along the Naragansett were granted full powers and authority to govern themselves. "Thus," says Mr. Bancroft, "to the Long Parliament, and especially to Sir Henry Vane, Rhode Island owes its existence as a political State." Vane was naturally zealous to secure legal recognition for a community whose polity was framed in precise accordance with his own theory of religious liberty.

Nor was this the only time that Rhode Island was indebted to the same powerful intercession. When, in 1651, Coddington had succeeded in secur-

ing from the Council of State a commission for governing the islands of Rhode Island and Canonicut for life, a dismemberment of the infant commonwealth that must inevitably have resulted in transferring the remaining portion of her soil to the adjacent colonies, and when Williams was sent to England to procure a revocation of this extraordinary grant, it was wholly through the vigorous interposition of Vane that his mission was accomplished. Writing from Bellan, Vane's seat in Lincolnshire, under date of April 1, 1653, to his "Dear and loving friends and neighbors of Providence and Warwick," Williams says, "Under God the sheet anchor of our ship is Sir Harry." His unflagging interest in the little colony prompted him soon after to write a letter in which he besought the settlers to compose some differences then troubling them. The answer of the colony to this letter, for dignity and feeling, will not suffer by comparison with any state paper of any age or country.

"From the first beginning of the Providence colony," thus ran the address, "you have been a noble and true friend to an outcast and despised people. We have ever reaped the sweet fruits of your constant loving kindness and favor. We have long drunk of the cup of as great liberties as any people that we can hear of under the whole heaven. When we are gone, our posterity and children, after us, shall read, in our town records, your loving kindness to us, and our real endeavors after peace and righteousness."

Vane's career in Massachusetts may have seemed to himself, as doubtless it seemed to others, a mortifying failure, but he left a deep mark on the institutions of the New World. Systems perish, but

ideas are indestructible. The curious theocratic state, built up with so much pains by Winthrop and his connections, has passed away. The principle of entire religious liberty, which, through the efforts of Vane, received for the first time in Christendom a recognition in Rhode Island, has continued to grow till the whole land sits under the shadow of it.

During Vane's stay in Massachusetts events had been rapidly ripening. Ten months before he left, the judgment respecting ship-money had been recovered against John Hampden, and when he landed, England was ringing with the uproar caused by Laud's attempt to force his liturgy upon the Scotch. In April, 1640, the Short Parliament was called, in which Vane for the first time took his seat. Through the influence of his father, still an influential adviser of the King, he was made first treasurer of the navy, and soon after, with the hope, apparently of attaching him to the court, received the honor of knighthood. In November, 1640, the Long Parliament assembled, and from this time the career of Vane becomes identified with the most stirring period of English history. To know that is to know with what address and eloquence he advocated the great principles of civil liberty, the maintenance of which made the Long Parliament the most memorable deliberative body that met; to know with what skill and success he managed the most difficult negotiations with the Scotch; with what ability he wielded the naval power of England; with what persistent and unshaken courage he defended the rights of Parliament against what he regarded as the dangerous encroachments of mil-

itary power. Though strongly opposed to the King, he had never favored the domination of the army, and when, by the act of Colonel Pride, the authority of Parliament had been virtually subverted, disdaining to share a triumph purchased by means which he could not sanction, he retired to private life. The final proceedings, resulting in the execution of the King, he strongly disapproved.

The most successful part of Vane's career was his superb administration of the navy during the Commonwealth. It was here that his genius for practical affairs was as conspicuously displayed, as his eloquence and address had been proved in a different sphere. When the war with the Provinces began the Dutch were undisputed lords of the seas. Before it closed, the energy of Vane and the valor of Blake had raised England to the first rank of naval powers. Between the two men there existed a profound agreement in political sentiment, and long as a vessel floats to bear aloft the red banner of St. George, the names of Harry Vane and of Robert Blake will be mentioned in the same breath. But I pass from a familiar story, and from passages in his history which the least generous of his critics have been forced to mention with applause, to consider his relations with Cromwell, relations which have affected more than anything else his reputation with posterity. There can be no doubt that this most brilliant statesmen of the Commonwealth is better known to the mass of readers by Cromwell's petulant exclamation when he dissolved the Long Parliament, "the Lord deliver me from Sir Harry Vane," than he is by any act in his long career. Without pausing to inquire what Cromwell meant, if indeed what he

meant was clear to his own mind, without asking which was right in the contest which was thus violently concluded, men, impressed and captivated by the colossal force of Cromwell's character, have hastily inferred that Vane was an impracticable visionary, whose speculations no man could understand, and whose schemes no age could reduce to practice. That Vane should have been misjudged by a man like Clarendon, who hated with all the energy of a powerful but narrow mind the political theories which Vane so vigorously supported; that he should have been misrepresented by Baxter, who disliked his theological opinions; that he should have been held in suspicion by the whole band of prosaic, commonplace fanatics, who prefer forms to essence and words to things, was to be expected; but he has been most depreciated by some whose only ground of dislike was his opposition to Cromwell.

In the beginning of the struggle Cromwell and Vane had stood side by side. They were not only in hearty agreement in political opinion, but they both, in opposition to Presbyterian as well as Churchman, advocated an unlimited toleration in religion. The great measures of the Long Parliament which had laid the foundations of Cromwell's military success, the new model and the self-denying ordinances, were measures to which Vane had given an enthusiastic support. That strange force, which, as Macaulay says, "from the time when it was remodelled to the time when it was disbanded never found an enemy who could stand its onset," was in part Vane's creation. After the death of the King, Vane and Cromwell were cordially united in establishing the Commonwealth. No person familiar with public sen-

timent supposed that anything like a majority of the English people were favorable to this form of government, but it was hoped by the leaders that a wise and successful administration of affairs would in time bring many to its support who at first received it with dislike.

It was not until the refusal of Fairfax to march against the Scotch left Cromwell in supreme command of the army, that Vane seems to have felt any suspicions of his intentions. The crowning mercy of Worcester laid everything at the victorious general's feet. The issue lay between the Parliament and the army. Since the establishment of the Commonwealth the question, How a new Parliament should be convened, had been earnestly debated. It was recognized by all that the remnant left of the Long Parliament no longer possessed a national character ; but respecting the remedy, opinions were divided. But the Rump and the army were aware that a free election would probably result in a royalist Parliament, and both shrunk from an appeal to the popular voice. The remedy at last proposed by Vane was to fill the vacant seats, allowing the old members to hold over ; the remedy advocated by Cromwell was to call a new Parliament, to be freely elected, but with such constitutional securities as would effectually guard against a royalist reaction.

It is hardly necessary for my present purpose to discuss the merits of this controversy. "Now that the King is dead and his son defeated," Cromwell said to the Parliament, "it is time to come to a settlement." But the bill for dissolving Parliament was only passed, after bitter opposition, by a majority of two ; and by a compromise that permitted the

House to sit for three years longer. To add to the discontent charges of corruption were freely brought against some members. The only remedy, in the opinion of the army, was a new House; but this step the House was determined to avert. Hardly had the Dutch war been declared when the army petitioned for an explicit declaration that the House would bring its proceedings to a close. This forced the House to discuss the question, but only brought out the resolve of the members to continue as part of the new Parliament without reëlection. A conference took place between the leaders of the Commons and the officers of the House. The attempt of Vane to hurry the bill through the House resulted in Cromwell's forcible dissolution of the Rump Parliament.

With regard to this difference between Vane and Cromwell, as with the difference between Vane and Winthrop, we are now in a position to judge both men fairly. There is no doubt that Vane honestly suspected Cromwell of aiming at supreme power, and there need be no doubt that Cromwell honestly thought that Vane was playing him a trick. But both were sincerely bent on realizing the same great object; both were aiming at a free state, governed by its elected representatives, and providing sufficient guarantees for liberty of thought and speech. It is not difficult to see how two men, so unlike in temper and habits as Vane and Cromwell, should fail to understand each other. We have had one illustration, in our own country, in the quarrel between General Grant and the late Senator Sumner, of the way in which two thoroughly honest men, both aiming at the same results, may come to

suspect each other's motives. But nothing would be more unsafe than to base one's estimate of the character or services of such men upon the opinions which they thus mutually entertained.

Because Cromwell was a man of action, always aiming at practical results. it has been hastily concluded that Vane was a mere theorist, and that, in pursuit of an unattainable ideal, he was ready to sacrifice a positive good. Nothing can do his character as a statesman a greater wrong. Vane was not a visionary politician seeking to brush away the old institutions of his country, and set up new ones, with no root whatever in the soil. It would be difficult to prove, either from his speeches or writings, that he was ever a theoretical republican, intent on establishing at all hazards a particular political form. In a "Treatise on Government," written shortly before his death, he says: "It is not so much the form of the administration as the thing administered, wherein the good or evil of government doth consist." The great objects which he kept steadily in view, were a reform of representatives, freedom of thought, and perfect toleration in religion. If he supported a republic, it was because he saw that these could not be secured under a monarchy.

But it is an error to infer that he was animated by any spirit of hostility to the ancient institutions of England.

"However I have been misunderstood and misjudged," he says of himself, "I can truly affirm, that in the whole series of my actions, that which I have had in my eye, hath been to preserve the ancient well-constituted government of England on its own basis and primitive right-

eous foundations, most learnedly stated by Fortescue in his book, made in praise of the English laws, and I did account it the most likely means for the effecting of this to preserve it at least in its root, whatever changes and alterations it might be exposed to in its branches, through the blusterous and stormy times that have passed over us."

These are surely not the words of a wild political enthusiast!

Yet Vane was opposed to Cromwel', and hence the eulogists of the one have felt it necessary to defame the other. No one has gone farther in this direction than Carlyle: —

"A man of endless virtues," he sneeringly says of Vane, "and of endless intellect, but you must not very specially ask How and When? Vane was the friend of Milton; that is almost the only answer that can be given — a man, one rather finds, of light fibre, — grant all manner of purity and elevation, subtle high discourse, much intellectual and practical dexterity, an amiable, devoutly zealous, very pretty man, but not a royal man, — on the whole, rather a thin man, whose tendency is towards the abstract, and whose hold of the concrete is by no means that of a giant."

A passage such as this may well suggest a doubt whether the biographer of Frederic the Great was, after all, the man to trace the stages of a struggle into which conscience so powerfully entered, whether a vision so purblind by the worship of mere force could appreciate the finer qualities of the moral hero!

Surely another answer might be given. Did they think Vane a man of rather light fibre who saw him stand in the forefront of the great debates that ended in sending Strafford to the block, those de-

bates, during which, said Ludlow, who knew him well, "he soon made appear how capable he was of managing great affairs, possessing in the highest perfection a quick and ready apprehension, a strong and tenacious memory, a profound and penetrating judgment, a just and noble eloquence."

Did they think him simply a pretty man, who selected him to conduct the difficult negotiations with the Scotch, speaking of which Lord Clarendon, his life-long and bitter enemy, declares, that having mentioned Sir Harry Vane as one of the commissioners, the others need not be named, since he was all in any business in which others were joined with him? "A man," he adds, "of extraordinary parts and great understanding, of whose ability there need no more be said than that he was chosen to cover and deceive a whole nation who excel in craft and cunning."

Or did they deem him a mere dreamer of abstractions, with no hold on the concrete, who in the hour of distress and danger gave him England's right hand to wield, and who recognized the proof of his rare administrative genius in the unparalleled exertions that were crowned with the most brilliant naval victory England had gained since the Great Armada? Or lastly, did Milton share this estimate of Vane when he wrote the admiring lines: —

"Vane, young in years, but in sage counsel old,
Than whom a better senator ne'er held
The helm of Rome, when gowns, not arms, repell'd
The fierce Epirot and the African bold.
Whether to settle peace, or to unfold
The drift of hollow states hard to be spell'd,
Then to advise how war may, best upheld,
Move by her two main nerves, iron and gold,

In all her equipage: besides to know
Both spiritual power and civil, what each means,
What severs each, thou hast learn'd, which few have done:
The bounds of either sword to thee we owe:
Therefore on thy firm hand Religion leans
In peace, and reckons thee her eldest son."

Mr. Masson, in the recently published volumes of his "Life of Milton," calls attention to the fact that in the "Defensio Secunda," which was printed in 1654, two years after this sonnet was written, while elaborate panegyrics of Bradshaw and Fairfax and other leading men of the Commonwealth are introduced, no mention whatever is made of Vane. But while this pamphlet proves beyond all doubt that Milton indorsed heartily the policy that Cromwell had adopted, since he expresses his approval not only of the dissolution of the Rump and the Interim Dictatorship, but also of the Protectorate after the failure of the Barebones Parliament, yet it has nothing to indicate that his exalted estimate of Vane's abilities had been in the least modified. In this very Defense he recommends a dissolution of the connection of Church and State, and a return to absolute voluntaryism in religion, — the precise measures with which Vane had all along been identified. In a production meant to recommend to the Protector a particular policy, Milton could hardly have praised Cromwell's most pronounced opponent.

But we need no better proof of the estimate in which Vane was held by those who had the best means of taking his true measure than is furnished in the events which followed the Restoration. When Charles II. returned, hailed with a frenzy of long-suppressed loyalty, Vane left his seat in Lincolnshire,

and came up to London. He was unconscious, he said, of having done anything for which he could not cheerfully give account. He had taken no share in the trial and death of Charles I. The new king had promised a generous indemnity for political offenses. Nevertheless, in July, 1660, Vane was arrested and flung into the Tower; and to flatter a sovereign, himself incapable either of love or hate, — who at all times assumed a cynical disbelief in human virtue as simply a trick by which hypocrites impose on fools, — he was arraigned for high treason in 1662. Denied the assistance of counsel, and even refused a copy of the indictment to which he was called to plead, alone, but unterrified, the prisoner made a masterly defense, speaking, as he declared to his judges, "not for his own sake only, but for theirs and for posterity."

The condemnation of Vane was a double outrage: first, on public decency, as it was a violation of the King's express promise of indemnity; and, second, on public justice, as it was directly in the face of a wholesome principle of English law, having the force of a statute since the time of Henry VII., which exempted from the penalties of treason all subjects obeying a *de facto* sovereign. But the most conclusive defense was idle, for the trial was a farce. Back of judges and jury a malignant influence was pushing on the foregone conclusion. In a note which has been preserved, addressed by Charles to Clarendon, he says of Vane, "Certainly he is too dangerous a man to let live, if we can honestly put him out of the way." Idler and voluptuary as he was, Charles II. was a shrewd judge of men. Holding them all in a kind of assumed contempt, he hereby divined

their differences of character. And when Charles thus wrote of a man that he "was too dangerous to let live," it surely does not seem likely that he regarded him simply as a "pretty man," as a visionary theorist, who had no hold on the concrete.

The end was not long in coming. On Wednesday, the 11th of June, Vane stood at the bar to receive his sentence, and on the Saturday following a vast concourse crowded every window and house-top over against the Tower to see him pass to execution. As the gloomy portals opened, and while the great multitude cried out, "The Lord go with you!" a stately figure, dressed in black, with scarlet waistcoat, bowed constant acknowledgments as the sled was slowly drawn to the slight eminence just outside the walls, on which stood the scaffold and the block.

There are few spots on earth round which such sad memories cluster. On that same eminence, twenty years before, with spirit as undaunted, putting off his doublet as cheerfully, he said, as ever he had done at night, had stood the great Earl of Strafford. Thither, a few years after Strafford, victim of a bigotry as cruel and unreasonable as that of which himself had been accused, had come Archbishop Laud. On the same blood-stained hillock had stood, in the preceding century, Guilford Dudley, the husband of Jane Grey, his gentle wife watching from a window as he walked along, and waiting to see his headless trunk brought back; and the Protector Somerset, whose high personal courage could not atone for political faults, but whose errors were forgotten in his tragical end; and the young Earl of Surrey,

whose enduring monument was the enriching of English poetry with blank verse; and Thomas Cromwell, perhaps the most perplexing figure in the whole line of English statesmen, who blended the maxims of Italy with the policy of Henry, and struck the death-blow to Papal supremacy in the confiscation of the monasteries.

But before all these, in merit as in time, there had come another sufferer, the first conspicuous victim of the attempt to stretch the royal prerogative, as Vane was the last. Between Sir Thomas More and Sir Harry Vane there may seem in common at first sight simply the mode of death: one laying his head on the block, as he did, out of supreme devotion to the Church of Rome, delighting in her rites and doctrines; the other, in his zeal for spiritual liberty, suspected of discarding all outward rites and forms. And yet, in spirit they were not unlike, — More the purest victim of the great religious, and Vane the purest victim of the great civil, revolution. As More found his eulogist in Erasmus, so Vane found his in Milton. In different ways both laid down their lives out of devotion to ideal truth; both confessing the supreme obligation of conscience, both scorning expediency as a rule of political conduct, both bowing before a law higher than any human ordinance. And still further might the parallel be traced between the scholar who, in his "Utopia," fondly depicted an ideal state, where the end of legislation should be to secure the good of the whole, — where social injustice, political tyranny, and religious intolerance should alike cease; where all should be taught to read and write; and where both priest and magistrate should

be chosen by the people, — and the statesman whose life was devoted to the realization of this ideal in a free, a self-governed, a prosperous commonwealth; who, in opposition to religious intolerance both in the New and in the Old World, and in defiance of a popular sentiment which decried him as a visionary and a fanatic, unflinchingly maintained the doctrine that religious opinion should under no circumstances be restrained by the civil power.

And now, while we watch Vane standing on the scaffold, his hands resting on the rails, surveying with a serious but composed countenance the surging multitude before him and around him; essaying to speak, but rudely interrupted by the trumpeters, who were commanded to crowd about him and blow in his face; the very mob murmuring their discontent as the sheriff tore from his hand the paper which he began to read, but himself maintaining a dignified composure, so that even a Royalist spectator declared "that he died like a prince;" then kneeling in prayer, and blessing God, who had counted him worthy to suffer in this way, his moral courage completely triumphing over the native timorousness of his character, — watching Vane, I say, in this supreme moment of his fate, what verdict shall we pass upon him?

I refer not to his personal traits, to his stainless integrity, his sincerity of purpose, the purity of his private life, the unaffected piety which in the darkest crisis of his career was his unfailing comfort and support, but what shall we say of him as a public man?

Was he, in the words of Anthony Wood, "the Proteus of the times, a mere hotch-potch of religions,

chief ringleader of all the frantic sectarians"?—a man whose writings, the historian Hume declares, "are absolutely unintelligible, with no traces of eloquence, or even of common sense"? Such, surely, is not the judgment of those who have studied his various productions, writings pervaded throughout by a depth of spiritual insight, a simplicity and nobleness of diction, which puts them on a level with the best theological literature of the seventeenth century. Even the charge which Clarendon brings against him of being a man "above ordinances," when translated into modern phrase, means simply that Vane regarded religious forms as means, not ends. Holding with the apostle that the gospel meant neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, he was equally removed from the extreme which elevated the form above the substance, and the extreme which elevated the letter above the spirit. He was equally aloof from the bigotry of the Churchman and the bigotry of the Puritan. It is not surprising that a hard-headed Scotchman like Burnet should have been puzzled to know what his true opinions were.

Burnet says that Vane was what was called a Seeker; that he waited for new and clearer revelations; and that he leaned to Origen's notion of a universal salvation. But what more than anything else gave rise to the opinion that his intellect was clouded and unsettled was his confident expectation of the speedy return of Christ. The scaffold and the axe mattered little to one who could declare with his latest breath that in the cloud and darkness of that hour he only saw more clearly the New Jerusalem.

Was Vane a statesman who accomplished nothing, — whose life was spent in idly dreaming of an unattainable ideal? So it might have seemed to those who saw him on the scaffold; who bitterly reflected how in the whirlwind of returning loyalty the wholesome reforms which he had advocated were blown aside. True, that English commonwealth, which to his mind was the very perfection of a body politic, had but a short-lived existence; but shall we say that he lived to no purpose when the identical measures which he advocated have, in the course of two hundred years, steadily wrought themselves into the English constitution; when his fundamental maxim, that the end of all government is the welfare of the governed, is to-day the accepted principle of English politics; when the reform of representation which he pressed has been carried out in a series of memorable enactments; when the separation of church and state, for which he contended, is at this moment the next problem confronting English statesmen?

Shall we say that he lived to no purpose when we remember that, in little more than a century after his blood was shed, his identical plan of a fundamental constitution, to be drawn up by a general convention of discerning men, chosen for that purpose by the whole people, was carried into effect by the body over which George Washington presided, which framed the Constitution of the United States? We who have demonstrated that his vision of a republic where the people are recognized as the sole source of power need not be scouted as an idle dream; clothing it in the Western world with an amplitude and majesty which his wildest imagi-

nation never pictured; proving in the throes of an unexampled civil strife that a government resting on popular consent is incomparably the strongest that can exist, able to bear a shock that would have swept away like chaff the proudest monarchies, — we who know and have experienced all this, shall we affirm that Vane accomplished nothing by his unflinching advocacy of principles for which his own age was not ripe? Then, indeed, must every willing sacrifice of hero or martyr be condemned as a reckless and useless throwing away of life!

I grant that Vane was an enthusiast; but society can ill spare its enthusiasts even from the arena of political life. The great struggle between King and Parliament in the seventeenth century was fruitful in spirits bravely pitched: in the front rank of either side were men of consummate parts; yet two stand out from all the rest, Falkland and Vane. They were on opposite sides. They were unlike in character: one was learned and accomplished, delighting to make his house a centre for wise and witty men; the other, devout and spiritual, gathering about him such as loved to commune with the invisible powers. Yet both were worshippers of the ideal; both yearned passionately for something broader and nobler than they found about them. Each gave his life for a lost cause: one on the field of Newbury, the other on Tower Hill. But now that the noise of the conflict has passed, men are coming to see that what these two were in search of was the best result of the struggle.

REVIEWS.

Eccl. Hist.
§ U. S. (1776 – 1876.)

RELIGION IN AMERICA.[1]

1776–1876.

THE Revolution which a century ago severed the connection between Great Britain and her colonies issued so directly from political disputes that its religious aspects have been obscured; yet no fact lies plainer on the page of colonial history than the intimate alliance of religious and political ideas, — a fact which the elder Adams emphasized when he cautioned the Abbé Mably not to undertake the history of the War of Independence without first mastering the church system of New England. And it would form a singular exception to the ordinary laws of historical development if that which is so evident in the causes of the Revolution could not be traced in its results. Those results supplied new ecclesiastical as well as new political conditions, and flowered, at the same time, in the novel experiments of a self-governed state and of a self-directing and self-supporting church. Nor should the formal separation of these two experiments betray us into the error of supposing that they are essentially distinct. They have been carried on together, by the same people, and during the same period, and throughout all this period have had a connection more close and real than will be conceded by such as are ac-

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customed to look only at the superficial causes of political and social progress. There can be no doubt that whatever circumstances tend to affect the one must ultimately affect the other also, and that any extensive modification of the religious sentiment would ultimately react upon political opinion. An acute critic of American society, not a religious philosopher but a political economist, has found in our experience a signal illustration of the principle "that there must be harmony between the political and religious schemes that are suited to a people;" and a later writer, the least inclined of any historian of civilization to lay stress on the spiritual forces that shape society, has indorsed Chevalier's maxim, in a striking passage which traces the influence exerted on political opinion by religious creeds. (The religion of a people is, in a profound sense, a part of its history, and results in phenomena, to which the mere political student cannot afford to shut his eyes.)

The hundred years which we are passing in review have been marked by sweeping ecclesiastical and theological convulsions. Hardly had the last royal regiment left our shores when the sky grew black with signs of a more far-reaching revolution, and for a time altar and throne went down together. Since that return of chaos and old night, the vexed problem which Hildebrand and the Hohenstauffens left unsolved has harassed every European state. In France, in Italy, and in Germany the struggle has presented its most brilliant phases. In the South the Pope has been stripped of every vestige of a political dominion which long antedated that of the proudest royal dynasty; while in the North a new Protestant empire has been called into existence, which

boldly remits to antiquaries the traditional relations between Germany and the Holy See. England, if less powerfully convulsed, has by no means escaped. The repeal of the Test Act, Catholic emancipation, the disestablishment of the Irish Church, are legislative measures which deserve to rank beside the Reform Bill and the abolition of the Corn Laws; and Mr. Gladstone has renewed the discussion of civil allegiance which Mr. Pitt opened with the Irish universities the very year that our Federal Constitution went into operation. The two greatest statesmen whom this century has produced have expended their supreme energies on the question which is, at this moment, the fundamental question of European politics. Nor have the revolutions of theological opinion been less marked. The avowed atheism of the Revolution and the undisguised indifference of the Empire were succeeded in France by the ultramontane revival of the Restoration; the bold rationalism of Germany issued in the transcendental schools, and the various modifications of German theology and criticism; the evangelical movement in the English Church was followed by the great Tractarian reaction; while the Council of the Vatican, contemptuously ignoring the political reverses of the papacy, proceeded to enunciate dogmas which touch, in their application, every state in Christendom. And while ecclesiastics and statesmen have been busied with these discussions, science has advanced new theories, which threaten to wipe out the lines of former controversies. In the vast range of investigation and argument thus disclosed, the most earnest and most adventurous thought of our time has found ample scope for utterance. It is certainly

a matter of no little interest to ascertain what part we have played in this great drama, and how much we have contributed to the solution of these perplexing problems. From an estimate of the mere intellectual value of our civilization such inquiries could hardly be omitted.

In a survey of our religious progress covering so long a period, and presenting so many phases, of course only the more salient and characteristic features can be noted. No mention can be made of those exceptional manifestations of the religious sentiment, or those reactions of individual opinion, which, however interesting in themselves, have left no distinct mark on the public mind. It is the main current, not the side eddies, that must be considered. What seeds, now small and despised, shall attain hereafter a vigorous growth it remains for time to show. A treatment so general is embarrassed with peculiar difficulties, on account of the unexampled diversity of religious phenomena which our history exhibits. To disentangle from this confused mass any common tendencies, to evolve from this dissonance any rhythmic movement, may seem at first sight an unpromising experiment, and one that to some, no doubt, will appear the less inviting from the pervading unpicturesqueness of our religious annals. The thrilling epochs of Old World history are when the cross and altar fill the foreground of the picture; when the brilliant narrative groups on a single stage all the heroic and venerable figures; but the huge bulk of our American Christianity is broken into many fragments; its energetic life is poured through various and widely separated channels; whatever of

romance gilds it belongs to its earliest youth. Yet neither the lack of romantic interest nor the hindrances to a satisfactory analysis should deter any one from an honest attempt to measure the real success of an experiment in which such great and manifold issues are involved.

We shall follow the most simple method if we fix our attention, at the outset, on the external features of our religious history; and, beyond question, the most characteristic of these is the entire separation that obtains, both in our Federal and State systems, between the ecclesiastical and the civil province. So heartily is this accepted, and so unhesitatingly is it maintained, that it ought, perhaps, to be regarded less as an external feature than as a fundamental maxim of our body politic. He who should deny it would find it hard to gain a hearing, and would be fortunate if he escaped the reproach of holding an unfriendly attitude towards popular liberty itself. "It belongs to American liberty," says Lieber, "to separate entirely from the political government the institution which has for its object the support and diffusion of religion." The broad line of demarkation between the opinions of to-day and those which prevailed a century ago can nowhere be more distinctly traced than precisely at this point; and the contrast that is presented the more deserves attention for the reason that it has hardly been touched upon with sufficient discrimination even by our best historians. That in all the colonies, previous to the Revolution, there existed a connection, more or less close, between religion and the state, is a fact often repeated and sufficiently familiar. Such a connection may be established in two ways: negatively, by

means of tests excluding from public office or the civil franchise the professors of a certain faith; or, positively, by means of legislation providing for religious establishments, or for the support of public worship. The thirteen colonies afforded illustration of all these modes. In all there existed religious tests, unless we regard as an unauthorized interpolation a clause by which, in the community which welcomed the virtuous Berkeley, Montesquieu and Turgot would have been accounted aliens. Even Delaware and Pennsylvania, refusing any legal preference of religion, denied the franchise to all who did not profess faith in Jesus Christ. Most of these tests were borrowed from English law, and were due to the exigencies of English politics. But throughout the Southern colonies the Church of England enjoyed a legal recognition. Into Georgia, where the social influences that operated farther north hardly found a place, it was introduced by the second royal governor. Unmindful of the principle which the wise foresight of Locke had sought to fix in the "Grand Model," South Carolina had taken the first step in the same direction before the close of the seventeenth century. In North Carolina it had found a place, though with meagre results, early in the eighteenth. In Virginia it was coeval with the civil constitution; and in Maryland, originally founded on the principle of complete toleration, it had so far triumphed that, in the colony which Calvert had planted, the rites of the Church of Rome could no longer be celebrated. And in New Jersey and New York, where the Church was not established, it basked in the sunshine of an official countenance that secured it a hardly inferior advantage.

Yet all this was but an attempt to transplant to the New World institutions which in the Old were already smitten with decay. The Establishment remained a sickly exotic, striking no deep roots into the soil, and it almost withered away when scorched by the fervent heat of the Revolutionary epoch.

The statement has been repeated by writers who should be better informed that before the Revolution the Congregational church system was established after the same plan in the colonies of Connecticut and Massachusetts. But in these two colonies there was not only no religious establishment, but even the bare suggestion of one had drawn forth an energetic protest. When we study their institutions we encounter an experiment the novel and unique features of which have been too much overlooked. It was not even a reproduction, on these shores, of the scheme of Calvin, — at least as that scheme was expounded by his disciple Cartwright, and indorsed by the English Presbyterians; for that claimed for the ecclesiastical a complete independence of the civil power. From the decrees of the clergy there was no appeal. The church was a self-subsisting spiritual republic; and the province of the civil ruler was simply to see that her discipline was carried out. According to this theory, church and state were essentially distinct, and might come into angry collision. But the plan devised by the founders of Massachusetts aimed at a blending of the two. In their view, "the order of the churches and of the commonwealth" formed a complete and harmonious whole. It was a prophecy of the new heavens and of the new earth. Between church and state there could exist no antagonism,

when both were alike but shapes in which one informing spirit masked itself. It is true that long before the Revolution this singular system had passed away. By the charter of William and Mary toleration had been extended to all Protestant creeds, and the right of suffrage was no longer restricted to church members. But the ideas out of which this experiment had grown still survived in a profound conviction of the indissoluble alliance between the spiritual and civil order ; and the staunch devotion of the colony to her traditions proved itself in an enactment requiring every town to support a religious teacher. This legislation rested on the unwavering conviction that religion was the foundation of society, and that the furtherance of religion was one of the prime functions of the body politic. Before we flout the legislators of Massachusetts for being behind the age, we should ascertain precisely what they sought to do. They were not emptying into the cup of colonial liberty the dregs of an old experiment. The support of religion, not the endowment of any specific church establishment, was what they had in mind. No doubt the overwhelming majority of the population were attached to the same form of faith, yet the statute left it open for each town to decide what ecclesiastical order it would adopt. An arrangement more liberal in principle never was devised. The theory thus applied to churches was precisely the same that was applied to schools. In this respect the minister and the school-master stood on exactly the same footing. Every argument that could be adduced in favor of giving public support to one could be adduced in favor of giving the same support to the other also.

Religion and education were alike essential to the welfare of the state, and it was equally the concern of the state to see that both should flourish. When the number of dissenters from the early faith had sufficiently increased, the law was modified so as to allow each separate congregation to claim its proportion of the ecclesiastical tax for the support of a clergyman of its own persuasion. It contemplated no exclusive privilege.

The conservative character of our Revolution was shown in nothing more distinctly than in the deliberate manner in which, under the new political order, the several States proceeded to modify the old relations between religion and the civil power. Of necessity, the formal church establishments which existed at the South, identified as they were both in religion and form with a foreign and hostile power, at once fell to pieces. But it is a somewhat rhetorical exaggeration of the fact when our foremost historian tells us "that from the rivers of Maine and the hills of New Hampshire to the mountain valleys of Tennessee and the borders of Georgia, one voice called to the other that there should be no connection of church and state." On the contrary, in every one of the new constitutions framed under the Declaration of Independence, with the single exception of that of New York, some connection of church and state was expressly recognized. Many of the restrictions that were retained may be properly described as "shreds of an old system" or "incidental reminiscences of ancient usages." Such especially were the tests, having their origin not so much in religious as in political antagonisms, which denied the franchise to Roman

Catholics. These purely negative provisions, which in this country had little meaning, and were readily eliminated, were of a wholly different nature from positive enactments in which some of the States embodied the conviction that religion lay at the foundation of civil government. Thus, into the Constitution of Maryland, adopted the very year in which independence was declared, a provision was inserted making belief in the Christian religion the condition of holding any public office. Massachusetts, four years later, retained a similar condition. In Pennsylvania every member of the Legislature was required to avow his belief in God and in the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. Delaware went still further, and demanded of every public officer a declaration of belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. The two Carolinas and Georgia required of every public functionary that he should profess the Protestant religion. Yet it is evident that in all these provisions the end in view was not the exclusion of any particular sect from the civil franchise, but the assertion of the religious basis of civil government. In Maryland and in South Carolina the public support of religion was still recognized as a duty of the State.

This conviction, however, naturally found its most emphatic assertion in New England, where the public support of religion was most strongly intrenched in popular tradition. As Connecticut continued under her colonial charter, without adopting a constitution, she escaped for the time any discussion of the question; but in Massachusetts it had already provoked a bitter controversy, and in the debates which preceded the adoption of the Constitu-

tion of 1780 it became the engrossing topic. The third article of the Bill of Rights, forming part of the Constitution, empowered the Legislature to make suitable provision "for the support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality." Against the whole principle of a public support of religion the Baptists had long been vehemently protesting. They had felt especially aggrieved by a law, passed in 1753, which enacted that no person should be reckoned of their persuasion whose name was not included in a list, the correctness of which must be attested by three Baptist churches. By a subsequent statute this list was required to be annually exhibited to the assessors of each town. Repeated complaints were made of grievous persecutions, and the year before the first blood of the Revolution was shed at Lexington, no less than eighteen members of a Baptist church were imprisoned in Northampton jail for refusing to pay ministerial rates. Remonstrances were laid before members of the Continental Congress, then in session at Philadelphia, and before the Massachusetts Congress at Cambridge. At the Philadelphia conference, which was simply an informal meeting of certain members of the Congress, Samuel Adams intimated "that the complaints came from enthusiasts who made it a merit to suffer persecution;" while John Adams declared "that a change in the solar system might be expected as soon as a change in the ecclesiastical system of Massachusetts." The opinions of the most serious supporters of the law will be found reflected in the annual Election sermons of the period. In 1770, Samuel Clark, of Cambridge, de-

clares "that in a flourishing and respectable civil state the worship of God must be maintained." In 1776, Samuel West, of Dartmouth, says that laws for "maintaining public worship and decently supporting the teachers of religion" are "absolutely necessary for the well-being of society." "The re straints of religion would be broken down," said Phillips Payson, of Chelsea, in 1778, "by leaving the subject of public worship to the humors of the multitude." Rulers, affirmed Simeon Howard, of Boston, in 1780, should have power to encourage religion, "not only by their example, but by their authority;" power not only "to punish profaneness and impiety," but to "provide for the institution and support of the public worship of God." A government which should neglect this would be guilty of "a daring affront to Heaven." These facts are sufficient to show that, while no desire existed with the great majority of the American people to retain religious establishments, the doctrine that the civil and the spiritual order were essentially related still had a powerful hold on the public conscience. Nor should this opinion be regarded as the result of any special ecclesiastical prejudice. On the contrary, it received its most impressive statement from laymen. Thus, when Chief Justice Parsons, who was not at the time a member of any church, entered upon his official career, he took the earliest opportunity to express, in the most solemn manner, his conviction of the necessity of a public support of religious institutions; and, still later, Judge Story declared that "it yet remained a problem to be solved in human affairs whether any free government can be permanent where the public worship

of God and the support of religion constitute no part of the policy or duty of the state."

It is only when we call to mind facts like these that we can appreciate the full extent of the revolution in public sentiment which the past century has witnessed. To this result three wholly distinct causes have contributed. The first of these was the number of religious organizations, widely differing in doctrine and worship, which rendered any public support of religion almost impracticable, although many of these bodies regarded such support without disfavor. A second cause was the conscientious objection of certain sects to any recognition of religion by the civil power. The third and most decisive cause was the rise of the secular theory of the state, a part of the great political development of modern times. Those who defended this theory did not profess, like the Baptists, to be governed by any religious scruples, but advanced the broad doctrine that state and church were inherently and essentially distinct. The great representative of this view was Mr. Jefferson, and it found its first expression in the famous Virginia act of 1785, which, in after years, he looked back upon as the most creditable achievement of his life. The phraseology of this act reflects no less distinctly than the Declaration of Independence "the semi-juridical, semi-popular opinions which were fashionable in France," and marks a decisive epoch in the development of American political theories. The change is illustrated in the two most famous of our political documents. When the Declaration of Independence was drawn up it was still deemed proper to insert a solemn appeal to the Supreme Judge of the world, and an expression

of reliance upon the protection of Divine Providence; but when the Federal Constitution was framed, a transaction surely not less vitally related to the well-being of the nation, all recognition of a higher than secular authority was carefully excluded, the sole allusion to religion being the provision that "no religious tests should ever be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the United States." The first amendment provided, further, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The Federal Constitution imposed no restriction upon the religious legislation of the States, and did not directly affect their action, yet its thoroughly secular character came more and more to stamp itself upon them, till at length all trace of the former connection between church and state had disappeared. Laws for the support of public worship lingered in Connecticut till 1816, and in Massachusetts till 1833, and religious tests in several States for a few years longer. But public opinion, from which all laws proceed, at length decided that the State, in its essence, was a "purely political organism." Provisions regulating the public establishment of religion, requiring the compulsory support of religious teachers, enforcing attendance upon public worship, restraining the free exercise of religious functions or the free expression of religious belief, have been expunged from the statute-book of every State. Not only does the maxim universally prevail that no particular form of religion should receive the countenance of law, but the far more comprehensive principle that the spiritual and secular provinces are essentially distinct. Al-

though our practice has not always been consistent with this maxim, yet in the main we have come to accept a secular theory of government. The effect of this upon our political life would furnish an inviting topic for discussion, but we are here concerned only with its bearings upon our religious progress.

There is no necessary connection between separation of church and state, and the subdivision of the former into a variety of independent sects. On the contrary, the first three centuries of the Christian era show that a catholic and a self-sustaining Christianity are not incompatible. Still, the unique circumstances which shaped the settlement of the thirteen colonies, collecting on these shores the representatives of so many nationalities, at the crisis when their religious convictions were stimulated to the highest pitch, involved contrasts in ecclesiastical and theological opinion which the perfect legal equality subsequently established powerfully heightened. That tendency to carry conscientious differences to the point of separation, which Luther and his compeers bequeathed as a legacy to modern Christendom, was freed in this country from the restraints which held it partially in check in every Protestant state of Europe. The German elector, the Dutch burgomaster, the English king, however they differed on other points, were all agreed in giving legal preference to some particular form of faith. Here, for the first time, Protestant sects stood on an equal footing, and the national result was a variety of religious organizations unexampled in the Old World. This result had already shown itself before the Revolution; and Dr. Gordon, the future historian of the war, tells us how much he

was edified when he landed at Philadelphia, in 1770, by the spectacle of "Papists, Episcopalians, Moravians, Lutherans, Calvinists, Methodists, and Quakers passing each other peacefully and in good temper on the Sabbath, after having broken up their respective assemblies." What the good doctor saw that Sunday morning was a panorama of our future religious history; for the annals of religion in this country are the annals not of one great national church, but of many separate communions; and in no other way can we so clearly present to ourselves the external features, at least, of our religious progress as by placing in contrast the leading religious denominations as they existed a century ago and as they exist to-day. Such general comparisons do not, of course, disclose the more subtile modifications of religious life, but they help us to estimate the leading drift. And although it has come to be the fashion, with some, to speak slightingly of the "popular religions," it is by no means certain that opinions are less significant simply because numbers have embraced them.

At the beginning of the Revolution the Congregationalists, although confined mainly to New England, formed by far the most numerous and influential body. As the total population of the country was still a matter of conjecture, religious statistics must, of course, be accepted with allowance; yet, according to the most careful estimate, the Congregationalists at this time did not possess less than seven hundred churches. The number of clergy was rather less. But it was not in numbers simply that the great strength of the body lay. Unlike any other ecclesiastical organization then existing in the

country, the Congregational churches were a vigorous native growth. Their distinctive polity, originally a part of the civil frame-work, was still linked with the same traditions. Hence resulted the important circumstance that they had never been a dissenting body, and had never felt that galling sense of inferiority which is provoked by comparison with more favored rivals. From the beginning they had been distinguished for conscious independence and proud self-respect. They had been sometimes harsh in their bearing towards others; but they had never themselves been welded together by any common suffering for their distinctive ecclesiastical discipline. The first generation of their clergy was renowned for learning, and a learned ministry had always been their pride and boast. No pains were spared to save the pulpit from the intrusion of unworthy or unbecoming occupants. So far was this feeling carried that in Connecticut a law was passed, at a time when the excitement which attended the Great Awakening threatened to throw off wholesome restraints, providing that no man should be entitled to recognition as a clergyman "who was not a graduate of Yale or Harvard, or of some foreign university." While the organization of the churches trenched on extreme democracy, and, in theory, the line between clergyman and layman was almost obliterated, in fact the clerical position was one of almost unrivaled authority and influence. Though possessing no immunities, and connected by no official tie, they formed a distinct order and enjoyed a social prestige such as was accorded only to the most considerable members of the community. The reverential regard in which the New

England minister of the last century was held has nowhere been so vividly depicted as by the late President Quincy, whose length of honored days almost linked the extreme terms of the period passing under our review. The scene is Andover, Mass., and the time a Sunday morning:—

"The whole space before the meeting-house was filled with a waiting, respectful, and expecting multitude. At the moment of service the pastor issued from his mansion, with Bible and manuscript sermon under his arm, with his wife leaning on one arm, flanked by his negro man on his side, as his wife was by her negro woman; the little negroes being distributed, according to their sex, by the side of their respective parents. Then followed every other member of the family according to age and rank, making often, with family visitants, somewhat of a formidable procession. As soon as it appeared the congregation, as if led by one spirit, began to move towards the door of the church; and, before the procession reached it, all were in their places. As soon as the pastor entered, the whole congregation rose and stood until he was in the pulpit and his family were seated. At the close of the service the congregation stood until he and his family had left the church. Forenoon and afternoon the same course of proceeding was had."

Not every country parson, of course, lived in the style of the Rev. Jonathan French, but all were treated with the same deferential homage. This illustration of the social position of the New England clergyman is not simply a curious picture of the manners of the period, but furnishes an important clew to some of the religious changes afterwards witnessed. The clergy formed an extremely aristocratic class, and it was hardly less their social emi-

nence than their speculative teachings which ultimately arrayed against them a portion of the population.

Beneath the apparent unity of the Congregational body it was true that silent modifications were going on. The austere Puritanism of an earlier epoch had "smoothed its wrinkled front." A taste for amusements had been introduced on which an earlier generation would have frowned. Thus, in Whitefield's time, "mixed dancing was very common in New England." Even the absence of the theatre, on which the law still frowned, was not an unmitigated evil; for a lively French chaplain, who was in Boston near the close of the Revolutionary War, assures us that "piety was not the only motive that brought the American ladies in crowds to the various places of worship. Deprived of all shows and public diversions, the church is the grand theatre where they attend to display their extravagance and finery. There they come dressed off in silks, and overshadowed with a profusion of the finest flowers." With these social innovations were disseminated new modes of thought. There was no avowed antagonism to the past, yet there were not wanting many indications that the sway of old ideas was weakened. The religious revival, which had swept through the churches like a whirlwind, divided the New England clergy into two parties, who already eyed each other with mutual distrust. In the country districts Wigglesworth's "Day of Doom" was, perhaps, "taught with the Catechism," for half a century ago there were many living who could recite from memory the doleful stanzas in which the New England Dante makes reprobate in-

fants argue with the Almighty respecting the difficult question of Adam's federal headship; but in the towns, especially of Eastern Massachusetts, the bard whom Mather so much admired was no longer cherished as a "sweet singer." Had not the disputes with the mother country turned the minds of men in a different direction it is not unlikely that the controversy which rent the New England churches asunder might have been precipitated half a century earlier. But the Stamp Act totally eclipsed the Five Points of Calvinism. Mayhew, of the West Church, the recognized chief of the liberal party after 1761, "threw all the might of his great fame into the scale of his country." Chauncy succeeded him as a leader of popular opinion, and, like Mayhew, turned wholly from theology to politics. Nor in doing this did they turn to an unfamiliar or uncongenial field. The relation originally existing between religion and the state had always disposed the New England clergy to hold political studies in the highest estimate. Refusing to regard human life as separated into two distinct spheres of action, they believed that God could be glorified in the performance of civil duties, and consistently held their town-meetings in the same house in which they paid Him their public vows. Locke and Sidney were hardly less read than Calvin and Owen. In 1766 we find Hollis writing: "More books, especially on government, are going to New England." This marked predilection of the New England clergy for political discussion was also a circumstance which had an important bearing on their fortunes in later years.

Next in numbers to the Congregationalists stood the Baptists, who were supposed to have, at this

time, about three hundred and eighty churches. This numerical strength was, however, less real than apparent, since most of these organizations were insignificant in size and influence. The Baptists were not confined to New England, but were scattered through the colonies, and had become especially numerous in Virginia. The story has often been repeated that it was from personal observation of the working of a small Baptist church, not far from his residence, that Mr. Jefferson was first impressed with the peculiar advantages of direct democratic government. But, notwithstanding their numbers, the Baptists, both in New England and the South, were held in great disfavor. Originally bringing to this country a name identified with the worst excesses of the Reformation, and opposing themselves with conscientious pertinacity to long-established ecclesiastical and political usages, they had been made to feel repeatedly the arm of civil power. In Massachusetts they had succeeded, after a long struggle, in winning a tardy recognition of their claims, but under conditions which had added to their exasperation. The slender importance of the Baptists as a body, even at the beginning of the Revolution, is plainly enough evinced in the contemptuous treatment which they received at the hands of the Massachusetts delegation to the Continental Congress. Manning, who was one of their leaders, speaks of them as "despised and oppressed." They were even accused of disloyalty to the popular cause. Yet, in spite of all this, they steadily increased. Two distinct causes contributed to this growth. Before all else the Baptists had insisted on a personal experience of religion as the

absolute condition of admission to the Christian church. But this was precisely the doctrine on which the leaders of the Great Awakening had laid such stress. The great Northampton controversy had turned on this very point. The inevitable effect was not only to direct increased attention to the tenets of the Baptists, but also to carry over to their ranks the numerous congregations of Separatists which had been called into existence by the conservatism of the Congregational churches. Backus, the faithful historian of the Baptists, was one of this description. But, besides this, there was another and perhaps more potent reason. Religious changes are rarely due to the exclusive influence of religious causes. A distinctive characteristic of the Baptists was the energy with which they extolled the gifts of the Spirit, and advocated an unlearned ministry. On this latter point, as we have already seen, the Congregationalists took high ground. Even Edwards, the most powerful promoter of the revival, would not allow that a man should enter the pulpit "who had had no education at college." Against what seemed to them an unrighteous prejudice in favor of "the original tongues," both Separatists and Baptists strenuously maintained "that every brother that is qualified by God has a right to preach according to the measure of faith." "Lowly preaching" became their favorite watchword, and it marked the beginning of a popular tendency destined to make itself deeply felt on the religious institutions of New England. The Baptists not only gained a controlling influence with a devout but humble class who had little appetite for the elaborate discussions of the Congregational di-

vines, but they were powerfully helped by the prejudice which exists in every community against the exclusiveness of superior culture. The rapid growth of the Baptists was, in large part, a democratic protest; and it is a noticeable fact that even during the war their numbers steadily augmented.

Third in numerical importance was the religious organization at that time known as "the Church of England in the colonies." Out of New England it included a majority of those whose wealth or social consideration gave them influence in the community. It was the oldest religious body in the colonies; its impressive liturgy was read at Jamestown seven years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth. In all the Southern colonies it had on its side the support of law, and everywhere out of New England the powerful countenance of official favor. But neither years, nor social consideration, nor legal support had secured for it a hardy growth. Even in the colonies where it was most firmly planted, its clergy were dependent for ordination on the mother country, and in New England both for ordination and maintenance. In New England they remained to the last hardly more than missionaries. There existed a wide-spread suspicion that in some way they were rendered subservient to the political designs of the British government. The scheme of erecting an Episcopate over the colonies contributed, Mr. Adams tells us, as much as any other cause, "to close thinking on the constitutional authority of Parliament." Nor was political prejudice, by any means, the only thing that had impaired its influence. In Maryland and Virginia, where its strength was greatest, the careless lives of the clergy

had alienated numbers of those who were sincerely attached to its forms. Before any political antagonisms had been excited, "the church was becoming more and more unpopular, because it was not considered as promoting piety." Jonathan Boucher, a clergyman of much intelligence, long settled in Virginia, whose sermons throw a clear light both upon the political and religious issues of the period, frankly confesses, that "whatever might be the case with the people of the north, those of the middle and southern provinces were certainly not remarkable for taking much interest in the concerns of religion." After the overthrow of the establishment, a considerable proportion of the Virginia clergy "continued to enjoy the glebes, without performing a single act of sacred duty." It was estimated that at least two thirds of the population of that colony had attached themselves to other religious bodies. The Revolution bore, of necessity, on this church with crushing weight. It was "reduced almost to annihilation;" many despaired "as to the perpetuating of the communion otherwise than in connection with an establishment." When the struggle for independence began, the clergy, with a few notable exceptions, were hostile or lukewarm. Their conduct was conscientious, but it was not the less fatal to their popular influence. At the close of the war many entertained scruples about taking the oath of allegiance required in some of the States, while others declined to conduct public worship on account of their canonical obligation to use the unabridged liturgy of the Church of England. Doubts were even expressed by some of the laity as to the desirableness of retaining the Episcopal office. In

Virginia, where there was no prejudice against the ecclesiastical constitution of the church, Patrick Henry had "hurled the hot thunderbolts of his wrath against the tithe-gathering clergy;" in New England, where it stood opposed to local traditions, "the breath of popular sentiment set so strongly against it that its continuance was almost as precarious as that of a newly transplanted tree amidst the sweepings of the whirlwinds." Even in Pennsylvania, where neither of the influences just referred to operated, Dr. White "was, for some time, the only clergyman."

About equal to the Church of England in number of congregations, though not in clerical force, were the Presbyterians, who did not exist in the colonies as an organized body till the early part of the eighteenth century. At the epoch of our survey they numbered three hundred churches, their main strength lying in the Middle States. The original members of this communion were almost exclusively of Scotch or Irish-Scotch descent, — a circumstance which has colored their whole history. Unlike the Congregationalists of New England, with whom at this time they heartily sympathized in theological opinion, they had brought with them to this country a completely developed ecclesiastical polity, for which they had suffered bitter persecution, and to which they clung with the devotion which sacrifice inspires. The Congregationalists, their veins flowing with pure English blood, had boldly struck out new paths; the Presbyterians, with the resolute tenacity characteristic of the Scottish race, clung to the old. The Great Awakening, which shook Congregationalism to its centre, had

also for a time divided them, but attachment to a common system soon triumphed over Old Side and New Side differences, and the controversy left no permanent memorial but the famous college which, founded by the radical party, has since become the Ehrenbreitstein of Presbyterian conservatism. The early Presbyterians brought with them profound respect for letters, and they insisted hardly less strenuously than the Congregationalists that the teachers of the people should be themselves well taught. In the ranks of their clergy were men of varied and accurate learning, not a few having been trained in foreign universities. Some were eminent for classical scholarship. If inferior to the New England clergy in aptitude for metaphysical speculation, they were equal, at least, in Biblical learning, and superior in pulpit power. Their eminence as preachers was mainly due to the fact that they were trained to speak without notes, while the New England minister was closely confined to his elaborately written manuscript. Even up to the close of the last century the prejudice against preaching written sermons was still so strong in the Presbyterian church "that a man's reputation would be ruined should his manuscript be seen." The Presbyterian clergy also cultivated at all times the practice of Scriptural exposition, while in New England reading a chapter of the Bible in public worship was looked upon as a long step in the direction of a liturgy. Dr. Hopkins, who ventured upon the dangerous feat during his ministry in Western Massachusetts, brought on himself a storm of opposition. When the Revolution came, the Presbyterians were staunch advocates of popular rights, and in the Middle States were the

main support of the cause of independence. All their traditions were on the side of resistance to oppression. Among them at this time were numbered those whose fathers had fought in the dikes of Holland and on the bloody fields of France, as well as in Highland glens and behind the walls of Derry. Nothing in their history or temper disposed them to remain silent when a great struggle was going on. Neither in Scotland nor in this country did they hesitate to act according to their convictions. The direction of their political sympathy was shown in the name selected for their college, — Nassau Hall, — and from the presidency of Nassau Hall the accomplished Witherspoon went to take his seat in the Continental Congress. The Revolution reënforced the Presbyterian church by establishing the republican principle on which the Presbyterian polity was rested.

Of the minor religious bodies existing a century ago less need be said, as they influenced but little the general current of events. Of these the Reformed Dutch, the Lutheran, and the German Reformed were in numbers nearly equal, each having about sixty congregations. But the Reformed Dutch, though long established and highly respectable for the character and learning of its clergy, was almost debarred from growth by its close dependence upon the Church of Holland and its persistent use of the Dutch language in public worship, — a practice kept up in many churches till the beginning of the present century. The Lutheran church, linked in its origin with memories of Gustavus and Oxenstern, was confined to the German emigration, a large proportion of its clergy

having been educated at the University of Halle or at Franke's Orphan House. The German Reformed, as its name implies, included that part of the German population which refused assent to the Augsburg Confession. In form of government the three were Presbyterian. The small body of Associate Presbyterians, a secession from the Scottish Kirk, should be reckoned in the same family. According to Bishop England's estimate, the whole number of Roman Catholic clergy in the country did not exceed twenty-six, though the congregations were perhaps twice as numerous. The rites of the church were publicly celebrated nowhere but in Philadelphia. A few gentle Moravians had followed Zinzendorf to the New World, and their communion, Episcopal in government, but Lutheran in doctrine, comprised eight congregations. Methodism had been introduced, but whether by Strawbridge in 1764, or by Embury in 1766, is still disputed. Up to the Revolution, however, the body had no distinct existence in this country; and as soon as hostilities commenced all the preachers except Asbury hurried back to England. As early as 1770, John Murray, whose curious autobiography should be studied by all who would understand the early history of this country, had begun to preach the doctrine of universal salvation; but as on other points he did not differ from the orthodox creed he was at first admitted to Congregational and even to Episcopal pulpits. The Quakers were still numerous in the colony which Penn had founded, and the great Lisbon earthquake sent to Newport a small but wealthy society of Jews. The summer visitor, strolling through the streets of the "fair seaport town,"

pauses to gaze at the sepulchral stones carved with strange characters which recall a faith whose hoary traditions make our modern creeds seem but of yesterday.

> "Closed are the portals of their Synagogue,
> No Psalms of David now the silence break;
> No Rabbi reads the ancient Decalogue
> In the grand dialect the Prophets spake."

The first impression that we derive from the foregoing facts is that of the diversity of religious belief existing in the colonies, but a more careful analysis will show that beneath this apparent diversity there was a widely pervading unity. Between the ecclesiastical polity of the Congregationalists and the Baptists there was no essential difference; while the systems of the Presbyterians, the Lutheran, the Dutch Reformed, and the German Reformed were alike in everything but the nomenclature adopted. And between all these, with the exception of the Lutheran, comprising together more than three fourths of all the churches, there existed the most entire harmony of dogmatic faith. That faith, whether embodied in the Assembly's Catechism, the Heidelberg Confession, or the Articles of the Synod of Dort, was the logical and precise system which the Reformer who "pierced to the roots" had knit with hooks of steel to the sternest hearts of the sixteenth century. It was the faith of John Knox, of William the Silent, and of Admiral Coligny; and could the heroic founder of the ill-fated Huguenot colony in Florida have lifted the veil that hid the two succeeding centuries, and have seen the flag of Geneva flying in almost undisputed triumph from the Merrimac to the St. John's, he might have deemed

the dark crime of Menendez more than avenged. These churches, too, whether in the parochial autonomy of the Congregationalists or the synodical federation of the Presbyterians, were singularly in harmony with the political movement; and that republican states and republican churches would flourish side by side seemed a conclusion admitting of no doubt. In 1783 the famous Dr. Stiles, the president of Yale College, preached the Election Sermon before the Legislature of Connecticut. His inspiring theme was "The Future Glory of the United States," and, warming to the hazardous rôle of a prophet, he declared "that when we look forward and see this country increased to forty or fifty millions, while we see all the religious sects increased into respectable bodies, we shall doubtless find the united body of the Congregational and Presbyterian churches making an equal figure with any two of them." Then enumerating the lesser sects, he considerately adds: "There are Westleians, Mennonists, and others, all of which will make a very inconsiderable amount in comparison with those who will give the religious complexion to America." And there was no man living at that time whose opinion on this matter was entitled to more respect.

We have now reached the limit of forty millions, and in the light of the census of 1870 the vaticinations of the learned president will deserve to be regarded as curiosities of literature. The Congregationalists, who in his day were double the size of any other body, now rank as seventh, while the "Westleians," whom he hardly names, stand largely in advance of all the rest. A century ago the more important religious bodies were ranked in the fol-

lowing order: Congregational, Baptist, Church of England, Presbyterian, Lutheran, German Reformed, Dutch Reformed, Roman Catholic. By the census of 1870 they stood: Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Christian, Lutheran, Congregational, Protestant Episcopal. Tested not as in the foregoing comparison by number of churches, but by number of sittings, the order remains the same for the four larger, but the Congregationalists and Episcopalians would outrank the Lutherans and Christians. Tested again by value of church property, the Roman Catholics come second, and the Episcopalians fifth. Yet far more striking than these relative contrasts is the enormous growth of American Christianity as a whole, — a growth which, as the figures clearly show, has more than kept pace with the rapid stride of population. A careful estimate makes the whole number of religious organizations existing in the country at the beginning of the Revolution less than nineteen hundred and fifty. The total population was then estimated at three and a half millions, which would show a church for every seventeen hundred souls. By the recent census, the total number of church organizations is returned at more than seventy-two thousand, which, in a population of thirty-eight millions, would show a church for every five hundred and twenty-nine. In other words, while the population has multiplied eleven-fold, the churches have multiplied nearly thirty-seven fold. The aggregate value of church property cannot be subjected to the same test, since we have no means of estimating the amount a century ago; but in 1870 it reached the considerable sum of three hundred and fifty-four millions. An illustration of the work-

ing of the voluntary principle is furnished in the fact that the church which seemed hopelessly shipwrecked by the Revolution, and which, as some of its most sincere supporters thought, had no prospect of existing without the public aid on which it had so long depended, now ranks for its property as fifth in the whole land. A recent Bampton lecturer affirmed that the experiments of voluntaryism and disestablishment, when tried in England under the most favorable circumstances, had proved signal failures. In this country the church of Hooker and Tillotson has certainly shown herself able to go alone. But the most extraordinary increase of ecclesiastical wealth is seen with the Methodists and Roman Catholics, because a century ago they had absolutely nothing. Indeed, the rapid ratio of increase during the last two decades might well attract attention, were it not that this vast amount of property is distributed among so many different bodies. Such statistics are of course very unsatisfactory tests of the real growth of religion. Even could the precise number of professed Christians be ascertained, we should still be quite as much in the dark. The subtle forces of the invisible world disdain the rules of arithmetic. Yet statistics, after all, afford us the only means of reaching general conclusions; and much as we hear of the decay of faith, and of the growth of religious indifference, it seems certain, from this comparison, that the positive institutions of religion have not, during the last century, lost their hold on the mass of the American people. A more zealous and liberal support has nowhere been accorded to them.

Facts like these lie, however, on the surface, and

similar comparisons might be multiplied to any length. It will form a more instructive task to trace the less obvious phenomena of our complex religious life. We have seen that a century ago the speculative faith of the various religious bodies then existing in America was singularly homogeneous. The church organizations that gave tone to American society heartily agreed in accepting the most precise dogmatic system to which Protestantism had given birth. Perhaps no feature of our religious progress is more striking than the wide-spread reaction that has been witnessed, not so much against any particular tenet of the old theology as against the whole dogmatic apprehension of Christianity. How far this reaction has been helped by any change of political sentiment is a curious question, but one not easily answered. Mr. Lecky expresses the opinion that, "if in the sphere of religion the rationalistic doctrine of personal merit and demerit should ever completely supersede the theological doctrine of hereditary merit and demerit, the change will mainly be effected by the triumph of democratic principles in the sphere of politics;" and he might have drawn an illustration of his theory from the fact that the great religious revolt in this country from the exclusiveness of Calvinism was coincident with the great democratic revolt from the conservative politics of the founders of the republic. If a connection could be established between the two, it would be by no means the first instance of two movements essentially distinct, yet due, in some measure, to the same general causes. This religious reaction assumed various forms, and was attended with very different results. Its most direct and

obvious effect was seen in the rise of new religious sects, but its influence was destined to be powerfully felt in modifying some already existing. One of its earliest fruits was the formation, near the close of the last century, of the "United Brethren in Christ," made up of seceders from the German Reformed and Lutheran bodies, and now numbering nearly fifteen hundred churches. The numerous sect of "Christians," which sprang up simultaneously in three different localities, near the beginning of the present century, and now numbers more than thirty-five hundred churches, was an illustration of the same movement. So was the remarkable "Declaration" of Alexander Campbell in 1807. But by far the most important phase of this reaction is shown in the enormous growth of Methodism. It would argue a most superficial acquaintance with this great movement to define it as essentially a protest; but it is not the less true that in the religious history of this country Methodism represents a profound popular reaction. In this light the rise of this great and influential body must be viewed as the most signal religious fact which the past century presents. When their first conference met at Baltimore in 1784 they collected but sixty preachers, and it was reckoned that in the whole country they could muster but twenty more. Dr. Stiles did them no injustice when he spoke of them in his Election Sermon as "very inconsiderable." They were not only few in number, but poor and unknown; they worshipped in barns, in back streets, and beneath the canopy of heaven. By the census of 1870 they were credited with more than twenty-five thousand parish organizations, and a church property of seventy millions.

Their own statistics for the past year give more than twenty-six thousand preachers, and a church property of more than eighty millions. The churches have increased at the rate of two for each secular day throughout the year. They are now by far the most numerous religious organization in the land, and with a zeal and confidence fully proportioned to their strength. A phenomenon so striking cannot be explained but from the operation of some powerful cause. The growth of Methodism may be attributed in part to its wonderful organization; yet it would seem that in this country the extremely autocratic character of that organization, while securing it extraordinary efficiency, could not have gained it popular favor. The vital power of Methodism must be sought, not in its form, but in its spirit. It is impossible to account for its rapid growth, save on the hypothesis that it met a great popular want. And it is equally impossible not to recognize the fact that this adaptation lay in the sharp contrast which it presented to the prevailing faith. The immense popular influence of Methodism lay in its bold appeal from "the theology of the intellect" to "the theology of the feelings." Calvinism, throughout all its camps, "lay intrenched in the outworks of the understanding;" but to souls sated with theological formulas, Methodism, with its direct intuitions of divine truth, came like springs of water in a dry and thirsty land. Wesley rejected all creeds but the simple symbol of the Apostles; and if his American disciples departed from his example in adopting articles of faith, they conformed to his spirit in making these articles "a simple compendium of the Universal Church, excluding even

the peculiar features of the Wesleyan theology." They insisted, always and everywhere, that religious faith is not a logical conviction. Making their appeal at once to man's spiritual nature, laying no stress on nice theological distinctions, they naturally held knowledge of Greek and Latin in light esteem as a qualification for saving souls. Not one of the men who founded Methodism in America, with the single exception of Coke, had received a college education. Asbury, whose influence was incomparably greater than that of Coke, had never enjoyed this advantage. The great feature of early Methodism was its faith in immediate inspiration. Its leaders lived, like Loyola, in a world of ecstatic visions. Not only were they inwardly called of God, but sometimes, like Garrettson, they heard the audible voice of the Spirit. The religious Genius of New England had recognized in love the benign sum of all morality; but the doctrine which his followers had obscured with the metaphysics of the will, became with the Methodist a burning impulse. The Quaker had exalted the Inner Light, but what with the disciple of Fox had sunk into an inoffensive quietism, with the disciple of Wesley became the impulse to an unexampled effort. It was estimated that Asbury, during the forty-five years of his untiring ministry, rode a distance that would have taken him twelve times round the earth. When we read the story which one of the early missionaries of Methodism tells of himself, but a story which hundreds, doubtless, might have repeated, — "I traversed the mountains and valleys, frequently on foot, with my knapsack on my back, guided by Indian paths in the wilderness where it was not expedient to take a

horse; and I had often to wade through morasses half-leg deep in mud and water; frequently satisfying my hunger with a piece of bread and pork from my knapsack, quenching my thirst from a brook, and resting my weary limbs on the leaves of trees," who does not seem to hear in these words the ring of the verses, "In journeyings often, in perils of waters, in perils in the wilderness, in weariness and painfulness, in hunger and thirst;" and who can doubt that the causes which gave Methodism its early success were the same that first carried the gospel to Damascus, to Antioch, to Corinth, and to Cæsar's palace? As Methodism has exchanged weakness for strength, and poverty for wealth, its outward aspect has greatly altered: the plain meeting-house has become the highly decorated church; the unlettered preacher has learned to emulate the culture which he once held so cheap; colleges and theological schools have been generously endowed; and a powerful periodical press discusses with dignity and erudition doctrines which once struggled for utterance from burning tongues; yet neither learning nor culture were the weapons with which Methodism achieved its early triumphs, and which caused it, in the striking words carved on Philip Embury's tomb, "to beautify the earth with salvation."

At first glance it may seem that the growth of the Baptist denomination, which now ranks as second in the land in point of numbers, contradicts what has been advanced, since the Baptists, in the usual acceptation of that name, are a Calvinistic body. But while it is true that this body, as a whole, accept the modified Calvinism of Andrew Fuller, yet it is not the less true that their distinctive tenet in-

volves a logical denial of that "doctrine of hereditary merit and demerit" which lies at the base of the Calvinistic scheme. Every speculative objection to infant baptism was equally an argument against the realistic conception which pervaded the old theology. As a natural result of this attitude no characteristic of the Baptists has been more marked than their contempt for all the historical statements of Christianity. They have made their appeal to Scripture as the sole authority. This, indeed, is defined by their most eminent American representative as their "fundamental principle;" and to this principle, through all their history, they have steadfastly adhered. The much-vaunted maxim, "The Bible, the Bible only," has found with them its most consistent advocates. Like the Methodists, they have undergone, in the course of a century, a great change in external features. Renouncing their preference for "lowly preaching," they have become zealous promoters of ministerial education. Among their divines are men whose names are ornaments of American scholarship, but it is a noticeable fact that their valuable contributions to religious literature have all been in the line of Biblical exegesis; to speculative theology they have made no important addition. Nor can it be doubted that their great popular success is due to the concrete simplicity of their creed, coupled with their extremely democratic polity. And whatever their technical theological position, their whole denominational strain has been in the direction of revolt from antiquity, tradition, and church authority.

But the boldest renunciation of dogmatic faith was witnessed among the descendants of the Pu-

ritans. This outbreak had two phases. The restrained and scholarly Arminianism, which made its appearance first, appealed to Scripture from human creeds; yet in its philosophical method and formal conceptions of religious truth it did not differ from the Calvinism, to which it stood opposed. Both accepted Locke, whose system sapped the foundations of the old theology. The real revolt was the rise of the Transcendental school, which threw all external authority to the winds, and owned no guide but the spiritual intuitions. The "Address to the Divinity School" was the veritable proclamation of a new gospel, — a gospel which indeed "ravished the souls" of the elect, but proved too subtle and ethereal to become "bread of life to millions." This ambrosial food was transmuted into homelier diet by Mr. Parker, and has served to furnish the board of the later Free Religionists.

In resisting the Unitarians, the more numerous section of the Congregationalists were betrayed into a position which their own traditions did not justify, and the way to the Lord's table was fenced with "sound forms of words." But various influences soon began to work in an opposite direction. The Evangelical revival, by laying as it did such stress on emotional experience, weakened the hold of objective truth. The great impulse given at Andover to Biblical study, under the inspiring lead of Stuart, disclosed the weakness of the old exegesis, and introduced the more comprehensive methods of German criticism. And a small but thoughtful and cultivated section, deriving from Coleridge the fruitful maxim that "Christianity is not a theory or speculation, but a living process," rallied the Tran-

scendental philosophy to the support of Christian faith. Thus the orthodox mind of New England was gradually loosed from its old moorings. The change was shown less in direct antagonism to any specific doctrine than in silent modification of mental habits. What had been betokened by more than one significant sign was at last brought clearly to light in the Congregational Council convened at Boston in 1865, an assembly which justly attracted attention for its intelligence and dignity. At this convention an attempt was made to agree upon some doctrinal basis for the denomination; but after earnest discussion the utmost that could be accomplished was to "affirm substantially" the Confessions of 1648 and 1680, in face of the declaration made by a leading member of the body that "there is language in every one of these old standards which not a man upon this floor receives." Many preferred a declaration "according to the fresh language of the present time," but the committee to whom the matter was referred declined to present one, for the reason "that it could not be harmoniously adopted." And in taking their action it was expressly understood that the Council affirmed those venerable formulas "only in a qualified manner." A "compromise document" was subsequently adopted by the Council, with much solemnity, at Plymouth. But so rapid was the march of opinion that at the Oberlin Council, held only six years later, the declaration adopted at Plymouth was discarded, on the ground of "committing the denomination to old and minute confessions;" and a new one was adopted, "being in substance the great doctrines of the Christian faith," of which the

odd remark was made that it "did not perfectly express the exact wishes of any party." Of this council a very high authority declared, "It may truly and frankly be called a new departure." This new departure consisted in the fact that, without disowning old confessions, it "refused to make them tests of fellowship." Accordingly the Council received as full members the Kentucky delegates, who distinctly explained that "their churches were organized on the evangelical basis, ignoring all distinction between Calvinist and Arminian." "There can be no doubt," wrote a prominent member of the Council, "that the progress of Congregationalism has been greatly retarded by the former limitation of its denominational fellowship to Calvinistic ministers and churches." Here is a distinct repudiation of the position asserted with so much earnestness sixty years before.

It is a characteristic of American religious life, compounded as it is of such various elements, that it presents many diverse phenomena; and we should run the risk of very imperfect generalization if any one class were made too prominent. Coupled with this marked reaction against a dogmatic apprehension of religion there has been a tendency equally marked and equally important in an opposite direction, — a tendency that does not any less deserve to be regarded as a representative movement in our religious history. In all countries where a connection between church and state is recognized, whether Catholic or Protestant, the ecclesiastical power is subject to important limitation; for the permanent contact of the spiritual and temporal authority requires that the sphere of either should be precisely

marked. This rule holds as well in Portugal as it holds in Prussia. Thus, when the relations of the two are not inimical, the free action of the church is fettered. Hence, in this country, where for the first time since Constantine the religious element has been left absolutely without restraint, conditions of ecclesiastical development have been supplied such as exist nowhere else in Christendom. Each religious organization has been allowed free scope to unfold according to its own interior law, and solve after its own way its distinctive ecclesiastical problem. The result has been a quickening of ecclesiastical activity and an impulse to ecclesiastical development, which already constitute a significant feature of our history, and promise to revive questions which were supposed to have been forever settled. Here, again, an interesting question presents itself, — the question whether any connection can be traced between this tendency to strong religious organizations and the general laxity in our political ideas. It is certain that the ecclesiastical life of the Middle Age was greatly stimulated by the prevailing political anarchy, and it seems not unlikely that the increasing fluctuation of our own political life may have disposed some to look with more favor upon stable ecclesiastical forms. But whatever may be the occult cause of the phenomenon, its existence is beyond question. It is a common impression that the prevailing impulse of American religion is to split up into an endless variety of sects. "How can I live in a country," Dr. Dollinger is reported to have said, "where they found a new church every day?" But nothing appears more certain, from a review of our religious

history, than the gradual working of a tendency in precisely the opposite direction. The multiplicity of sects is, indeed, a patent fact, and in a land where expression of opinion on all subjects is unrestrained, and where combination for every purpose is allowed, such a result is not surprising; but most of the petty organizations that go to swell the portentous aggregate are but ripples on the surface of the stream, appearing for a moment and then vanishing forever. In their most repulsive forms they are mere social excrescences, deriving their morbid growth mainly from foreign sources. The most characteristic fact of our religious history, as the census clearly shows, is not the tendency of American Christianity to split up into a multiplicity of sects, but its disposition to aggregate itself under a few great denominational types. This conservative preference of the vast majority for stable ecclesiastical order is a leading and unmistakable distinction of our religious life. Whatever may have been the tendency at an earlier period, at the present time it is undeniably in this direction.

We have already noticed that the religious organizations which were transplanted to this country seemed, under the inspiration of our institutions, to acquire new energy. This result was witnessed with the Methodists, who, in England, during Wesley's life, had clung to the skirts of the Establishment, but here boldly organized a complete church, and proceeded to the institution of bishops. The success of the Methodists was due hardly less to their autocratic discipline than to their burning zeal. And it should be observed that it is the recognized value of the system which has commended it to pop-

ular regard. But a more important illustration of the same principle is presented in the Presbyterian Church. The history of this influential body, which now ranks as third in the country, is especially instructive, for the reason that its uniform and healthy growth is not connected, as is that of the Methodists, with exceptional phenomena, but is the evident result of the persistent and intelligent administration of an admirable polity. In the face of the proudest monarchy of Europe, it had proclaimed its capacity of self-direction, and in the new field which this country opened it was not backward in asserting a logical development. No sooner was the Revolution ended than the Presbyterians took the first steps towards a complete organization; and before the Federal government had gone into operation the constitution of the church was adopted as it now stands. From the outset it assumed the character of a missionary church, and in the earliest General Assembly a plan was adopted for promoting the evangelization of the West; and in the most gloomy period of our religious history, the closing decade of the last century, when the wide diffusion of French Revolutionary maxims "threatened the dissolution of religious society," the growth of the Presbyterian Church was uniform and rapid. Nothing is so characteristic of this church as the resolution with which it has adhered to its theological and its ecclesiastical traditions. Amid the great movements of modern thought, it has stood unflinchingly to its Confession, and in the great crises of its history has been thoroughly consistent with itself. When the West was frenzied with religious excitement, rather than relax its requirements for the

ministry, it submitted to the great Cumberland secession of 1810, preferring well-tried method to mere numerical increase; and when, in consequence of the famous "Plan of Union," it found itself invaded with New England usages and New England ideas, it preferred the excision of nearly half its members rather than not purge itself of the foreign element. Whatever successes it has gained have not been gained by denying its principles, or by making terms with its opponents. The steady growth of this powerful communion, in the face of its uncompromising assertion of a rigid dogmatic system, furnishes a striking illustration of the decided preference of a most intelligent section of the American people for a vigorous and well-administered ecclesiastical system. The Reunion of 1871, when, after a separation of more than thirty years, the two branches of the Presbyterian Church were once more happily united, whether considered in its immediate or its ultimate consequences, is second in importance to no recent event of our religious history. It fixed universal attention as showing that the tide had turned, and that the weary period of discord and secession was to give way to a new period of union and consolidation. There seems no good reason why other Presbyterian bodies should not follow the example.

This marked preference of the majority of our people for well-ordered system may be still more conclusively shown from contrasting the progress of the Congregational and Presbyterian bodies. A century ago the Congregationalists were by far the more numerous and influential. The two were in close sympathy, and Congregational delegates were al-

lowed to sit and vote in the General Assembly. Both cordially united in the "Plan of Union" for combined missionary operations at the West; but it was found that whenever the stronger organization came into contact with the weaker, the weaker was uniformly swallowed up, and the result was an immense loss of strength to the Congregational communion.

It would, however, be an error to represent that the change in the relative strength of the Presbyterians and Congregationalists was due wholly to difference of polity. Other causes contributed to weaken Congregationalism in its own seats. The proclivity of the Congregational clergy for political discussion, so conspicuous in the period preceding the Revolution, was hardly less marked during the stormy times that preluded the memorable "Civil Revolution of Eighteen Hundred." Almost to a man the Congregational clergy of New England were on the Federal side. The biographer of Mr. Jefferson complains with bitterness that the ministers were all for Hamilton. As an inevitable result, the Democratic triumph swept from the New England parishes all whose sympathies were pledged to the victorious faction, and considerable numerical strength, if not much piety, was carried over to rival congregations. But the fatal wound was inflicted upon New England Congregationalism, not by an enemy but by its own hand. The doctrinal antagonism which the Revolution for a time had smothered blazed up at the publication of Belsham's "Life of Lindsey"; and when Channing preached his famous sermon at Baltimore the divorce between the main body of Congregationalists and their oldest traditions and finest culture was complete. Hence-

forth the New England Israel, that had come out of Egypt so gloriously, pursued two separate paths, and presented the unedifying spectacle of a house divided against itself.

This impulse of our leading religious bodies to a complete logical development has naturally led to a sharper accentuation of ecclesiastical distinctions. The Protestant Episcopal Church furnishes a striking illustration of this tendency. Attaining its complete organization in 1789, when White and Provost were consecrated at Lambeth Palace, during its early years it reflected the moderate temper of the English Church of the last century. Its leading characteristic was eminent respectability; its preaching had the mild accent of that apologetic period when, as Johnson put it, the apostles were tried regularly once a week on charge of committing forgery. Bishop White, whose unswerving support of the cause of independence showed that he was lacking in no manly element, as a preacher was "dignified without animation," and "much esteemed for solid and judicious instruction." Bishop Jarvis was noted for an "unusually slow and deliberate pronunciation," a characteristic not suggestive of excessive fervor. The amiable Madison "at all periods of his life was much addicted to scientific studies." The early style of Bishop Griswold, "like that which generally prevailed in the church at the time, was rather moral than evangelical." Though the church derived its ecclesiastical legitimacy from England, and made the Anglican Church so far as possible its model, yet the altered conditions of society necessitated some not unimportant changes. Though the American bishops retained the name and eccle-

siastical functions, they lacked the civil rank and ample revenues which conferred so much additional lustre on the English prelates; and the absence of patronage threw increased power into the hands of the parishes. But the most important constitutional change was one carried through by the influence of Bishop White, which introduced the novel principle of lay representation. In consequence of these modifications the "Protestant Episcopal Church" corresponded nearly, if not exactly, with the model which Baxter declared would suit himself and the more moderate Presbyterians. Nothing could be more marked than the mildness with which the claims of the new church were asserted. The popular prejudice which still lingered against the office of bishop, and "the fashion of objecting to it prevailing even among a considerable proportion" of the church, led to a cautious definition of Episcopal titles. The Convention of Maryland, in 1783, recognized "other Christian churches under the American Revolution." The Virginia Convention, two years later, while expressing a decided preference for uniformity in doctrine and worship, declared that this should be pursued "with liberality and moderation." Where the church, before the Revolution, had been established by law, its tone was uniformly most conciliatory; where, on the contrary, it had been in opposition, its tone was most pronounced. The stanchest Churchmen were in Connecticut. When Griswold moved from Connecticut to Rhode Island, sermons which had been preached with applause in the former State were received with "great disfavor" by Episcopalians in Providence and Newport. Coke's friendly overture

to Bishop White, proposing a union of the Episcopalians with the Methodists, drew from the latter the reply "that he did not think the difficulties insuperable, provided there was a conciliatory disposition on both sides." The first evidence of a change of tone was the publication, in 1804, of Hobart's "Companion to the Altar," in which not the nature of the sacraments, but the "lawful authority" by which they might be administered, was discussed. This provoked the memorable controversy with Dr. Mason, in which the distinctive claims of the Episcopal Church were for the first time publicly set forth. These were further asserted in Hobart's "Apology for Apostolic Order," published in 1807. The eminent personal qualities of Hobart marked him for a party leader, and his elevation to the Episcopate, a little later, proved a signal epoch in the history of the church. In a Pastoral Letter of 1815 he took strong grounds against coöperation with other Christians in promoting religious objects, and, in defiance of a growing sentiment represented in the formation of the American Bible Society, he boldly declared, "That all the differences among Christians are on points subordinate and non-essential is an unfounded assertion." For a time these views found a weighty counterpoise in the Evangelical party, but, by degrees, what was first described as "bold and startling" came to be accepted maxims, and by the action of the Convention of 1844 the church was placed conclusively upon Hobart's ground. And the decided growth of the Episcopal Church dates from the period when it clearly enunciated its distinctive theory. The later controversies which have disturbed its peace have not touched

this principle, and those who differ most widely on questions which the Tractarian and Ritualist have raised are heartily agreed upon what constitutes the "Church of the true Order."

The tendency so clearly revealed of American Christianity to aggregate itself in a few great denominational families, strenuously affirming theological or ecclesiastical tenets that are mutually exclusive, deserves special attention in its bearing upon the prospective development of a truly catholic type of Christianity. It might have been supposed that the contact, upon a perfectly equal footing, of so many Christian bodies, each zealously asserting its distinctive faith, would have provoked such mutual comparison as would gradually have brought into clear relief the essential truths which all were agreed in recognizing. Professing to receive the same gospel, it might have seemed that somewhere there must have existed substantial harmony; but no such result has followed. It is amazing to note how slight has been the reciprocal influence which these bodies have exerted. They seem to have pursued their separate paths, coming into contact with each other's opinions only to controvert them. With individuals, of course, changes of opinion have been frequent, but so far as concerns the formal affirmations of the leading religious bodies, with the sole exception of the Congregationalists, there has not been the slightest change. With most of these bodies no modification has been thought of; in one or two cases, where the relaxation of some distinctive denominational feature has been suggested, it has drawn forth a storm of indignation. The irreligious world has laughed at the spectacle of an emi-

nent philanthropist actually brought to trial on the atrocious charge of singing hymns with Christians of another name. It is evident that our leading religious organizations have done nothing in the way of promoting any external Christian unity. There are many to whom this state of things is not repugnant, who defend the "denominational" type of Christianity as the natural efflorescence of the Reformation, and rest content with it as the ultimate achievement of Protestant Christianity. On the other hand, there have been some who have protested against "the 'evangelical' heresy that the normal state of the church universal is a state of schism." From many quarters have come eloquent expressions of the conviction that the sectarian system, however much it may stimulate zeal, does not furnish the conditions of the finest and noblest Christian culture. But no adequate remedy has thus far been proposed, and American Christianity seems hopelessly committed to the denominational experiment.

This drift of American religious sentiment towards the formation of compact and powerful religious organizations not only affects the relations of these bodies to one another, it is already presenting novel and difficult problems in relation to the civil power. To comprehend fully the most important of these, it must be remembered that for many years two antagonistic opinions have been developing themselves with respect to the functions of political society. On the one hand, the maxim has been steadily gaining ground that these functions are purely secular, and in consequence the formal relations between religion and the state have been every-

where annulled. But, on the other hand, there has been a tendency as marked on the part of the civil power to invade the spiritual province, by undertaking the support and control of education. For it will hardly be denied that even in its rudimentary forms education touches the springs of spiritual life. Precisely at this point the Roman Catholic Church emerges into significance as an element in our complex ecclesiastical equation.

The growth of the Roman Catholic Church, which according to the census now ranks as fourth in order, reckoning by number of parishes, but second if church property be made the test, has been viewed by some with grave apprehension, though, as it would seem, on insufficient grounds. This great numerical increase can be accounted for by our enormous foreign emigration. It has been doubted even whether the increase has kept pace with the emigration, and whether the church has not actually lost in strength by the transplanting of so many of its members to the New World. There seems to be no way of arriving at any precise estimate of the Roman Catholic population; but if the ratio of increase has outstripped the aggregate gain of the nation, the same would equally hold of the larger Protestant bodies. The fact that the members of this communion are mostly congregated in great centres gives them an exceptional local influence, and exaggerates the popular notion of their actual power. Less fettered by the civil authority than in any other portion of Christendom, they have shown a most intelligent appreciation of the possibilities of their position, and in zeal for ecclesiastical development have certainly been surpassed by none of the Protestant bodies

about them. And when we contrast their condition at the Revolution, shut out from political functions in nearly every colony, and celebrating their attenuated rites in a single city, with their present liberty and splendor, it is not surprising that the more enthusiastic among them have learned to look on this country as a Land of Promise. By none among us has the full significance of our political experiment been more intelligently grasped than by the members of this communion. For many years the Roman Catholic Church held itself aloof from American society. Deriving its increase from a foreign element, owing allegiance to a foreign head, caring nothing for the controversies that racked the various Protestant bodies, its presence was felt only in an occasional debate. It urged no exclusive claims. The acquisition of territory from Catholic states added to its importance, but it was the impulse of self-development that first brought it into conflict with American society. To insure that development nothing was more essential than that the church should control the education of its young; and strong at length in consciousness of wealth and numbers, it boldly threw down its first gage, in 1840, by demanding the removal of the Bible from common schools.

Had this controversy turned simply on the reading of a few verses of King James's version at the opening of the daily exercises, it need have caused no intelligent Protestant embarrassment. Simple justice would have dictated a concession involving neither disrespect to the Almighty nor peril to the spiritual welfare of the child. But the difficulty lay deeper; the real grievance of the Catholic was, not

that too much, but that too little, religious instruction was given in the schools; he dreaded an education from which all positive religious influence had been eliminated; he rejected, in other words, the whole theory on which the public-school system had been based. The attitude which he assumed furnishes an interesting illustration of our religious changes, since in asserting so emphatically the indissoluble connection of religion and education he occupied precisely the ground of the Puritans of Massachusetts and Connecticut, who gave the whole system of public education in this country its first great impulse. With them the spelling-book and catechism always went together. Furthermore, in the remedy which the Catholic proposed, of proportioning the annual amount raised for school purposes among the various religious bodies, he recalled the identical arrangement adopted in Massachusetts to meet a similar dilemma in providing for the support, by law, of public worship.

While it is a wholly gratuitous assumption that the Catholics in their persistent warfare against public schools have been actuated by any covert hostility to those political institutions which have secured them such unparalleled advantages, especially in view of the fact that the most vehement denouncers of the system of mixed education are among the most enthusiastic and discriminating advocates of our civil polity, it is nevertheless true that by the Papal Encyclical of 1864, which brands "the system of instructing youth which consists in separating it from the Catholic faith and from the power of the church, and in teaching exclusively, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things and the

earthly ends of society alone," as a thing *reprobatam, proscriptam atque damnatam*, the Roman Catholic Church in the United States is irrevocably committed to conflict with a part of our public system which, by the great majority of our people, is regarded as absolutely essential to the perpetuity of our free institutions. This question has been looked at so exclusively from a partisan stand-point, and has been so overwhelmingly decided by popular opinion, that its ulterior bearings have hardly received enough attention. But a cursory glance will show that the problem of the relation of religious and political society is less simple than our politicians half a century ago supposed. If the popular opinion be well grounded, that the temporal and spiritual authorities occupy two wholly distinct provinces, and that to one of these civil government should be exclusively shut up, — a position in which the disciple of Mr. Jefferson and the liberal Catholic who seeks to reconcile the doctrines of his church with modern liberty are perfectly at one, — it would be difficult to make out a logical defense of our present system of public education. If, on the contrary, it be the right and duty of the state to enforce the support of public education from a class of the population conscientiously debarred from sharing its advantages, then our current theory respecting the nature and functions of the state stands in need of considerable revision.

The theory of the absolute separation of church and state has given rise to another question. The rapid accumulation of ecclesiastical wealth is a fact that could not fail to arrest attention. By the immemorial traditions of all Christian countries, such

property has been exempted from taxation. When the church was a public institution, and when the benefit of its ministrations was freely open to rich and poor alike, a sufficient reason existed for such exemption. But, it is argued, the effect of our voluntary system has been to render the modern Protestant church little more than a religious club, where Christians in easy circumstances, by paying an annual assessment, may listen once a week to reasonably good music, and to such preaching as it pleases the Lord to send. The portion of the population debarred by pecuniary inability from enjoying this soothing Sunday relaxation is not inconsiderable; a still larger number decline to attend for other reasons. The enormous increase of our public burdens, directing as it has, increased attention to the principles on which equitable taxation should be adjusted, has raised the question whether those who derive no benefit from public worship should be indirectly taxed for its support. That exemption is such indirect support, and that so far it tends to throw an additional burden upon other property, there needs no argument to show. It only differs from direct support in furnishing the most liberal assistance to those who need it least. And conceding the general benefits that accrue to society from the positive institutions of religion, the question still remains, Why should a "purely political organism" give even an indirect support to religious worship?

The manner in which this subject has been handled affords striking evidence of the confused and unsettled state of public opinion with reference to the relations of the spiritual and temporal power. Mr. Brownson claims that neither in politics nor in

religion is it the destiny of the United States to realize any theory whatever. What the future may have in store for us it would be beyond the scope of this paper to predict, but a review of our past history should incline us to place a modest estimate on our success.

"Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth."

He certainly would be a very bold or a very thoughtless man who would venture to affirm that the ideal of catholic unity has been reached in our system of "strenuously competing sects," or that the problem of church and state has received a final solution in remitting public worship to voluntary support. At the close of a century we seem to have made no advance whatever in harmonizing the relations of religious sects among themselves, or in defining their common relation to the civil power. The Evangelical Alliance was an interesting expression of individual sentiment; but in proclaiming so energetically that the differences of religious sects were non-essential, it cut away the limb on which its whole fabric rested.

There are phases of religious culture not touched in the foregoing survey which also furnish marked and significant tests of religious progress. A century ago the religious culture of this country was theological. The intellectual strain was in one direction, to solve the solemn problems arising from man's relations to his Maker. Every thoughtful mind was haunted with a sense of the divine order of the world; for, however weakened the social sway of Puritanism, it had hardly relaxed its tremendous grasp upon the spiritual nature. The system of doc-

trine almost universally accepted enforced deliberate conclusions respecting mysteries into which angels might shrink from looking. To these problems the acute and venturesome New England intellect was stimulated by the prevailing methods of intellectual discipline. At Yale College, a century ago, logic held the highest place; and from the school where Burgerdicius, Ramus, Crakenthorp, and Keckerman were "the great lights" came the leaders in the most distinctively original and vigorous school of American religious thought. Of this school Samuel Hopkins was the foremost representative. A typical New England thinker, a sincere and noble character, he deserves the veneration that is never withheld from masculine independence and transparent honesty. The elder New England divines were disciples of the Reformation, not of the Renaissance; they were more concerned for accuracy of statement than for polished diction. The qualities which have caused the Ecclesiastical Polity and the Provincial Letters to outlive all controversy, their writings did not share. As a consequence, these writings have hardly more influence to-day on the cultivated intellect of New England than the writings of the schoolmen. Their very phrases have lost all meaning to the men of this generation. This makes it less difficult to do justice to their real merit. While the wider culture in our time condemns their intellectual range as narrow, and their philosophical method as defective, yet we can never mention but with respect a school of thinkers who so seriously grasped the great problems of existence, and who, withal, dealt so honestly with themselves in the solutions which they attempted; who

may have erred in not accurately measuring the limits of human thought, but who neither ignored difficulties nor paltered with terms; who had "no sophistry in their mouths, and no masks on their faces."

Whether it be understood as a eulogium or a reproach, it is nevertheless a fact that the original impulses of religious thought in this country have proceeded almost wholly from New England. And throughout all our history no more genuine intellectual force has been expended than was devoted to theological discussion by the school that began with Hopkins and closed with Taylor. Yet these acute and powerful thinkers have had but little influence on other religious bodies. With most of them they have never come in contact, and where, as in one memorable instance, they seemed to effect a lodgment it was only at last to be rejected and disowned. Nor even in New England have they retained their sway. They were profoundly metaphysical; recent theology has become historical and critical. It has gained in breadth, but lost in intellectual force; it is more learned, but less original. A striking illustration of the degree to which the theological intellect of New England has lost its relish for metaphysical inquiries is furnished in the fact that the most acute vindication of the freedom of the mind in willing, which our generation has produced is the work, not of a divine, but of one who snatched from an engrossing business career the opportunities of literary labor.[1]

The second great phase of our religious culture was ethical, and it need hardly be added that its

[1] *Freedom of Mind in Willing.* By Rowland G. Hazard.

representative was Channing. In terming the first epoch metaphysical it should not be forgotten that Hopkins denounced slavery when slaves were still landed on the wharves of Newport; and in terming the second ethical we would by no means depreciate the eminent intellectual qualities of some of its early leaders. But it is not less true that when the movement, which is so imperfectly described by the theological term commonly employed to designate it, passed from its negative to its positive stage its note was ethical. The inspiration of Channing lay in his noble "enthusiasm of humanity." As a scientific theologian he cut no deep lines on our religious thought; but as an apostle of that benignant Gospel which seeks in the welfare of man the highest glory of God he must be reckoned a star of the first magnitude in our spiritual firmament. His true and abiding influence overruns the boundaries of sects. He was the foremost and most eloquent propagator of that humanitarian sentiment which pervades so widely our modern life. The force of this sentiment has been by no means expended in specific philanthropies and moral reforms. While it has made itself felt most decisively in these directions, it has also silently reacted in quarters where its influence has been least suspected. The tone of every Christian communion has been affected by it. It has widened the range of religious effort, modified the emphasis of preaching, and even tinged perceptibly the impulses of missionary zeal. The unmistakable change that has come over American Christianity in the disposition to assign so much greater relative importance to practical well-doing, and to recognize the relations

of the Gospel to the present life, is due, in very large measure, to this more open vision of "the god-like in the human." The wider diffusion of this humane philosophy has been promoted by an exceptional literary excellence. The qualities in which the theological culture of the former epoch was so conspicuously deficient became the distinctive characteristic of the second phase. Still, its success has been more evident in the discussion of social questions than in solving "problems of the soul."

The most recent phase of our religious culture, and one that can hardly yet be studied in its full development, is the tendency, so marked at the present time among all religious bodies, which assigns to sentiment a more prominent function in religion. In its most general aspect, this is part of that great reaction against a logical apprehension of Christianity which we have before considered, and is the result of social development and of a more diversified civilization. It may be termed the æsthetic phase, although it should be remembered that this tendency even in its most pronounced forms seldom usurps exclusive control, being found not unfrequently allied with an efficient recognition of practical religious duties. This æsthetical revival is, without doubt, the characteristic feature of our religious culture at the present day. Were it no more than an æsthetical revival it would scarcely deserve notice in a review of religious progress; but in its most extreme manifestations it has an avowed connection with doctrine; and where no such connection consciously exists the tendency can hardly be dissociated from subtle modifications of religious thought. The illustrations of this present phase of

our religious culture are too familiar to need more than the most passing mention. They are seen in the general disposition to affect a more elaborate religious ceremonial, and in the extraordinary impulse given to ecclesiastical architecture. That these results should be witnessed in religious communions which have always recognized symbolism and ceremonial as legitimate instruments of religious culture is not surprising, for, even if carried at times to an extreme, the development is logical. It works out a principle which has never been denied. Yet even in these communions the transformation is very marked. Things undreamed of even in Hobart's time have long ceased to attract attention. The first stained windows were brought to this country in 1827, and in the same year we find Doane urging the restoration of the cross to churches. Not till twelve years later did this leader in ecclesiological reform venture to suggest the propriety "of removing the holy table back, and setting it up a step or two upon the platform." At that day a surpliced choir would have excited consternation. But the most conclusive evidence of the wide diffusion of this æsthetic impulse is furnished in those religious bodies with all whose traditions it is at war. The tendency pervades all sects, and mediæval architecture is no longer, as it once was, a matter of principle, but simply a question of expense. The Baptist and the Methodist have learned to covet the "dim religious light" and the "pealing organ;" and the children of those whose early history was a stern protest against the perilous alliance of faith with any sensuous forms, and who refused, in their plain meeting-houses, to tolerate so much as the stated

reading of the sacred volume, lest a spiritual worship should degenerate into a formal service, have come to listen with composure,

> "under vaulted roofs
> Of plaster, painted like an Indian squaw,"

to such artistic "renderings" of Holy Writ as awaken a bewildered doubt whether Hebrew, or Greek, or Latin be the tongue employed. Whatever the defects of religious teaching a century ago, it was certainly a vigorous intellectual discipline. It is not easy to believe that the substitution of such different methods is a sign simply of a more cultivated taste.

From the foregoing review it has been made sufficiently apparent that the function of American Christianity has been discharged in a moral and practical rather than in a scientific and theological development. The scope of this article does not permit a survey of our copious religious literature, but such a survey would undoubtedly establish the same conclusion. The impulse of original religious thought was almost wholly limited to a single school. As speculative has been succeeded by Biblical and historical theology, we have drawn our best supplies from a foreign source. Each of our larger denominations is amply furnished with its representative literature, but no supreme mind has appeared whom all acknowledge as master. It may be doubted whether denominational training is conducive to such a result. Our most successful efforts have lain in the more popular discussion of religious truth, a direction in which our literature has been enriched with more than one admirable monograph. At the close of the first century of its independent exist-

ence, Christianity in this country, with an undeniable external growth and a prodigious external activity, finds itself confronted with great and perplexing problems. Some of these, as the question how, under our voluntary system, the Gospel shall be preached to the poor, are incidental to the peculiar conditions of our American religious life; while others, as the issue between Christianity and science, are connected with the general movement of modern civilization. There are not wanting many indications of a disposition on the part of those who hold earnestly to Christianity as a great historical fact to look these questions fairly in the face; but whether, in attempting to solve them, we shall simply repeat the experiments of the Old World, or, rising to nobler modes, shall illustrate some deeper adaptation of the Gospel to human society and to human thought, it remains for the coming century to show.

Educ. – Coll.

UNIVERSITY CORPORATIONS.[1]

1. *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts im Mittelalter.* Von F. C. VON SAVIGNY, Zweite Ausgabe. Heidelberg: 1834.
2. *Geschichte der Pädagogik vom Wiederaufblühen klassischer Studien bis auf unsere Zeit.* Von KARL VON RAUMER, Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart: 1854.
3. *The English Universities.* From the German of V. A. HUBER. London: 1843.
4. *The Reorganization of the University of Oxford.* By GOLDWIN SMITH. London and Oxford: 1868.
5. *Schools and Universities on the Continent.* By MATTHEW ARNOLD, M. A. London: 1868.

THE question of University Reform, so long confined to a discussion of the comparative advantage of certain studies, has, of late, extended over a much wider range, and the general administration of our higher academic institutions is attracting more and more attention. The efficiency of these institutions must depend so largely upon the direction given by those intrusted with the supreme control that it cannot but be a matter of surprise that the constitution of college corporations, instead of being the last, should not have been the first, subject of inquiry. As a contribution to a more correct understanding of the whole matter, we propose to review the historical development of these venerable bodies, which, once a year, as the season of our annual commencements comes round, arouse from sleep, and taste, for a single day, the bliss of resurrection. For they are not

[1] Published in the *Baptist Quarterly*, October, 1869.

less the legacy of a former age than the mysterious parchments which express, in unknown terms, their periodic functions.

An inquiry into the origin of universities directly opens one of the most brilliant chapters in modern civilization. Mr. Merivale allows himself to speak, in his "History of the Empire," of the two great universities of Alexandria and Athens, but the term cannot be accurately applied to any of the ancient schools. Universities sprang out of wants which ancient society never felt, and were quickened with a motion and a spirit of which it never dreamed. The Theodosian code abounds in regulations respecting education, yet affords no trace of the existence of any such great corporate centres of intellectual life as we encounter at a later period. After the dissolution of the Western Empire, instruction gradually ceased to be a concern of lay society, and sought the fostering shelter of the Church. From the fourth to the twelfth centuries, the only schools in Europe that deserved the name were connected with the monasteries. At that of Saint Médard, four hundred students were gathered in the sixth century. The vast schemes of social reconstruction that engaged the capacious intellect of Charlemagne assigned to education a conspicuous place; but the Austrasian Cæsar was before his time, and his famous palace-school proved a premature experiment.

Not till the Feudal System had taken effectual possession of Western Europe did that remarkable intellectual tendency develop, which, under various forms, has been perpetuated to the present day. It is in the twelfth century that we must place the proper beginning of universities, a movement in

which all Catholic and Feudal Europe shared. For it is now well understood that the true initial point in the intellectual regeneration of the European mind must be sought, not in the glittering Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century, when Grecian art and letters were revived, under the benignant auspices of the Medici, but in an earlier movement, within the limits of the proper Middle Age. Of this great awakening, the rise of Modern Languages, the rise of Gothic Architecture, and the rise of Universities are the three illustrious monuments. While, therefore, the secondary schools of Europe have a long history, joining on, as they do, to the traditions of Roman culture, the universities, like the free towns, must be regarded as the product of the mediæval period. And that singularly sympathetic social state which, during this period, sprung from the mixed influence of Latin Christianity and the feudal spirit, and which made Western Europe, in effect, one community, explains their rapid increase and their striking internal correspondence. From the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries they exercised a continuous and controlling influence on the intellectual, the religious, the political, development of the leading European states. For they were not simply schools of instruction for the young; they were far more teeming centres of thought and study, where leading minds from every nation were drawn into eager and stimulating conflict. It is not too much to affirm that they led the way in all the great movements by which Western Europe emerged from the Middle Age. Whether we consider the momentous revolution in modes of apprehending truth, betokened by the scholastic

philosophy, that system so aptly named by Frederic Schlegel the Rationalism of the Mediæval Church; or the change in ecclesiastical theories represented by Gerson in the successive councils of Pisa and Constance; or, what was not less far-reaching in its results, the essential modification of feudal monarchy, effected by the maxims of Roman jurisprudence, we are equally confronted with the everywhere-operative influence of the great mediæval universities. They furnished Philip the Fair the cruel weapons with which he carried through his relentless persecution of the Templars; they undermined, with subtle dialectics, the mighty structure which Hildebrand and Innocent had built; they wrested the mind of Europe from its perilous subjection to tradition, and kindled the torch destined one day to be seized by Bacon and Descartes.

The influence of universities, however various the direction which from time to time it followed, was everywhere essentially the same. For they everywhere presupposed the same spirit of intellectual independence which they everywhere most powerfully aided to develop. They were arenas for the unrestricted interchange of the foremost scientific and philosophic thought which the age afforded. At a time when the art of printing was unknown, and when the oral communication of ideas was the most effectual, they rendered a service to society which finds its most perfect analogy in the free press of modern times. This prime characteristic of unhampered intellectual freedom was the secret of their living power. They were fields on which the master spirits of the age were matched against each other; not so much like modern schools as like

modern reviews and essays. They were sought by men of more mature development than those to whom the designation, student, is now restricted; a circumstance which helps to explain some of their most striking internal features, and renders credible the statements respecting the great numbers who frequented them. Thus it is stated that, in the fourteenth century, the university and those depending on it made a third part of the population of the French capital. When, on one occasion, the whole body went in procession to St. Denis, one end had reached the door of the cathedral before the other had passed the city gate. The crowds at Oxford and Bologna were hardly less. And, making every allowance for exaggeration, we can well understand how such great multitudes should have been drawn together when we bear in mind that life at the university was not, as with us, the brief prelude to a wholly different career, but afforded the very widest circle of aspiration and achievement.

The oldest universities were not foundations, in our sense; that is, they were not originally established by any formal act, but arose gradually from the voluntary impulse of students to gather about some inspiring teacher. He received neither appointment nor support from any authority above him. His sole claim on the attention of his hearers rested on his eminence over them. Such were Irnerius and Gratian at Bologna, and William of Champeaux and Abelard at Paris. All these had taught before any legal incorporation of universities had taken place.

At nearly the same time, that is, during the first half of the twelfth century, three schools, in three

different cities, became illustrious in three different departments: Salerno for medicine, Bologna for civil law, and Paris for theology. The first of these, although the most ancient of the three, may be dismissed from any further mention, not only for the reason that very little has been preserved respecting its early history, but also because its influence upon the growth of later schools is imperceptible. But Bologna and Paris require particular examination, for they were the most illustrious and influential universities of the Middle Age, and furnished the models after which all subsequent institutions were arranged. In the organization of these two there existed, from the outset, a striking difference. At Bologna the whole body of students formed the corporation, choosing from their own number the governing body, to which the instructors were subjected. At Paris, on the contrary, the professors formed the corporation, the students having no share in university administration. Bologna became the pattern for all the universities that sprang up in Italy and Spain and France, while Paris furnished the model to Germany and England. That the French universities should have looked not to Paris, but to Bologna, was due to the fact that they were designed chiefly for the study of Roman law. The difference between Paris and Bologna was the result in part of the republican spirit of the Italian city, and in part of the different nature of the studies. For the study of theology disposed the mind to a spirit of subjection to authority, more especially as so many of the students had received their early training in the cathedral schools.

We may take, therefore, these two universities as

models of the whole system which prevailed throughout Western Europe, although it should be borne in mind that they were not exactly copied, but, both in Germany and in England, received essential modifications. In Germany, especially, was this the case after the Reformation, when the universities adapted themselves with great freedom to the new wants of the time. The Reformation marks, in fact, the dividing line between the mediæval and the modern systems.

The enthusiasm of Italian antiquaries has traced the University of Bologna to the reign of Theodosius the Second. But, leaving the domain of fable, it is sufficient reason for not fixing the origin of the institution with chronological exactness that it dates from no formal authorization. The fame of a great teacher and the eagerness of students established at Bologna a school of civil law long before any corporation had been created. The university was recognized, rather than established, by successive imperial edicts. The first of these was the "Privilege" of Frederic Barbarossa, published at the Diet of Roncaglia, November, 1158. Although there is no mention in it of Bologna, yet there was no other city to which it could apply. It had a two-fold operation. In the first place, foreign students were put under special protection of the laws. They could travel without restraint; any injury done them was punished with unusual severity; none of them could be called to account for the misdemeanors or debts of their countrymen. In the second place, if accused of crime, they had the choice of being tried by their teachers or the bishop. Thus the foreign students were rendered, in great measure, indepen-

dent of the municipal authorities. It is perfectly clear, therefore, that while this "Privilege" of Frederic conferred great immunities, it was not, in any proper sense, a charter. There is no mention of rector or university, for the reason that none as yet existed. Nor was the act limited to Bologna only; it included any university and any students that might afterwards exist in Lombardy. The whole transaction strikingly illustrates the manner in which the oldest European universities gradually grew up. It is impossible to study it without being reminded of the similar manner in which the most vigorous of the free cities came into being; not by any formal charters of incorporation, but winning their liberties through successive concessions of feudal lords. The universities were products of a movement like that from which the communes sprang; only in the one case it had its origin chiefly in intellectual, in the other in social and material, causes. In the case, however, of the Bologna University, these intellectual and social and material causes were very curiously blended.

To comprehend the causes of this intermixture we must bear in mind that the extraordinary development of the study of Roman jurisprudence, which was seen in the Italian cities during the twelfth century, and which gave Bologna its eminence as a place of study, was not the result of accident. The story, so long repeated, of the discovery of the Pandects at Amalfi, has been long exploded. Both the authorities relied upon to prove it are at least two centuries later than the occurrence they attest, and both come to us in a shape exposing them to great suspicion. The older and

more trustworthy chronicles make no mention of the incident. According to another, though somewhat later, statement, the famous manuscript had been in Pisa since the time of the Emperor Justinian. Either account must be ranked with the innumerable fables with which local patriotism labored to adorn the annals of each petty Italian state. The great revival of the civil law was due, not to any accident, but to a social and political necessity. Leaving aside the disputed question, on which Savigny and Carl Hegel are so much at variance, whether the old Roman municipalities were preserved in Italy from the fifth to the twelfth centuries, there is no ground whatever for supposing that a knowledge of the codes had ever perished. And when, during the contests between the popes and the Hohenstauffen princes, the Italian cities suddenly sprang into new importance, experiencing, from their peculiar character as great commercial centres, a variety of novel wants for which the feudal legislation made no provision, the Justinian code supplied precisely what was needed. The study of Roman law was not a mere literary or antiquarian diversion ; it met a great public want. The peculiar situation of the Lombard cities, their invigorated civic spirit, the unaccustomed and manifold relations created by their commercial enterprise, the enhanced value imparted to personal, in distinction from real, property, the endless and intricate questions connected with commercial law, were the true reasons why the refined system of the Roman code was substituted for the rude process of the feudal tribunals. This circumstance has an important bearing as showing how universities, instead of holding themselves

aloof from the tendencies of society about them, were, in reality, created by these very tendencies. Never was there a more striking instance of an attempt to apply science to the practical concerns of life than was seen in the lectures of Irnerius at Bologna, and never was an institution in more hearty sympathy with the leading movements of the time.

The internal constitution of the university with which we are now especially concerned was of gradual formation, having for its basis a series of statutes finally confirmed by Innocent the Fourth in 1253. In accordance with a somewhat singular provision, these statutes were revised and corrected every twenty years by eight scholars appointed for that purpose. The slow development of the system is seen in the fact that it is not till near the close of the twelfth century that we find any mention of the rector, the official head of the university. The jurisdiction of this officer was very extensive, and entailed endless disputes with the municipal authorities, who sought in vain to establish a control over him. His powers were finally confirmed by a papal edict of the year 1224. After this time the students, singularly enough, were amenable to four jurisdictions. The first was the ordinary local; the second, special, resting on the Roman theory of a corporation; the remaining two were based on the "Privilege," granted by Frederic Barbarossa. These four jurisdictions were exercised respectively by the city, the rector, the bishop, and the professors. The inevitable confusion arising from this conflict of authority was, more than once, the means of bringing the university to the verge of ruin. For the most part, however, these disputes confirmed and extended its immunities.

It should be carefully borne in mind that, at the outset, Bologna was simply a law school; for the term "Universitas" did not, by any means, as is commonly supposed, imply a seat of learning in which the four faculties of arts, theology, law, and medicine existed. Still less was it used in the English acceptation of a federal union of many separate colleges. Bologna bore the name of university for two centuries before any provision had been made for the study of theology, and at Paris the Roman law was not introduced until the year 1679. In the same way, Salerno and Montpelier, for a long time, contained only the faculty of medicine. In the technical language of the codes, the word "Universitas" included both things and persons. In the latter sense, it denoted a plurality of persons associated, by law, for a common purpose; in other words, a corporation. Thus, at Rome, any trade association was termed a university; and, in ecclesiastical phrase, the canons of a cathedral were sometimes designated by the same title. When applied to those associated in learned studies, it was originally qualified by the words "magistrorum et scholarium;" but in the fourteenth century these were dropped, and the designation "Universitas" by common consent applied only to the higher schools of learning.

Owing to the enormous throng of students, amounting in the early part of the thirteenth century, to ten thousand, the law school of Bologna was divided into two sections, according as the students were from Italy or from beyond the Alps. and to both these bodies, the *citramontanes* and the *ultramontanes*, the term university was equally applied. In 1316, after a long struggle, medicine and philos-

ophy were created into a distinct faculty; and finally, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, a theological school was established by Innocent VI. This latter was copied from the Parisian model, and was therefore a *Universitas magistrorum*, not *scholarium*. From this time, Bologna really included four universities: two of civil law, one of medicine and philosophy, and one of theology. Ultimately, the two schools of law were combined in one.

If now we examine this university of law as a corporation, we find that it was composed of three distinct classes, enjoying three distinct kinds of academic rights. Full academic rights were accorded only to the foreign students, and these, when convened by the rector, constituted the proper corporation. The students who were natives of Bologna could neither vote in this assembly, nor be elected to any academic office. This distinction had its origin partly in the special immunities accorded to foreign students by the "Privilege" of Frederic, and partly in the legal relation of the native students to the municipality. The university feared that its independence might be compromised by intrusting any jurisdiction to these students. The professors held a wholly subordinate position. Not only at their first appointment, but every succeeding year, they were required to swear obedience to the rector and the students. For any disobedience they were liable to punishment by fine, or to be deprived of the right to teach. They could not go on a journey without permission of the rector, nor be absent more than a week except by consent of the whole university. They had no part in the university convocation, unless called to fill the office

of rector. In all other respects their rights and duties were those of ordinary students.

The two great bodies of law students were further divided, in accordance with a custom that became universal, into nations; of which, at first, there were no less than thirty-five. The number, however, as well as the name of these nations were subject to constant changes. The German nation possessed special privileges, the students being allowed to take an oath, not to the rector of the university, but to their own procurators. In addition to these nations, there were associations of poor students, deriving support from a common fund, which were termed Collegia. These charitable foundations, the germs of the great collegiate establishments of Oxford and Cambridge, never, at Bologna, exercised any important influence.

The rector was required by statute to be twenty-five years old, to be unmarried, and to possess sufficient pecuniary means to enable him to meet the expenses of his dignity. It is a striking evidence of the lay influence prevailing at Bologna that no member of any religious order could be chosen to the office. The rector, whose term of office was limited to a single year, was chosen by his immediate predecessor, by the counselors or representatives of the nations, each nation having one, and by certain electors appointed by the university at large, and selected from the nations in a certain order. The rector took precedence not only over bishops and archbishops, but over any cardinals who might be enrolled as students, — a provision which affords another striking illustration of the difference between a great mediæval university, where men of

all ages were collected, and a modern seat of learning. The ordinary jurisdiction of the rector included all members of the university, but was generally limited to academic discipline. In more serious cases, the municipal authorities acted with him. He was also assisted by the counselors of the nations, who formed an academic senate. The German nation was represented in this body by two members, termed procurators. The rights of the university were defended in all outside tribunals by its Syndic.

Nothing connected with the history of university corporations is more curious and intricate than the subject of academical degrees. When these were first conferred cannot be ascertained, but they seem to have been in use at least from the middle of the twelfth century. The title "doctor," literally teacher, implied no more than that the person bearing it had a right to instruct. It seems a most reasonable conjecture of Savigny that the degree was a device for preventing unauthorized persons from claiming the immunities granted by the Emperor Frederic. The rank of doctor was conferred by coöptation, and by the sole authority of the respective faculties, until frequent abuse caused the Archdeacon of Bologna to be joined with them. Degrees were first granted only in civil law, but canon law and medicine soon followed. Candidates were examined both in public and in private, and for each examination a distinct rank was given. For the canon law, six years' study was demanded; for the civil, eight. The public examination was held in the cathedral, where the candidate delivered an oration, and received his ring, book, and cap.

The students and professors entered and left the cathedral in a procession, a custom which most of our American colleges retain to the present day. It is a notable feature of the Bologna University that women were sometimes admitted, both to its honors and to its offices.

The degree of doctor conferred the right to teach not only in Bologna, but in all schools of law, wherever established. Only such as had received it could vote on the promotion of a new candidate. Connected with the exercise of this right there was a peculiar condition. There were five distinct faculties, or associations, which regulated all promotions to the academical degrees. Although these faculties were termed colleges, they had no connection, of any kind, with the eleemosynary foundations before mentioned. They were five in number, corresponding to the faculties of civil and canon law, medicine, philosophy, and theology. Admission to the College of Jurists was limited to natives of Bologna, who must also be of Bolognese descent. At the head of each college stood a Prior. They had a common place of meeting near the cathedral.

At the beginning there were no foundations for the support of teachers, but very early we find them receiving compensation. Thus, in the year 1279, the students agreed to pay a certain lecturer three hundred and twenty dollars in gold for reading a year on the Digest. In the year 1289, two professorships were founded, apparently with the design of attaching the professors more closely to the university. The salary was paid by the city, but the professors were chosen by the students. The election was only for a year. A beginning having once

been made, the number of endowed chairs constantly increased. The schools, or lecture-rooms, during the whole of the thirteenth century, were in private houses. In the following century public lecture-rooms were first provided by the university. The relation of teacher and pupil was more exclusive than in modern times; students, for the most part, attaching themselves to some single master. Lectures were divided into ordinary and extraordinary, a distinction which has given rise to much debate, but which Savigny has proved beyond doubt to have had its origin, not in the circumstance that some were given in public, and others in private halls; still less in the fact that some were free, and others restricted to those students paying a fee; but in the nature of the subject treated. Ordinary books, in the phraseology of the civil law, were the Digest and the Code; all others were extraordinary. The lectures on the former were given in the morning; on the latter, in the afternoon. Ordinary professors might lecture in the extraordinary courses, but the converse was not permitted. Besides lectures, repetitions and disputations formed part of the courses of instruction.

The other universities of Italy differed from that of Bologna in no essential particular, with the single exception of the University of Naples, which, both in the circumstances of its founding and in its internal administration, formed a marked exception to all the rest. For, instead of springing from a great social necessity, and receiving its shape from the free development of the relation between pupil and instructor, it owed its origin and its distinctive characteristics to the will of a single man. The

Emperor Frederic the Second, perhaps the most extraordinary character in the whole range of the Middle Age, who cultivated all liberal arts with the same ardor with which he wooed the dark-eyed daughters of the East, decided in the year 1224 to found, in Naples, a school of all the sciences, and on a far more comprehensive plan than had been, as yet, anywhere attempted. Since, in his contests with the Lombard cities, Frederic had conceived a prejudice against all kinds of corporate immunities, Naples was allowed neither rector nor university of students. The supreme oversight was entrusted to the chancellor of the kingdom; all appointments and promotions, as well as the direction of the lectures, being in his hands. Degrees obtained at other universities received no recognition; for admission "ad eundem," new examinations were in every case required. Yet, with all this pretension to superiority, and with the most strenuous support that the government could give, Naples accomplished far less than any of her rivals. Although the claim has been put forth, in her behalf, that, in the thirteenth century, she was the only proper university in Europe, her influence was always insignificant. The genius of an enlightened but arbitrary ruler could not supply the place of the free intellectual impulse which found such full scope in the republics of Northern Italy.

If now from Bologna we turn to Paris, the type of another class of universities, the model which Germany and England copied, we are struck with essential differences, — differences which may be explained in the circumstances in which each had its origin. Bologna grew up in a republic; her leading

function was to expound those legal principles which the wants of a free commercial state had clothed with new significance. Paris, on the contrary, owed all her greatness to theology, and, naturally, assimilated the temper of the church. She was the great Middle Age university; where Abelard and Peter Lombard taught; where Roger Bacon and Aquinas and Dante studied; to which Henry II. of England was willing to refer his memorable dispute with Becket; to which Christendom itself was ready to defer in the great schism of the West. "Nos fuimus simul in Galandia" was a password among scholars throughout Europe, and it was deemed sufficient ground for any academic regulation to add the words "quemadmodum in Parisiensi studio."

While there seems no reason for doubting that, for two centuries after the death of Charlemagne, Paris was frequented for purposes of study, a regular succession of instructors can be deduced only from the time of William of Champeaux, who opened a school of logic in the year 1109. The oldest documents relating to Paris as a seat of study are two decretals of Pope Alexander III., the earliest of which, dated 1180, was directed against the practice of exacting fees for licenses to teach. An ordinance of Philip Augustus, of the year 1200, makes the first mention of a rector. The division into four nations existed as early as 1206. And lastly, in a decretal of Innocent III., in the early part of the thirteenth century, the title "Universitas" is first applied. The papal sanction was indispensable for an institution in which theology was the leading study. By a decretal of Nicholas IV., near the close of the same century, it was ordained that de-

grees at the University of Paris should confer similar privileges in every country of Christendom.

In the constitution of the University of Paris, the first thing to be remarked is, that from the beginning there was only a single body, so that we find nothing of the distinction between independent corporations existing in Bologna. A second point of difference was that the administration was wholly in the hands of the instructors, the students enjoying no participation. To the general governing assembly belonged, originally, all who had received the degree of doctor or of master, and these, for a long time, were identical with the actual teachers. When, however, it gradually became the custom for many to take a degree who did not intend to teach, the right to sit in the university assembly was restricted, as a rule, to those performing the duty of instruction. In this peculiarity of her constitution lay the chief ground of the great influence which Paris exercised. For while the Italian universities made it their chief aim to secure the freedom of the students and to call eminent professors, the University of Paris took part in great theological controversies, pronouncing her opinion as one organic body. This thorough academic unity, which could never have existed had the whole body of her students taken part in her deliberations, enabled her at times to fling a tremendous weight into the scale of European authority. Her influence was direct and undivided.

From a very early period the students were divided into four nations, the French, the English, the Picard, and the Norman; and these, in turn, were subdivided into a multitude of provinces. Thus,

the English nation embraced, besides England and Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Northern kingdoms. In these nations the professors and students were alike reckoned, without any distinction of special faculties. But in the middle of the thirteenth century the university became involved in a bitter strife with the new mendicant orders, and as a result, the doctors of theology were erected into a distinct body. The doctors of canon law and medicine soon followed the example. From this time the university was made up of seven distinct bodies: the four nations and the three faculties. The faculties were governed by their deans, the nations by their procurators. The four nations were, in fact, the university, and with them the choice of rector rested. So, also, the students and bachelors of all the faculties were considered as belonging to the nations, the faculties being made up of doctors only. In the course of time this relation was much modified, and the four nations came to be reckoned together as a fourth faculty, that of arts. But they still retained the original control over the election of the rector.

In the internal organization of the Paris University the colleges deserve particular attention. These were at the outset, as in Italy, mere foundations for the support of the poorer class of students; but, by degrees, they were greatly multiplied, becoming not simply foundations for the poor, but boarding-houses for the rich, so that at last it was the exception to live out of college, such students being known as martinets. As these were less amenable to discipline than college students, the legislation of the university was turned especially

against them. The oldest and most famous of these colleges, the Sorbonne, was founded in 1250. These differed wholly from the English colleges in being appropriated, for the most part, to single faculties. Thus, the theological faculty was collected at the Sorbonne. Regent masters were nominated, by the several faculties, to lecture in the colleges, and, in the course of the fifteenth century, instruction in the colleges came almost wholly to supersede the university lectures given in the public schools.

The head of the university, as in the Italian universities, was the rector, who must be single, and held his office at first for four weeks, but after the year 1279 for three months. He was chosen by electors named for that purpose by the four nations. The rector, with the four procurators, constituted the ordinary government of the university. He was only eligible from the faculty of arts.

The fact that the university was situated partly within the diocese of Paris, and partly within the abbey jurisdiction of St. Genevieve, was the occasion of an important modification in the manner of conferring degrees. For it had always been the prerogative of a bishop to grant licenses to teach within his diocese, and the same power was claimed by abbots within their territories. The exercise of this power was usually delegated by the bishop or abbot to his chancellor. Hence it followed, at Paris, that promotions to all degrees must be made with the concurrence of these officers ; the chancellor of the church of St. Genevieve being the chancellor of the faculty of arts, and the chancellor of the diocese of Paris of the remaining three faculties, and therefore considered, in general, chancellor of the univer-

sity. But while the chancellors regulated the conferring of degrees, they had no power whatever to interfere in other departments of administration.

In the middle of the twelfth century there arose among universities a violent prejudice against the study of the civil law. In councils held during that century the study was repeatedly interdicted to monks, a prohibition extended, in the next century, to the whole body of the clergy. From this prejudice arose the remarkable decretal of Honorius III. in 1220, by which all lectures on Roman law were forbidden in Paris and its immediate neighborhood. Theology and arts were the glory of the university.

The time when academical degrees were first conferred at Paris is uncertain. According to some they were coeval with the university, while others hold that they were borrowed from Bologna. The earliest degrees were those in arts. In the middle of the fifteenth century the course of study requisite for obtaining the degree of bachelor of arts covered three years and a half. The candidate was next required to devote an equal period to the study of philosophy, and, if he passed his examination, received a license to teach the seven liberal arts. The seven arts were the Trivium, including grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; and the Quadrivium, including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. "This," says Matthew Arnold, "was the liberal education of the Middle Age, and it came direct from the schools of ancient Rome." To obtain the degree of doctor of divinity the candidate must have studied philosophy for seven, or if he belonged to a religious body for six, years. An additional pro-

bation of nine years was then required, so that the student must have been at least sixteen years connected with the university. Salaried professors were not known at Paris until the eighteenth century. The university, as a corporation, was always poor, never possessing any public buildings of its own; but schools were provided for the several faculties, and the endowments of some of the colleges were very large.

With the sole exception of the restriction relative to the study of the civil law, the University of Paris was a centre of the freest intellectual activity. Like her sister of Bologna she owed her vast influence to her vital sympathy with the movements of the age. Her glory culminated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. When, in the fifteenth century, she became false to her own traditions, and refused to assimilate the new studies of the Renaissance, she rapidly fell from her proud position at the head of European culture. The splendid foundation of Francis the First, the only institution that kept pace with the progress of the sciences, was not connected with the university.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, the focus of free thought in Europe was the newly-founded University of Wittenberg. Since, however, the German universities, so far as their organization was concerned, were copies of that of Paris, they require no special explanation. The only important difference consisted in the fact that in Germany the college system never attained any development. In all the older universities there existed Bursæ; but these were simply funds for the support of poorer students. There was no provision made for common residence.

The two great universities of England, whatever may have been their origin, unquestionably derived from Paris the model of their corporate organization. During all their early history, this similarity continued very striking. Thus, at Oxford, the students were lodged in private houses, as at Paris and Bologna; and the business of instruction, instead of being confided to an exclusive body, was shared by the graduates at large. The division into nations also continued for a time, but fell into disuse on account of the small proportion of foreign students. A reminder of this original division is still preserved in the two proctors. The degrees and the conditions of bestowing them were also similar to those of Paris. The earliest application of the term "Universitas" to Oxford was in 1201, earlier than any instance where it is known to have been applied to Paris. The first formal charter of privileges was granted to Oxford in 1224, and to Cambridge in 1291, although legal instruments recognizing the existence of the universities are found of an earlier date. Both Oxford and Cambridge obtained a confirmation of their privileges from the Holy See.

Since Oxford stood, originally, within the diocese of Lincoln, the bishop, as in the case of Paris, claimed the right to interfere in university affairs; but, in the reign of Edward First, a violent dispute arose, which resulted in the entire emancipation of the university from episcopal jurisdiction. A similar dispute between Cambridge and the Bishop of Ely led, although at a somewhat later period, to the same result.

The more pronounced ecclesiastical character of the English universities is shown in the absence of

a rector, an officer who, on the Continent, was the embodiment of the civil or lay influence. The head both of Oxford and of Cambridge was the chancellor, a dignitary elected by the general body of graduates, but requiring the confirmation of the bishop. The office was held for a short period, and was always conferred on a resident ecclesiastic. The universities were accustomed, at the beginning of each new reign, to solicit a confirmation of their privileges. By the act of the thirteenth Elizabeth, all charters, liberties, and privileges granted to both universities were expressly confirmed, and their legal constitution settled. The two institutions were known to law as "The Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge."

Meantime, an internal revolution had been gradually accomplished, which was destined not only to subvert the constitution of the universities, but to change entirely the methods of instruction. This was the extraordinary development of the collegiate system, to which the Continental universities present nothing parallel. The colleges of Paris were, it is true, richly endowed corporations; but they never supplanted, and never aimed to supplant, the university. In England, on the contrary, the universities came, by degrees, to be mere associations of colleges. This remarkable transformation can be most clearly traced at Oxford.

At Oxford, as in the case of Paris, the colleges had been originally founded for the support, and better discipline, of the poorer class of students. In the absence of the control supplied by the far more efficient organization of the nations at Paris

and Bologna, the need of some such arrangement was more keenly felt. At first, the number of these charitable foundations was very small, in comparison with the halls where students were simply furnished with cheap lodgings. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, while there were about three hundred halls, there were only three colleges. All that was needed to establish a hall was that a few students should agree to live together, with some respectable graduate as their master. Simply the sanction of the chancellor was needed to make the arrangement binding. The distinction between colleges and halls consisted in the possession, by the former, of endowments. On this account, from the beginning of the fifteenth century, the colleges increased, while the halls rapidly diminished; so that at the beginning of the sixteenth, while the number of halls had fallen to fifty-five, the number of colleges had increased to twelve. It had now become an established rule that all students should be connected with some hall or college. The colleges, which originally had admitted only on the foundation, now began to receive other students. To comprehend the cause of the rapid increase of the wealth and influence of the colleges, it must be remembered that each college was a distinct corporation, governed by its own laws, and controlling its own funds. The college consisted of a head, variously styled Provost, Master, Rector, President, Principal, or Warden; a body of Fellows, who usually elected the head from their own number; and a certain number of scholars, or students, on the foundation. In nearly all the colleges, there were also exhibitioners, who received annual stipends, either from the col-

lege funds or from the endowed schools where they had been prepared. Thus, it was inevitable that a corporate spirit should be developed. The Fellows and students, naturally, came to look upon the interests of the particular colleges to which they were attached as more important than the interests of the university. The common and intimate academic life could result in nothing else. So that, in the course of time, what had been simply a contingent and accessory element came to absorb all the rest.

The gradual subversion of the university was effected in two ways. While, in the beginning, the general academic administration had been in the hands of the regents, under which designation were included all who had acquired the right to teach, the colleges were now gradually intrusted with exclusive functions. The university retained the examinations and the degrees; but the real work of instruction passed to the colleges, partly, no doubt, in consequence, as Professor Goldwin Smith remarks, of the decline of the scholastic philosophy, and the rise of the classical studies, which the colleges took up. By the statutes of Leicester, the heads of houses, with the doctors of the three higher faculties and the two proctors, were constituted a body, to which was conceded the prior discussion of all measures proposed in convocation; and, by the subsequent statutes of Laud, an absolute initiation was given to the heads and proctors, thus making the heads of the colleges, in fact, the masters of the university. Thus it happened that a form of government, originally elastic and allowing a free development, was exchanged for a system in which local and collegiate interests stood always in the way of

any comprehensive changes. To make the dominion of the new powers more complete the two proctors, who, from the beginning, had been chosen by the whole body of the graduates, were now elected, in rotation, by the colleges. This final step in the administrative revolution converted what had been a great university into a mere aggregation of private corporations. It sufficiently explains the intellectual torpor which prevailed at Oxford for the two centuries following,—a torpor in such shameful contrast with her early history.

For, by these changes, the university instruction, although not formally abolished, was yet completely paralyzed. The whole influence of the heads of houses was thrown in favor of the college tutors, to the exclusion of the university professors. Attendance on the university lectures, except as a mere form, was not required, even for university degrees. The stimulating influence of great minds, in eager contact with new truth, was thus wholly lost. The right of teaching, once belonging to all graduates, was restricted to a single class. The public universities became private schools. And since, in consequence of the mediæval statutes with which most of the colleges were saddled, all graduates, save those of one profession, were excluded from position, it followed that all studies not connected with that profession were neglected. The once famous faculties of law and medicine found a refuge at the inns of court and the London hospitals. Even theology, under the depressing influence that prevailed, lost all genuine scientific impulse. The two great English universities became universities only in name.

It is a most significant circumstance, in the history of higher education in this country, that just at the crisis when the great revolution in the English universities was completed the earliest American colleges came into being. Harvard College, with its corporation of seven persons, a President, Treasurer, and five Fellows, was simply a copy of the model with which all the leading clergy of the colony of Massachusetts Bay were well acquainted. At a time when the college had supplanted the university, it was, naturally, a college that they essayed to plant. Notwithstanding the arguments which the late President Quincy advances in his "History," there seems no good reason for supposing that the term "Fellows," as used in the charter of 1650, is to be understood in any other sense than that familiar to those who used it. By usage, however, the title, in the course of time, ceased to be limited to resident instructors, and a distinction came to be established between resident and non-resident Fellows: the former being known as Fellows of the house; the latter, as Fellows of the corporation. This distinction was recognized in the year 1712, when Joseph Stevens was elected Fellow of the house. When, however, nine years later, Sever and Welstead claimed seats in the corporation, on the ground of being engaged in actual instruction, the claim was denied. As soon as the distinction between Fellows of the house and Fellows of the corporation had become thus fixed, the general direction of the college passed into the hands of a body of non-residents, — a change which led to the most important results in the constitutional form of all American colleges. In consequence of this

change, the original significance of the term "Fellow" has been wholly lost; for the power of conferring degrees, the sole distinctive prerogative retained by the Fellows of an American college, was never possessed by the Fellows of an English college. In the charter of Brown University, granted by the General Assembly of Rhode Island, in 1764, the original quality of the Fellows is in some measure preserved. They are not only constituted a "learned faculty," but are charged with "the instruction and immediate government of the college." With a singular disregard of the plain intent of the charter, this duty of immediate supervision has been wholly renounced by the board of Fellows, and is understood to be committed to an anomalous body, the executive board, made up, indifferently, of Fellows and Trustees.

The origin of this latter body, which, in many of our more recently founded colleges, has entirely absorbed the functions of the Fellows, was as follows: Before the corporation of Harvard College had been created, there existed a board of overseers, consisting of the governor, deputy-governor, and magistrates, together with the teaching elders of the six next adjoining towns. These were intrusted with the general duty of supervision, which, in England, was exercised by Parliament. But their duties were simply of supervision, not of direct administration. They could only approve or reject the propositions of the board of Fellows. This, too, is the theory of the functions of the Trustees in the charter of Brown University. The Fellows have the exclusive right to make and publish all laws and statutes for the instruction and government of the

college; but these laws are not valid unless approved by the Trustees. While, however, at Harvard the rights of the "corporation," or, in other words, the Fellows, have been carefully preserved amid all changes of the overseers, at Brown the Fellows have lost their character as a body charged with the instruction and immediate government of the college, and become, with the single exception of granting degrees, merged with the Trustees. In many colleges no board of Fellows exists.

As a result of this extended examination, it appears that academic governments have undergone a complete transformation. Beginning, in Italy, with intrusting to students and graduates the whole charge of administration, it ends, in America, with excluding graduates from all share in academic government; committing the entire authority to a more or less numerous body of non-residents, who not only need not be graduates of the institution which they control, but, in many cases, lack the qualification of a liberal education. Taking for our model the English colleges, just at the time when the English colleges were at their worst, we have preserved, even then, but the shell of the system, carefully eschewing all its valuable features. For the Fellows of an English college were at least men of culture, and were directly concerned in promoting the interests of the body with which they were connected. The history of higher education in Europe begins with universities. The colleges were a later and subordinate growth. In this country it has been precisely the reverse. We begin with colleges; and are now, at least in the case of Yale and Harvard, endeavoring to engraft universities upon them. But,

whether it be our object to have a good college or a good university, it is clear that our present corporate system stands in need of thorough revision. No substantial progress can be hoped for until this is done.

SERMONS.

THE SON OF MAN.[1]

And he saith unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man. —JOHN i. 51.

IN this striking passage, Jesus for the first time applies to himself the title of "Son of Man." It has here an emphasis more marked because Nathaniel had just addressed him as "Son of God." The terms would seem to be used antithetically, as involving correlative ideas, and as needing to be explained from their reciprocal relation. Both titles are used in the Old Testament as designations of the Messiah, yet, clearly, the two are not mere synonyms. Unless we conceive that the language of Scripture is used with unparalleled looseness, we must regard the terms as designed to describe the Messiah in two distinct and peculiar aspects of his nature.

The phrase, Son of God, which Nathaniel employed was the one in most common use among the Jews, as it best embodied the Jewish conception of the Messiah's dignity. That "Son of Man" was not a familiar title of the Messiah may be gathered from the fact that when Jesus, on one occasion, referred to his own approaching death as Son of Man, the Jews, in seeming doubt whether He spoke of the

[1] Written in 1861.

Messiah in a manner that accorded so little with their own expectations, asked, "Who is this Son of Man?" Yet this less familiar and perplexing phrase is the one under which the Saviour most frequently describes himself. He that sowed good seed was the Son of Man. As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, so must the Son of Man be lifted up. It was the Son of Man who had not where to lay his head; the Son of Man who had power to forgive sins; the Son of Man who should suffer many things; the Son of Man who should be betrayed; the Son of Man who should rise from the dead, who should come again in glory, who should judge the world.

It must have been, therefore, with some special meaning that Jesus so continually employed this term; its reiterated and emphatic utterance forbids any other supposition. The antithesis between it and the title "Son of God" implies clearly a reference to Christ's human nature. Yet to say that it implies no more than that Christ was a man, to make it mean simply "the mortal" or the "incarnate," fails wholly to account for the frequent and peculiar use which the Saviour makes of it. The phrase itself would seem borrowed from the prophet Daniel, when, in visions of the night, he saw one like the Son of Man come with the clouds of heaven to the Ancient of Days, and dominion and glory were given Him; but just as Jesus gave to the phrase Son of God a meaning far more profound than that attached to it in current Jewish usage, so to this He gave a sense unhinted in prophetic symbols. Accordingly, it can only be from his own use of the phrase that we can declare his deep consciousness of its significance.

In his words to Nathaniel, the obvious meaning of our Saviour is that in Him, as Son of Man, human nature shall be glorified; the figure of ascending and descending angels implies that its fellowship with heavenly powers will in that way be restored. When, in another place He says to Nicodemus, "No man hath ascended up to heaven but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven," He as clearly teaches that human nature in its highest form is capable of dwelling with God; when, again, He declares, "Except ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of Man, ye have no life in you," his words can only mean that man must become partaker of *his* perfected humanity; and when, again, He tells us that to Him all judgment has been committed *because* He is the Son of Man, we are forced to the conclusion that his perfected humanity will be the standard with which the human race will be compared. These illustrations are enough to show us the breadth of meaning which the phrase included.

The title could not, therefore, have been employed by Christ to express the bald fact that He had a human nature; on many occasions when He used the phrase, such expression was uncalled for; nor could those who were with Him day by day, who saw Him and heard his voice, have needed such frequent reminding of a fact so obvious. His reiterated, peculiar indication of this aspect of his nature could have sprung only from a consciousness of some deeper alliance with humanity.

We infer that the phrase "Son of Man" designates the human nature of Christ in its most comprehensive character; not the mere human as dis-

tinct from the divine, but Christ in the whole breadth of his relations to the race; as embodying the eternal archetype of man; illustrating not simply an individual, but a generic being; manifestation, as much of the fullness of man as of the fullness of God; not more an incarnation of divinity than stature of a perfect humanity.

We must believe that Christ's frequent use of the title "Son of Man" sprung from this profound consciousness of a relation to the whole race of Adam. Nor need we dread the imputation of borrowing from Alexandrian mysticism, when we thus impute to Him, who did not shrink from declaring, "Before Abraham was, I am," a recognition of his archetypal being. Christ was, by preëminence, the Son of Man, as He was that image of the race which had dwelt from eternity in the creative mind; the first-born of the whole creation; that ideal standard, with reference to which all things in heaven and on earth had been created, whether they be thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers; the Word by which all things were made, and without which was not anything made that was made. Thus, the pattern, by which the first Adam was created, in this second Adam was restored. In him was summed up and once more brought together its manifold perfection. As the first man had been of the earth, earthy, so this second man was the Lord from heaven. How luminous, in the thick mystery that shrouds our little lives, this light of primeval day! How serene and spotless in the noise and jar of life stood this Son of Man, in every act giving a silent rebuke to men; Son of Man, yet unrecognized by men; Son of Man, yet rejected of men; Son of Man, yet redeem-

ing and judging men! What insight into the actual state of men, what mark of their short-coming and shame, is set before us in this manifestation of the great original!

We miss a signal aspect of the Messiah's nature when we miss this significance which He claimed for himself as Son of *Man*. The ancients fondly fancied that in each human soul there lingered reminiscences of an earlier and purer being; but it is not a poet's dream when we behold in Christ the intimation of an earlier purpose, looking from the marred ruins of many generations to this unblemished archetype, gazing back from cloudy night to the clear and unruffled dawn. In the Son of Man, related as He was to the race, the capacities of human nature were meant to be set forth; in Him were presented the proportions of a perfected humanity, the summit level of the years. Gazing back upon Him with fullest persuasion of his uncreated being, we are still to bear in mind that that being was identical with ours; that even with his eternal dwelling in the bosom of the Father was coupled this relation to the whole race He was destined to redeem. In the Son of Man the dignity of genuine manhood was thus vindicated; the native ore came out in contrast with all the base counterfeits that had buried it up. The majesty of the inner life, the incomparable worth of the spiritual nature, the lustre of unselfish love, — all these shone forth in contrast with the meanness, the brutality, the slavery to sense, into which the human race had fallen.

Note, in passing, how varied and contrasted this affluent completeness of the Son of Man; how unbending in his integrity, but how ready to forgive;

how separate from sinners, yet how touched with their infirmities; how profound, yet how simple, in his teachings; his thoughts absorbed in heavenly things, angels of God ascending and descending in ceaseless ministry upon Him, yet making his abode with the friendless and the outcast, not neglecting, even when seated by the dusty wayside, to tell a wretched woman of the water of life! How meek, but how brave; how mild, but how manly! In his various completeness how each phase of human nature, how every type of character, faith, steadfastness, fidelity, tenderness, obedience, may find some congenial feature, marked as He is by such opposite excellences, exercising each in due season: now driving money-changers from the temple; now submitting himself to be scourged; now refusing the kingdoms of the world; now crowned in mockery with thorns; led as a lamb to the slaughter, yet Lion of the tribe of Judah!

With what fullness of meaning, then, is this phrase invested! Nathaniel had hailed Jesus as the Messiah of the Jews. "Thou art," he cried, "the *Son* of *God*, Thou art the *King* of *Israel!*" But Jesus gave him promise of a more open vision; not of the Jew's Messiah, heir of the glories of one race, but of the second Adam, the head of the new creation. It was not on the Son of David, but on the Son of Man, that he should see the angels of God ascending and descending. The vision promised to this guileless Israelite is the vision of all perfect faith, the recognition of the Son of Man in the grand scope of his relations to the human race; as corresponding in the fullness of his being with the length and breadth of our humanity; as identified with each

one of us in his manifold completeness; as involving in this mystery of his uncreated glory the ideal of that stainless manhood, that in the dispensation of the fullness of time shall be gathered together in Him.

I. From this view of Christ's relation to the race we must infer that our reasonings respecting human nature should rest on the Son of Man as their central point. We must recognize Him as the sole historic expression of human nature in its completeness. Only through the knowledge of Him can we know ourselves. He is the fixed point of departure from which every measurement must be made. What is essential, what is right, what is desirable in man, we have set before us in Christ.

And what comment on the insufficiency and untrustworthiness of mere human philosophy is afforded in the fact, that from all famous inquiries into human nature Christ has been omitted? In the systems that have long reigned supreme we search in vain for an analysis of the character of Jesus. By a kind of common consent, the only being who affords any adequate insight into the mystery of man, who unveils alike the glory and the shame, is put aside as undeserving philosophic study. Of subtle dissections of human nature in its actual working we have enough. Montaigne, Hobbes, Hume, and a host of inferior students have explained its intricate windings, and sought to fathom its secret depths. We have had on the one hand those who would imprison human nature in direful fate; on the other those who would absolve it from all recognition of superior laws, those who would strip man of his spiritual nature, and those who deny him any mate-

rial being. So, too, we have been flooded with pretentious theories of human progress; with widespread inductions respecting human destiny based on presumed facts of experience; with elaborate codes of ethics drawn from man's actual consciousness of moral distinctions; with plans of reform and imagined perfect states, all developed in entire unconsciousness of Him in whom alone are any hopes of human progress, any hints of human destiny, any absolute and indisputable moral intuitions.

Theology, in part, must be held responsible for this, by exalting the Son of Man above that race whose nature He expressed, and creating an impassable gulf between Redeemer and redeemed. In her zeal to enthrone the Lord of Life above all principality and power, and all that may be named in heaven and on earth, faith has been at times forgetful that it was the Son of *Man* whom the dying Stephen saw standing at the right hand of God, and whom John beheld in Apocalyptic glory. Recognizing Christ as the type of unfallen human nature, as man originally formed in the image of his Maker, we must be pierced with the dismal sense of our short-coming; we must, as the contrast is drawn out between himself and us, be appalled at the distance we have wandered from our Father's house; for the unstained life of the Son of Man is a sorer judgment on our actual state than was ever proved by the most sober moralist or hissed out in the most stinging satire.

Let us not forget that man's normal nature is seen in Christ, and not in us. In our sweeping condemnation of human nature as the world reveals it, let us not blind our eyes to the fact that the world but

partially and dimly shows it; our estimate of human nature is sadly incomplete if we omit that Son of Man in whom alone it was perfectly displayed. His spotless excellence not less truly illustrates man than all the sin and misery and guilt we mourn. It is this sense of a common nature, of a nature whose essential qualities and capabilities no sin, degradation, nor long centuries of alienation have rooted out, that establishes the sympathy between us and the Son of Man. Without this there were for us no redemption. *Because* He is Son of Man is He Saviour of the world. We may believe that this phrase was so often on his lips, because He would have men feel that with all their sin He was not ashamed to call them brethren.

In the Son of Man as revelation of man's real nature we have illustrated at once man's greatness and misery. The perplexing thing in human nature is that in the same breast are pent up conflicting tendencies. There is an endless war of impulses; a choosing of evil, but an enforced approbation of the good; the soul seeking to deceive itself in vain; a sense of better things that overrides all flatteries of the heart, all sophisms of the understanding, attesting the nobler man. "Philosophers," says Pascal, "never furnish men with sentiments suitable to these two states. They inculcate a notion either of absolute grandeur or of hopeless degradation, neither of which is the true condition of man. Consider all the great and glorious aspirations which the sense of so many miseries is not able to extinguish, and inquire whether they can proceed from any other save a higher nature. Had man never fallen he would have enjoyed eternal

truth and happiness; had man never been otherwise than corrupt he would have retained no idea of truth or happiness."

II. Our promise for the future is in the Son of Man. As He restored the effaced image, so was He the harbinger of our hereafter. For He tenanted his fleshly tabernacle not to torment us with the retrospect of an irremediable past, but to introduce the new creation. In Him the latent capacities of that creation, that was groaning and travailing for redemption, were set forth. As Son of Man, He held out to man the hope of partaking in his glorified nature. This was the purpose hid in Him from the foundation of the world. The Word made flesh, was the living corner-stone of the new temple in which we are builded together for an habitation of God. The Son of Man opened for us the gates of this glorious and unending race. In Him was the pledge of a final completing and glorification of man that no fancies of human reform had reached. In his manifestation of human nature in its original form, was revealed at the same time, the goal towards which we tend; himself the forerunner of his people, his life a prophecy of that perfect man to which they should come at last. And it is because the Son of Man is that herald and forerunner of a perfected race, because in the very fact of his humanity is involved this issue, that it is held up as the aim of all true disciples to be fashioned more and more like unto his glorious body; for He was not the sole secret of this comprehensive purpose, but the first-born among *many* brethren. If this language be not a delusive mockery of our wants, it must imply that Christ, the second Adam, foreshadows the new creation, at once its head and harbinger.

Such was the Son of Man; with this breadth of comprehensive meaning did He wear the title; himself the central point of man's checkered history, the full light illuminating the eternal purpose that was heralded by the strains of morning stars, and shall be celebrated in its consummation by the song of Moses and the Lamb.

> "Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day and cease to be;
> They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And Thou, O Lord, art more than they."

When Pilate led Jesus forth wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe, he cried to the angry mob before him: "Behold the *Man!*" But in a sense far deeper than the Roman governor intended they saw *the man;* not the despised and hated Nazarene alone, the man of sorrows, who had not where to lay his head, but *the man,* — the man whose unthroned and unsceptred manhood shamed the craft of priestly spite and cowardice of kingly power.

Behold, then, the *man,* not as they saw Him, marred, scourged, spit upon, but as He stands revealed in his real nature; as He rises in glorified majesty over all the accidents of time; as He rebukes with his completeness the hollow, partial, distorted manhood that received Him not; as He rules more and more the increasing purpose that runs through the ages; as He sits exalted over each loftier reach of redeemed, regenerated souls, crowned in endless adoration as Lord of all.

Behold the *man,* you who are emulous of genuine manhood; you who prize what is real and essential above factitious rank; you who recognize the worth of your spiritual being, and would school it dis-

creetly for its great hereafter. See in this Son of Man the pledge and promise of your destiny, if only, like Him, you learn how much greater and nobler it is to minister rather than to be ministered unto; to seek not your own glory, but the glory of your Father which is in heaven.

Let the world's heroes go; they strut their brief hour on the stage, and then vanish like a dream, and their pomp and circumstance go with them. They bring nothing into the world, and 't is certain they carry nothing out. The Son of Man made himself of no reputation, and took on Him the form of a servant, to show how separate from such outward trappings is the real man; how little the great ends of our earthly being depend on these things that the nations of the world seek after.

I say to you, as Philip to Nathaniel, "Come and see." Outwardly the Christian life of self-denial, of humiliation, of meek endurance, of secret well-doing, of abstinence from worldly aims, of mortified ambition, of unappreciated, often misrepresented, merit, may seem to have in it little that it should be desired; but, unseen by human eye, over such a life the heavens are open, and on it angels of God continually descend.

CHRIST, THE WAY, THE TRUTH, AND THE LIFE.[1]

Jesus said unto him, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. No man cometh unto the Father but by me. — JOHN xiv. 6.

THE separate clauses of this suggestive text of Scripture, so charged with the consciousness of divine authority, are not to be taken as mere emphatic repetitions of one statement; they embody distinct characteristics of the work of Christ. Thomas had said unto Him, "Lord, we know not whither Thou goest, and how can we know the way?" Jesus, as was his wont, instead of directly answering the inquiry of his follower, comforts him with a truth larger and broader than he had dreamed of. Thomas was evidently thinking of some literal way by which the Saviour would depart. Jesus endows the word with a deep spiritual sense, connecting it at the same time with distinct, yet essentially related and coördinated truths. "I," said He, "am the Way, the Truth, and the Life:" the spiritual Way, by which every soul must walk to come to the perfect truth; the Truth, which every soul must believe to attain eternal life; the Life, which every soul must share to know the power of faith and the fellowship of the heavenly societies. No man cometh to the Father but by this threefold experience: threefold, yet one; essentially

[1] Written in 1867.

distinct, yet always combined together; at once practical, logical, experimental; appealing to every side of human nature; enlisting equally the will, the understanding, the affections; covering the whole man, embracing every aspect of his wonderfully fashioned structure, fitted to all his wants alike. The example to be followed, the doctrine to be accepted, the spiritual experience to be tasted, — these are the harmonious parts of that complete and perfect discipline which is the inexorable condition of attaining unto life eternal. "I," said the Saviour, "am all this. No man cometh unto the Father but by me."

I. Christ is the *Way*. In what precise sense, let us ask, does Jesus say this? Nothing at first sight could seem simpler than such a figure. The Scriptures furnish abundant illustration of its use. "The Lord," says the Psalmist, "knoweth the *way* of the righteous." "Search me," was his prayer, "and know my heart, and lead me in the *way* everlasting." "The ways of wisdom," says the wise man, "are ways of pleasantness;" and our Saviour himself, in a memorable passage, uses the same figure when He contrasts the broad *way* that leadeth unto death with the narrow *way* that leadeth unto life. Nor is there reason to suppose that in the text the word is introduced in any distinctive or peculiar sense. In all these passages, and in many more that might be quoted, the word "way" is a synonym for course of conduct. It is this that the Lord knows and searches; it is this that has in it the awful issues of life and death. When, therefore, our Lord calls himself the Way, it is not his meaning that He has opened a way for us, but that the course of conduct which

his life exemplified is to be the example and the pattern of our lives. This was his own obvious meaning when He said, "If any man will be my disciple, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me." "My sheep hear my voice and follow me." "If any man serve me, let him follow me." Follow Him, not in the literal sense of tracking his steps as He went about from city to village, and from village to city, despised, unheeded, rejected, not knowing where to lay his head; not even in the sense of going with Him in sorrowful companionship to the upper chamber, the garden, the judgment hall, the cross. Men might do all this, might beat their breasts as they beheld his unutterable anguish, and not be his disciples indeed. They alone were his followers in the sense which He intended, who shared his spirit; who were themselves conformed to his image. In this sense the great Apostle used the phrase when, counting all else but loss that he might know Christ, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, he adds, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect, but I *follow after*, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus."

When, then, we speak of Christ as our perfect pattern and example, let it never be forgotten that He is all this not in the sense of being simply set up for our *outward imitation;* we can never, in that cold, formal way, come to be like Christ. His living impress must be stamped upon the heart; we must be like Him inwardly before we can truly resemble Him in his outward life; we must be buried with Him in the spiritual likeness of his death before

we can rise and walk with Him in newness of life. Thus we see how the distinct truths into which our text unfolds are still all connected. Is Christ the way? So is He just as much the truth and the life. Would we follow Him as our example? We cannot do so unless in our hearts we believe the truth He manifested; unless in our daily experience we know the power of the life He lived. He is our ideal pattern; the mark of the prize of our high calling is to be like Him; our lives can have no higher aim; but we can be conformed to his outward example only as we are transformed into his inner and spiritual image.

They show you in the "quaint old town of toil and traffic" forever associated with the genius of Albrecht Durer, "Nuremberg the ancient," a series of stone pillars, extending from the city gate to the old cemetery of St. John, where the ashes of the great artist rest. Where the line of pillars ends stand three crosses, on which are carved the figures of Christ and of his companions in the last agony. The distance from the gate to the crosses exactly measures the distance which, according to tradition, the Redeemer trod on the weary journey when He sank beneath his load, — the stone pillars marking its successive stages. The whole was the work of a pious pilgrim, who made more than one journey to the Holy Land to insure the exactness of the measurements. He did it that he and his fellow-townsmen, treading that dolorous way, might know the fellowship of the Saviour's sufferings. He knew no deeper meaning of conformity to Christ than by such outward and literal imitation.

Now, may we not commit as fatal a mistake

when we suffer ourselves to regard Christ as merely an example; when we suppose for a moment that by any outward imitation, however painfully exact, we can come to be truly like Him; when we view Him as set in the ever-receding frame-work of a past age, like an antique marble, with no inner and vital relation between Him and us; when, in short, we take Him as our Way, forgetting that He is not less our Truth and Life, and that no experience of Him can be complete into which all these do not enter? Christ is, indeed, our perfect pattern; but oh, the disastrous mistake of accepting Him as *simply* that! How little does that soul taste the secret springs of life that knows no nearer access than this to the Son of Man! Outwardly correct, it may be zealously devoted to good deeds, but at best a cold and distant walk; keeping the commandments; penetrated, perhaps, with awful sense of the sanctity of the divine law; but knowing nothing of that close and tender and joyous fellowship when the whole law is fulfilled in love!

II. Christ is the *Truth:* and He is this, not in the limited and partial meaning simply that He spoke the truth. To give this interpretation to his sayings would abolish the essential difference between Him and human teachers. We miss the force of his declaration if we stop with this. He calls himself the Truth in that ampler sense in which the evangelist describes Him, in this same gospel, as the "only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." He was the manifested truth, the revelation in human life of the innermost and eternal reality of being. He set forth that central truth, of which all other truths are only parts and fragments.

In the manifestation of truth there are various degrees and stages. The sides and angles of a crystal are the manifestation of one kind of truth. The well-ordered movements of sun and stars are the manifestation of another. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handiwork." But the manifestation of truth, of character, and of life is more excellent than these. They all shall perish, but this remains. This expresses what no material form can represent; this is a partaking of the divine nature. In this vital sense did Christ call himself the Truth. From the beginning of time had truth been embodied in material forms, and so far as it was possible had the invisible things of God been shadowed forth in the creation of the world. "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! In wisdom hast Thou made them all," was the anthem that nature had ceaselessly repeated since the morning stars began the strain. More impressively had it been illustrated in the course of eternal Providence, so that, beholding the unmistakable dealings of the Almighty, men had been moved to cry out that "righteousness and judgment were the habitation of his throne;" and still more distinctly had it been expressed in the symbolic language of the temple service, and in the express teaching of prophets and holy men; but these all had been only the preparatory stages for that full and perfect revelation, when the law that was given by Moses faded before the grace and truth that came by Jesus Christ. "God," says the writer to the Hebrews, "who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, the

brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person."

Christ, then, was the *living* Truth. Let us keep earnestly in mind that this was what was distinctive in Him. In this his supreme excellence consisted. Not a mere teacher, though He spake as never man spake, and men, when they heard Him, wondered at the gracious words that proceeded out of his mouth. Back of his words lay something unuttered and unutterable: the beauty of a sinless character; the grace of a life that was one with the Father; the enticing power of a love whose height and depth were measureless. Christ was the *living* Truth; how vain, then, the attempt by any logical dissection of his teachings to fathom his uncreated being! How far short fall all definitions of theology, all verbal niceties of creeds, of setting forth his transcendent fullness! How powerless is any mere effort of the intellect to grasp Him! How pitiable is their mistake who dream that they know Christ, because they have reasoned themselves into any amount of traditional archaism, or have suffered themselves to be seduced into any amount of fanciful speculation respecting his mysterious nature!

That is a most pathetic passage in which a great writer of the last generation likens a kindred spirit to "a solitary thinker, who in the morning of his day found some ancient riddle hewn upon an eternal rock. He believes in this riddle, but he strives in vain to guess it. He carries it about with him the whole day, allures weighty sentiments from it, spreads it out into doctrines and images which delight the hearer, and inspire him with nobler wishes and hopes. But the interpretation fails; and in the

evening he lays him down, with the hope that some divine dream or the next awakening will pronounce the word of his intense desire."

Of the experience of how many souls is this a picture, — of souls ardent in the pursuit of truth, inflamed with high ideals, but who search for the *abstract* instead of following the *living* Truth; who vainly fancy that they can apprehend the Son of Man without coming into a personal fellowship with Him, that they can know his doctrine before they have been ready to do his will! Alas, they cannot reverse the divine method. They can never comprehend the deep sense in which He calls himself the Truth, till in their lives they have found Him to be the Way. There can be no genuine belief in Christ which does not spring from this vital, experimental acquaintance with Him.

I would not seem to undervalue some of the contributions that have recently been made to our religious literature. They furnish eloquent and varied delineations of the character of Jesus; they call to mind aspects of his work too much forgotten or overlooked; they illustrate the yearning that men feel to solve the mystery hid from ages and generations; they show that the old question is ever fresh and new — "What think ye of Christ?" But after all their chief value consists in the conviction they arouse of their own inadequacy; in turning the inquiring spirit from their own eloquent discussions to the simple picture of the gospels; in stirring within the soul such utter sense of the wearisomeness and emptiness of human speculation as shall cause it to thirst for the springs of living water. To such as these does Christ become the Truth; and as evi-

dence of such vital apprehension, better than whole chapters of fascinating portraiture, better than whole volumes of learned disquisition, is the tender, yearning trust that sings,

> "Jesus, lover of my soul,
> Let me to thy bosom fly."

III. Christ is the *Life;* and thus is his work in us completed. He is the Example to be followed, He is the Truth to be believed; but, more than all this, He is the Life to be lived. As we cannot heartily surrender ourselves to the contagion of his example without being irresistibly persuaded of the truth He manifested, so we cannot truly believe in Him without experiencing the mysterious consciousness that it is no longer we that live, but Christ that liveth in us. The process is organic and indissoluble. Sooner shall seed-time and harvest fail. There is a kind of climax here; for this doctrine of the manifested life flowing from the vine through all its branches, fusing together all generations of believing souls in the unity of one common spiritual nature, is the core of Christianity, — its central, and at the same time most transcendent, truth. In nothing does the Son of Man mark so much his distinction from all other men and his eminence over them as when He says, "For as the Father has life in himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in himself."

The mystery of life! Everywhere we study it. In its lowest and most imperfect forms, how it eludes our scrutiny! Physiologists are forced to the admission that it lies back of organization; that it fashions organization and builds it up. In the helpless globules of jelly that float in our summer seas,

that the child catches in his hand, lies imprisoned a mysterious life that works itself out in delicate seashells, whose lines of grace and tints of beauty no art of man can rival. What is that power of life?

The inner life has its centre of action, its organic law. It is built up, a house not made with hands, by the subtle operation of spiritual forces. It must conform throughout its fitly framed construction to a divine scheme. A vital force lies back of all growth of human character, as it lies back of all growth of the external world. And as the countless lilies of the field confess one common pervading vital force, so the leaves of the tree of life, the branches of the true vine, are the organic outgrowth of one common spiritual principle.

And this common pervading life is Christ. It was in Him in its fullness; it must be in us if we would be like Him. "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men." To no part of his teaching did the Saviour recur with such emphasis as to this central characteristic truth. On nothing did He lay such weight as on the principle, repeated in so many forms of statement, and enforced with such variety of illustration, that identity of spiritual life was the distinctive feature of his kingdom. "I," said He, "am the bread of life;" "I am the living bread that came down from heaven;" and the affecting sacrament of his body and blood, which He commanded his followers to observe until his second appearing, was designed not, according to the cold and artificial view of some, as a mere memorial of his death, but far more as a perpetual and speaking witness of the great truth that He ever liveth, and that all his true disciples live in Him; eating

his flesh and drinking his blood in the acknowledgment of that inner indissoluble union, whereby they evermore dwell in Him and He in them!

Christ is our *Life;* we confess no doctrine more comprehensive than this. The power of apostolic faith acknowledged no more satisfying mystery. Recognizing this pervading oneness of spiritual being, St. Paul declared, "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." It is in his view the characteristic mark of our perplexed and changeful Christian course, with its doubts and fears and struggles, that thus we ourselves, always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, make manifest the life also of Jesus in our mortal flesh. His epistles are indeed a kind of running commentary on this portion of our text. Without the words of Christ the rapt language of the Apostle might appear a mystic dream; without the comment of the Apostle the language of our Lord might perplex with seeming impossibility; but when a man, sinful and tempted like ourselves, affirms, "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me," we feel convinced that this far-off ideal is not outside the range of our experience.

The *Way*, the *Truth*, and the *Life;* Christian experience is completed here. The soul of man in its endless growth can have nothing that is not contained in this. To live by the faith of the Son of Man, to have our life hid with Christ in God, to share the eternal life in which mortality at last shall be

swallowed up, — this is the goal of all effort and of all aspiration. Of this life all other life is but the evanescent type; for it all human experience and discipline are designed but as the portal and preparation. Can we count it strange that the faintest hint of this great possibility, the far-off promise of this luminous reality, should have led men literally at times to give up father and mother, and houses and lands, yea, all that they had, that they might attain this blissful state; that, fleeing the temptations and follies of the world, in mountain solitudes and in monastic cells, they should have sought by prayer, by fasting, by tears and stripes, by the ecstasies of mystical devotion, to soar to the serener height of the new and living way which Christ hath opened?

A modern poet, catching the purest strain of mediæval piety, has not inadequately embodied in his verse such mystic breathings: —

> "Deep on the convent roof the snows
> Are sparkling to the moon;
> My heart to heaven like vapor goes,
> May my soul follow soon!
> The shadows of the convent towers
> Slant down the snowy sward,
> Still creeping with the creeping hours
> That lead me to my Lord.
> Make Thou my spirit pure and clean,
> As are the frosty skies,
> Or this first snow-drop of the year
> That in my bosom lies."

Yet such yearning of passionate affection that embraces Christ with almost the warmth of a natural love is not, after all, the truest experience of Him He is, indeed, the Life; unless we ourselves know Him as such we can never know Him aright; but He is also the Way and the Truth. We rend at our

peril the seamless robe. Except we walk in the straight and narrow way which He has trod, except the truth that came by Him guides and illumines and enlarges us, our rapt forms of devotion are only an idle dream.

Who are they that have learned to eat the living bread? Not those who have stood gazing up idly into heaven; not those who have forgotten this life in selfish aspirations for another. There is in the Christian life the element of mystical fervor, the seasons of sweet communion, the longing of the soul to flee away; no deep and pure and ardent piety can ever wholly lack it; yet is it always the outgrowth of some practical obedience. The winds of heaven may blow among the branches, but the roots of the tree are set in the solid earth. Never can we be sure, then, that Christ is our Life, unless we follow Him as the Way, unless we accept Him as the Truth. The Christian life in its nature is an *inner* life, but not a life without outward tests and conditions. It is a *spiritual* life, yet the office of the Spirit is to take of the things of Christ and show them unto us. A humble, patient, faithful following of Christ, a daily crucifixion for his sake, a bearing of Him about in all the common walks of life, an earnest study and intelligent comprehension of the truth that came by Him, can alone assure us that this life we now live in the flesh we live by the faith of the Son of God.

It may be that in the unobtrusive performance of daily duty many humble souls live truly by this faith who, measured by human standards, have very imperfectly complied with these conditions of our text. It may be, even, that some truly follow Christ's ex-

ample who do not call upon his name. The church has ever cherished a touching legend of one who carried the Saviour across a stream, not knowing that it was He. And may not this legend have been verified in the story of the shipwrecked sailor, cast, years ago, upon a desert coast, who, finding among his surviving comrades a fair-haired child, whose parents had perished in the wreck, led it by the hand, and, when the little feet were sore with long wading through the burning sand, bore it in his bosom, and, though his own failing strength was overtaxed, refused to leave it alone, and at last, when both were wasted with burning fever, laid down to die beside it? Perhaps, though he knew it not, that starving sailor had been eating the bread of life; it may be, though no human voice consoled him, that the Lord, whom he had never known in the flesh, was saying unto him, "Inasmuch as thou hast done it unto this little child, thou hast done it unto me." The Good Shepherd knoweth his sheep, and though we hear it not He calleth them by name.

It has been the case in all ages that some have known the truth as it is in Jesus whose conceptions of his character and offices were meagre and indistinct. Such is the unmistakable testimony of Scripture itself. For all the fathers, says the Apostle, drank of the same spiritual rock of which we drink. This faith supplies the inner unity to all Hebrew history. This ever-increasing, ever-deepening experience of the one spiritual life, that is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, was the bond that held ancient society together. In the accents of the dying Jacob, of the cast-down but not despairing Job, in the raptures of Isaiah, in the vision of the

Son of Man that Daniel saw, have we the abundant and convincing evidence that many had been lighted by the rays of true light to whom was never granted any open vision of the Son of Righteousness!

But, with this clearly recognized, that the modes and degrees in which Christ may become the Way, the Truth, and the Life do not admit of any human measurement, there still remains the condition with which our text concludes: "No man cometh unto the Father *but by me.*" There is no qualification, there is no limitation. In no other way, does the Son of Man assert, than by such practical experience of the truth manifested in my life, can any human soul find access to the Father of spirits. So has it always been, so shall it always be. Of the spiritual Rock the fathers drank; of it shall children and children's children drink through all generations. The changeless, eternal outlines of experience which the text presents are the conditions of all true living unto God. The Son of Man asserts for himself in this respect an exclusive eminence. He is not one among many, but one alone; He illustrates the unalterable law of the spirit of life. In Him is the essence of whatever good has ever been in human nature, and of whatever good there shall ever be.

In this sense Christ has been aptly termed the "contemporary of all ages." A shallow and flippant unbelief has dared in our day to speak of Christ as though He were obsolete. "Show us the Father, and it sufficeth us," is its ignorant rejoinder to his claims. Alas, has He indeed been so long with us, and have we not known Him? Have we so failed

to comprehend his fullness as not to have learned that he that hath seen Him hath seen the Father, and that no man cometh unto the Father but by Him? Have we understood so little of our own nature and our own wants as to deem that mere intellectual progress or scientific culture can ever satisfy us? Have we felt no pain and weariness in our pilgrimage of life that have made us yearn for the shadow of the Rock of Ages?

I speak not now of the Christ of theology, the Christ of controversy; in some such sense Christ may be obsolete, for our little systems have their day. I speak of the living Christ, — the Christ who sat by the well of Jacob, who wept at the grave of Lazarus, who suffered the sinful woman to bathe his feet, who whispered words of comfort to the dying thief. I speak of the Christ who ever liveth, the unseen Saviour who is ever coming to his own; whose presence makes the "path of life we tread to-day as strange as that the Hebrews trod;" who is ever near to strengthen and comfort; whom we bear about with us; whom we know in the fellowship of our earthly suffering; who holds us safe when we sink in deep waters; who in the final hour, when flesh and heart fail, is our rod and our staff through the dark valley. Tell me, has the world outgrown its need of a Christ like this?

Are men weary of the story of the cross? Are they weary of sunrise and of spring? It is ever old, yet ever new. Only a pitiful failure to comprehend these various and profound aspects in which the Son of Man stands related to the spiritual constitution of the race, these aspects which himself intimated when He declared, "I am the Way, the Truth,

and the Life; no man cometh unto the Father but by me,"— only a pitiful failure to comprehend these could have betrayed any into the terrible delusion of thinking that they could climb up some other way.

CHRIST, THE BREAD OF LIFE.[1]

Then said they unto Him, Lord, evermore give us this bread. — JOHN vi. 34.

THE Scriptures emphasize the close analogy between the natural and the spiritual world. The woman of Samaria coming to draw water at Jacob's well was told of the living water, of which whosoever should drink would never thirst; this great multitude seeking Jesus, not because they saw the miracles, but because they did eat of the loaves and were filled, were bidden to labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life.

There is something impressive in the very homeliness of these analogies. Our Lord selects, as most striking types of spiritual things, the commonest necessities of our daily life. He holds out divine truth not as a rare luxury, to be enjoyed on great occasions, but as the water and the bread that we need for every-day support. As these are the indispensable conditions of our physical being, so is the divine nourishment which comes through Him, in the same manner the indispensable support of our spiritual being. He is the living Bread which came down from heaven; if any man eat of this Bread he shall live forever. The miraculous food

[1] Written 1863.

which was daily dropped on the weary path trodden by the chosen people for forty years, was only a far-off anticipation of this living Bread supplied to the true Israel of God. The rock smitten by Moses was promise of a Rock whereof all may drink. And the twelve tribes were not more dependent on those daily mercies of their unseen deliverer than are we all on daily supplies of this true and living food. In the strict and real sense we live thereby. Our natural life is but the shadow, and not the substance, of that inner and imperishable life that we live by eating this bread and by drinking this water that Christ supplies. Well may we cry, then, in the language of our text, Lord, evermore give us this bread!

With how much of divine recognition of the truth and new-born yearning for it the multitude uttered these words, we cannot say. Whether, as some suppose, they were here awakened to a recognition of spiritual things, or whether they were dazzled still by visions of some outward glory, in which they would fain be partakers, the context leaves unexplained. It would seem, however, that so full an exhibition on the part of our Lord of the mystery of his spiritual kingdom would scarcely have been vouchsafed to such as felt no real longing for spiritual light. But with how much or how little of meaning the words were uttered by the multitude, we may adopt them as expressing a legitimate demand of the soul. "Lord, evermore give us this bread." Before we ask even for our daily bread this petition should be offered. Better, if need be, go wholly without our daily bread, better let the body famish, than suffer the soul to lack its nourishment. "There-

fore, take no thought, saying what shall we eat or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed, but seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," — this is the monition of the Great Teacher.

As Christ was the Bread of Life, so are his apostles and ministers the breakers and dispensers of that Bread. They can give no such proof that they wield an apostolic ministry as when they feed men's souls. If they are true apostles, not by man but by the Holy Ghost, if they have the divine commission that cometh from above, if through them as chosen instruments the Divine Spirit exercises its dominion of the souls of men, they will see repeated around them the miracle of feeding the great multitude. Their words may be, indeed, no more than five barley loaves and two small fishes, yet if vivified and distributed by the Holy Spirit they will suffice often to feed five thousand, and still send none empty away. To feed and nourish the spiritual life is, then, the great end for which the ministry is instituted; and a ministry which does not fulfill this end, no matter whatever else may be said about it, must be regarded as a failure. No matter how eloquent, no matter how richly furnished forth with taste and learning, if it does not achieve the supreme end of nourishing the inner man, and bringing the soul to the completeness of its full and perfect growth, it does not accomplish the chief end for which it was ordained. Better the rudest, most unlettered ministry, where only the heart is reached, and where the hearers are made to grow in grace and in the knowledge and experience of Christ. "Evermore give us this Bread," is the cry sounding in the ears of

every preacher of the gospel from the lips of hungry and perishing men. "Evermore give us" not poor words of human wisdom, but the living word of God, whereby we too may live.

The food of the soul, the living water, the bread of God that cometh down from heaven, — what is the meaning of these phrases? What is that true bread, which not Moses, but only our Heavenly Father, giveth us? How are we led to crave this heavenly manna? How shall we learn to live like our sorely tempted Master, not by earthly bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God? Let these questions, in which lie hid the great issues of life eternal, claim for the passing hour our earnest thought.

1. What is the true and living Bread that cometh down from heaven? The question is answered in the verse following our text: "And Jesus said unto them, I am the Bread of Life; he that cometh to me shall never hunger; he that believeth in me shall never thirst." And when the Jews murmured at this saying, our Lord repeated it in still more emphatic language: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." Christ, then, is the Bread of Life. It is in the knowledge of Him, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, that true life consists. "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." We can know the Father only as we know the Son, and he that hath the Son hath the Father also. The Bread from heaven which the Father gives is therefore his own eternal life imparted to us and implanted in us through his Son Jesus Christ.

When our Lord calls himself the Bread of Life He uses figurative language. But every figure sets forth some substantial truth. We are not, then, dealing here with mere metaphors, but with the very realities of the spiritual world. What our Saviour means is that He is to us a principle of *spiritual* nourishment, in just as strict and true a sense as that the bread we eat is to us a principle of *bodily* nourishment. That bread is in fact but the shadow of the true bread which He supplies. Our bodies are supported by the food we take. Without this constant supply they would inevitably perish. They have in them no capacity of self-existence. Our spiritual natures need in the same way to be supplied with nutriment. Without it they too will perish. They cannot exist in healthy action, and grow day by day to a fuller stature, if shut up to their own interior resources. They must be fed with living bread, and this living bread is He that came down from heaven and gave his life for the world.

Observe that our Lord does not say, "I *bring* you the bread of life," but "I *am* the Bread of Life." "Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you." The meaning of this evidently is that the divine nutriment which Christ furnishes consists not so much in his formal teaching as in his person, in the whole mysterious and life-giving efficacy that flowed out from him as Lord of life and Head of the new creation. There is a sense in which mere instruction is sometimes called food. Books are the food of the mind. The intellectual nature is nourished and stimulated by them. We digest the wise sayings of Bacon and Shakespeare

and Burke, and make them a part of our own mental being. But it would be a strained and unmeaning phrase to say that we eat the flesh and drink the blood of Bacon, or Shakespeare, or Burke. It must be, then, in some deeper sense than that He outwardly instructs us that our Lord calls himself the Bread of Life. He touches our springs of being by some more vital contact.

In Him, we are told, was life. He did not come simply to reveal eternal truth; *He was* the truth, — the embodiment in human nature of the eternal verity of things; and the fact that He was this perfect embodiment of truth made Him the full and supreme revelation of it. He was the manifested life of God, which men saw with their eyes, and which they looked upon, and which their hands handled. What He taught was but incidental to what He was.

In using, therefore, the peculiar phrase, "I am the Bread of Life," our Saviour meant to assert for himself a dignity and efficacy far beyond those of a mere teacher. True, he taught men; and never man spake as He spake. But his oral teaching was designed only to introduce men to the true and perfect revelation. This was indeed eternal life, that they might know Him; but they could never know Him in the fullness of his saving power if they never received Him as more than a mere teacher, though sent from God.

There is doubtless a deep mystery here. But we must not shrink from mystery if we would seek out the ways of God. There is mystery, which the nicest analysis of science cannot unfold, in the way in which our daily bread is made to nourish our natural bodies. How, from the dead matter on

which we feed, is drawn that subtle principle of life which builds up our goodly frames and shoots through our delicate nerves, thinks in our brains, and loves in our hearts, and speaks in our voices, and sparkles in our eyes? Do we ask what is meant by the life-giving efficacy of Christ's person? We have the human hints and illustrations of it in every life of love and goodness and truth. The love of every mother, shining like daily sunlight on her child; quickening its young life as the sunlight quickens the perfume and beauty of the rose; nursing it with constant sacrifices of joy, as the rose is nursed by the south wind and the dew; drawing out its young affections; by loving, teaching it to love, —all this is illustration of the mighty but mysterious working of the living person. And from this which we see every day, what shall we argue as to the might and efficacy of that person, who was not a poor, weak, frail, sinful being like ourselves, but the express image of the Infinite Father; whose love was not the love of a mere human friend, but had a height and depth and length and breadth that pass all knowledge? If the young child is so marvelously nourished by the springs of love that are opened in a mother's heart, what may we not expect from that heart which compassed all human wants, and bore the burden of all human sorrows? If the sunshine of mere human goodness can warm the soul, and drive from it the chill vapors of selfishness and hate and doubt, what shall be the effect of the rising on it of the Sun of Righteousness, of the shining into it of infinite eternal love, of the abiding there of heavenly truth, of that divine power and presence which were brought near to us in the person of Jesus Christ?

It might seem at first sight as if our Lord, in this likening of himself to the Bread of Life, had distinct reference to the sacrament of his body and blood, which He afterwards instituted as a perpetual memorial. But the reference is not to the sacrament; it is rather to the great truth which the sacrament visibly sets forth, — the great truth, never to be forgotten nor lost out of sight, that Christ is made available to us not by any outward work, but only by a true inward participation in his nature. "Abide in me, and I in you," is his own monition to his disciples. His spiritual nature must be assimilated even as our physical frames assimilate the nutritious principle of food, till by degrees He becomes so completely inwrought into the believing soul that it can say, "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me." It is in this deep inner sense that Christ becomes the Bread of Life. Thus it is that we live by faith of the Son of Man, and, in the phrase of the Apostle Peter, are made partakers of the divine nature.

Christ is, then, the Bread of Life, not in the sense that He conveys to us instruction in divine truth, but in that through Him as indwelling fullness of the Godhead was imparted to human nature a new principle of life. Christ was head of a new creation, as Adam was head of an old. And by the regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit all true believers are made partakers of Him, as by natural descent we are all partakers of the first man. This is the Bread which came down from heaven, of which, if a man eat, he shall never die. That infinite love which opens its hand daily and satisfies the desire of every living thing, which fed Israel with manna

in the long march through the wilderness, in the fullness of time gave the world this true Bread from heaven to eat. It was given for the nourishment of men; for the spiritual food of such as through long ages of sin and darkness had been starving upon husks. Received into the believing soul, it was life eternal.

2. The insight we have thus gained into the nature of the Bread of Life will at once suggest the second question, How are we led to crave it? We are drawn to seek our natural food by the natural desires and wants implanted in us. Our appetites are the unmistakable hints that nature gives us, telling us what it is we need. It is not reason, it is not reflection, it is not intelligent foresight and care for self-preservation, that lead the child to ask for food. He knows nothing of the kinds of food best suited to him; he knows nothing of the necessity of food to sustain his life from day to day; with him it is an instinctive craving and prompting of natural desire, the involuntary working in him of the great laws of that physical world of which himself is part. Were he left to follow the dictates of reason and reflection before he tasted his first food, he would inevitably starve. We call these promptings instinct. These are seen not in man alone, but in all living things. The very flowers, by an instinct of their own, seek the light, and the roots of trees grope about in the dark chambers of the earth for damp and mellow spots. We call it a law of growth; but whether we call it instinct or law, it is all the same. It is the invisible power of God working in all things and through all things, and bringing all things to pass in the fit time and season; doing

whatsoever pleases Him in heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deep places; causing the grass to grow, and feeding the young ravens when they cry. Wherever we turn we are compassed about with the divine arms of this all-embracing Spirit. The heart refuses at the bidding of a blind science to put it aside as the working of *mere* natural laws. The laws of nature, — what are they but established and familiar modes of God's operation? It is His hand that sober wisdom sees in everything. Our hunger and thirst, our weariness, our aches and pains, even, are only His tender monitions. They waken in us the sense of those wants which his goodness is waiting to satisfy.

Shall we scruple to believe that in his grander spiritual creation the divine Maker works in analogous ways; that there, too, his ever-watchful, benignant providence in the same manifold arrangements compasses us about; and when we know not what are our most crying wants, when we are all unconscious of our deepest needs, when we are too much blinded by sin to realize our actual condition, that His infinite compassion in the same way awakens in our souls the slumbering spiritual instincts, and causes us to hunger and to thirst after life eternal; that when, in the weakness and infancy of our spiritual being, we do not take in the tremendous issues of life and death, nor see that we need to be fed daily with this true and living Bread, nor yet understand by any intelligent perception and reflection of our own how our spiritual wants may be supplied, — that then His merciful spirit takes possession of us, lifting us up from our own weakness into the strength and blessedness of His divine guidance?

This was our Saviour's meaning when to the Jews who murmured because He said, "I am the Bread which came down from heaven," He answered, "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him." Does this seem a hard saying? Are there those in our day as well as Christ's who cannot bear it? But no mountain oak thrusts its gnarled roots into the rents and fissures provided for it; no bird pursues its unerring way through the pathless tracts of air; no young lion goes in search of its prey, unless our Heavenly Father draweth it. Nothing is left to itself. All things are impelled and driven and drawn and awakened to act by a spirit that dwelleth within them. Over the whole creation the great truth is written, "It is not we that work, but God that worketh in us." Whether we cry out for our daily bread, or whether we cry, "Lord, evermore give us the true and living Bread," it is our Heavenly Father that first quickens the yearning in our breasts.

And even as in his natural creation God tempts and solicits our appetites with all manner of food that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, painting the fruits with luscious tints, and bathing them with fragrance, so He stirs our slumbering spiritual senses with the visible presence and beauty of his divine life among us; bidding us behold his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. He sets before us One fairer than the children of men; One anointed with the oil of gladness above his fellows, all whose garments smell of myrrh and aloes and cassia. He seeks to rouse our dormant yearnings by the vision of One altogether lovely. He entices us with the fruit of

the tree of life. He leads us gently beside the springs of living water. By the working of his own Spirit in us He stimulates our thirst. In the weariness and want and disquietude of life there falls on our ears the invitation, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

And when of the sick man, languishing on his bed, refusing to be tempted with food, turning away with loathing from the most delicate viands that skill can suggest or tenderest affection press to his lips, we draw sorrowful conclusions, believing that his end is nigh, what inference shall we draw respecting the nature and intensity of that disease that afflicts the soul, — that disease that has so completely blunted its appetite for truth and holiness that when even the Bread of Life is put before it it feels no desire to taste? If we begin to take alarm when our daily food no longer tempts, if we begin to suspect that some secret disease is poisoning the springs of life, can we feel wholly unconcerned when the great things of the spiritual world no longer take hold on us, — when we find ourselves fast sinking into a state of stupid indifference respecting our responsibilities as immortal beings?

3. Having thus seen how the appetite is first wakened in us, let us further consider how it is that we eat the Bread. How is it that Christ is made our daily food? Clearly we do not live merely by having our appetite awakened. The bird, the beast, the child, must do something more than feel the pangs of hunger. Even the food in itself is nothing; it is the food digested, assimilated, made a part of the system by the subtle chemistry of the body, that alone strengthens man. In the same way

our spiritual yearnings, left to themselves, accomplish nothing. It does us no good to hunger and thirst after righteousness if we do nothing but hunger and thirst. Only he that *eateth* the Bread hath eternal life. Besides the divine drawing, then, that first impels, we have ourselves a work to do. By our readiness to seize the heaven-sent opportunity, and by our diligence in using it, the blessing must be secured. The question is, then, craving the Bread, how shall we eat?

Words need not be multiplied in answering this question. The secret springs of life eternal, the first dim yearnings of the soul, may lie far back in God's eternal providence; but the stream is clear; the path we all have to tread is so plain that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. We taste the bread of life only as we become the partakers of Christ. We eat his flesh and drink his blood only so far as we enter into living fellowship with Him. To know Him is life eternal; but we can know Him truly by no mere intellectual search, by no mere sentimental worship; we can know Him only by the plain, honest, practical method of obeying his precepts. "If any man," says He, "will be my disciple, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me." The bread and the wine of which He bade us partake as perpetual memorials were memorials of a sacrifice, the meaning and reality of which we must ourselves experience.

If we would taste the divine food we must be willing, like our blessed Master, to make it our meat and our drink, to do the will of our Father which is in heaven. We must learn to care more for the immortal soul than for the perishing body; we must

seek the kingdom of heaven before we seek any worldly gain or advantage. We must gladly count all else as loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, our Lord. We must find in Him our supreme and perfect delight. The gospel recognizes no other mode of abiding in Christ except this practical mode of making Him our only model, and pressing on towards Him as the mark set before us. We must be like Him to know Him as He is. Through the mysterious alchemy of a daily communion must He be made our life, and we be transformed into his image. The path that He trod lies before each one of us. We must be ready to do his will if we would know, by experience, his doctrine.

This may be a hard road, but no one can deny that it is a straight and a plain road. And though hard to travel by our own unassisted strength, yet He who has been pleased to hide from the wise and the prudent the things that are revealed to babes causes many a weak child to run along it and not be weary, to walk in it and not faint. Many a humble spirit, but scantily furnished with mere intellectual knowledge of Christ; far removed from the imposing rites which kindle the imagination and work upon the natural sensibilities; struggling with the hard trials of common life, with little sympathy or help from those around, but entering through the mystery of its own temptation into the deeper mystery of its tempted Lord; sustained by his presence, and lifted above all earthly struggles to the joy of his companionship, has been brought to understand the meaning of his declaration that man liveth not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God!

We may sometimes be led to ask ourselves the question, whether we are deriving the nourishment that we should from divine truth. It may be our lot to live in the midst of unusual religious opportunities; we may be accustomed to a frequent hearing of the Gospel, we may be strict and constant in our attendance upon public worship, and yet it may be that we do not grow in the divine life, we may find that we are losing our interest in religious truth; the preaching of the word may seem cold and profitless. Alas, no religious advantages have in themselves any power to feed the soul. The purest and most earnest preaching, the preaching of an inspired apostle, nay, the preaching of Christ himself, can minister nutriment to the spiritual nature only so far as it shapes our lives. It is not by hearing but by obeying that we grow; just as our natural strength is not in proportion to what we eat, but in proportion to what we digest, and make part of ourselves. We are not fed, because, in some solemn gathering, borne away by the full tide of awakened feeling, we are rapt into heavenly ecstasy; we are not fed because beneath the magic sway of some great pulpit orator we are alternately roused and terrified and melted; we are truly fed by the bread of life only when we come ourselves to live by it; only when we bear about with us in all our common walks the body of Christ; when we are made to drink of his cup and be baptized with his baptism.

Is it then our first and great desire to be fed daily with this true and living bread? Is it our earliest prayer as we rise in the morning, is it the burden that rests on our hearts during the toil of the day,

not that we may prosper in our gettings, not that we may be increased in worldly goods, in reputation and honor with men, but that before all else we may be nourished with this divine food? Could the thoughts and wishes that daily occupy us be analyzed and exposed to our view, would this petition be found lying at the roots of all other aims and hopes "Lord, evermore give us this bread"? Can we expect to grow in the divine life if we do not diligently practice the divine precepts? Can we be fed by the living bread while we surfeit ourselves with the meat that perisheth? Can we live by faith of the Son of Man when in all our practical concerns we give so much more thought, so much more care, so much more anxiety to the things which are seen and temporal, than to the things which are unseen and eternal?

"Lord, evermore *give us* this bread," do we realize how momentous for every soul among us is this request? Do we feel how small and trivial a matter it is what we shall eat, and what we shall drink, and how we shall be clothed, in the few days of our earthly life, compared with the great and overwhelming question, What shall be the nourishment and support of our immortal parts? What shall we eat and what shall we drink? Shall we eat the bread of pride and worldliness, and drink the bitter water of disappointment and remorse and despair; or shall we eat the true bread that cometh down from heaven, and drink of the water that springeth up unto everlasting life? There is only One that can satisfy. He is the Bread of Life. He that cometh to Him shall never hunger; and he that believeth on Him shall never thirst.

CHRIST IN THE POWER OF HIS RESURRECTION.[1]

That I may know Him and the power of his resurrection. — PHIL. iii. 10.

THIS prayer of the Apostle, that he might know the power of his Lord's resurrection, so far as the mere language is concerned, may be interpreted in two ways. It may mean a desire to comprehend the nature of that supernatural agency or power by which the resurrection was effected, or a desire to understand the influence or power which the resurrection was fitted to exert. In the one case it would be a speculative, in the other a practical, inquiry. That it was the latter aspect of the inquiry which presented itself to the Apostle's mind, may be inferred as well from the general tenor of his teaching as from the specific drift of the context in which the phrase is embedded. He, whose uniform habit it is to view spiritual truth as vested in some actual experience, seems in this exultant utterance of faith, so soon to be changed to sight, to insist with more than usual energy on the connection between Christian doctrine and Christian life. True, the resurrection was a great fact, the primary truth of apostolic doctrine, the doctrine which dominated the

[1] Written in 1874.

faith of the apostolic church. No Apostle was prompter than St. Paul himself to concede it this preëminence. In his view it was the corner-stone of the whole fabric of Christian teaching. If it were not true, his associates in the great work of founding the church had propagated a lie, and all preaching is vain. Whether before the skeptical Agrippa or the mocking Athenians, he never puts it in the background. In all his epistles to his brethren it is insisted on as the impregnable basis of belief.

The resurrection as an actual fact of history, a fact which multitudes who had been admitted to intercourse with the risen Christ were ready to attest, was the most powerful weapon with which the apostolic church confronted the bigotry and indifference of Jew and Gentile. In no other way, save in the assumption of the reality of this event, can we account for the marvelous transformation of the church itself, which so swiftly converted the doubting disciples, who fled from their Lord's last agony, into preachers, who stood undismayed before the judgment seat of kings.

To our critical, hesitating minds, the questions that most naturally suggest themselves in connection with such a mysterious phenomenon are questions as to the agency by which it was effected. We shrink from admitting so stupendous a break of the natural order; we curiously scan the testimony; we note the seeming contradictions; nay, we even turn from it in a kind of sad perplexity, as something too hard to be believed, and yet too well attested to be utterly denied, and so in our scheme of faith it stands too often an insoluble

enigma outside the circle of our shaping religious thought.

But this speculative solution of the mystery was not what the Apostle desired to know. What he craves is a knowledge of the resurrection as a vital and as a vitalizing truth; not an explanation of its external circumstance, but an experience of its spiritual power. To him it is not a bare historic fact, nor mere fulfillment of old prediction, nor transcendent demonstration even of the divine authority of Christ; it was all this, but more; it was closely knit with his own experience; a fruitful principle and spiritual energy, the shaping law of that new life which he no longer lived in the flesh, but by the faith of the Son of God. To know Christ, therefore, in the power of his resurrection in this sense, which the Apostle meant, was to know those spiritual influences which proceed from the resurrection as a central principle or law. Or, in other words, it is to experience the power of the risen Christ in his relation to our own spiritual life; to recognize Him as our living head; to walk with Him in the new life of a personal communion; to have our lives hid with Him in God. This is the knowledge that the Apostle craves, and beside the excellency of which he counts all else as loss. This is the mark to which he presses forward. Much of his language, in speaking of this knowledge, may seem but metaphor, yet, if we look closely, he is describing no shadowy or unsubstantial thing. He is dealing with the great facts of the spiritual life; he is describing something that lies close to the actual experience of the soul; not a dreamer of idle dreams, but a man sorely tried and buffeted in life's great strug-

gle, and writing to men who had themselves suffered too much in behalf of Christ to be put off with sounding words. We seem to hear the strong tones of a great spiritual hero, not the shrill accents of a heated enthusiast, when he declares "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me." We cannot, in fact, read a page of his epistles without being struck by the practical power always exercised over him by this ever-present sense of his personal relation to the risen Christ. From the day when his bold, uncompromising, intolerant career received such sudden check, as he was struck down on his journey to Damascus, on to the hour when he penned these burning utterances beneath the very shadow of Cæsar's palace, his life was pervaded and glorified with this conviction. He who had never seen Christ after the flesh seemed to walk ever with him in the closeness and reality of a more than mortal intercourse.

Whether it is meant that most disciples should reach this high mark and taste the blissful experience of the Apostle who was deemed worthy to be caught up to the third heaven, and who heard unspeakable words which it is not lawful for man to utter; we may not say; yet many of his declarations without doubt imply that this practical experience of the power of the resurrection is designed to enter into all earnest Christian life. Not to know Christ in this way is to lose out of our spiritual experience its most animating principle; not to know Him thus is to turn to the dead past and shut our eyes to the living present.

Two considerations at the outset will help us to apprehend the meaning of this phrase.

In the first place such experience of the power of the resurrection is obviously an experience that can be tasted only by believers. It is the prayer of the great Apostle that he himself might know it; it is to his brethren that the exhortation is addressed that they should press on to know it also. In other words, whatever may be the precise nature of such experience, it is not an experience arising from the ordinary conditions of human life, but is a special and distinctive prerogative of Christian faith. The Apostle in this epistle is not addressing the unbelieving world but his dear Philippians, his loved and longed for, his joy and crown, to whom his thoughts turned with delight, the very remembrance of whom lifted his soul in thankfulness to God. In the flowing confidence of a spiritual communion and sympathy which no separation could impair, he writes to them of those joys and hopes of the inner life which only a common faith could enable them to understand. He lifts the veil of the spiritual temple, and beckons them within the holy place. His pregnant sayings can have no meaning but to those who lived in the same circle of supernatural convictions with himself.

Nor is there anything singular in this. The resurrection itself, viewed in its main design, was subject to the same limitations. It has been common to speak of the resurrection as a great crowning miracle, the primary design of which was to convince an unbelieving world by a conclusive demonstration of the divine power of Christ. But were this its leading aim it is hard to see why Christ only showed himself in such mysterious and perplexing ways; why He showed himself to his disci-

ples only. If his rising from the dead was meant as convincing proof for all, why did He not show himself to those who sent Him to death; why did He not show himself again in the streets of Jerusalem, and let his voice be heard once more in the Temple courts? He did nothing of all this. He displayed himself to his disciples; He spoke to those who already believed in his name; in all his movements during the mysterious period of forty days that intervened between his resurrection and his ascension He most evidently indicated that the great and primary purpose of the resurrection was not so much to furnish a new weapon to the armory of Christian evidence, as to supply a new agency in the development of Christian faith. The resurrection was not meant as a thaumaturgical display, but as a spiritual power.

And, secondly, the foregoing considerations suggest a further condition under which alone it is possible for the soul to experience the power of the resurrection, that is, that the recognition of Christ in the communion and sympathy of his *risen* life is, in every case, the result of a practical expression of his *human* life. This condition is implied in the verses, of which our text forms a part, where the Apostle prays that he may know Christ in the power of his resurrection and in the fellowship of his suffering. There is a unity of Christian experience; it is not something artificial and disjointed, but forms an organic whole like the vine and its branches. There is but one door by which we all enter in. The Apostle's writings abound with emphatic statement of this principle. If we would rise from a lower to a higher spiritual level, after the great analogy of

Christ's resurrection, we must first taste the death of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice and of struggle with our lower nature. We cannot be planted in the likeness of his resurrection unless first planted in the likeness of his death. "Therefore," says the Apostle, "we are buried with Him by baptism unto death; that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father even so we also should walk in newness of life." Life out of death is the universal law.

To know Christ, therefore, in the power of his resurrection we must first know Him in the fellowship of his sufferings and death. The suffering Christ is the central figure on which the thought and faith of the increasing years concentrate. It was the figure that the prophet saw in vision when he told of One who should be despised and rejected and whose visage should be marred; it is the figure on which Christian art has lavished her most consummate touch. The Man of Sorrows remains the great marvel of time. By what mysterious law of moral government the Son of God was thus made to suffer and die has been the perplexing question of Christian thought. This question seems in part, at least, solved when we come to look at the sufferings of Christ as the divine analogy of our own spiritual lives. "For it became Him," we are told, "for whom are all things and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering." In this view the sufferings of Christ cease to be something anomalous and strange. They illustrate a universal principle. His death on the cross no longer stands apart. We too must die unto

sin would we attain unto the resurrection from the dead. "For even hereunto," says the Apostle, "were ye called because Christ hath suffered for us, leaving us an example that ye should follow in his steps."

The traveler who speeds from Rome to Naples, in his luxurious railway carriage, as he catches the view on the overhanging height of the famous monastery where Benedict gathered his first disciples, and imposed the rule destined for a thousand years to rally the most earnest faith of Christendom, is apt to think of monastic virtues as not less obsolete than the feudal compact. It may be that self-renunciation and self-sacrifice are not conspicuous features of modern Christianity. But the principle which Benedict, perhaps unwisely, hardened into rule can never be obsolete. It is old as Christianity, and can only die with Faith itself. "If any man will come after me let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me," remains still the divine injunction. Spiritual insight cannot be purchased with easy living. The elect spirits to whom has been vouchsafed the inner intuition have always been the crucified ones. The mystery of suffering is not a problem for the intellect to solve; the law of life has never been summed up in any dogmatic statement. They alone have known the Christ of God who have been made partakers of his sufferings. He was first-born among many brethren. The path He trod is the straight and narrow way that lies before each one of them.

With these preliminary considerations, we may advance more safely in explication of our text. And the first and most obvious result of this knowing

Christ in the power of his resurrection is the quickening of our sense of supernatural things. I use the term simply to designate that which lies above that ordinary plane of natural things in which as creatures of time and sense we live and move and have our being. It is nothing to our present purpose to determine anything respecting the relation of the natural and the supernatural. For aught we know they may be but two sides of the same truth, blending to the infinite eye in pure and simple white, but which as relative to us seem distinct. We recognize in our habitual speech the distinction between things seen and things not seen, we draw a line between the temporal and the eternal.

It is safe to say that all religion rests on the recognition of this distinction. The savage who carves out his unshapely idol instinctively expresses his dim sense of something above that ordinary world in which he lives. If this distinction be obliterated, religion is reduced to the sphere of common human ethics. It rests on human sanctions. It must rise above them; it must reach up to a higher sphere; it must incorporate into itself energies of a different kind to become a practical principle of faith and worship. The point is too plain to need any argument; the very essence of religion is the instinctive recognition of a something above ourselves which we call the supernatural. No psychological analysis of human nature can fail to recognize this instinct. It belongs to man as man. He is not more certainly a social being than he is a religious being. Speech is not a more universal impulse than is worship. And when under the blighting influence of some false system of metaphysics

he has, in a few individual instances, succeeded in suppressing this instinctive tendency, his own sad confessions testify to his haunting sense of unrest and want. And if individuals have in a few instances achieved the melancholy distinction of ignoring the supernatural, and living without God, nations have never done so. The basis of historic progress has been this recognition. That continuous development which has come down through the centuries, and now bears us along in its mighty sweep, began with the patriarch of whom it is emphatically said that he believed God. The great empires that towered in colossal majesty around him have passed away, but he still lives. That faith in the supernatural which led him away from his own country is essentially our faith, and his name is a household word to-day in either hemisphere.

Now Christianity is peculiar in the distinctive prominence which it assigns these supernatural agencies. In other religions the supernatural exists as a dim border land surrounding our human life, the future is an undiscovered country from which no traveler has returned; the vague realm where disembodied spirits flit in a doubtful identity and recognition; but in Christianity the supernatural and natural exist together, they interpenetrate each other; the soul is the perfect synthesis of these two spheres which to the natural understanding seem so wide apart. It is not left to seek in the distant future its supreme felicity — the kingdom of heaven is in itself.

The gospel presents itself to us in various aspects, and in all of these it challenges attention. It is a wondrous history, telling in language that children

can understand, the most sublime, pathetic story recorded in any literature; it is a mighty code of ethics touching the conscience at more points, and testing human action more profoundly than most subtle rules of casuistry; all subsequent experience has only enlarged its application and illustrated its sufficiency, yet we do not begin to understand its scope or feel its power if we do not recognize the fact that it rests throughout on the presence and constant operation in us of the invisible things of God.

Now the resurrection was an event eminently fitted to intensify this sense of the supernatural order. What with the disciples had been a vague, shadowy belief was now felt in the power of an actual experience. Henceforth to them the earthy and the spiritual seemed no longer far apart. They tabernacled in both worlds. They were profoundly conscious that the kingdom which they had so earnestly expected was already come; they who so lately had been trembling and dismayed were converted to men of heroic mould by the lofty confidence that they were the children of God and that they were compassed about with a great cloud of witnesses. In thus refusing to recognize any middle wall between the visible and the invisible the perfected faith of the disciples agrees with the trustful confidence of the child. The kingdom of heaven flings wide its gates to both. And who of us is willing to affirm that the visions vouchsafed to such as these are but the phantasies of a sick brain. Who that has journeyed with some loved one to the extremest verge of life, and bent tenderly to catch the last expiring breath, and felt the solemn awe of

that supreme moment when the spirit trembles between two worlds, but has felt that even before the earthly house is dissolved the glory of the heavenly is revealed.

I know in history no more pathetic story than of the slow, lingering death of the boy-prince, the son of the unhappy Louis XVI. Doomed to a loathsome dungeon for no other offense than being a king's son, shut out from light and air, fed with the miserable food of the vilest malefactor, consigned to the remorseless tortures of a monster in human shape; as if this were not enough, the unresisting victim kicked and beaten because he would not revile his mother's memory and because he persisted in saying, by his wretched cot, the prayer he had been taught to utter by her knee. And when Nature, more merciful than man, brought on the close of the long, solitary night of pain and anguish, and the last morning came, and the dying child, in answer to the inquiry of his keeper, whether he was in pain, murmured, with weak voice, "Yes, but I hear sweet music; I hear my mother's voice," who of us will dare to say that this was mere delusion with which his fevered brain peopled that solitary cell, or that if he dreamed, it was not such dreams as Jacob had?

But the soul that knows Christ in the power of his resurrection goes beyond this. It is not simply the general sense of the supernatural that is thus intensified, but that supernatural sphere is brought closely home to us in which the Son of Man stands revealed as the central figure. The invisible world is no longer a mere spiritual existence; it assumes a definite aspect, it is revealed in distinct rela-

tions, it becomes a *kingdom* of heaven. The personal soul is quickened with the apprehension of personal affinities; it feels more than mere faith in immortality; as it gazes steadfast into heaven, like the dying Stephen, it *sees* Jesus standing at the right hand of God!

Hence in strictest sense the power of the resurrection is the power that comes from the communion with a living person. And this, we must believe, suggests the main reason why Christ thus rose from the dead and showed himself to his wondering disciples. We can, indeed, conceive that, without the resurrection, Christianity might have been established; that when the first bewilderment of grief was over the disciples might have come together, and might have called to mind what Christ spoke when on earth, and might have organized some society for the diffusion of his doctrine. Then would they have thought of Him, as they thought of Moses and the prophets, as one who had been with them for a season, and had vanished utterly away. But the resurrection would not allow them to think of the Master thus. His mysterious intercourse evidently established a sense of continued personal relationship which they could have gained in no other way. Henceforth they no longer thought of Him as dead, but as living, — as living in a spiritual communion and intercourse with his disciples, of the closeness and reality of which his few years of earthly sojourn had been only the fleeting and imperfect type. They did not seek Him in the grave; the superstition which surrounded with such halo the place of his sepulchre belonged to a later age, when the vivid sense of the living Christ had faded from men's hearts.

Thus while on the one hand the resurrection freed the disciples from the sway of mere earthly memories, so that they no longer clung to the mere human Christ, feeding the faith with the cherished recollections of his human ministry, the same Christ being now exalted above the heavens, the Lord of life, not to the few who heard his voice, but to all who should believe on his name; so just as much on the other hand it kept this more personal faith in Him from evaporating into any vague sense of spiritual power and might. Though they might not any longer identify Him with mere earthly scenes, yet was He the same Jesus who stretched out his hand to Peter, and who wept by the grave of Lazarus.

The power of the resurrection is, therefore, the power of sympathy with an immortal friend. It is the distinctive feature of all highest truth that it cannot be revealed in abstract statements. The moment we subject it to rigid analysis and definition its fragrance and bloom depart. Men make no drearier mistake than when they fancy that they can sum up truth in a series of propositions. Mere truths of relation may be thus stated; but truth in the highest sense, truth of character and life, defies such petty manipulation. No religion can be stated in a creed. If it be the living truth it can only be embodied in a life; hence the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. The resurrection perpetuates the incarnation. It carries on and renders fruitful through all the ages the distinctive influence that centred in the Son of Man. To the eye of faith it holds up the highest truth not as doctrine to be studied, but as a person to be loved. It thus sets in motion a unique system of spiritual agencies. It

is thus that Christ becomes the living head of that Church which is his body. The saving influences that ceaselessly radiate from Him are vital influences, — the influence of a person over persons. When looked at as an attempt to symbolize this central principle of the new creation, the mass itself seems more than unmeaning mummery.

Is it said that in all this we are dealing with the ideal; that faith itself creates these relations on which it seems to feed; that they are powerless in presence of the hard realities of life? But can we reduce them to airy nothing without denying the fundamental facts on which the whole fabric of the Gospel rests? Can we deny this power of the resurrection without denying the resurrection itself, without denying the very Christ of history? They exist together like vine and branches; they are part and parcel of an organic spiritual whole; why accept Him as a teacher come from God, if we refuse to accept his own sublimest sayings?

In cherishing this sense of personal communion with a living person we are dealing with an ideal, if by ideal we mean something which our gross natural senses cannot recognize; but are we on that account dealing with something that does not exert over us a felt power? What, after all, in life so allures us and so transforms us as the ideals that we cherished? And when we remember that this ideal is not an ideal of the intellect, but an ideal of the heart, who will measure its mighty transforming power? Thus, indeed, it is that we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory. This transforming power exercised by the

living Christ over such as cherish Him with faith and love is indeed the transcendent grace of Christianity. This ideal of the risen Saviour, if you choose to designate it by such phrase, how it has wrought itself into human life! I have in mind not the supreme intellects who have confessed it, and whose spiritual experiences have become illustrious landmarks in the history of the race, but rather the innumerable multitude of the poor, the lowly, the uneducated, whose lives of toil, of privation, of suffering have been transfigured by this gracious presence. By how many bedsides of the neglected and forgotten has this image of the Son of Man been revealed? In how many abodes, but scantily furnished with this world's goods, has He been a familiar, though unseen, visitant? In how many souls shut out from opportunities of learning human lore has this benignant culture been diffused? Along how many a dusty pathway of modern life men have felt their hearts burn within them as they have talked together of these things? "Because thou hast seen me thou hast believed," said our Lord to Thomas; "blessed are they that have not seen and yet have believed;" yea, blessed are they who have so realized the power of the resurrection that in their pilgrimage of life they have been solaced with this divine society whose habitual conversation is thus with the heavenly powers. What is life without this belief?

THE HOLY SPIRIT — THE GUIDE TO TRUTH.[1]

Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth. — JOHN xvi. 13.

"To this end," said Jesus, "was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth," and never has man approached nearer to that ideal perfectness revealed in the Son of Man, than when seeking after truth. The lovers of truth have led the hopes of the world; the getters of it have compassed the chief good of life. The fading years leave them girded with a glory and a majesty beside which the pomp of kings seems poor. As we look back over the past, the names that the world cherishes with greatest reverence are the names not of heroes and rulers, but the names of patient seekers after truth.

It is after all the only real legacy with which one age can endow the next. All else perishes, and "leaves not a rack behind." All material things have in them the seed of their own decay. The structures that human pride and power erect all fall to pieces. Mournful lessons are recited to us, as we linger amid ruins that were meant as mon-

[1] Written in 1862.

uments of human glory, but which serve only as monuments of human nothingness.

Only truth endures; and the fervent worshipper who has but partially raised the veil, comes at last to be revered as the world's best benefactor. There is no vocation that deserves to be weighed with this. That human soul in which is implanted the conviction that for this end it, too, was born, and for this cause it came into the world, can smile with pity at the prizes which vulgar ambition covets. He has riches which the merchandise of gold and silver cannot equal. Such a soul remains, however, an inexplicable phenomenon to two large classes. They stand at opposite extremes, and seem diametrically opposed, yet in fact are much alike. First are those whose conception of what is true never goes beyond the things presented to the senses. They lack the ideal element. They believe in material existences, in material goods; they care only for what is actual and tangible, for that which has some positive relation to present wants. This species of materialism is not always coarse and vulgar; on the contrary it is sometimes very subtle and refined. It is shown not unfrequently in connection with the highest scientific culture and most exquisite literary taste. But it is everywhere the same breath of a positive philosophy. It always asserts itself with the same denial of what lies beyond the actual. It suffers its scheme of truth to be restricted to those truths which rest on the basis of rigid scientific demonstration.

In minds, however, of only ordinary activity and culture, and such are the great majority, this form of indifference to truth is often exhibited in connec-

tion with mere worldliness and selfishness. Men of this stamp care very little what truth is, if they only achieve success. All they want is wealth or station, and in pursuit of these tangible results they brutalize themselves without compunction. The spectacle is so common that it hardly excites remark, yet when we consider it, what is there so pitiable as this utter degradation of the soul, this complete insensibility to what is noblest and most satisfying in life; this blank denial of what constitutes a man? Did we not have the illustration of it furnished every day, who could believe that the soul, created in God's own image, could become so small? Who could believe that the immortal instincts, which vindicate for man his headship over the creation, could be so effectually smothered up?

But there is still a second class, very distinct from these, yet not less indifferent to truth. A man may be indifferent to truth for two reasons: because he does not believe in truth, or because he believes he has the whole truth. In either case he ceases to inquire further. Nor is it easy to say which of these two classes hinders truth the more; whether it is more effectually stifled by skepticism or conceit; whether its worst foe is worldliness or bigotry. It is indeed a pitiable spectacle to see men sunk in selfish unconcern; to see them wasting their lives in pursuit of that which will perish in the using; but it is not less pitiable to see those who will not on any account allow their preconceived opinions to be disturbed; who cherish their own ignorance and narrowness as something sacred; whose halting souls, instead of pressing ever toward the mark, come to a dead stop, and reproach others

for passing by them. It is a disheartening thing for a preacher of that Gospel, which is not a letter that killeth but a spirit that giveth life, to have his hearers listen with cold indifference, to have them push aside that priceless wine and oil for the husks that swine do eat, but it is not any less disheartening to have them steel themselves in opposition to what he says, simply because it is something that they did not know before, to have them answer, as he seeks, like a wise householder, to bring forth from his treasures things new and old, "I am satisfied with what I have, I do not wish you to disturb it. My opinions on those subjects are made up; I will hear nothing more." This, too, is a pitiable case for any human soul. It is more than pitiable; the soul that assumes this attitude puts itself in virtual alliance with the Gospel's deadliest foes. The Son of God was crucified simply for disturbing men's convictions, for telling the Pharisees that grace and truth were greater than mint and anise and cummin. All such as these are lovers of themselves rather than lovers of truth. They may be outwardly respectable, useful members of society, even of the church, but they know nothing of that immortal race which the soul is called to run. They have no sympathy with those devout inquirers to whom only is vouchsafed the open vision. We can afford, then, to pass these by, as having no possible connection with our text. What do they care for a guide into all truth?

But there are those (and I speak here not of elect and consecrated souls, the Bernards, the Pascals, Miltons, the heavenly flowers of our common manhood, whose yearnings have become histories, but

of humbler spirits) there are those, I say, whose love of truth is sincere and earnest; who are neither sunk in worldliness, nor blinded with complacency; but who, realizing that they only know in part, are ready to welcome a Guide that shall bring them to the mark of their high calling. Among these have been arrayed some of whom the world was not worthy. They are not always among the popular leaders of mankind; the Great Captain himself was not. They have often been mistrusted and suspected by their age; they have been in peril often, not only with the heathen, but far more with their own countrymen. In rude ages they have been beaten and burned at the stake, in more polished times they have been stabbed with the tongue. As preachers of the Gospel they have not met with the great outward success which follows the mere flatterers of sects, and fomenters of party prejudice, but when in the end of the years the world gathers up her jewels, these will shine like the stars forever and ever!

It is such as these who alone feel the full force of the inevitable questions: "How shall I know the truth?" "By what test shall I separate it from error?" "How shall I be assured that my search is not in vain?" At the first step the inquiring soul is immersed in this troubled sea. The air is filled with the war of opposing faiths, and the more vital the interests at stake the more bitter and irreconcilable seem the contradictions. A mind so made that it runs on without reflection in the ruts into which it once has fallen, receiving without question the opinions that happen to prevail in the region where Providence has placed it, will find no

difficulty here; but a mind large enough to look abroad, keen enough to scan the broad discrepancies in men's opinions, cannot but yearn for some fixed and abiding standard, by which unchanging truth may be distinguished from human errors.

What, then, shall that standard be? Shall it be the human reason? Some have said so, and have refused to own any other guide. "For what," they ask, "is the god-like gift imparted, but for this very end?" "Why has the Creator endowed us with these faculties, that raise us to such superb preëminence above the brute creation, that lead us in such airy flights through all the years, and beyond the flaming walls of space, but to launch us in this adventurous voyage?" "Is it not by the exercise of reason," it is further asked, "that man has taken every step in his onward march? Is it not by confiding in this guide that he has mastered the mysteries of nature, subjugated the obedient elements, made the winged lightning, even, his willing messenger? Is it not by reason that all his knowledge has been built up? Can there be any other path to still undiscovered truth? Can there be any other sign than this by which we can guess the unknown?"

To a fair mind no cant is more disgusting than that which seeks to exalt religion by depreciating reason. A few phrases of the Apostle, misunderstood and misapplied, have been the favorite watchwords of all such as know not how to prize one gift of the Almighty, save by disparaging another; as though (to borrow an illustration from John Locke) in order to use a telescope it was first necessary to put out our eyes. Let us willingly concede to rea-

son whatever is her due. Let us confess her imperial and victorious sway over the provinces legitimately hers. Let us not believe that faith can be effectually confirmed by making man a fool. But still, is there not something more? Does the experience of the past assure us that unaided human reason can settle beyond dispute the questions that most harass and perplex the soul? Has it been the unerring guide we want? I use the term "reason" here in its ordinary sense, not as the universal, but as the individual reason; not the eternal law and principle of all things, the wisdom established from everlasting, but simply the human faculty, the process by which the finite understanding advances from premiss to conclusion. Does this reason, by which we investigate with such success the laws of nature, does this serve us as well in those higher reaches to which the spirit soars?

"But can I know anything," it may be still objected, "that I do not arrive at in this way? Do I not become a sheer dreamer or enthusiast? Am I not involved in infinite uncertainties as soon as I forsake this guide?" The question, then, simply reduces itself to this: Shall I stop at this point, beyond which my reason cannot securely tread? Shall I abandon what lies beyond, and give myself no concern but for that truth which can be demonstrated to the understanding? But to do this is to abandon what man wants most to know. The deep, enduring thirst that the soul feels is precisely for the truth that lies beyond this bound; not for the knowledge of mere natural things, but of those deeper spiritual mysteries that concern the soul's highest duty and destiny. To put these things

aside as lying beyond the range of legitimate inquiry is in itself a virtual confession that unaided human reason is not a sufficient guide. But besides this there are truths lodged in human consciousness that claim supernatural sanction, — truths that rest on revelation; what relation has reason to such truth as this? Much of this truth is not only destitute of demonstration, but seems in its nature incapable of being demonstrated to finite comprehension. How shall I decide whether this is indeed the truth of God or the myth and tradition of a bygone age? Why, in short, shall I receive the Bible and reject the Vedas and the Koran?

Is it strange that with these questions multiplying so thick upon them, and receiving on every side such various answers, men at last should begin to ask whether reason be indeed a sufficient guide to all these mysteries, — whether, by any searching, unaided man could find the solution of these problems? Is it strange that some have said with Pilate, "What is truth?" half doubting whether the human mind can ever rise above this conflict of opinion?

One extreme runs directly to another. From exalting human reason as the sole and sufficient standard men next demand an authority that shall constrain the reason. The spectacle has come to be too common to attract much notice, of those who had asserted the extremest use of reason and exhausted all their rhetoric in praise of a liberal and progressive Christianity, deserting their old allies, to find a resting-place beneath the wings of a traditional ecclesiasticism. I can fully understand such men. I can hardly find it in my heart to blame them. The natural condition of the soul is trust. It loves to con-

fide in a power above itself. It loves to feel that a mightier arm encircles it. This state of blind submission, even to church authority, is a truer and nobler state than that reckless and defiant independence that will acknowledge nothing above itself, — that measures by its own ignorance eternal truth. Soon as experience shows that reason is not sufficient men say we must have some other guide. The soul soon wearies of being at the mercy of every wind. It longs to be at rest beneath the protecting shadow of something about which there can be no dispute. It craves a rod and a staff on which it may securely lean; sick of endless controversy, despairing of any solid result, it at last cries out, "Lead me to a rock that is higher than I!" Some may be led by selfish motives to identify themselves with a church that has with it respectability and dignity and weight of years; some, doubtless, are attracted by mere outward trappings, by the pomp and ceremonial that ages have silvered o'er with a solemn grandeur; some, even by the small social pride of seeming to be select and different from the mass; but I can well understand how sincere and earnest minds should be driven by their own inward struggles to this result, and I doubt not that among those who have thus willingly renounced the right of private judgment, and confided themselves and their dearest hopes to the keeping of an infallible church, have been some of the truest and purest spirits of our time. How often the soul of an honest and an earnest man, seeking on the one hand to be true to himself while on the other he seeks the supreme and perfect truth, is forced to murmur, "Oh that I had wings like a dove, that I might fly away and be at rest!"

Complacent Protestants sneer at the Church of Rome; they marvel why she holds her sway over the souls of men. But the Church of Rome embodies the deepest yearnings and instincts of human nature. She stands up in grand parallel with tendencies that are universal as man himself. What may seem her most arrogant and abhorrent claims are precisely what is yielded with most grateful satisfaction. She meets those wants that every perplexed thinker at times must feel. The Church of Rome, claiming, as she does, to rest on that Rock against which the gates of hell shall not prevail, uttering an unerring wisdom, clothed with infallibility, going back in the unbroken succession of her bishops to apostolic days, carrying the same rites and ritual to every nation under heaven, speaking in one language to learned and unlearned, rich and poor, barbarian, bond, and free,— meets and satisfies these yearnings of the soul for some authority that shall forever still its doubts. How easy would it be to swell the list of most devout, most logical, most earnest thinkers of this century who have been driven to this extreme by their profound experience of the insufficiency of human reason,— who see no order and stability in society, no peace and hope for man save in unqualified submission to church authority. It is not a sign of weakness and imbecility, but a mighty instinct of the soul that leads it thus to worship and obey.

"But," it is said, on the other hand, "in this very surrender of private judgment, must I not exercise my judgment? I want nothing more than that absolute authority; but how shall I know that I have found it? Some tell me the Scriptures are suffi-

cient; but when the meaning of Scripture is in doubt, how shall I be assured of an infallible interpretation? If the church interpret, where shall I find the church? Shall I find it in Rome or in Geneva or in Oxford? Shall I follow the successor of St. Peter or the mouth-piece of some petty sect?"

So, then, we round the circle. The unaided reason is not a sufficient guide; experience shows that, trusting to this alone, we are hopelessly adrift on a sea of errors; so long as each individual makes his own opinion the single standard there can be no judgment absolute and final. Neither is outward authority a sufficient rule; for in the very act of deferring to such authority we are forced to exercise that individual reason which we abjure. What, then, is man's position? How shall he ever draw the line between the true and false? How shall he ever reach an assured conviction respecting these great questions on which his peace depends? How shall he ever pass from darkness, uncertainty, and ignorance to serene and cloudless day? If he cannot follow the light of his own understanding, — if he cannot follow the light of tradition and authority, — what else shall serve him as a light to his feet and as a lamp to his path?

Or is he meant to live in endless doubt? This latter supposition may be dismissed as inconceivable. We cannot for one moment be persuaded that He who dwelleth in perfect light, and in whom is no darkness at all, should have doomed the human soul to this dreary destiny; that He, who at so many times and in such divers manners, in the utterances of day and night, in the teaching of the written word, has declared his truth, should have destined

his creatures to remain always ignorant of it. And much as we may dispute respecting Scripture teaching there can be no dispute respecting this, that the Scriptures not only represent the soul as created to know the truth, but represent this knowledge as its only enduring peace and satisfaction; we cannot, then, believe that doubt and darkness are meant always to fold their cheerless wings about it, that it has been left wholly without a guide. But where shall that guide be found? If I read aright the last words of promise uttered by our Lord to his sorrowing disciples, the soul has that guide, — a guide implanted in it for this very purpose, a guide that cannot err, a guide that rises supreme over human ignorance and human prejudice, a guide that is independent of traditional authority, that shall guide the willing and trusting soul into the perfect truth.

So I read the great promise of the text. If language has any meaning these words must mean that the soul, yearning to be set free from doubt and error, is not left without a comforter; they must mean that He who created man to know the truth has provided a new and better way by which he may follow after it, — that in the light of this latter day that has dawned upon the soul, it is meant that the gloomy shapes that have so long beleaguered it shall be made forever to flee away. "Howbeit, when he, the Spirit of truth, is come," said Jesus, "he will guide you into all truth." Can language be more explicit? Can we conceive an answer more direct and satisfying to those questions that have so perplexed us? Is there not here a divine provision indicated for these very wants and yearnings of the soul? Tossed on the restless sea of doubt, closed

about with the night of darkness, sinking, it may be, in deep waters, is not this the outstretched hand?

Of course it was not our Saviour's meaning that his followers should be made omniscient; the translation here is liable to leave a wrong impression. Instead of reading, "He will guide you into *all* truth," we might better read, "He will guide you into the *whole* truth;" that is, not all truth of whatever sort, but that truth involved in the mission of the Redeemer, and in our relation to Him; for the Holy Ghost is not given to guide us to that knowledge which mere natural reason comprises, but He is to take of the things of Christ and show them unto us. The best comment on this mystery of the new creation is furnished in the apostolic writings. They teach, with unanimous consent, that the Holy Spirit dwells in regenerate souls; that by this indwelling the individual spirit becomes identified with the universal spirit; that the finite reason is merged and blended with the infinite; that not by limiting, but by enlarging human freedom the child of God is made to think and know and feel in accord with his divine Original. Words need not be multiplied in proof of this. It would only be to reiterate the whole scope and tenor of the Epistles. He surely misses what is most significant in the new dispensation who does not recognize this all-pervading principle. The whole consciousness of apostolic teaching rested on this assurance that a Spirit dwelt within the soul which guided it to a knowledge of the truth. Nor did the Apostles restrict this inward guidance to themselves; they imparted it to all believers. In the splendid figure of the Apostle the body of the believer was represented as the temple

of the Holy Ghost. As in the temple round which have hovered such sacred recollections, the Shekinah had abode, attesting with visible splendor the actual presence of Jehovah, so in these living temples abode that eternal Spirit which was the Light of men, shedding its resplendent glory, not over outward gifts and sacrifices, but over the better offerings of a penitent and believing heart. This was the true Light that should light every man. The Spirit which convinced the soul of sin and righteousness and judgment did not then forsake it, to grope its way alone. The same power which turned from darkness unto light led to the perfect day. Once wedded to his living Head, the believer could never again be left alone. The Good Shepherd did not desert his sheep. Leaving them, He left behind another Witness, that should witness to the human soul the unchanging truth of God.

Does the question still arise, Shall we recognize this inward Witness? How shall we guard ourselves from error here better than before? How shall we separate this spiritual guidance from our own native promptings? Are we not here involved in new and greater difficulties?

The answer given by Scripture to these questions is explicit. It is not meant that we should be left in any doubt respecting this. To have been left so would have defeated every purpose for which the guide was given. The sufficing evidence of the inward presence of this guide is the conviction that itself awakens. This conviction may be as strong as the conviction of personal identity. Paul never doubted this inward guidance; he could no more doubt it than doubt his own existence. The meas-

ure of the gift will always be the measure of the conviction of it. The soul can be as much assured of the shining of this inner light as it can be assured by the outward eye that the day breaks and the shadows flee away. It is striking to observe how those who stand farthest removed from resting religion upon individual conviction, who assert most strongly the authority of external standards, yet in their deeper moods fall back instinctively on this inner guide. We know in our language no more emphatic utterance of this trust than those touching lines of Newman, dear to all tried and doubting souls:—

> "Lead, kindly Light, amid th' encircling gloom,
> Lead Thou me on;
> The night is dark, and I am far from home,
> Lead Thou me on."

The sense of this divine guidance made the first preachers of the Gospel preach it with such unfaltering lips. This inward assurance was their sole authority. Not of man, nor by man, but by the Holy Ghost; not by power of human reason, not by ecclesiastical traditions, but by the living Spirit. Can we conceive of any conviction that could be stronger than was theirs, that any guidance could be more distinctly felt than that which guided them?

And was there any limit to the promise? Was it only to the Apostles or to the apostolic age that this guide was given? Does man now need it any less; can it not now as well as then make its abode within him? Do we doubt that if we to-day desire the truth with the simple, fervent yearning with which they desired it, if we receive it with the same humble, child-like trust with which they received it, that the Holy Ghost will dwell in us less richly than

it dwelt in them? Here, then, we have the solution, and the only possible solution, of the great conflict between authority and reason. Reason is not in the least abjured. Rather is reason here first raised to its rightful sphere. Reason is purged and clarified; the individual reason becomes the universal; the indwelling light illumines all its functions. It is made a trusty, unerring guide, because it acts no longer by its mere blinded instincts, but is made partaker of all the fullness of God.

Nor, on the other hand, is authority in the least impugned. On the contrary, here is established an authority absolutely binding; here is revealed a guide to be followed at all hazards; here is set up a standard infallible, imperial, unchanging. Never may the soul renounce these claims, never may it utter a protest against this rule. This is the very voice of God that speaks within it. The wisdom that was set up from everlasting, before ever the world was made perpetually enriches it with all counsel and all knowledge.

The operation of this inward guide saves the soul from false extremes. It teaches man first of all to look within, to follow the inner light, to hearken to the inner voice, to be loyal to his own conviction of truth and duty; but it teaches him not less to respect the convictions of all good men, to remember always that they too are guided by the same unerring guide, to act not apart from them, but in the unity of one spirit to acknowledge one Lord, one faith, one baptism. In this sense the church is infallible. The Spirit is continually guiding it. So far as good men are illumined by this indwelling light they cannot err. That truth, therefore, in

which all good men agree, which is attested by the common experience and faith and hope of all, is invested with divine authority. The voice of this unanimous conviction is not the voice of man. It is the Holy Ghost that speaks to us in this as clearly, as unmistakably, as it spake of yore by the voice of prophets and apostles. We shrink now from accepting the lesson of our text in all its fullness. We cannot receive the promises of Christ in their simple, natural meaning. Instead of trusting with perfect faith to the guidance of this inward light, we fall back on outward supports and hug the traditions of men. So around us rages the unappeased strife of authority and reason. But when I see on every side the upheavals of opinion, when I see how unsettled everywhere are men's convictions, how powerless in defense of truth seem human arguments, how slow and impeded is the growth of that kingdom which is destined to cover the whole earth, I can almost believe that the present must make way for another and greater dispensation; that the King of Glory must return in sublimer, more triumphant exhibitions of spiritual power; that the failure of all present means is only meant to pave the way for a presence of the Spirit, before which the very mountains and hills shall break forth into singing.

And, lastly, we may learn from this study the temper with which alone we can seek the truth aright. The condition of success is not intellectual, but moral. What we want is not great mental keenness, nor learning, nor logical skill, but an humble, patient, docile spirit. We do not ourselves discover the whole truth; we are guided into it. The more we can put ourselves in sympathy with that spiritual

guide, the more we can throw aside the pride of opinion, the love of sect or of self, that holds us back from entire surrender to it, and yield ourselves with simple, child-like trust to the divine influence that is acting on our hearts, the sooner shall we come to a perfect knowledge. "Learn of me," said the great Teacher," for I am meek and lowly in heart." Learning this first and greatest lesson, the humblest soul may say at last, "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."

THE BAPTISM OF THE HOLY GHOST.[1]

For John truly baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence. — Acts i. 5.

These were the last words of promise spoken by our Lord to his disciples just before the clouds veiled his ascending form forever from their sight. They gave the final sanction to a long series of prophetic intimations that his work would receive its completion in a new outpouring of the divine Spirit upon men. In his discourse on the night before He was betrayed He had distinctly taught them that the great work which He had assumed would not be completed by his death. That was not the last result towards which all things had tended, but was itself the transition step to a greater result, the necessary condition of another and more glorious stage of spiritual development, the door of a nearer approach to the invisible world. The sadness of his farewell address was relieved by the assurance that it was expedient that He should go away. After He had gone, a Comforter would come who would abide with them forever. This Comforter was the Holy Ghost.

[1] Written in 1878.

All distinctive Christian teaching centres in the three cardinal conceptions of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The essential and inseparable relation of these three conceptions was affirmed in the great command of Christ when He bade his disciples go forth and teach all nations, baptizing them into this single and indivisible name. With each application of the symbolic water, which signified the translation of a believer from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light, was solemnly reiterated the mysterious formula which drew the line between the gospel and all other forms of religion. Of the three correlated truths expressed in this formula, that relating to the Holy Ghost was not only the last in order, but the last revealed. Some faith in a divine influence exerted on the soul had been, it is true, a part of every religion, and the comforting doctrine that the eternal spirit at times conversed with man, and that in rapt moments of ecstatic vision the soul pierced the veil that rounds off our little lives and was lifted to companionship with the invisible powers, played a large part in that elder dispensation of which Christianity was in some important respects the outgrowth. In this sense the doctrine of the Holy Ghost was no new revelation. But where the teachings of Christ respecting the Comforter who was to come, departed from earlier conceptions, was in the distinct representation that He made of the new mode in which this spiritual power would work. It was not a new spirit that was to be poured out upon them, but it would be poured out in a new way. Through the kings and prophets of the old dispensation its working had been sporadic and exceptional. It had come

to them at intervals. Its visitations had been rare and eminent exhibitions of supernatural power. Only a favored few had been selected as its ministering agents. But in the new spiritual realm about to be established all this would be changed. The baptism of the Spirit would no longer be restricted to a select class. All who truly believed in the Lord Jesus Christ would be counted worthy to receive it. Its consecration set apart no exclusive hierarchy, but each redeemed soul in the inherent nobility and greatness of a spiritual priesthood would shine with its mystic chrism. It would abide in the church as the normal and permanent law of its growth. It formed the definite ground-work and constitution of that new kingdom which was not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

The earlier teachings of our Lord did not touch distinctly on this final, consummate truth. At the very beginning of his ministry He contented himself with the command that men should follow Him. For only by willing surrender of all that they had, by full renunciation of all selfish plans of personal indulgence or ambition, and by a daily companionship, by seeing his works, by testing the truth of his words, could they enter on the great path of a genuine discipleship. Thus were they prepared for clearer teachings ; for the parables in which the mystery of the kingdom of heaven was set forth to the disciples, but not to the world. But not even then were they ready for the whole truth. Not till the solemn crisis of his career, not till the dark night when they were gathered about Him in the upper chamber, when at the very table was

seated the one who so soon should betray Him, did Jesus disclose the deeper mystery of the soul's relation to the spiritual world. Not till then, in the pathetic chapters the whole meaning of which seems still to elude our most earnest study, did He venture to depict the grand outlines of that eternal kingdom of spiritual light and life and peace which no malice of man nor violence of earthly foes could ever invade or destroy.

And as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was the last which our Lord revealed, so it has been the hardest for his disciples to comprehend. The truths of the Father and of the Son, however illimitable the lines of speculation which they opened, in their general outline appealed more directly to human comprehension. That God was our Father; that He cared for us with even more than the love with which a human father cares for his child; that He was even more ready to give good gifts to them that asked them; that his ear was never deaf to our petitions, was a conception that even the youngest could comprehend. That the only-begotten Son was the Saviour of the world; that his lowly walk among the neglected and despised of earth was a manifestation of more than human love; that his whole self-denying life was a sacrifice for us; that his death on the cross was a perfect example of submission to the divine will, were truths appealing for evidence to undoubted historic facts,— to facts telling the story of redemption in language more intelligible than Hebrew, or Latin, or Greek. But the doctrine of the Spirit was one that in its nature could only be spiritually discerned. It could not be conveyed by any of the ordinary methods of in-

struction, but must be understood and felt by an inward and personal experience.

Hence, that part of Christian doctrine which relates to the Father and the Son has always supplied the principal topics of theological discussion. Respecting the nature and attributes of God whole libraries have been written. The proofs of the divine existence have been examined and reëxamined, till in the din of conflicting views the most sober thinkers have begun to doubt whether the human mind is capable of framing any logical demonstration that this mighty frame of things had any origin in creative mind. In the same way, what theologians have called the plan of redemption has been dissected with all the confidence with which science investigates the phenomena of matter. The most signal, pathetic, persuasive exhibition of yearning love for men ever compassed within the limits of a human life has been analyzed into dry, repulsive syllogisms, and summed up in the metaphysical dialect of creeds, and made the shibboleths of contending sects. For even the story of redemption could be easily perverted into an abstract theory of the divine administration. But when we study the doctrine of the Spirit we pass from the theology of the intellect to the theology of the feelings. The ways of the Spirit lend themselves less readily to the formulas of logic. We are in a region of insight, of experience, of inner recognition, where intellectual conclusions no longer satisfy.

We can never grasp the Christian doctrine of the Holy Ghost if we simply or mainly regard it as a dogma of theology. We only deceive ourselves if we seek to define it to the understanding; we can

never search out the Spirit by vain attempts to trace back its timeless beginning; we only perplex faith by raising questions about the relations in the Godhead, and by vain disputes respecting persons and processions. The last discourse of our Lord, so pervaded in every sentence with this comforting truth, says nothing of these things. The work of the Spirit is practical; its operation is within the limits of human experience. The question for us is not its eternal relation to the uncreated source of all things, but its manifestation in our lives. We are in a region where we need to tread with caution, where we are easily misled, where the most wholesome and life-giving truths lie dangerously near the most disastrous error, but yet a region where the soul breathes its native air, and where it finds its highest satisfaction. We enter here the inner sanctuary of Christian faith; we tread the true holy of holies, where we see no longer as in a glass, but with open face. Of all born among the sons of women there was not a greater than John the Baptist; yet John baptized only with water, while we are baptized with the Holy Ghost.

In calling attention to a few of the more obvious conclusions to be derived from this supreme article of revealed truth, let us observe: —

1. That the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit rests throughout on the great fact that there is between the human soul and its Maker an inner contact and relationship which the ordinary laws of intellectual action do not explain. It most unmistakably means that there are interior spiritual relations, capable of being recognized in a personal experience, attesting themselves to the soul as a part

of its life, of which the grosser external senses can take no note. Nothing can be plainer than the teachings of our Lord upon this point. He comforts his disciples with the assurance that they shall receive from the Father a Spirit whom the world cannot receive, — a Spirit who shall dwell in them; who shall teach them all things; who shall give the inward testimony of the truth of his sayings; who will show them things to come. Such sayings can have no meaning save on the assumption of a direct influence exerted upon the soul by the powers of the invisible world. Any interpretation short of this reduces to cruel mockery the most solemn, the most pathetic, the most precise, teachings of the Son of Man.

Here we have, then, revealed on the one hand the capacity of the infinite Spirit to bring itself within the limit of human consciousness, and on the other the capacity of the finite spirit to come into immediate communion with its Maker. We have at once the highest truth that can be grasped by human intelligence and the highest experience that can be tasted by the human soul. We have the assurance that there is no middle wall of partition between man and God; that, made in the image of God, man is capable of directly recognizing God, of coming into conscious personal contact with Him whom no man has seen at any time. With the psychological problems involved in this proposition we need not perplex ourselves. The great Teacher does not seek to explain them; it may be that we are not capable of understanding any explanation were it made. We have never yet solved the problem how we know anything at all; how the impres-

sions of the senses are made the possession of the soul. We can only rest in the fact, — a fact not simply attested by the personal consciousness of the individual, but finding its verification in the Incarnation of our Lord; for what was that, considered in its deeper meaning, but a publication of the great truth that the divine Spirit can dwell in man?

And bearing in mind that this immediate contact of the finite and infinite Spirit is presented to us by our Lord as the ultimate and supreme result of religious experience; that the long line of supernatural influences that stretched from the call of Abraham, in the dawn of patriarchal story, on to the Day of Pentecost, was but the ordered preparation for this final access of the soul to its highest life, we are brought directly to the conclusion that religion in its most perfected form is this inner experience; that the soul wins its closest access to spiritual things in this sphere of feeling and inner intuition. In other words, this is to say that religious belief in its highest form has its origin and foundation in religious intuition; that it lies back of the ordinary intellectual processes by which the understanding arrives at truth; and that it does not appeal to the tests by which the ordinary conclusions of the understanding are verified. The impulse, the guidance, the illumination, by which the soul is enabled to rest in its supreme convictions of spiritual things are due to a direct contact of the soul with something distinct from and above itself; a power making itself felt in recesses of our being far removed from the familiar commerce of life.

It has been asserted by a famous writer that

the human mind passes through three successive stages: that, beginning with the conscious feeling of dependence upon a higher power from which all religion springs, it passes next to a stage where it is held in thrall by its metaphysical conceptions, emerging at last into the cold, clear air, where it accepts nothing that science cannot demonstrate by a rigid process of induction. But this ignores man's highest aptitudes. The right method of human progress is not to pass from the sphere of feeling to the sphere of mere intellectual cognition; but when man is at his best estate, when he has reached his amplest growth, when he is in the fullest exercise of all his faculties, then it is that he is capable of feeling most deeply, and then it is that his feelings, that is the affirmations of his moral nature, may be most confidently relied upon as a guide to truth. Here is seen the profound meaning of the Saviour's maxim that whosoever would enter the kingdom of heaven must receive it as a little child. For childhood is the period when we are most under the sway of feeling; when the heart is most capable of being touched, attracted, transformed, by whatever is higher and better than itself. Then it is we hear divine voices most distinctly.

Nor is it a skeptical philosophy alone that has misconceived this point. The Christian church has many times been betrayed into the same error. When saving faith has been confounded with the recognition of certain intellectual formulas, when the progress of truth has been measured by mere precision of dogmatic statements, and the growth of simple and undefiled religion has been argued from the success of theologians in framing systems of

divinity, then surely has the most distinctive feature of the gospel been overlooked, — that in its highest form it is something to be felt, and that the things hid from the wise and the prudent are revealed to babes.

And let us never forget the inestimable service rendered in an age of dry, dogmatic controversy by the religious body which revived, in modern times, the almost forgotten doctrine of the Holy Ghost. It is said that the Society of Friends is gradually passing away. They can ill be spared from the household of faith. But should they become extinct as a sect it will be only because their mission is accomplished. The great cardinal truth of the Christian system to which they called attention, which kindled the enthusiasm of Fox and moved the eloquence of Barclay, must appeal to human souls with increased power as the years roll on, or Christianity itself will become but as sounding brass and tinkling cymbal.

2. As the doctrine of the Holy Spirit sets before us the origin and foundation of all religious belief, so at the same time it supplies the law of religious growth. In its essence, religion is life.

In Scripture the two words are constantly interchanged as synonyms. The Founder of our religion came on earth that we might have life. In Him was life, and this life was the light of men. And in language even more emphatic we are warned that he that hath the Son hath life, while he that hath not the Son of God shall not see life. Faith in Christ, whatever else may be said of it, is first of all a living principle implanted in the soul. But the characteristic of all life is growth. It is the law of

the natural world, — a law illustrated afresh as each new season salutes us with the green grass and the budding leaf and the song of birds; it is even more the law of the spiritual world, of whose unseen agencies and potencies external nature is only the type and semblance; so that when we define religion as consisting essentially in a devout temper of mind we do not exclude, but include, the possibility of enlargement and elevation and enrichment. Because religion lies so near the centre of being must it be, in its very nature, a most stimulating and potent principle of growth.

But what is the law of the soul's growth? How is the germ planted in the inner life carried on through the successive stages of its development, till at last it ripens into the full-grown and perfect man? Is it left to itself, — left to its own unaided strength, to the uncertain light of its own experience, to the feeble efforts which itself is capable of making in the long race it has to run and in the incessant wrestling it must keep up with foes without and foes within, — or is it helped and quickened and strengthened by a power above itself, and led in the illumined pathway of a divine guidance?

On this point, too, there is no room for doubt respecting the Master's teachings. The sayings of our Lord are clear and positive. The soul once brought into inner and immediate contact with a divine power and life is never left to itself. It is meant to live on in the joy and strength of this unchecked communion. Having once found access to the holiest of all, it does not go out from this blissful society. The gift of the Holy Ghost is always described as an indwelling and perpetual gift; not

simply one original impulse given to the soul, but a ceaselessly acting principle, a dwelling of the divine life in the believing and obedient soul.

This indwelling Spirit is held up to us as the operative principle of all genuine religious progress. And herein lies the distinction between religious and intellectual growth. The advance we make in the discovery of mere natural truth is through the cultivation and right exercise of our mere natural faculties. We move forward securely by making use of rational methods. The keenness of our intellectual perceptions, the logical correlation of the conceptions which the understanding frames, are the conditions of all successful searching into the secrets of the external universe. So we measure the courses of the stars, and note the subtle affinities of physical force. But when we turn our inspection in upon the secret springs of life and action, when we set clearly before us our conscious self, and ponder the mystery of our personal being, we come into a more mysterious and sacred presence. Amid the deep foundations of our spiritual nature, we are forced to recognize the working of forces, the analysis of which eludes our ordinary methods. We are confronted with problems and stirred with questionings which do not yield to the familiar methods which we have applied with so much success in a different sphere. The primary condition of progress is not so much clear perception as a right temper of heart.

The function of the Spirit in guiding the soul of man is therefore primarily made effectual in changing the inner disposition. It is in the sphere of feeling, as we have already seen, that we lie nearest

the centre of light and truth, and it is through the moral disposition or temper that we are directly acted upon by the illuminating power whose office it is to guide us into all truth. The first step is here; and only by effecting a change in this inner man can the divine Spirit bring us into that right relation to the spiritual world which is the indispensable condition of all progress in the knowledge of spiritual things. But man is so made that his inner operations cannot be divided. There is an underlying unity of being, in which his moral and his intellectual life are both included. The heart and the mind exert a reflex influence, and the healthfulness of one makes itself directly felt upon the other also. Hence, the effecting of a right temper of heart carries with it a clearer intellectual perception, and faith passes by an inherent and necessary law from the sphere of mere feeling to the sphere of rational cognition. The soul cannot be deeply stirred on any subject without having the intellectual faculties at once roused to new activity.

How far the teachings of Christ authorize us to regard the Holy Spirit as a direct source of intellectual illumination I will not undertake to say. We know so little of the nature and origin of these internal changes of mental state, in which lies the explanation of what we call conceptions or ideas, that any mere affirmation or denial would be little to the purpose. While one school of philosophers insists on regarding them as the mere result of physical modifications of the brain's structure, another sees in them unmistakable tokens of a divine agency; but the problem seems as far from being solved as in the day when the earliest thinkers began to study

it. The promise of our Lord, "Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth," seems, indeed, at first sight broad enough to cover the most extreme hypothesis; yet I do not understand these words to mean all truth, of whatever sort, but only that truth pertaining directly to his own work and teachings. So, at least, the context would seem to show; for the Spirit, He adds directly after, shall take of the things of mine, and shall show them unto you; so that the office of the Spirit is not to guide the mind into truth which its unaided faculties are competent to explore, but simply into truth pertaining to the supersensuous and unseen world.

We do not for a moment suppose that the Holy Spirit is promised as a guide in mere scientific research. The Creator has endowed us with powers ample for all purposes of intellectual investigation, and He has spread around us and above us the infinite solicitations of the external world, that these powers might be stimulated to highest development. The astronomer would be mad indeed who should throw aside his optic glass, and seek divine communications respecting the position of one of the heavenly bodies. We have no assurance which would authorize us to expect that God will do for us what He has given us power to do ourselves. Nor have we any more reason to suppose that when we apply to divine truth our metaphysical methods, when we reduce the mysteries of the spiritual world to the plane of the human understanding, He will give us his help. The office of the Spirit is, by effecting a change in the moral disposition, to bring the soul to an inner, immediate, intuitive, perception of divine

things, but it is no part of the Spirit's work to correct the notions which the mere logical faculty has fashioned. The abstract definitions and statements respecting the divine nature and the divine government, that form so large a part of the creeds and confessions which have rent the church asunder, belong for the most part to a sphere where the Spirit does not claim to operate.

3. As the doctrine of the Holy Spirit supplies the law of religious growth, it affords us the surest ground of confidence respecting the ultimate triumph of divine truth. As the truth wins its first access into the soul by a change worked by the Spirit in the inner disposition or feeling of man, so we may expect that it will spread and prevail by modifications of the moral temper of mankind, due just as much to the permanent operation of a divine power. In other words, the experience of each individual is but an epitome of the experience of the larger man, of which we all are members, moving by the same law to the mark of its high calling. That not only individuals, but the race, are moving on in a predestined path, according to some law of progression, is a conception that has taken strong hold of human thought. To see on all sides in the external world the signs of conformity to law, and to see in the long history of the human race signs only of discord and confusion; to believe that the well-ordered spheres are balanced by a directing hand, and to believe that man alone is left to plunge along helpless, and unaided to the darkness that rounds off his little life, is a conclusion from which human reason instinctively holds back. Rather would it accept iron fate than rest in chaos.

It has been the bold aim of a modern school of thinkers to reason back from the phenomena of human history to the great underlying law which regulates its onward march. Vico, Herder, Comte, have busied themselves with a problem which must always possess a singular fascination for all who have an ear for "the still sad music of humanity," but thus far, it must be confessed, with results that furnish slender hope of any complete solution. Human history is an ever-unfolding drama; if any regular movement lies veiled behind its shifting scenes, we are ourselves too much a part of it to note it with precision. Only the eye that sees the end from the beginning can know the significance of the successive acts, and how each part stands related to the finished whole. But the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, while it in no way undertakes to solve the whole problem of human destiny, lifts us up into the inspiring confidence of a divine direction of the race. Saving us alike from the alternations of a blind, remorseless fate, and the conception of a world without God and without hope, it supplies the ennobling thought of a divine power working in human souls without infringing on human freedom, and of a human society moving onward in an ordered path towards perfection.

The Spirit abiding in the soul of the individual believer is at the same time the indwelling law of social growth. It is the characteristic of Christ's kingdom that its members are not isolated atoms, each achieving his destiny solitary and alone; but each is part of a whole, and all are members one of another. The same voice that said, "I will pray the Father, and He will give you another Comforter,"

uttered the prayer, "that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." The essential unity of the vine and the branches was the fundamental thought pervading his last discourse. There is, indeed, no promise of the Spirit save to those abiding in Christ, and no assurance of any effectual guidance into the truth but with the condition that each separate branch should maintain its organic connection with the vine. So that the work of the Spirit is not with the individual simply, but with the individual as part of a spiritual society; its mission being completed not in the salvation of single believers, but in building them up into a compact body. Hence the relation of the Holy Spirit to human society is not to be viewed as something incidental and subsidiary, but as involving the essential condition of its perfect manifestation.

Not then, in the secret experiences of our own souls, but in the broader aspects and more significant changes of society, may we note the operative presence of the Holy Spirit. Not only each individual, but the whole household of faith, is acted upon and guided and led forward to its final goal by this divine working. And when, in the great conflict of truth and error, we become at times perplexed and discouraged; when we sadly realize the inefficacy of what we can do, and feel ourselves powerless before the swelling surge of human misery and wrong, then let us take comfort in the thought that agencies of which we can make no account are working with us, and that avenues of influence which we cannot enter, and which we do not even note, all lie wide open to that resistless Spirit, which, like the wind,

bloweth where it listeth, so that we cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. Least of all are periods of mere intellectual doubt or unbelief to be viewed as threatening portents in the pathway of truth. The intellect does not save, nor can it destroy. The work of the Spirit is made effectual in another way. When the intellect is most clouded and bewildered, the heart is often most open to its persuasive voice. Mere logical quibbles are forgotten when the soul is once brought to hunger and thirst for the living God. "Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I!" is its despairing cry, when it sits comfortless amid the ashes of its empty speculations. In its secret depths it yearns for communion with the invisible world; it instinctively reaches out for a hope that goes beyond the rule of time and sense; and at such times the Comforter comes to it. That Comforter comes not to argue, not to confute, not to relieve from mere intellectual perplexities, but to instill a new life, to abide in human souls, to incarnate itself in human society as a permanent principle of progress and growth.

Such, as I understand it, is the promise contained in the baptism of the Holy Ghost; so much of joy and comfort for each believer, so much of hope and confidence for the whole body. The disciples to whom this promise was spoken did not understand it. To their dull minds it seemed connected with old predictions of times and seasons. The church has never fully understood it. In every age it has shown itself hard of heart and slow to believe all that lay wrapped up in its mighty assurance. We, ourselves, to-day, are far from fully accepting it. We are baptized truly with water, but how many of us, think you, with the Holy Ghost?

Yet I cannot escape the conviction that in the more complete understanding and experience of this doctrine lies our hope for the future triumph of the faith. The church has had its period of external organization, when the zeal of bishops and monks carried it with great external success; it has had its period of doctrinal development, when the logic of theologians built up imposing doctrinal systems; yet in neither of these periods has been realized the promise of the New Jerusalem, that, like a bride adorned for her husband, she shall one day come down from God out of heaven. She waits for that fuller outpouring of the Spirit which shall witness itself in far greater works than these.

Meanwhile, for each of us as individuals, the pressing question presented by the text is whether we are waiting to have the last prayer of Christ for his disciples fulfilled. Remembering the words He spoke when on earth, do we receive them with humble and obedient hearts? Do we seek, by daily self-sacrifice and self-surrender, to hold ourselves open to the impulses of that Spirit, which, by causing us all to abide in the Son, can alone make the world believe that the Father has sent Him? For the promise is to us and to our children, Ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost!

THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN AND THE KINGDOM OF NATURE.[1]

Another parable put He forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard-seed which a man took and sowed in his field. — MATTHEW xiii. 31.

THE immediate purpose of this parable was to set forth the striking contrast between the small beginnings of the kingdom of heaven and its marvelous growth; but, like all the parables, it conveys another lesson, — a lesson lying beyond its immediate aim, — and it is for this that I have selected it as the text. By the phrase "kingdom of heaven," which our Lord so often uses, is intended that higher system of spiritual laws and agencies first fully revealed in Him, and of which He is always represented as the head. To disclose the inner nature of this kingdom was the great purpose of his teaching. And in the significant figure with which the text sets it forth we have the fruitful lesson inculcated that though the kingdom of heaven was higher than the ordinary methods of nature, it yet found in nature its counterpart and illustration. This principle is sufficiently familiar, yet it has some applications which at the present day may be profitably considered. For what our Lord obviously im-

[1] Written 1880.

plies is that the kingdom of heaven, in the whole course of its development, finds its counterpart in natural processes; that not alone when we are dealing with the simple and primary truths of religion, but when we pass on to what are termed the mysteries of the faith, to the truths which centre in the life and teachings of the Son of Man, we may still trace this correspondence between the spiritual and the natural, so that when studying the deepest aspects of divine truth we may expect to find its aptest illustration in the most familiar physical phenomena, the things that are seen remaining our best helps for understanding the things that are unseen. Not alone in these simple lessons in which He instructed his disciples in the rudiments of spiritual life, but in the latest instructions which He left them as their richest legacy, the sayings which have remained as the great storehouse of spiritual truth, He follows this same habit, and emphasizes the correspondence between the supersensuous world in which we walk by faith and not by sight, and the system of natural powers and forces with which we are so familiar in our every-day experience. For the most vital contact of the soul with its true life He can find no better image than in eating bread and drinking wine, and He seizes the vine and its branches as the best symbol of his relation to his followers. The point on which I wish especially to insist is, that this correspondence between the physical and the spiritual is carried through all stages and up to the highest line of spiritual experience. The two realms of nature and of spirit are not presented as antagonistic or as diverging, but as harmonious, and as remaining through their entire growth in perfect

correspondence. The processes of nature serve the great Teacher not simply to set forth the simple truths which belong to the beginnings of religious experience, as of the sower going forth to sow his seed, but they serve Him equally to illustrate the most advanced and exalted phases of religious growth, as when speaking of the Bread of Life.

What this parable implies is not simply that nature, in her manifold and wonderful processes, exemplifies those truths of the invisible world which the natural reason may reach, but that nature also illustrates and confirms those laws which revelation has brought to light; that, in short, as we approach what is most distinctive and eminent in the new dispensation, we still tread a path which our common, every-day observation may help us to understand. And hence we may infer that enlarged study of nature and of nature's laws, instead of indisposing us to accept the distinctive teachings of revelation, will arm those teachings with new arguments and lend them more convincing force. For want of attention to this fundamental and pervading characteristic of our Lord's teaching, the relations between what is termed natural and revealed truth have been strangely misunderstood and confused. They have been too often looked upon as two distinct realms, the methods and laws of the one standing in sharp contrast with the methods and laws of the other; and with this misapprehension of their nature the conclusion has been rashly reached, that devotion to the one results in indifference to the other, and that a mind trained in the observation of natural processes is prone to become skeptical with regard to spiritual things. It has been hastily assumed

that the student of nature deals simply with phenomena, forgetful of the obvious fact that in all the fundamental conceptions which the student of nature forms, and from which he is forced to reason, there are involved inferences that go beyond phenomena, and that the whole proud fabric of human knowledge rests at last upon assumptions which mere science is not competent to make. There can be no greater mistake than to suppose that it is the exclusive prerogative of religion to make its appeal to faith. Science enlists the same faculty. We exercise faith in the unseen when we assume the existence of matter as much as when we confess the presence of supernatural power. It has been, if I mistake not, the leading view of those who in our time have undertaken to defend revealed truth to show that its teachings have not been and cannot be contradicted by any of the conclusions of modern science. Thus it is claimed that the great problems of human life and of human destiny lie wholly outside of the limit of scientific search, that they belong to a sphere which science cannot enter, and that the essential grounds of religious belief cannot be affected by any legitimate conclusions that science is capable of framing. Confined as she is to the phenomena of nature, Science can neither affirm nor deny those transcendental truths which lie beyond her vision.

While I would by no means say that the distinction here drawn between science and religion is not, in the main, a sound one, and that some useful ends may be gained by bearing it in mind, I still believe it to be a very incomplete account of the relation between the two. It is only half the truth to say

that the truths of religion and the teachings of science are distinct. It is equally true that, while distinct, they correspond and are opposite sides of one harmonious whole; so that it is not enough to affirm that the conclusions of the one can never contradict the affirmations of the other; we shall fail of the whole truth if we do not see that one is the counterpart of the other, and is its prophetic anticipation. The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard-seed. In the interests of religion it is high time that we abandon this mere defensive attitude, and recognize the fact that the natural sciences not only are not the foe, but that they are the ally of revealed truth. For the conclusion which our text unmistakably warrants us in drawing is, that as we become more profoundly trained in the methods of nature, instead of being turned away from the teachings of revelation, we shall be more disposed to accept them; that all we learn of nature and her ways only qualifies us to comprehend more clearly the invisible ways of that Spirit which we are told finds its fittest emblem in the wind that bloweth where it listeth. Not only are the established conclusions of science not antagonistic to religion, but it is my earnest conviction that the distinctive methods of science and the new and more adequate conception of the physical universe which it has been the work of modern science to make familiar render the distinctive teachings of revelation more easy of comprehension. The deeper movement of modern science, whatever may be said of some of the shallower eddies, has been in the direction of spiritual truth, and the fundamental conceptions on which science now insists, the conceptions which give to modern sci-

ence its characteristic tone, are conceptions in striking analogy with the deeper teachings of the gospel.

Let us look at this more closely. In the first place, the conclusions of science must incline us to accept the great primary fact of a revelation itself. I know it has been hastily assumed that the reverse of this is true, and that the rigorous methods of science leave no room for revealed truth. But the last result of science is the recognition of the great law which the text so impressively sets forth, that all things are parts of a great process of growth. Of this process man is not only a part, but is the crowning result. Hence human nature is a fact, — a fact as real, a fact as indubitable, as any that can claim our attention. Man is, in truth, the supreme fact that nature presents. No matter how he began his career, — no matter how extreme the hypothesis we adopt to explain his origin. We may trace, if you wish, not only his physical, but also his intellectual and even his moral being through a process of evolution reaching back to the fiery cloud which, we are told, was once the sole thing floating in space; still man, with his present endowments and attributes and yearnings, remains just as much a fact, and just as much the last supreme result which the creation has brought forth. He is the marvelous man-child; in him the whole effort of nature is summed up. Our highest inferences from nature must be drawn from his constitution, and from his convictions and beliefs.

Now no one can deny that the most characteristic thing in man is his appetency for the spiritual and the unseen. Creature of time and sense, he is perpetually driven by the inexorable needs of his own

nature to overleap these barriers. With large discourse of reason, and looking before and after, he longs to lift the veil and solve the haunting mystery of life and death. But, according to science, such a being as man can only be explained as the result of a process of development.

Yet evolution becomes a rational hypothesis only when we connect with it the idea of purpose; nor can we conceive of orderly and progressive evolution without a directing Intelligence behind it. So that man, with his marvelous appetencies, must be regarded as created for a purpose, and that purpose can be nothing less than communion with something above himself. Thus the very constitution of man renders a revelation in the highest degree *probable.* Revelation is, in fact, a postulate of human nature, when we use the term in any large and adequate sense. All experience shows that man is never satisfied with his present surroundings. He instinctively puts himself the question, Whence am I, and whither shall I go? Hemmed in with mysteries which he longs to pierce, he utters the cry, "If a man die, shall he live again?" He is as distinctively a religious as he is a social animal, and by the whole make and strain of his being he is forced to murmur, "Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I." Thus human nature, in the course of a strictly natural development, and as a result of that development, reaches at last a stage where it cannot be content with the conditions of its existence; when, like a child that has come to man's estate, it is no longer pleased with childish things, but demands a new environment, and yearns for a fuller knowledge, and is haunted with the larger problems that stretch out

before it. To borrow the image of the text, the grain of mustard-seed has become the greatest among herbs.

Now if we consider what science claims, — that the human soul has been brought to this ample growth by a normal development; that these yearnings, instincts, appetencies, whatever they may be called, are inseparable from the advanced stage of progress which man has reached; that they are the necessary consequence of a process of moral and spiritual evolution, no matter at what point that process began, or by what agencies it has been carried on, — then I claim that the accepted teachings of science warrant the inference that these new wants and these new capacities will be provided for by some new modification of the conditions of its existence. Such correlation would be in strict accordance with the law of evolution as it has been formulated by modern science. It would be simply carrying out the principle that the inner growth and the external environment must correspond; and hence a revelation of spiritual truth to waiting, expecting, yearning man would be the most complete, the most impressive, the most beautiful, illustration ever given of this law.

And if, in answer to this, it should be urged that revelation, if we regard it thus as a continuation of a great system of development, reaching back to the very beginning of things, should itself bear the marks of progress, I reply without hesitation that such is undoubtedly the fact. We have only to revert to history to see it. If we glance especially at that revelation which asserts itself as the supreme communication to man from the spiritual world, we find

it marked by nothing more indubitably than by this very characteristic of progressive adaptation both to human capacities and to human wants. First the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear, — this is the unmistakable note of revelation from the hour when waiting patriarchs wrestled with one whom they did not see, on to the full-orbed day when man was taught the great lesson that he was a son of God. Both the Old and New Testaments are vocal with this truth. And nothing in the New is more marked and more significant than the constant assertion of the organic connection between the earliest simple communications and the final complete manifestation. It has passed into a maxim that what was hid in the Old Testament was brought to light in the New, and that lawgivers, prophets, and apostles, how dimly soever they may have recognized the fact, were engaged in one great work, and were the ministers of one organic, ever-advancing revelation. In apostolic phrase, they all drank of one spiritual Rock.

In a natural desire to emphasize the claims of revelation it has been too much the habit to draw a sharp line of distinction between natural and revealed religion, and to represent the latter as something in its nature exceptional and out of the common course. Thus the argument from miracles has been assigned a wholly disproportioned prominence among Christian evidences. Such reasoning is of precisely the same kind as that which leads a savage to see more evident tokens of the divine presence in an eclipse than in the orderly sequence of sunrise and sunset. But a better instructed eye views in a creation controlled by uniform law, in the

harmonious movements of the heavenly bodies, in the unfailing succession of seed-time and harvest, the most convincing proof of the existence of an Intelligent Cause. He is most conscious of the presence of God, not in the earthquake nor in the whirlwind, but in the still voice that day utters to day, and in the silence of night.

So the most convincing proof of the truth of any revelation is to be found not in the fact that it stands apart from nature, still less in the fact that it seemingly contradicts or suspends any of nature's laws, but far more in the fact that it corresponds with nature, and that, while going beyond it, while disclosing truths which nature does not even suggest, it yet, in its supreme utterances, conforms to the analogy of nature, and follows the method which nature in a lower sphere has always adhered to. Thus is it, and thus only, that revelation carries with it the irresistible conviction that the truths of nature and the truths of revelation have proceeded from the same source, and illustrate one system of things.

In the very idea of revelation as the communication not only of new truth, but of truth above the ordinary level of human faculties, there is involved not only the possibility but the anterior probability that it would be accompanied with unusual phenomena. These phenomena would be, however, not so much an essential part of the revelation as its incidental concomitant. They would serve not so much to demonstrate its truth to those disposed to doubt or reject it as to confirm its truth to such as were already inclined to accept it. They would have no convincing power where faith was not already pres-

ent. To unbelief they would seem simply the works of one having a devil.

But we may go still further; for, in the second place, not only do the conceptions rendered familiar by modern science prepare us to accept the idea of revelation as part of the general and orderly system of things, they also render more credible and more intelligible what is most distinctive in Christian revelation, the doctrine of the manifestation of the divine life in human form. In this doctrine, when understood in all that it implies, we have that which gives Christianity its peculiar stamp, and what I now claim is that the conclusions of modern science are in striking correspondence with this central truth.

I have just referred to miracles as an incidental part of revelation. But in the record of revelation the greatest of all miracles is the Son of Man himself. Nothing in the mighty works which no other man did, nothing in the marvelous words which moved his hearers to cry out that never man spake like this man, was after all so wonderful and so impressive as the person behind them. We instinctively recognize a reserved strength, an unexhausted depth of being, that is more impressive than any uttered truths or any mighty deeds. The simple life of the man Christ Jesus remains the most signal fact that the four Gospels present.

The more closely and dispassionately we study his career, the more deeply shall we be convinced of this. I do not refer to Him in any of the mere dogmatic or ecclesiastical aspects in which He is usually presented, and in which the most significant features of his character are so often obscured, but

I refer to Him simply as an authentic fact of history. Whatever interpretation we may put upon Him, whatever degree of obedience we may choose to accord to Him, respecting his purely historical career, and his actual relation to the course of man's spiritual development, there is no room for dispute.

The most obdurate skeptic must recognize Him as the most significant figure which human history presents. In Him beyond all question centres the most marvelous revolution in the spiritual life of which the human race has had any experience, and to Him as their source and fountain head reach back the most commanding impulses that shape modern civilization.

Yet what must strike us most forcibly, as we study this unique career, is its perfect simplicity and naturalness. Asserting himself as a manifestation in human life of the divine nature, Jesus was the most intensely human of all religious teachers. Separate from men in the sinless purity of his life, He drew the outcast and the contemned and the forsaken to Him with a might as irresistible as it was gentle and mild. He entered into the hidden springs of human life, and touched its sympathies and kindled its hopes and drew forth its confidence and love as could only be done by one who was in all respects himself a partaker of human nature. He taught transcendent truths, truths that the heart of man had never conceived; but He uttered these truths in words that were heard gladly by common people, and loved to set them forth in parables and illustrations drawn from the most familiar incidents of life. He did mighty works, He healed the blind, He raised the dead, but He constantly declared that bet-

ter and greater than these wonders was the practice of the common duties we owe to one another.

In further illustration of this let us not omit to note the significant declarations which Jesus makes respecting himself. At the beginning of his ministry He speaks with the authority of a master. He calls on his hearers to give up all that they have to follow Him, and He calls with a tone that they are constrained to recognize and obey. His relation to them is external; He stands above them as their Lord and King. So filled are they with the sense of his supremacy that they cast their garments in the way as they see Him coming. To them He is heir of the throne of David; with eager faith they view the near return of the regal rule and splendor of the former kingdom. But when, at the close of his career, He leads his disciples to the deepest and truest and tenderest revelation of himself, his relation to them is no longer represented as something external and official, but as internal and personal. In that wonderful discourse in which He set forth most adequately the true nature of his spiritual kingdom, He describes himself under the most simple analogies. He is the true vine, of which they are the branches; He is the living bread, which is given for them; He is no longer a mere teacher, conveying formal instruction, but his life is blended mysteriously with theirs; He abides in them, and they must abide in Him.

Now who can fail to notice, in all this, the striking analogy between these highest teachings of Jesus and some of the latest results of our study of the natural world. As physical science has brought us to the conclusion that back of all the phenomena

of the natural universe there lies veiled an invisible universe of forces, and that these forces may ultimately be reduced to one pervading force, in which the essential unity of the physical universe consists, and as philosophy has further advanced the rational conjecture that this ultimate all-pervading force is simply will, so the great Teacher holds up before us the spiritual world as a system in the same way pervaded by one life, — a life revealed in Him as its highest human manifestation, but meant to be shared by all those who, by faith, become partakers of his nature. When, therefore, we are told that the Word, by whom all things were created, was made flesh and dwelt among us, — in other words, that the eternal reason by which the creation from the beginning had been shaped, in the fullness of time allied itself with human intelligence and with human will, — we are not only told nothing that science contradicts, but we have hinted to us a law of the spiritual world which the laws of the natural world confirm, and with which all the last conclusions of science stand up in striking and convincing parallel. When, in fact, we separate Christianity from its more external circumstances, when we strip it of the dress it wears as related to a particular age and social state, and look at it in its deeper meaning, nothing about it will seem more striking than the feature of which I speak. It is a larger and fuller illustration of what nature everywhere shows. For not only does nature, looked at in the largest sense as including man, render antecedently probable the fact of a revelation, not only does all that it reveals of man's spiritual aptitudes and wants prepare us to anticipate the time when the human soul shall be

brought into some closer communion with the invisible world, but all that we learn of the precise processes of nature, of its progressive evolution, of the presence of an all-pervading force shaping its phenomena, still further prepares us for a revelation, which, like that brought by the Son of Man, is not a mere system of external laws and ordinances, not a written code, but an inner spiritual power, dwelling in man and operating through the human will.

The last and highest conclusion to which the researches of physical science have brought us is that of a power behind nature, making itself manifest through all natural phenomena. The highest, and at the same time the simplest, aspect in which Christianity is revealed is that of a spiritual force revealing itself in human souls.

That stupendous fact which we term the Incarnation meant no more than this. It was the dwelling in human nature of a divine life and power, the lifting of the human race to a higher level of spiritual experience and action. When Jesus chose for his most habitual designation of himself the title of "Son of Man," He hinted this great analogy between the natural and the spiritual. For as Son of Man He expressed and illustrated the crowning result of a human development, since in Him humanity was first conscious of its divine affinities. Even when asserting his most intimate relation with the Father He ever described himself as Son of Man. And what He claimed for himself He accorded to his followers.

We are too much accustomed to look at the manifestation of God in Christ as something exceptional and apart, — as something having no precedent, nor

analogy, nor hint in any recognized modes of the divine working. Hence, as often presented, the doctrine of the Incarnation perplexes human reason. But there is no justification of such a view. Not only is the Incarnation in harmony with the method of nature, but in Scripture it is uniformly represented as lying within the natural course and tendency of things. It was heralded by a long historical preparation; it is held up as the crowning result of a connected series of social and political changes; it came in the fullness of time. Everything about it shows that it was part of a purpose that had long been ripening,—the realization, in fact, of a plan formed from the foundation of the world.

While all this does not in the least detract from the dignity and authority of the Son of Man, it sets Him before us in the great stream of historical phenomena, and presents Him in his deepest and truest aspect, as part and parcel of the whole system of things. Such a revelation of God as is given us in Christ is therefore, I repeat, precisely the kind of revelation which the methods of nature would lead us to expect. It was a revelation prepared for, coming as part and result of an orderly process, and making, when it came, all the antecedent steps of that process plain. The Son of Man did not separate himself from what had gone before, but claimed that He was the complete fulfillment of what the law and the prophets had imperfectly taught. And not simply in his own career, but in all that He taught respecting the nature of that spiritual kingdom which He came to establish, we have this same truth continually set forth, that the natural and the

spiritual proceed according to the same method, and illustrate the same law. Not more in his earliest than in his latest sayings does the great Teacher insist on this. Whether He likened the kingdom of heaven to a grain of mustard-seed, or described the great mystery of the church under the figure of a vine, it was the same truth. When we look at the external world we are everywhere struck with the presence of two great principles to which all the varied operations of nature conform. These are the law of unity and the law of progress. There runs through the material universe an organic connection, by virtue of which nothing stands apart and alone, but all things are members, one of another; and precisely as we rise in the scale of being this organic unity is more apparent. And not less striking is the other law, by which all the phenomena of nature follow an orderly succession, and tend to rise from a less to a more perfect state. As a rule, each stage of inorganic or organic being leads to a better, so that progress from a lower to a higher has been the universal law.

Now who can fail to note that in all that the Son of Man teaches respecting the future destiny of the church, which is described as his body, we have these two principles continually set forth? He represented organic unity as the fundamental and essential condition of the new dispensation. This unity He set forth under the most expressive figures. Not only was He the true vine, but only as his hearers became branches of Him could they bear fruit. In other words, the new life revealed in Him was not sporadic and individual, having its source in the personal conviction of each disciple; it im-

plied a real connection with Christ as the head. From Him as its source it must all proceed.

Furthermore, as nature shows everywhere a constant progress from the lower to the higher, so, the Son of Man taught, would the kingdom of heaven be governed by the same law. As the new dispensation was primarily a new life, in its very nature were involved constant progress and growth. The gospel of Jesus was a proclamation of life; in Him was life, and the great aim of his coming was that men might have it more abundantly. And not only in the individual, but in the larger scope and movement of history, would this progress be illustrated. It would pervade the world as leaven leavens the loaf; it would cover the earth as a mighty tree spreads out its branching arms.

This principle received its complete expression in the revelation of the Holy Spirit. In this doctrine, the full meaning of which is too much overlooked, we have, set forth, the inner and essential relation of divine truth both to the individual and to society. According to the last teachings of the Son of Man, his own personal work on earth was meant simply as preparatory. It was only the door to a higher and permanent dispensation. Not till after his departure was the new spiritual power promised which should abide in them as a controlling and shaping force. This indwelling life and power would supply the pervading principle of unity, by virtue of which, though many, they should yet always remain one. In the Christian doctrine of the Holy Ghost we have the harmony of natural and spiritual forces most clearly revealed. Here the methods of physical nature and the methods by which the di-

vine Spirit sways and illuminates human souls illustrate each other. They are seen to be parts of one system, and we recognize the same power working in all things and through all things, and bringing all things to pass, whether we consider the lilies of the field or study the more subtle workings of man's spiritual nature. These two revelations lend each other an overwhelming support. As we accept in its fullness the Christian doctrine of the Spirit, we shall learn to look on all nature not as a mass of inert matter, but as everywhere pervaded by a living power; and so, too, as we adopt the modern conceptions of science respecting the force behind phenomena to which life and organization are due, we shall be disposed to accept the teaching of Jesus respecting the office and mission of the Holy Ghost.

My limits allow me to glance only in the most superficial way at a great and solemn subject. Of course the analogy of natural and revealed religion is an old and familiar theme. We have all of us been taught it in the pages of one of the wisest masters of English theology. But the special point on which I have been insisting throughout this whole discourse is this: that the argument of Butler, instead of being weakened, has been greatly enlarged and strengthened by the conclusions of modern science. From the obvious course of natural phenomena he reasoned to the more obvious doctrines of revelation. What I claim is that the refined conceptions of nature to which modern science has accustomed us, conceptions unknown in Butler's time, have brought out in still more striking manner the analogy between the methods of nature and the most distinctive and spiritual teach-

ings of the Son of Man. Modern science rests throughout on realistic assumptions. It tends to recognize in all nature a pervading unity; it discerns behind phenomena what no phenomena directly reveal; it views the universe as a process which only an ideal cause can account for: and in all this, I confidently assert, there is a mental habit, a mode of conceiving truth, an attitude of mind in harmony with the disposition that accepts the highest teachings of revelation. Not only have the great postulates of religion not been affected by scientific research, but science has brought us to a result where these postulates assert themselves with new force; for the methods of operation on which science now insists, methods which have so completely transformed our notions of the material universe, cannot, in my opinion, be clearly comprehended and cordially accepted without disposing a fair and thoughtful mind to accept that fuller truth of which the church is the pillar and ground.

The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard-seed which a man took and sowed in his field. Let us learn from this lesson of the great Teacher that there is nothing in the study of nature that can turn us away from revealed truth. On the contrary, the more patiently and reverently we explore the processes of nature, the more devoutly shall we bow before that wisdom which cometh from above. The advance of scientific knowledge has already modified, and will continue to modify, many notions which men have entertained respecting God and his works, but it can never shake the strong foundations of that catholic faith which is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

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